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PARTY IMAGES AND COALITION RELATIONS 
Rosemary Whip and Colin A Hughes 
Accounts of elections depend on a variety of sources. The media report 
who said and did what and when, and often what someone else or the 
media reporters themselves thought were the implications and likely 
consequences of what was said and done. The electronic media are 
relatively ephemeral, unless a deliberate effort is planned well in advance 
to capture their words and images; the print media leave a more readily 
accessed record and therefore are much more likely to survive as the 
principal, and often only, witness even though it is conceded that print now 
has less influence than television in determining election outcomes. 
Sometimes it is possible to be a participant observer or, after the event, to 
go to those who had been steering and managing the election campaigns 
and ask them what they had done and why, and what effects they thought 
had followed from their actions. But this is only half the story, the sources 
and the messages of the communications flow that is an election campaign; 
that half of the story will be told in Part 11 of this book. To understand 
what really happened we also need to know how these messages were 
received (and perceived) by their audience, the electorate; what they 
thought the election campaign was about; and how they made up their 
minds. 
One means of starting to find out would be to tap public opinion 
surveys conducted for the media and the political parties during the 
campaign. However state elections in Australia are relatively down-market 
for the media, even for the local media where the election is being fought, 
and commissioned polls are infrequent and limited. There are likely to be 
some voting intention questions asked, and these will be reported 
immediately in news stories which may or may not influence the way the 
campaign goes. Unfortunately such surveys are, almost invariably, 
restricted in their probing of the electorate's attitudes and intentions, and 
more often than not are confined to voting intention only. The parties and 
their pollsters are more likely to question respondents extensively, with a 
view to monitoring and reshaping campaign strategies and tactics, but these 
data are bought to be weapons in a political war and rarely become 
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available to the non-partisan chronicler. That leaves the possibility of 
modest liule surveys conducted under academic auspices, funded y a 
research grant and either tacked onto a commercial poll or undertaken by 
university staff working with a shoestring budget. It is to a cache of such 
surveys that we must turn for an understanding of what was in Queensland 
electors' minds whilst they prepared to vote at the 2 December 1989 
general election. 
The record of University surveys of electors' perceptions of the state's 
political parties and their leaders now extends back for a quarter cenUiry. 
The data collection had begun with the 1963 and 1966 state elections when 
surveys of a panel in three contiguous electoral districts in the western 
suburbs of Brisbane were paid for by the Australian National University 
and reported by one of the present authors in 1969.' There was then a 
break until the 1977 state election when surveys which followed up some 
of the themes raised in the 1960s in three different electoral districts were 
reported by the other author and her associates in 1980.^  Thereafter at 
each successive general election, and some significant by-elections as well, 
a small survey of electors was conducted by the University of Queensland 
to accumulate data with the intention of pursuing the questions raised by 
the earlier work. In most instances the interviews were conducted by 
undergraduate students who were paid for their services from university 
research grants. 
Table LL Electoral districts in which surveys were conducted, 1977-1989 
n 
292. 
296 
282 
197 
199 
192 
267 
303 
220 
331 
190 
90 
80 
100 
Election 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
]985by 
1986 
1989 
Electoral District 
Bulimba 
Chatsworth 
Ipswich West 
Sherwood 
Redcliffe 
Redcliffe 
Redcliffe 
Sherwood 
Redlands 
Aspley 
Toowong 
Ashgrove 
Greenslopes 
Yeronga 
Readers familiar with the electoral geography of Queensland will have 
noted that there are some problems in the selection of electoral districts in 
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Table 1.1. Only three outside the city boundaries of Brisbane have been 
polled: two in contiguous provincial cities, Ipswich West (1977) and 
Redcliffe (1979by, 1980 and 1983) and one contiguous rural district 
experiencing scattered urbanisation, Redlands (1985by). Within Brisbane 
the electoral districts are almost invariably non-Labor - Bulimba (1977) 
is the sole exception - and comfortable middle- and upper-middle class 
electorates. As a consequence, the number of National party supporters in 
each survey sample and in the total pool of respondents is far below the 
party's statewide proportion; moreover it is drawn from only one of that 
party's three main sources of support with the provincial towns and cities 
and the rural population totally absent from the sample. Probably less 
serious in its consequences, the Labor supporters are disproportionately 
middle-class in their demographic characteristics. 
Part of the explanation for so skewed a selection is the means by which 
the surveys were conducted. Student interviewers based on the St Lucia 
campus of the University of Queensland were most readily deployed into 
nearby suburban sectors of the city. Another part of the explanation is the 
continuing preoccupation of the researchers with strains within the 
National-Liberal coalition and later with the hostilities between those 
parties that followed collapse of the coalition. These phenomena, it was 
thought, could best be followed in the sort of seat that was selected, and 
limited resources precluded controls to establish whether or not this 
hypothesis was correct. Substantial funding of the data collection would 
have allowed professional interviewers to fan out across the whole city and, 
at least, operate in a number of provincial cities further afield than Ipswich 
and Redcliffe. Expenditure at a quite formidable level would have been 
necessary to add a rural component to the samples. 
What the survey data lack in geographical representativeness they may 
compensate for by the exceptional, by Australian standards at least, time 
dimension, spread as they are over a period of twelve years, five general 
elections and three by-elections. In Bergson's metaphor, as photographs 
of electoral reality they may be small snapshots not perfectly focused, but 
there are a lot of them. 
A full account of contemporary political history would require more 
space than can be given on this occasion. However readers may find the 
following chronology a useful overview of the events which shape the data 
discussed in the first three chapters: 
1957 August Coalition government wins office following Labor 
split 
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1968 
1974 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
August 
December 
August 
November 
October 
November 
September 
November 
October 
August 
October 
November 
August 
November 
November 
December 
January 
March 
September 
December 
Bjelke-Petersen becomes premier 
Burns becomes Labor leader 
Knox becomes Liberal leader 
General election 
Edwards becomes Liberal leader 
Sherwood by-election 
Casey becomes Labor leader 
Redcliffe by-election 
General election 
Wright becomes Labor leader 
White becomes Liberal leader 
Coalition splits; National government formed 
General election 
Knox becomes Liberal leader again 
Warburton becomes Labor leader 
Redlands by-election 
General election 
Ahern becomes premier 
Innes becomes Liberal leader 
Goss becomes Labor leader 
Cooper becomes premier 
General election; Labor wins office 
Voting Intentions 
This chapter will examine what respondents thought about the major 
political parties over the period of the surveys 1977-1989, thereby leading 
up to the contest described in some detail in Part 11. A necessary first step 
will be to sort the respondents into the supporters of each of the parties, 
and those who do not admit to any such connections, for it is a well-
established fact of political life that beauty is in the eye of the beholder, 
and a report on the responses of a sample of electors that failed to separate 
Labor, Liberal and National partisans from the indifferent would inevitably 
mislead. The simplest approach is to ask each respondent how they will 
vote at the forthcoming election; public life in Australia is sufficiently open 
and secure that few are unwilling to answer such a question. Subsequent 
tables in this and the next two chapters will use voting intention as the 
single indicator of partisanship. Table 1.2 sets out the numbers of 
respondents in each category to be used, as a point of reference for the 
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subsequent tables in these three chapters which will omit the n's to simplify 
presentation. 
Table 1.2 Respondents by voting intention, 1977-1989 
Election Labor Liberal National Undecided 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
407 
61 
79 
70 
225 
80 
100 
173 
211 
53 
47 
99 
188 
27 
110 
35 
84 
20 
19 
-
71 
66 
65 
18 
117 
36 
35 
17 
50 
20 
31 
20 
Note: Other voting intentions e.g. Democrats, excluded. 
But it must also be asked early in the analysis how sound a measure of 
attitudes towards the competing political parties is the voting intention 
response when taken in isolation. Without canvassing the substantial 
literature on the concept of party identification, one useful check might be 
to match voting intention (Q: Which party do you intend to vote for in the 
election next Saturday?) with party identification (Q: Generally speaking, 
do you think of yourself as a Liberal Party supporter or a Labor Party 
supporter or a National party supporter, or how do you think of yourself?). 
Table 1.3 does this, showing as well as the intending voters and self-
identifying supporters for the three major parties those who said they were 
still undecided as to how they would vote and those who said they did not 
identify with any party; minor party support and identification are omitted 
from the table and as a consequence some columns may not add to 100 per 
cent. 
Prior to 1989 roughly three quarters of Labor's votes come from its 
self-identifying supporters and the balance from those respondents without 
party identification; only very occasionally does a regular supporter of 
either the Liberal party or the National party stray into the Labor camp. 
For example, in 1977 78 per cent of intending Labor voters were Labor 
identifiers, 2 per cent Liberals and 20 per cent did not identify with any 
political party. On the other side of the political fence matters are much 
more complicated, and there is also more evidence of change over time. 
Prior to 1989 only once (1977) could the Liberal party rely on its 
identifiers to a comparable extent. Usually it drew on its own supporters 
but also to a lesser extent on the Nationals and, from the point when the 
data identify a third non-Labor option, identification with the coalition 
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Table 1.3 Party identification and voting intention, 1977-1989 
Party 
identification Labor 
Voting intention 
Liberal National Undecided 
1977 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
none 
1978by 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
none 
1979by 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
none 
1980 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
none 
1983 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
Coalition 
none 
1985by 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
Coalition 
none 
1986 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
Coalition 
nane 
1989 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
Coalition 
none 
78.1 
1.5 
0 
19.7 
77.0 
0 
0 
22.9 
79.7 
0 
1.3 
1.3 
84.3 
0 
0 
14.3 
77.3 
0.9 
0 
0.4 
15.6 
77.5 
1.2 
1,2 
0 
J2.S 
78,0 
tt 
0 
0 
13.0 
55.0 
12.7 
1.2 
0.6 
20.2 
2.4 
72.0 
2.4 
20.4 
1.9 
62.3 
5.7 
30.2 
2.1 
51.1 
31.6 
0 
4.0 
34.3 
24.2 
32.3 
2.1 
48.4 
6.9 
9.6 
23.4 
3.7 
40.7 
7.4 
7.4 
37.0 
6.4 
51.8 
5.4 
2.7 
20.9 
0 
60.0 
5.7 
5.7 
17.1 
1.2 
26.2 
22.6 
47.6 
5.0 
30.0 
30.0 
30.0 
1.3 
10.6 
47.4 
11.4 
.^ 
-
-
-
0 
19.7 
46.5 
16.9 
11.3 
1.5 
16.7 
65.1 
1.5 
9.1 
0 
12.3 
63.1 
12.3 
6.1 
5.6 
0 
66.7 
5.6 
16.7 
10.3 
18.8 
0 
65.0 
11.1 
30.0 
5.6 
52.8 
11.4 
0 
11.4 
71.4 
11.8 
11.8 
11.8 
58.8 
18.0 
20.0 
0 
6.0 
38.0 
25.0 
10.0 
10.0 
0 
50.0 
12.9 
19.3 
3.2 
3.2 
41.9 
3.9 
19.3 
11.5 
3.8 
30.8 
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rather than either of its components, on those who named the coalition, 
plus the occasional Labor deserter. The picture for the National party is 
less certain because of the small numbers of intending voters and 
identifiers, but it does seem that after the break-up of the coalition in 
1983, the Nationals rely on their own identifiers more than previously - for 
two-thirds of their vote rather than a half or less - as might be expected 
given the upswing in their vote in the Brisbane area. 
There might have been a case for sharpening the identity of a partisan 
elector by requiring the same voting intention and party identification, but 
this would result in very small numbers indeed, and in particular would 
scatter the non-Labor electors all over the place. However it would be as 
well to provide a temporal dimension as well, by a vote flow table that 
compares voting intention for the coming election with vote at the previous 
state election to see whether the relative solidity of the Labor vote and the 
relative fluidity of the Liberals and Nationals hold good here as well. The 
data are set out in Table 1.4. To take the same example as with Table 1.2 
above, in 1977 86 per cent of those who said they had voted for the Labor 
party at the previous election (in 1974) thought they would vote Labor 
again, 3 per cent expected to vote for the Liberal party and 2 per cent for 
the National party, and 8 per cent were still undecided which party they 
would vote for. 
Apart from the 1985 Redlands by-election and the 1986 election the 
Labor carryover of vote is substantial, roughly 85 per cent. Not 
surprisingly in 1989 it goes close to 100 per cent, for why would anyone 
who had voted for the ALP in 1986 abandon them in 1989? Between the 
coalition parties there is a substantial amount of movement back and forth, 
much eddy and little tide, though somewhat surprisingly there seems to be 
more of a tendency for National voters to go off to vote for the Liberal 
party than the reverse. Perhaps this is attributable to the novelty of voting 
for the National party in Brisbane seats; National voters were not yet set 
in their ways to the same extent as Liberal voters. 
The data for 1989 must be treated with some caution for the actual shift 
in voting in the three electoral districts surveyed is unlikely to have been 
as dramatic as Table 1.4 would suggest. While the proportion of 
respondents who recall voting Labor in 1986 (43 per cent) corresponds to 
the actual Labor vote in those three seats at the 1986 election (40 per cent), 
the proportion who recall voting Liberal (17 per cent) is lower than the 
actual Liberal vote in 1986 (28 per cent). Similarly, only 20 per cent of 
respondents recall voting for the National party whereas the 1986 National 
vote in the three electorates was actually 28 per cent. 
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Table 1.4 Previous state vote and voting intention, 1977-1989 
Previous vote Voting intention 
Labor Liberal National Undecided 
1977 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
1978by 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
1979by 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
1980 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
1983 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
1985by 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
1986 
LabBir 
Liberal 
National 
1989 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
85.7 
9.8 
8.1 
83.1 
2.5 
0 
83.1 
14.9 
7.0 
84.1 
6.9 
3.2 
85.7 
6.9 
1.8 
'Wt-6 
0 
3.9 
7m 
&7 
2.5 
96.5 
53.2 
20.7 
3.4 
63.4 
13.5 
4.6 
54.3 
23.8 
4.8 
51.1 
30.2 
11.6 
84.5 
83.9 
3.6 
65.0 
37.0 
3.4 
61.5 
8.7 
12.6 
75.3 
22.2 
0.9 
29.8 
34.0 
1.6 
5.4 
71.6 
0 
8.6 
52.4 
0 
6.4 
34.9 
_ 
_ 
-
0.5 
15.2 
48.1 
3.4 
11.5 
78.3 
1.0 
2.2 
65.4 
1.7 
2.1 
24.5 
7.7 
17.4 
5.4 
4.6 
19.7 
14.3 
7.2 
17.0 
16.3 
4.3 
8.6 
12.9 
7.1 
9.2 
9.3 
10.1 
15.4 
2.9 
5.3 
9.0 
8.6 
0 
12.8 
17.0 
384 
276 
IS 
if 
m 
n 
83 
47 
43 
69 
58 
31 
196 
217 
54 
89 
26 
69 
95 
89 
81 
116 
47 
53 
Note: Redcliffe (1980) previous election is 1979 by-election. 
On the other hand, the proportion of respondents who recalled voting 
for candidates other those of the three major parties was higher (12 per 
cent) than the actual 1986 vote for such candidates (4 per cent). Of course 
there is a great deal of movement of voters among electoral districts in a 
three year period, and this factor could account for some of the 
as much as the survey data suggest, given the remarkable stability of voting 
patterns in individual electoral districts despite the massive movements of 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Party Images and Coalition Relations 11 
electors which occur over time. That leaves a skew in the sample or 
selective recall of the 1986 vote or a combination of the two as possible 
explanations. 
Had the actual vote in 1989 gone the way that the figures in Table 1.4 
predict. Labor, with over half the 1986 Liberal vote and a fifth of the 1986 
National vote in those three electoral districts, would have polled about 60 
per cent of the 1989 total, almost 5 percentage points more than it did. 
Labor actually polled 55 per cent, but 64 per cent of respondents had said 
they would vote Labor - and there were still some failures to answer the 
voting intention question to be distributed as well. The Nationals did 
rather better, 9.5 per cent of the actual vote against a predicted 7 per cent 
from the sample, and the Liberals did remarkably better with 31.9 per cent 
of the actual vote when only 13 per cent of respondents said they would 
vote Liberal. 
Finally, the vote for other candidates, which had looked so suspicious 
when 1986 recall was the question, landed not far off target: 3.4 per cent 
actual against a 2 per cent prediction. Perhaps the implausible 12 per cent 
recall of voting for other candidates represents unconscious resolution of 
a cognitive dissonance conflict. Getting ready to abandon the Liberal party 
or the National party for Labor or Liberal respectively, it was less stressful 
to forget having voted for them three years earlier and remember a 
transitional vote for a third party. This is more likely than believing their 
recall was a preparation for voting for a minor candidate in 1989 which 
was abandoned after the interview and before voting. 
But to return to the main contenders, it may well be that in the 
atmosphere which prevailed in the 1989 campaign Labor's bandwagon 
attracted both temporary passengers who changed their minds and leapt off 
at the last minute to return to old loyalties, and some who ran alongside 
without much of a commitment because that seemed to be the thing to do 
at a parade. 
Party Images 
Eight questions were asked in each of the 1977-1989 surveys to establish 
the party images of the three major parties, five positive and three negative: 
Q: Do you think each of the following statements is a good 
description of the X Party? 
Is the best party to govern Queensland today 
Would make the state more prosperous 
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Has a fine record of achievement -
Is prepared to resist the federal government in the interests ot 
Queensland 
Is the only party that knows how to deal with the trade unions 
Has no clear policy 
Gives in under pressure 
Is too conservative to deal with modern social problems 
realistically 
It might be reasonably expected that so central a question as which is 
"the best party to govern" the state would be synonymous with voting 
intention, and as Table 1.5 shows that is more or less the case. Each group 
of voters backs their own party, which is presumably why they are voting 
for them, and is not very likely to back the opposing party. However, 
before the break-up of the coalition Liberal voters are quite likely to give 
the National party an endorsement as well; after 1983 the proportion ready 
to do so drops off noticeably. National voters were never so ready to 
acknowledge the Liberal party, and after the break-up even less so; 
National voters were about as ready to acknowledge the Liberal party 
before the break-up as Liberal voters were to acknowledge the National 
party after it. The difficulties of the Liberal party are clear: their enemies 
and their quondam allies almost always were more highly regarded by their 
supporters; only Labor at the 1978 Sherwood by-election did worse. 
As that item ought to allow only one party to be selected by each 
respondent, if electors are consistent, it would be as well to check a 
comparable item, whether each party had a fine record of achievement, 
when it would be possible to acknowledge the performance of two or even 
all three favourably, or to admit the limitations of the party for which the 
respondent was going to vote. A much less polarised picture emerges. 
National voters are solidly behind their party, but the Nationals also receive 
the plaudits of a majority of Liberal voters on every occasion - this holds 
good even after the break-up although with slightly less enthusiasm - and 
of a significant bloc of Labor voters. Labor voters, who could have been 
influenced by either their party's long absence from office or by its 
abysmal performance in opposition, were not nearly as .supportive of their 
own party as National voters were of theirs. 
Curiously, in 1989 when Labor prospects looked the best for almost two 
decades, Labor voters were least inclined to claim a fine record; that might 
have been a realistic assessment that a corner had been turned and some 
undistinguished history could now be admitted. 
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Table 1.5 "Best party to govern Queensland" responses by voting intention, 1977-1989 
Voting intention 
Party Labor Liberal National Undecided 
Labor party 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
Liberal party 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
National party 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
Liberal voters were usually more ready than National voters to concede 
a fine record to Labor, another hazard of their location in the political 
middle. As for their own party, Liberal voters were about as disinclined 
to give credit as were Labor voters, despite its having been in office at the 
time (up to 1983) or quite recently; more damaging still, in every survey 
they were more inclined to give credit to the Nationals' record than the 
Liberals' and that held good even after the break-up of the coalition. 
Another of the positive image items, that the party "would make the 
state more prosperous", is the prospective companion of the retrospective 
"fine record" item, and produces a somewhat similar pattern of responses. 
However, there are some differences. National voters are slightly less 
supportive of their own party and there is not the falling-off in concession 
82.8 
60.7 
81.0 
75.7 
87.1 
71.2 
91.0 
93.6 
5.7 
13.1 
7.6 
5.7 
4.0 
5.0 
2.0 
4.0 
2.9 
3.3 
6.3 
2.9 
1.8 
7.5 
1.0 
1.2 
4.3 
0 
4.3 
5.0 
8.0 
0 
9.1 
0 
67.3 
64.1 
48.9 
46.5 
41.0 
59.3 
54.5 
57.1 
46.9 
28.3 
38.3 
41.4 
34.0 
22.2 
10.0 
14.3 
1.2 
0 
0 
-
1.4 
1.5 
1.5 
5.6 
23.8 
15.0 
15.8 
-
4.2 
6.1 
3.1 
0 
80.9 
95.0 
94.7 
-
84.5 
93.9 
83.1 
77.8 
15.4 
11.1 
17.1 
11.8 
28.0 
20.0 
12.5 
7.7 
33.3 
27.8 
8.6 
29.4 
26.0 
25.0 
16.1 
7.7 
12.8 
19.4 
28.6 
35.3 
24.0 
15.0 
6.2 
7.7 
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of merits to the Liberals after the break-up of the coalition that there was 
on the "fine record" item. 
10*77—1QRQ Table 1.6 "Fine record of achievement" responses by voting intention, iv/ 
Party Labor 
Voting intention 
Liberal National Undecided 
Labor party 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
Liberal party 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
National party 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
]985by 
1986 
1989 
57.2 
34.4 
60.8 
54.3 
47.1 
46.2 
42.0 
31.2 
17.7 
16.4 
12.7 
10.0 
14.2 
17.5 
5.0 
8.7 
20.4 
21.3 
38.0 
20.0 
30.2 
26.2 
15.0 
25.4 
14.7 
18.9 
31.9 
5.0 
14.9 
11.1 
8.2 
0 
64.0 
54.7 
44.7 
39.4 
53.2 
40.7 
36.4 
45.7 
73.5 
83.0 
72.3 
65.7 
75.0 
51.8 
55.4 
62.9 
9.5 
5.0 
15.8 
3.1 
11.1 
45.2 
55,0 
10.5 
-
32.4 
27.3 
27.7 
11.1 
85.7 
100.0 
100.0 
-
97.2 
95.4 
86.1 
88.9 
17.1 
11.1 
20.0 
17.6 
22.0 
20.0 
18.7 
Q 
34.2 
44.4 
20.0 
33.3 
36.0 
25.0 
22.6 
11.5 
37.6 
55.6 
60.0 
70.6 
58.0 
55.0 
54.8 
42.3 
Liberal voters are now more frequently (but only just) rating their party 
ahead of the National party. Labor voters become more pessimistic about 
their party's future performance in the later surveys which may say 
something about their assessment of economic trends as well as increasing 
scepticism of their party's abilities. 
Both the "more prosperous" and "fine record" items are generalised and 
consequently fairly subjective. The two remaining positive items have 
much more specific content, and might as a result respond to changes in 
the political environment more readily. Table 1.7 sets out the data for the 
resistance-to-the-federal-government item which, though premier Bjelke-
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Petersen had made it very much his own, had roots going back to earlier 
(including Labor) periods. National voters rate their party very highly on 
this item - save for a blip in 1989 which might be no more than a 
consequence of the small number of National respondents. Liberal voters 
are almost as ready to see the National party in this role, and Labor voters 
are not far behind - at least two-thirds, at most more than three-quarters. 
And it makes no difference that in 1983, before the break-up of the 
coahtion and before the 1983 election survey was conducted, there was a 
change in the federal government with the Eraser coalition government 
going out and the Hawke Labor government coming in. 
It did, however, make a difference for how the other two parties were 
perceived. Labor voters who, from 1977 to 1980, were more inclined to 
see their party battling Canberra than even the Nationals, fell away when 
there was a Labor government in office in Canberra, although a half still 
saw their party in this way, and the proportion started to creep up again as 
the Hawke government lost its novelty. And where they had not been 
prepared to concede that the Liberals stood up for Queensland (only a 
quarter to a third did so), after the change of government in Canberra about 
a half were prepared to allow the point to the Liberals. Similarly while 
about a half of Liberal voters were prepared to concede that the Labor 
party would stand up to Canberra when Malcolm Eraser was there, many 
fewer would concede this when Bob Hawke was there. Indeed they were 
only slightly more inclined to put their own party ahead of the ALP in 
Canberra-resisting before the change of government; once it had taken 
place, the Liberal party was much more likely to get the nod - although 
still definitely behind the Nationals. Thus responses to an item where 
predisposition to rate one's own party ahead of opponents was complicated 
by the dominance of the Nationals over the Liberals among their 
supporters, were tempered with some political realism. The Nationals 
really didn't care who was in office in Canberra when engaged in 
Canberra-bashing; Labor and Liberals were more circumspect about 
attacking their own and some of the electors noticed this. 
The remaining item on the positive side concerns the unions, and given 
the importance of industrial relations at key points in the history of the 
Bjelke-Petersen government, and the intimate connection between the 
Labor party and the trade union movement, the data in Table 1.8 warrant 
close attention. In the first place. Labor voters are consistently more likely 
to identify their own party as best "to deal with the unions" than are 
National voters, and conspicuously more so than Liberal voters. 
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Table 1.7 "Prepared to resist the federal government" responses by voting intenUon, 
1989 
Party 
Voting intention 
Labor Liberal National Undecided 
% 
Labor Party 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
Liberal party 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
National party 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
80.1 
72.1 
91.1 
74.3 
54.2 
57.5 
69.0 
68.8 
35.4 
26.2 
30.4 
24.3 
53.3 
46.2 
46.0 
63.6 
66.8 
73.8 
72.1 
65.7 
79.6 
71.2 
79.0 
81.5 
54.0 
52.8 
55.3 
51.5 
21.3 
14.8 
31.8 
22.9 
63.0 
60.4 
51.1 
45.4 
83.5 
74.1 
80.9 
80.0 
85.3 
90.6 
85.1 
80.8 
95.2 
92.6 
93.6 
88.6 
41.7 
35.0 
63.2 
-
14.1 
19.7 
16.9 
16.7 
48.8 
45.0 
31.6 
-
70.4 
47.0 
50.8 
50.0 
91.7 
100.0 
100.0 
-
98.6 
95.4 
95.4 
77.8 
52.1 
58.3 
65.7 
88.2 
44.0 
30.0 
25.0 
26.9 
38.5 
38.9 
17.1 
17.6 
70.0 
55.0 
71.0 
53.8 
67.5 
77.8 
80J) 
S8.8 
90.0 
85.0 
83.9 
73.1 
Now it may be that to Labor voters "deal with" means negotiate with 
and preserve the industrial peace and to National voters the same words 
mean hammer into the ground in a final solution, but even if it that is the 
case the National party is not scoring well amongst its supporters. Liberal 
voters are all over the place on this item: they are more inclined to credit 
the National party ahead of their own, and after the first two surveys 
(except for 1989) are as likely to credit the Labor party as their own party. 
It would appear that although the National party's dominance in state 
political life over this period is manifest in generalised items relating to its 
record and its likely contribution to the state's prosperity, and on a specific 
item like standing up to Canberra, geUing stuck into the trade unions was 
not particularly an asset. 
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Table 1.8 "Only party to deal with the unions" responses by voting intention, 1977-1989 
Voting intention 
Party Labor Liberal National Undecided 
% % % % 
Labor party 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
Liberal party 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
National party 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
To turn now to the negative items, the most polarised is the charge that 
the party "gives in under pressure" which few Labor voters were prepared 
to admit about their own party, and even fewer National voters about 
theirs, but about half of Liberal voters were ready to say about the Liberal 
party - as were approximately 60 per cent of National voters and 70 to 80 
per cent of Labor voters. However whilst National and Liberal voters were 
consistently and fairly solidly (a third to a half or more) prepared to say 
this about the Labor party. Liberal voters rarely said it about the National 
party and Labor voters did so fairly erratically e.g. 7 per cent in 1983, 46 
per cent in 1989. 
The second item, "too conservative to deal with modern social problems 
realistically", seems more vulnerable to subjective assessment. A 
substantial number of voters are prepared to say it about their own party: 
64.6 
52.5 
62.0 
78.6 
54.2 
56.2 
58.0 
42.2 
3.2 
6.6 
5.1 
1.4 
3.1 
5.0 
1.0 
0.6 
3.9 
1.6 
12.7 
2.9 
0.9 
10.0 
3.0 
4.0 
14.7 
13.2 
10.6 
13.1 
11.7 
14.8 
12.7 
2.9 
25.1 
24.5 
10.6 
13.1 
14.4 
11.1 
11.8 
8.6 
29.4 
26.4 
25.5 
19.2 
15.4 
22.2 
21.8 
20.0 
10.7 
5.0 
10.5 
-
9.9 
10.6 
6.1 
5.6 
9.5 
10.0 
10.5 
-
4.2 
3.0 
4.6 
5.6 
41.7 
35.0 
57.9 
-
28.2 
57.6 
56.9 
27.8 
13.7 
11.1 
34.3 
29.4 
38.0 
30.0 
22.6 
3.8 
1X0 
5.6 
5.7 
5.9 
0 
10.0 
3.2 
3.8 
12.8 
11.1 
31.4 
5.9 
8.0 
10.0 
18.7 
7.7 
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Labor voters from 7 per cent (1983) to 24 per cent (1979); Liberal voters 
from 9 per cent (1989) to 30 per cent (1985); National voters from 16 per 
cent (1979) to 27 per cent (1983). A majority of L^bor voters apply it to 
the Liberal party and even more (from 72 per cent to 88 per cent) to the 
National party. Only a minority of Liberal and National voters say it about 
the Labor party, whilst Liberal voters are more likely to say it about the 
National party than National voters are to say it about the Liberal party. 
The third and last negative item is lack of "clear policy". National 
voters are least likely to admit this about their party, 5 per cent (1979) to 
13 per cent (1977) but with a conspicuous blow-out to 28 per cent in 
1989. Liberal voters have been the most likely to say it about their party, 
21 per cent (1983) to 41 per cent (1985), with Labor voters - 9 per cent 
(1989) to 31 per cent (1985) - in the middle. A majority of Labor voters 
consistently (save for 48 per cent in 1983) say it about the Liberal party 
and slightly fewer, 38 per cent (1979) to 63 per cent (1986), about the 
National party. Similar proportions of Liberal and National voters (about 
a half) say it about the Labor party. Prior to the break-up of the coalition, 
Liberal voters and National voters were about equally likely to say it of the 
other party; after they parted company, National voters were slightly more 
likely to be critical of the Liberal party than vice versa. 
The picture that emerges from the preceding account is one of relative 
stability. The parties' images are stable over time, and though after the 
coalition fails the former partners are somewhat more critical of each other, 
or rather their supporters are more ready to criticise, given the trauma 
involved they continue to show a fair degree of objectivity, or some of 
them do. It is clear that partisanship continues to shape attitudes to and 
assessments of political parties; one's own party has its merits, and its 
opponents have their defects - or otherwise it might be time to start 
thinking about transfering support 
But this partisanship is tepid. Eor many Labor respondents it cannot 
paper over the obvious deficiencies displayed in the years in the 
wilderness, for many Liberal respondents it cannot conceal their party's 
junior role and the attendant stresses. The National party's dominance 
comes through loudly and clearly; it not only holds the unqualified 
allegiance of its own supporters, but on some matters it has attractions for 
Labor voters which are not balanced by equivalent pulls of National voters 
in the direction of Labor on other items. The Labor party's inability to 
make inroads into coalition voting support is also apparent; only rarely do 
Liberal and National voters see any merit in Labor, and even the undecided 
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voters who might be more vulnerable to Labor pull are not particularly 
likely to look favourably on the Labor party image. 
The Liberal party is squeezed and torn apart in the middle. Its 
supporters frequently prefer the National party's image on particular items. 
Rather than putting new heart into Liberal voters, the break-up of the 
coalition leaves them still further depressed. The general lack of esteem 
for opponents which originally divided Labor and anti-Labor supporters 
never reaches quite the same level between the former partners after the 
coalition has disintegrated, but it does take a turn for the worse from the 
Liberals' point of view. 
In order to get a composite picture of the way in which respondents 
viewed the three parties a positive image index was constructed for each 
party. To do this a score was calculated for each respondent based on the 
total number of positive responses to the eight items listed earlier in this 
chapter. Each "yes" response to the five positive items and each "no" 
response to the three negative items was scored as one; all other responses 
were scored as zero. The range of possible scores was zero to eight. 
Figures 1.1 to 1.3 show the mean scores of all voters and of voters for the 
Labor, Liberal and National parties for each of the three major parties at 
each of the elections surveyed from 1977 to 1989. It should be noted in 
reading these graphs that there are no data for intending National party 
voters in 1980. 
Although the ALP is clearly perceived more positively by its own 
supporters than those of the two conservative parties (see Figure 1.1), this 
difference was not great until the 1979 Redcliffe by-election when ALP 
voters' image of their party rose sharply and continued at a comparatively 
high level through to the 1989 election. The rises and falls in Labor voters' 
perceptions of their party are reflected, albeit at a much lower level, in the 
perceptions of Liberal and National voters, with the former exhibiting a 
slightly more positive view until 1989. Then their image of the ALP 
jumps by almost three points on the eight point scale while the National 
voters' image of the ALP remains almost unchanged. 
Liberal voters' image of their own party remains fairly constant until 
1983 when its stand against the National party appears to have given the 
Liberal party a higher positive image (see Figure 1.2). This dropped at the 
1985 Redlands by-election but recovered slightly in 1986 and reached new 
heights at the 1989 election. Surprisingly, the rise in the party's image 
among its own supporters in 1983 was matched by a slight rise in the way 
in which National voters perceived it, although the absence of data from 
National voters in 1980 complicates this issue to some extent. 
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Australian Labor Party 
Positive Image 
Liberal ' National 
1977 1978 1979 1988 1983 1985 1986 1989 
Figure 1.1 Positive image scores for the ALP by intending voters for each of the three 
major parties and total voters. 
Liberal Party 
Positive Image 
1985 
Total Labor Liberal National 
Figure 1.2 Positive image scores for the Liberal party by intending voters for each of the 
three major parties and total voters 
National party voters' image of their party reached its highest level at 
the 1979 Sherwood by-election, declined in 1983 and rose again at the 
1985 Redlands by-election (see Figure 1.3). 
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National Party 
Positive Image 
1977 1978 1979 1988 1983 1985 1986 1989 
Figure 1.3 Positive image scores for the National party by intending voters for each of the 
three major parties and total voters 
Parties 
Positive Image 
Figure 1.4 Positive image scores for each of the three major parties by those intending to 
vote for them. 
It declined again in 1986 and again 1989 at a time when its image 
improved among Liberal and Labor voters. Figure 1.4 sets out the image 
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scores of each of the three major parties by those intending to vote for that 
party. Whereas all three parties are held in approximately the same degree 
of esteem by intending voters up to 1979, from that point they diverge 
markedly. While the Liberal party continues to be perceived in much the 
same way, except for a rise in 1983 and again in 1989, the esteem in which 
the National and Labor parties are held by those intending to vote for them 
rises considerably, and continues high in spite of a dip in 1983 at the time 
of the rise in Liberal voter scores. By 1989, however, there is evidence of 
some convergence of the level of esteem in which each party is held by 
those who express the intention to vote for it. 
Coalition Relations 
One of the commonplaces about political behaviour in Australia is that 
voters cannot abide disunity. They want the party they will support to be 
solid, not to say monolithic, and will punish, by deserting it, any party that 
shows signs of splitting. What has been lacking is knowledge about the 
extent to which this proposition might, or might not, apply to the coalition 
situation. One of the justifications for preferential voting (the alternative 
vote) is that it allows allies to compete with each other without letting their 
common enemy come through the middle of the divided field. In both 
Queensland and the federal jurisdictions it was introduced for exactly this 
purpose: to prevent a single Labor party slipping past the multiple parties 
of the conservative camp. 
The surveys now being reported identified this phenomenon and started 
to ask questions to establish how much support there was for intra-
coalition contests; once the coalition had broken up, other questions were 
asked to ascertain how electors viewed the development. Initially, in 1977, 
respondents were asked whether or not they agreed with a coalition 
partner's candidate opposing a sitting MLA of the other party. The 
question was asked in relation to both sitting Liberals and sitting Nationals 
to see if it depended on who was the incumbent and who the challenger. 
About 70 per cent of respondents agreed with such challenges; 20-25 per 
cent disagreed, but their voting intentions made no difference to their 
responses and they were even-handed between Liberals and Nationals. 
At the 1978 Sherwood by-election, when the Nationals were invading 
a traditional Liberal seat, the generalised proposition "any party should be 
free to contest any seat" won nearly unanimous support, the only 
disagreement coming from 11 per cent of undecideds, 8 per cent of Liberal 
voters, and 5 per cent of National voters and of Labor voters. However the 
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specific proposition, "the National party shouldn't run a candidate in a 
recognised Liberal seat like Sherwood", spread the field with 85 per cent 
of National voters, 69 per cent of the undecided, 66 per cent of Labor 
voters and only 55 per cent of Liberal voters favouring a contest - by 
saying they disagreed. Asked whether they approved of the National party's 
decision to run a candidate in Sherwood at the by-election, 90 per cent of 
National voters said they did, but only 58 per cent of the undecided and of 
Liberal voters and 56 per cent of Labor voters. 
Asked to editorialise on the subject by responding to the proposition 
that it showed that the National party had little respect for the Liberals, 61 
per cent of Labor voters thought this was so, as did 42 per cent of 
undecideds, but only 38 per cent of Liberal voters and just 20 per cent of 
National voters. Asked what the event portended, whether it "indicates 
fundamental disagreements within the coalition", 72 per cent of Labor 
voters, 47 per cent of undecideds, 45 per cent of National voters and 35 per 
cent of Liberal voters thought it did. And, finally, when asked whether this 
was "typical of the National party's attempt to gain more power", 82 per 
cent of Labor voters, 61 per cent of undecideds, 60 per cent of Liberal 
voters, but only 25 per cent of National voters thought it was. 
Whilst an open and competitive party system was alright in principle, 
in practice partisan considerations quickly crept in. Labor voters were 
ready to see the worst motives and consequences; coalition voters reflected 
their party's interest, less likely to disapprove of what their own party was 
doing, more likely to condemn what their ally was doing to look after 
itself. 
The next survey was conducted at the Redcliffe by-election where the 
shoe was now on the other foot as the Liberals were moving into National 
party territory. The general proposition that any party should be free to 
contest any seat held up with Labor voters (99 per cent) and Liberal voters 
(96 per cent), but slipped a trifle with the undecideds (83 per cent) and the 
National voters (84 per cent). Figures for the item that the Liberals should 
not have run a candidate in a previously National seat were very much the 
mirror image of Sherwood's for the critical coalition parties voters: 85 per 
cent of Liberal voters and only 42 per cent of National voters approved of 
the contest; Labor voters, 75 per cent and undecideds, 74 per cent, are 
marginally more approving than in Sherwood. And asked whether they 
approved of the Liberal decision to run, again Liberal voters were solidly 
up, to 91 per cent, and National voters correspondingly down, to 60 per 
cent; Labor voters were more favourable, up to 81 per cent, and undecideds 
too were up to 83 per cent. 
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The now revised editorial proposition that the intervention showed the 
Liberal party had little respect for the Nationals had Labor voters rather 
less inclined to agree (40 per cent compared to 61 per cent in Sherwood 
the previous year), undecideds also down but a bit less so at 34 per cent, 
but with the National voters indignantly up to 53 per cent compared with 
20 per cent in Sherwood, and the Liberal voters smugly down to 15 per 
cent compared with 38 per cent in Sherwood. As to whether it was an 
indication of fundamental disagreements within the coalition, again it was 
the Labor voters who were most ready to agree (73 per cent); the 
undecideds at 57 per cent were slightly up on the corresponding Sherwood 
figure. Supporters of the coalition partners, both the Liberal voters, up to 
47 per cent, and the National voters, up to 79 per cent, were more inclined 
to see trouble ahead than their Sherwood equivalents. On the re-run of the 
third item, now whether this was typical of the Liberal party's attempt to 
gain more power, slightly fewer Labor voters (75 per cent) and slightly 
more of undecideds (74 per cent) thought that it was; Liberal voters were 
about as inclined to agree as they had been in Sherwood (66 per cent) but 
it is the National voters who have swung around so that 89 per cent agree 
with the proposition about motives for a Liberal move into a National seat 
when only 25 per cent had taken the point when it was the other way 
round. 
The 1980 survey was confined to Redcliffe once more. No official 
National party candidate stood and so with no authentic National voters to 
be reported the only comparisons can be among Labor and Liberal voters 
and undecideds. Few differences are observable on the items repeated 
from earlier questionnaires. Labor voters are only marginally more likely 
than are the Liberal voters to endorse Liberals running in National seats 
(67 per cent to 59 per cent) and Nationals running in Liberal seats (63 per 
cent to 59 per cent); and surprisingly the undecideds are much more likely 
to endorse both events (76 per cent and 82 per cent respectively). 
However events in Redcliffe added some more permutations to the 
hostilities possible and these items enlarge the picture. 
Asked about Liberals running candidates against National party 
ministers, there was no difference from the answers reported in the 
previous paragraph, the undecideds approved with 82 per cent, as did Labor 
voters with 64 per cent, and Liberal voters with 56 per cent. However 
when asked whether it was alright for the Nationals to support candidates 
who had resigned from the National party and were standing as 
independents (which had been the Redcliffe situation back in 1960 when 
Alderman J.E.H. Houghton, the local mayor, beat the official National 
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candidate to win the new seat which he then held until his death), only 26 
per cent of Liberal voters, 33 per cent of Labor voters and 29 per cent of 
undecideds were prepared to approve the tactic. Similarly, when asked if 
it was alright for the National party to direct its preferences to the ALP "if 
it helps its fight against the Liberals", not surprisingly only 14 per cent of 
Liberal voters agreed - but so did only 23 per cent of undecideds and just 
41 per cent of Labor voters. On the other hand, 52 per cent of Liberal 
voters approved the Nationals' decision not to offer a candidate on this 
occasion, as did 47 per cent of undecideds and 40 per cent of Labor voters. 
Responses appear to reflect several aspects of the intra-coalition 
competition problem. One might be regarded as the constitutional: 
ministers are different from backbenchers and ought to be protected. 
Another is some sense of fairness: seeking short-term advantage by 
helping your traditional enemy goes too far; for some, candidates who have 
switched party loyalties are beyond the pale. A third aspect is the party 
commitment already considered: what your party does must be right, or 
what someone does to the disadvantage of your party must be wrong. 
Perhaps, though this is not certain from the items available, the long-term 
goal of keeping Labor out ought not to be imperilled by jockeying for 
position within the coalition. 
By 1983 Liberal-National contests were general, and voters were more 
relaxed about it. Labor voters were, not surprisingly, more ready to see 
such contests: 78 per cent endorsed Liberals opposing sitting Nationals and 
76 per cent endorsed Nationals opposing sitting Liberals. Similarly the 
undecideds with 80 per cent and 74 per cent respectively. But the National 
and Liberal voters were not far behind: 63 per cent of National voters 
approved Liberals opposing sitting Nationals and 61 per cent the reverse; 
65 per cent of Liberal voters approved Liberals opposing sitting Nationals 
and 62 per cent the reverse. On the slightly different question, "In general 
1 agree with the National [Liberal] party's decision to stand against sitting 
Liberals [Nationals]", figures were very much the same though the National 
voters' approval of contests went up, very slightly, to 70 per cent on the 
Nationals running candidates and 66 per cent on the Liberals running 
candidates against the other. And on the item, "Running candidates against 
sitting Liberal party members is typical of the National party's desire to 
gain more power", 80 per cent of Labor voters, 66 per cent of undecideds, 
60 per cent of Liberal voters and 44 per cent of National voters agreed. 
Once the coalition had broken down, the old questions about intra-coalition 
contests were no longer appropriate and were dropped, but a different line 
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of inquiry on the relationship between the Liberal and National parties had 
already been started. 
Table 1.9 Perceptions of amount of difference between Liberal and National parties by 
voting intention, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1986, 1989 
Difference Labor Liberal National Undecided 
A lot 
1979by 22.8 25.5 10.5 14.3 
1980 26.7 21.3 19.7 18,0 
1985by 27.5 25.9 24.2 10.0 
1986 17.0 25.4 41.5 12.9 
1989 12.7 20.0 27.8 3.9 
Some 
1979by 26.6 36.2 47.4 37.2 
1980 
1985by 17.5 51.8 31.8 25.0 
1980 
1986 
1989 
% 
23.6 
33.0 
26.0 
32.9 
31.6 
33.7 
26.0 
42.2 
16.5 
12.9 
20.0 
20.0 
17.9 
Voting 
% 
31.4 
44.5 
45.7 
36.2 
34.6 
14.8 
25.4 
22.9 
0 
2.7 
3.7 
4.5 
11.4 
intention 
% 
35.2 
32.3 
44.4 
36.8 
38.0 
33.3 
16.9 
22.2 
0 
2.8 
7.6 
4.6 
5.6 
46.0 
1986 
1989 
Very little 
1979by 28.6 
35.5 
30.8 
26.0 
1985by 45.0 
1986 29.0 
1989 34.6 
None 
1979by .  11.4 
1980 12.9 .  .  4.0 
1985by .  15.0 
9.7 
23.1 
In 1979 a question had been added to try to catch voter perceptions of 
the increasing difficulties between the coalition partners: "How much 
difference do you see between the Liberal and the National parties in 
Queensland?". It was repeated in 1980 when, it will be recalled, the survey 
was again taken in Redcliffe, at the 1985 Redlands by-election, and at the 
1986 and 1989 general elections. Table 1.9 sets out the responses from the 
five surveys and indicates that there was little difference of opinion among 
the various groups of voters and little change over time despite the 
dramatic events that took place in this period. 
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Table 1.10 Perceptions of Liberal/National relations by voting intention, 1979, 1980 
Voting intention 
Relationship Labor Liberal National Undecided 
% % % % 
Very good 
1979by 3.8 8.5 0 5.7 
1980 0 1.0 - Q 
Good 
1979by 6.3 19.1 10.5 22.9 
1980 4.3 4.0 - 5.9 
Fair 
1979by 31.6 48.9 57.9 42.9 
1980 18.6 30.3 - 41.2 
Poor 
1979by 31.6 19.1 31.6 20.0 
1980 25.7 37.4 - 29.4 
Very poor 
1979by 26.6 2.1 0 5.7 
1980 50.0 27.3 - 23.5 
The question, therefore, may be thought to be testing fundamental 
political information and attitudes concerning a basic component of the 
informed electors' model of the political system, and consequently the 
degree of stability is not surprising. Labor voters could be expected to be 
more likely to see no difference between the other two parties, and so they 
are but only marginally more likely, whilst they could be expected to be 
less likely to see a lot of difference and this is not always the case. An 
informed response could, of course, go either way depending on which 
aspects of the two parties were being weighed. 
Having sought to establish how much difference was seen between the 
coalition parties, the next step was to ascertain what the state of their 
relationship was thought to be. In the 1979 Redcliffe by-election survey 
respondents were asked "How do you see the relationship between the 
coalition partners in Queensland, the Liberal party and the National party? 
Would you say the relationship was very good, good, fair, poor, very 
poor?" and the question was repeated at the 1980 general election. Data 
are set out in Table 1.10. It is unfortunate that there was no National 
candidate standing in Redcliffe in 1980 to provide data on National voters' 
views, for there have been substantial movements with both Labor and 
Liberal voters. In 1979 58 per cent of Labor voters thought coalition 
relations poor or very poor; in 1980 the figure had risen to 76 per cent. 
Among undecideds the figure had gone up from 26 per cent to 53 per cent, 
and for Liberal voters from 21 per cent to 64 per cent. Whilst not many 
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Labor voters had assessed coalition relations as very good or good in 1979 
and the movement had come from "fair" responses, among the undecideds 
those providing such a clean bill of health fell from 29 per cent to 6 per 
cent and among Liberal voters from 28 per cent to 5 per cent. 
By 1983 the Liberal/National story had opened a new chapter. The 
coalition was dead, and a new set of questions were used to conduct a 
postmortem; some of these related to the replacement as Liberal leader of 
Llew Edwards by Terry White and will be discussed in the next Chapter. 
Respondents were asked first, "What do you think was the main factor 
contributing to the breaking up of the coalition government of the Liberal 
and National parties?". The principal response categories are set out in 
Table 1.11. The majority, about 55 per cent of each group of voters, saw 
personalities - Bjelke-Petersen, White, Edwards or a clash of several 
personalities - as the main factor. Some 20-25 per cent saw one or other 
of the parties, or a clash of party interests, at work. Labor voters were 
slightly more prone to see it in personal terms and blame Bjelke-Petersen, 
National voters slightly more likely to see it in party terms and blame a 
Liberal leader. 
Table 1.11 Main factor in breaking up coalition by voting intention, 1983 
Voting intention 
Factor Labor Liberal National Undecided 
% % % % 
National leader 
Liberal leader 
Personality 
National party 
Liberal party 
Party 
Respondents were then asked, "How important were each of the 
following in contributing to the break-up of the coalition?" The factors 
put to them are listed in Table 1.12 with the percentages of respondents 
from each party who thought each factor was "very important". 
Some di.stinctions are apparent. National voters are less ready to blame 
Bjelke-Petersen or to see earlier dealings with Edwards as a principal 
cause, and they are somewhat more likely to see White or the Liberal party 
as the trigger. Labor voters are more likely than Liberal voters to stand up 
for the Liberal cause and blame the Nationals. Most respondents get the 
history correct: it was White's vote with the ALP and Bjelke-Petersen's 
subsequent refusal to have him in cabinet that ended the coalition 
40.9 
14.7 
3.1 
1.8 
9.3 
11.1 
27.7 
22.4 
5.8 
2.7 
14.4 
9.6 
8.4 
39.4 
8.4 
1.4 
18.3 
9.9 
24.0 
20.0 
8.0 
0 
8.0 
16.0 
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Table 1.12 Very important factors in breaking up coalition by voting intention, 1983 
Voting intention 
Factor Labor Liberal National Undecided 
% % % % 
B-Petersen's refusal to 
accept White 
White's voting with the opposition 
B^Petersen's style of leadership 
Disagreements over policy 
Nationals desire to govern alone 
Edwards' failure to stand up to 
B-Petersen 
Liberals desire to govern alone 
Invited to attribute blame explicitly by the question "Which of the two 
coalition parties do you think was mainly responsible for the break-up of 
the coalition?", almost all respondents had an opinion; only 5 per cent of 
the sample failed to offer a judgment. Data are in Table 1.13. Again 
Labor voters are more supportive of the Liberal party's part in the break-up 
of the coalition than are Liberal voters themselves, and there is a striking 
symmetry across the table with the Liberal voters and undecideds in the 
middle. 
Table 1.13 Party entirely or mainly responsible for breaking up coalition by voting 
intention, 1983 
41.3 
48.9 
67.6 
41.3 
48.9 
43.1 
11.1 
34.0 
54.8 
42.5 
34.0 
28.7 
30.8 
17.5 
32.4 
66.2 
28.2 
32.4 
26.8 
11.3 
31.0 
46.0 
60.0 
50.0 
46.0 
42.0 
42.0 
16.0 
Party 
Liberals 
Equally 
Nationals 
Labor 
% 
10.7 
20.0 
65.8 
Liberal 
% 
19.6 
26.6 
46.2 
Voting intention 
National 
% 
70.4 
18.3 
9.8 
Undecided 
% 
20.0 
36.0 
36.0 
The same sort of pattern emerged in the answers to the next question, 
"Do you think that the seven Liberal ministers were right in resigning from 
the cabinet?", as 72 per cent of Labor voters, 64 per cent of undecideds 
and 63 per cent of Liberal voters, and 45 per cent of National voters 
thought they were right; Labor voters were the most supportive of the 
Liberal ministers, National voters least supportive. 
When asked why they thought what they did, there was little difference 
between Liberal and Labor voters and undecideds, though National voters 
had a somewhat different stance. Responses fell into five main categories 
which are listed in Table 1.14 with the percentage from each party whose 
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response fell in that category. It would be interesting to know why 
National voters were so much more likely to mention party solidarity and 
less likely to mention leader loyalty. Did they question the legitimacy of 
White as leader? Did they think if Liberal ministers owed loyalty to a 
leader it should have been directed to Bjelke-Petersen as coalition premier? 
Table 1.14 Reasons for agreeing that Liberal ministerial resignations were right by voting 
intention, 1983 
Reason 
It was a matter of principle 
The ministers has no choice 
Party solidarity required it 
Loyalty to leader required it 
Liberals has to take a stand 
Other 
n 
Labor 
% 
17.7 
15.8 
24.1 
25.3 
13.3 
3.8 
(158) 
Voting 
Liberal 
% 
18.5 
21.8 
25.2 
21.8 
9.2 
3.4 
(119) 
intention 
National 
% 
13.3 
13.3 
60.0 
6.7 
0 
6.7 
(30) 
Undecided 
% 
21.9 
25.0 
18.7 
21.9 
9.4 
3.1 
(32) 
Opinions were more polarised on the next question, "Do you think Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen was right in appointing National party ministers to replace 
them?" Only 24 per cent of Labor voters thought he was, but 80 per cent 
of National voters approved; the Liberal voters (48 per cent) and 
undecideds (44 per cent) were in the middle. The "don't know" responses 
point to the Liberals' tendency to uncertainty: only 4 per cent of National 
voters had no opinion on the premier's action, 15 per cent of Liberal voters 
had none. 
The postmortem completed and blame apportioned, with partisan 
loyalties playing a large part in that process, where did respondents think 
Queensland politics would go from there? When asked "Which party do 
you think will be in government after the election?", party loyalty played 
a large part in determining responses. Data are in Table 1.15. Labor 
voters and National voters loyally thought their party would win, but only 
a third of the National voters believed they could manage alone. Hardly 
any Liberal voters believed that their party could win, and they turned 
instead to a combined win with their former partners. In the event, and 
aided by the post-election defection of two Liberal MLAs, it was the 32 
per cent of National voters who got it right. 
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Table 1.15 Anticipated party in government after the election by voting intention, 1983 
Party in government 
Labor 
Liberals 
Nationals 
Coalition 
Don't know 
Labor 
% 
56.9 
0.9 
9.3 
20.0 
10.2 
Liberal 
% 
13.3 
9.0 
13.3 
51.6 
12.2 
Voting intention 
National 
% 
11.3 
1.4 
32.4 
43.7 
8.4 
Undecided 
% 
22.0 
2.0 
10.0 
36.0 
28.0 
A new question asked at the 1985 Redlands by-election and repeated 
at the two subsequent general elections sought an evaluation of the 
Nationals' performance in government without benefit of the coalition and 
the Liberal presence; data for the three surveys appear in Table 1.16. It is 
not surprising that National voters were likely to see an improvement in the 
government's performance and Liberal voters the contrary; what was not 
so predictable was that Labor voters and the undecideds would so closely 
resemble the Liberal voters in rejecting any suggestion that there had been 
a better performance from the Nationals, and indeed Labor voters again 
resemble the Liberal voters in saying the government performance was 
worse - whilst the undecideds' position is complicated by the increase in 
the number of don't know responses. On the other hand, given the 
deterioration in the National government's fortunes by 1989, it is 
remarkable that there is no increase in "worse" responses apart from the 
marginal slippage among the dwindling band of National voters. 
Asked to expand on their initial assessment, the National voters (who 
comprised the great majority of respondents who could see improvement) 
thought the government could now get on with its job, would be free of 
obstruction, and could be more decisive, but only about two in five 
National voters had an opinion on the subject in 1985 and 1986 and only 
one in five in 1989. The Labor voters and Liberal voters, who were likely 
to think the government had got worse, were more likely to have an 
opinion: among Labor voters 39 per cent (1985), 41 per cent (1986) and 
45 per cent (1989) had no answer; among Liberal voters the figures were 
respectively 37, 28 and 31 per cent. The most common response was that 
there was no longer a moderating influence on the government; this was 
offered by 33 per cent (1985), 24 per cent (1986) and 20 per cent (1989) 
of Liberal voters, but rather fewer Labor voters - 24 per cent, 19 per cent 
and 14 per cent respectively. The Bjelke-Petersen factor, that the premier 
was now allowed to have his own way, does not seem to have had much 
weight with anyone: 12 per cent (1985) and 5 per cent (1986) of Labor 
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t n Q8M nf Liberal voters. But then 
voters, 7 per cent (1985) and 8 P^^^^^J^^l^ ^Lung his own way before 
perhaps most respondents thought he h^d ^een ge g 
the coalition broke up and nothing had changed. 
laoie i.±" i.ia.iv/..— r 
Performance 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
No difference 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
Worse 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
Don't know 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
Labor 
% 
8.7 
4.0 
4.6 
20.0 
22.0 
32.4 
65.0 
65.0 
56.1 
6.2 
6.0 
6.9 
Voting 
Liberal 
% 
3.7 
6.4 
8.6 
25.9 
13.6 
17.1 
66.7 
74.5 
74.3 
3.7 
4.5 
0 
intention 
National 
% 
43.9 
56.9 
38.9 
36.4 
21.5 
27.8 
12.1 
15.4 
22.2 
7.6 
6.1 
11.1 
Undecided 
% 
10.0 
9.7 
3.8 
30,0 
32.3 
50.0 
40.0 
41.9 
34.6 
20.0 
12.9 
11.5 
At the 1986 survey a new element was identified among the responses: 
cronyism, corruption, etc., which was mentioned by 14 per cent (1986) and 
17 per cent (1989) of Labor voters, and 12 per cent (1986) and 20 per cent 
(1989) of Liberal voters. By 1989 that subject had become a central issue 
of the election; it will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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1. Colin A. Hughes, Images and Issues: The Queensland Stale Elections of 1963 and 1966 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1969). 
2. R.J. Whip, IS Western and F.M.B. Cass, "Images and issues revisited" in Margaret 
Bridson Cribb and P.J. Boyce, eds. Politics in Queensland: 1977 and beyond (St Lucia' 
University of Queensland Press, 1980), pp.67-101. 
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The three party images reported in the preceding chapter changed little 
between the first survey in 1977 and the last in 1989. That is not 
surprising, for the structures and the socio-economic realities of each 
changed very little over that period. Certainly the Australian Labor party 
that Wayne Goss led to victory in 1989 was more effective and more 
presentable than the battered and bewildered party of the preceding 
elections; how it came to change so significantly is described in some 
detail in Chapter 4. Certainly also, the Liberal party before the coalition 
fell apart in 1983 was a somewhat different party, and was seen as 
different by many electors, from its post-crisis image; some aspects of this 
modification, for transformation would be too strong a word, are looked at 
in Chapter 6. And similarly the National party after the enforced departure 
of premier Bjelke-Petersen was changed, and changed again after the 
departure of premier Ahern, matters which are canvassed in Chapter 5. 
By comparison with the parties and their images, the three state party 
leaders and their images were remarkably fluid. Over the eight surveys 
there were five Labor leaders: Tom Burns (1977, 1978by), Ed Casey 
(1979by, 1980), Keith Wright (1983), Nev Warburton (1985by, 1986), and 
Wayne Goss (1989); four Liberal leaders: Bill Knox (1977), Llew Edwards 
(1978by, 1979by, 1980), Terry White (1983), Knox again (1985by, 1986), 
and Angus Innes (1989); but only two National leaders: Joh Bjelke-
Petersen (1977-1986) and Russell Cooper (1989) - for the intervening 
leader, Mike Ahern, came and went between the last two general election 
surveys in 1986 and 1989. 
Visibility 
With so many changes of leaders, the question to begin with is, how many 
respondents even knew their names, much less could pass judgment on 
their strengths and weaknesses. Table 2.1 sets out responses to the 
question "Who is the parliamentary leader of the X party in Queensland?" 
divided by the respondents' voting intentions for the impending election. 
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„ ,„d,ca,es .ha. ataos. a>. o, .he .ime ,he g.ea, maicrUy aormaBy 
A ^f 80 ner cent and sometimes close to lUU per cent, ot 
r e C n d L s knew':ho the party leaders were. There can be exceptions: 
SirWiHiam Knox had a low profile in 1977 and again after his return to 
the office at the 1985 Redlands by-election; the handful of National voters 
in 1989 seemed lost without Sir Joh and were even less informed about the 
new Liberal leader - but they were aware of Goss. The exceptional 
prominence of the three parliamentary leaders can be illustrated by a 
comparable question asked in 1977, "Who is the president of the 
organisational wing of the X party?". Yvonne McComb of the Liberal 
party was known to 33 per cent of Liberal voters, 25 per cent of Labor 
voters, 23 per cent of National voters and 19 per cent of undecideds. Bob 
Sparkes of the Nationals was known to rather fewer respondents: 14 per 
cent of his own National voters, 19 per cent of Labor voters, 20 per cent 
of Liberal voters, and 13 per cent of undecideds. But Tom Burton of the 
Labor party was totally unknown: 2 per cent of Labor voters, 1 per cent of 
Liberal voters, no National voters at all and 1 per cent of undecideds. At 
that time public conflicts within and between the National and Liberal 
parties were securing considerable publicity for their state presidents, but 
even so relatively few members of the public appear to have been 
interested. The question was not repeated in subsequent surveys. 
Party officials, even at the highest level as state presidents, might not 
warrant high public recognition save in exceptional circumstances, but it 
might be expected that cabinet ministers, or at least some of them as a 
consequence of their political importance or the impact of their portfolios 
on the public, ought to be known individually to an unpredictable but 
substantial proportion of the electorate. Therefore in the 1977 survey 
respondents were asked, "Can you name three ministers of the present state 
government, other than the premier and deputy premier?"; the question was 
repeated in the next three surveys. The percentages of worst (none 
recalled) and best (three named) performances are shown in Table 2.2. 
There is a lot of variability over the four surveys, with the 1978 Sherwood 
by-election respondents displaying much more knowledge than the other 
three samples, but overall it is clear that knowledge of cabinet ministers is 
not widespread. A substantial proportion of the electorate manages without 
knowing, or perhaps one should say on the evidence of the surveys being 
able to recall, any of them. 
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Table 2.1 
1989 
Correct identification of parliamentary party leaders by voting intention, 1977-
Leader 
Labor 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1983 
1985 
1986 
1989 
Liberal 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1983 
1985 
1986 
1989 
National 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1983 
1985 
1986 
1989 
Bums 
Bums 
Casey 
Casey 
Wright 
Warburton 
Warburton 
Goss 
Knox 
Edwards 
Edwards 
Edwards 
White 
Knox 
Knox 
Innes 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
Cooper 
Labor 
% 
82.3 
88.5 
79.7 
82.9 
89.8 
71.2 
89.0 
97.1 
68.1 
91.8 
79.9 
75.7 
90.7 
57.5 
84.0 
86.1 
83.0 
91.8 
91.0 
85.7 
92.9 
91.2 
96.0 
90.2 
Voting 
Liberal 
% 
81.5 
92.4 
72.3 
83.8 
85.6 
74,1 
93.6 
94.3 
74.4 
88.7 
80.8 
98.0 
93.6 
44.4 
91.8 
91.4 
84.4 
92.4 
85.1 
94.9 
95.2 
96.3 
100.0 
94.3 
intention 
National 
% 
77.4 
80.0 
100.0 
-
91.5 
68.2 
87.7 
83.3 
71.4 
85.0 
89.5 
-
88.7 
57.6 
86.1 
50.0 
88.1 
90.0 
89.5 
-
95.8 
87.9 
96.9 
61.1 
Undecided 
% 
67.5 
66.7 
71.4 
52.9 
88.0 
45.0 
83.9 
88.5 
56.4 
69.4 
65.7 
88.2 
90.0 
50.0 
87.1 
53.8 
76.1 
83.3 
77.1 
94.1 
98.0 
95.0 
96.8 
69.2 
Those who recalled ministers thought of relatively few individuals. 
Edwards (1977), before he became Liberal leader, was mentioned by about 
one in five of Labor voters, Liberal voters and undecideds, and two in five 
of the National voters. Knox, after he ceased to be Liberal leader (1978by, 
1979by), by similar proportions. Hinze, who had long attracted exceptional 
personal attention in the media, was mentioned variously by about one 
respondent in five (1977), over half of them (1978) and better than a third 
(1979). The National party's deputy leader, Camm, was much less 
frequently recalled: by about one in ten (1977), a quarter (1978), back to 
just over one in ten (1979). Other ministers, including some who had been 
in cabinet for years and/or held strategic and frequently reported portfolios 
like education or police, were rarely mentioned by as many as one in ten 
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of the respondents, frequently by fewer than one in twenty, sometimes by 
no one at all in a particular sample. Liberal ministers, presumably because 
they were Brisbane MLAs and possibly because coalition arrangements 
lumbered them with most of the more newsworthy and risky portfolios, 
may have had a slight advantage, but not much. Neither was there any 
tendency, such as was displayed in respect of the election candidates 
discussed below, for coalition party respondents to remember their own 
people and forget the other party's, nor for the undecided voters to have a 
consistently lower level of recall than those who had a party commitment 
to hang other information on. 
Table 2.2 Ability to name up to three ministers, 1977-1980 
Voting intention 
Number named Labor Liberal National Undecided 
% % % % 
None 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Three 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
A question that was asked in each of the eight surveys checked 
respondents' knowledge of local candidates' names. Table 2.3 gives the 
data which, it should be remembered, were collected shortly before polling 
day for the general election or by-election in question, and therefore at a 
time when respondents' recall ought to have been at its height. Labor 
voters are more likely to remember the Labor candidates; the exception 
was the Redlands by-election when a controversial pre-selection contest 
involving the party's state secretary provided unusual publicity for the 
candidate who defeated him. Liberal and National voters are slightly more 
likely to remember their own, but there is not much in it; given the 
exchange of preferences between the two parties, even after the coalition 
was ended, it would be rational to know both of the top preferences one-
would be voting for. Local candidates are more likely to be identified 
correctly in a by-election than at a general election. To take the Labor 
candidate as an illustration, recall is 20 percentage points more likely for 
50.1 
14.7 
41.8 
32.9 
21.4 
47.5 
31.6 
20.0 
46.4 
18.9 
36.2 
13.3 
23.2 
49.1 
34.0 
22.2 
42.9 
25.0 
26.3 
-
17.9 
30.0 
21.0 
-
57.3 
33.3 
28.6 
26.6 
10.3 
33.3 
31.4 
17.6 
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Labor voters and undecideds, 30 percentage points more likely for Liberal 
and National voters, at a by-election over a general election. 
Table 2.3 Correct identification of local candidates, 1977-1989 
Candidate Labor 
% 
63.6 
48.2 
43.2 
91.8 
80.3 
75.4 
94.9 
92.4 
82.3 
82.8 
87.1 
NA 
74.2 
84.9 
22.7 
90.0 
68.7 
61.2 
63.0 
64.0 
83.0 
73.4 
47.4 
34.7 
Voting 
Liberal 
% 
53.5 
66.3 
48.8 
79.2 
84.9 
69.8 
72.3 
93.6 
87.2 
71.7 
91.9 
NA 
61.2 
98.9 
24.2 
96.3 
85.2 
81.5 
39.1 
82.7 
87.3 
40.0 
71.4 
45.7 
intention 
National 
% 
35.7 
50.0 
58.3 
45.0 
70.0 
65.0 
68.4 
84.2 
89.5 
_. 
-
-
31.0 
77.5 
37.7 
90.9 
77.3 
86.4 
36.9 
67.7 
83.1 
50.0 
38.9 
33.3 
Undecided 
% 
44.4 
37.6 
39,3 
66.7 
75.0 
61.1 
77.1 
88.6 
80.0 
70.6 
100.0 
NA 
56.0 
80.0 
16.7 
70.0 
65.0 
70.0 
35.5 
51.6 
74.2 
57.7 
50.0 
34.7 
1977 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
1978by 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
1979by 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
1980 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
1983 
Labor 
Liberal 
National* 
1985by 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
1986 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
1989 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
* Contesting only 1 of the 2 electoral districts in that survey 
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Leader Evaluations 
Candidates flash across the sky and are gone or turn into sitting Members. 
By comparison with the other major political actors who are continuously 
on the stage and in the media, party presidents and cabinet ministers, the 
three parliamentary leaders of the major parties were very widely known. 
But was this anything more than basic political information as to their 
names and party connections or was it the start of something more 
evaluative? Respondents' images of each of the party leaders were tested 
by a series of items following the question: 
With regard to the state political leaders, would you describe A, 
leader of the X party, as: 
A strong leader 
Hardworking 
Honest 
A good speaker 
In touch with the people 
Arrogant 
Intolerant 
Incompetent 
Colourless 
Stubborn 
Cunning 
A "yes" response to the first five items was considered favourable, whilst 
a "yes" to the next four items was unfavourable. The last two items were 
ambivalent; it appeared that some respondents saw stubbornness and/or 
cunning as positive attributes whereas others assessed them negatively. In 
1989 this question was asked also concerning Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen in 
order to maintain continuity of the data; these responses are included in the 
tables which follow. 
Strength might be expected to have been a particularly good indicator 
of which leader would draw support to himself and his party and its 
candidates; Table 2.4 gives the percentages of favourable responses. Each 
group of voters were invariably more inclined to see their leader of the 
moment as strong than were the voters supporting the other parties or the 
undecideds. However premier Bjelke-Petersen attracted almost as much 
praise from Liberal voters as from his own Nationals, and though the Labor 
voters were a notch below that 90 per cent plus degree of adulation they 
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still were likely to rate him ahead of their own leader of the moment on 
this item. The sweeping leadership changes prior to the 1989 election 
brought in a new Labor leader who did better with his own voters and his 
opponents' voters than any other Labor leader apart from Wright had done 
previously, a new Liberal leader who did marginally better with his own 
voters, and a new National leader who crashed on this item with every 
category of elector. The deposed Bjelke-Petersen continued to score 
almost as well as he ever had done, pointing to the problems the party 
would have at the election in managing without him (see Chapter 6). 
Table 2.4 "Strong" party leader responses by voting intention, 1977-1989 
Leader 
Labor 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
Liberal 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
National 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
Bums 
Burns 
Casey 
Casey 
Wright 
Warburton 
Warburton 
Goss 
Knox 
Edwards 
Edwards 
Edwards 
White 
Knox 
Knox 
Innes 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
Cooper 
Labor 
% 
78.1 
49.2 
70.9 
68.6 
91.1 
35.0 
62.0 
92.5 
19.2 
26.2 
26.6 
18.6 
25.3 
25.0 
19.0 
22.5 
67.8 
77.0 
79.7 
74.3 
80.0 
73.7 
75.0 
81.5 
31.8 
Voting 
Liberal 
% 
46.4 
30.2 
40.4 
27.3 
58.5 
18.5 
46.4 
62.9 
38.4 
32.1 
44.7 
34.3 
42.5 
40.7 
46.4 
54.3 
91.0 
92.4 
91.5 
90.9 
94.1 
92.6 
96.4 
97.1 
45.7 
intention 
National 
% 
34.5 
25.0 
36.8 
-
57.7 
18.2 
33.8 
38.9 
22.6 
40.0 
10.5 
-
15.5 
28.8 
27.7 
22.2 
96.4 
100.0 
100.0 
-
100.0 
98.5 
96.9 
88.9 
55.6 
Undecided 
% 
54.7 
55.6 
45.7 
29.4 
74.0 
20.0 
54.8 
73.1 
22.2 
36.1 
14.3 
17.6 
28.0 
25.0 
35.5 
30.8 
73.5 
91.7 
85.7 
88.2 
92.0 
80.0 
87.1 
76.9 
34.6 
Honesty should be a quality to compare with strength in the attributes 
of an ideal leader, or so it might be hoped. Table 2.5 gives the responses 
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on this item. Partisanship is slightly more apparent; after the break up of 
the coalition National voters are less ready to perceive honesty in a Liberal 
leader and vice versa. Bjelke-Petersen drops sharply between 1986 and 
1989 (37 percentage points) with National voters on this item, although his 
image of strength was largely unaffected; Cooper fails to attract the level 
of support with National voters that Bjelke-Petersen previously did though 
he manages levels of support with Labor voters comparable to his 
predecessor's, admittedly a not very high score, and attained Bjelke-
Petersen's post-coalition levels with the Liberal voters. 
Table 2.5 "Honest" party leader responses by voting intention, 1977-1989 
Leader 
Labor 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
Liberal 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1S86 
1989 
National 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
Bums 
Burns 
Casey 
Casey 
Wright 
Warburton 
Warburton 
Goss 
Knox 
Edwards 
Edwards 
Edwards 
White 
Knox 
Knox 
Innes 
B-Petersen 
B-Pelersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
Cooper 
Labor 
% 
83.0 
62.3 
72.1 
82.9 
73.8 
67.5 
83.0 
87.3 
49.4 
72.1 
62.0 
50.0 
58.2 
57.5 
35.0 
56.1 
22.4 
29.5 
40.5 
31.4 
18.7 
23.7 
9.0 
12.1 
27.2 
Voting 
Liberal 
% 
55.4 
62.3 
46.8 
41.4 
44.1 
40.7 
62.7 
48.6 
75.8 
84.9 
76.6 
84.8 
77.7 
40.7 
79.1 
77.1 
73.9 
60.4 
74.5 
62.6 
59.6 
44.4 
40.0 
45.7 
51.4 
intention 
National 
% 
45.2 
45.0 
21.0 
-
36.6 
33.3 
30.8 
33.3 
71.4 
90.0 
94.7 
-
40.8 
43.9 
50.8 
50.0 
82.1 
90.0 
78.9 
_ 
78.9 
77.3 
81.5 
44.4 
55.6 
Undecided 
% 
,59.0 
61.1 
54.3 
58.8 
54.0 
35.0 
61.3 
65.4 
52.1 
72.2 
68.6 
58.8 
60.0 
30.0 
54.8 
42.3 
52.1 
52.8 
60.0 
41.2 
36.0 
25.0 
29.0 
15.4 
34.6 
The three other positive items can be dismissed more quickly. 
Although each bloc of voters is slightly more inclined to think its own 
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leader as hard working than they are prepared to credit the other two party 
leaders with being, the margins are small and generally favourable 
majorities are large every time, two-thirds or three-quarters or more. In 
this the public are accurate: party leaders do have to work very hard by 
anyone's standards. Being a good speaker appears to have more of a 
partisan flavour and not much stability, and therefore probably not much 
objective content; for example, between 1985 and 1986 Warburton's score 
rises by about 20 percentage points with each category of voters, Edwards' 
score drops by about 30 percentage points from 1978 to 1979 and stays 
down in 1980. Liberal voters' assessment of Bjelke-Petersen drops when 
the coalition ends, but National voters' assessment of the Liberal leaders 
does not. On the other hand, the third remaining item, being in touch with 
people, distinguishes Labor voters who rate their own leader highly and the 
National and Liberal leaders much lower and National voters who rate their 
own leader highly and the Labor and Liberal leaders well down from that 
from Liberal voters who rate all three sets of leaders about the same. 
The unfavourable items inevitably project more partisan feelings. Labor 
voters overwhelmingly think Bjelke-Petersen "arrogant" (lowest score over 
the eight surveys 89 per cent) but are nowhere near so ready to say it of 
any Liberal leader (lowest 7 per cent, highest 37 per cent) or Labor leader 
(lowest 14 per cent, highest 28 per cent). Liberal voters are more ready to 
say it of Labor leaders (low of 24 per cent, high of 52 per cent) and of 
Bjelke-Petersen (low of 48 per cent, high of 85 per cent) than of the 
Liberal leaders (low of 4 per cent, high of 23 per cent). Cooper comes in 
only marginally less arrogant (83 per cent) with Labor voters, but with 
Liberal voters he records a low score (49 per cent) such as Bjelke-Petersen 
had not registered since the late 1970s when the coalition was still in place 
and coalition voters did not criticise the other party's leader quite so much. 
Varying numbers of National voters were prepared to concede that Bjelke-
Petersen was arrogant (low of 25 per cent in 1978, high of 72 per cent in 
1989) but not yet Cooper (a high of 22 per cent), and in the late 1980s 
rated Labor leaders lower than their own leader; Liberal leaders who had 
barely scored on the arrogance measure with National voters went up to 
almost half in 1983 when the coalition split was fresh, then dropped to a 
consistent quarter of respondents subsequently. 
Respondents to the "intolerant" item follow much the same pattern, and 
one would expect that the two facets of a leader's image would be closely 
connected. Almost everyone says it of Bjelke-Petersen: Labor voters (low 
of 70 per cent, high of 96 per cent). Liberal voters (low of 57 per cent, 
high of 86 per cent) and undecideds (low of 64 per cent, high of 90 per 
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cen 
„..t). National voters (low of 45 per cent, high of 67 per cent in 1989) are 
not quite so ready to criticise but those who are critical are a majority in 
five of the seven surveys where there were National voting intenUons 
recorded. Cooper's score in 1989 is much less uniform among the groups 
of electors, perhaps because he was so new that respondents were only 
guessing and being guided by partisan predispositions: 78 per cent with 
Labor voters, 43 per cent with Liberal voters and 46 per cent with 
undecideds, only 22 per cent with National voters. Labor leaders do well 
with their own voters (low of 16 per cent, high of 30 per cent), and not 
that badly with Liberal voters (24 per cent to 43 per cent) and National 
voters (26 per cent to 46 per cent). Liberal leaders did extremely well with 
their own voters (10 per cent to 26 per cent) and with National voters 
while the coalition lasted after which National voter figures rose to Labor 
voter levels. 
"Incompetence", by contrast, was not readily acknowledged; perhaps 
just as party leaders have to be hard-working they cannot afford to be 
incompetent. Hardly any voters would say it of their own leader: Labor 
voters on the subject of Labor leaders ranged from 14 per cent (Warburton 
in 1985) to 1 per cent (Goss in 1989); Liberal voters about Liberal leaders 
from 16 per cent (Edwards in 1980) to 2 per cent (Edwards in 1979); 
National voters from none in two surveys (Bjelke-Petersen in 1978 and 
1979) to 11 per cent (Bjelke-Petersen in 1989) and 17 per cent (Cooper in 
1989). But then they were not very likely to say it of their opponents 
either. In only four out of fifteen possible instances did more than a third 
of coalition voters say the Labor leader was incompetent: Liberals of Burns 
in 1978 (36 per cent) and Casey in 1980 (35 per cent), Nationals of Burns 
in 1978 (50 per cent) and Warburton in 1986 (35 per cent). Only once did 
as much as a third of Labor voters say it of a Liberal leader, Knox in 1986 
(35 per cent), but their hostility to Bjelke-Petersen was such that only once 
did less than a third say it of him, in 1978 (28 per cent), and in his last 
years the proportion rose to 59 per cent (1985), 71 per cent (1986) and 62 
per cent (1989); when Cooper came along he was tarred with the same 
brush, 57 per cent (1989). After the coalition broke up, each bloc of its 
former voters was slightly more inclined to think that the others' leader was 
incompetent, but the proportion rose usually by 10-15 percentage points 
and still was fairly low: consistently between 20 and 30 per cent for 
Liberals on Bjelke-Petersen, and only once higher than 20 per cent for 
Nationals on a Liberal leader (and that was Terry White who according to 
the National party had destroyed the coalition). 
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"Colourless", the last of the negative items, has a slippery quality that 
suggests its limited usefulness. It is clearly a stick with which to beat the 
dog: more than a half (from 52 per cent for Edwards in 1978 to 80 per 
cent for Knox in 1980) of Labor voters consistently said it about the 
Liberal leaders, but between a quarter (23 per cent in 1983) to close to 
two-fifths (44 per cent in 1978) were prepared to say it of Bjelke-Petersen 
- which seems somewhat less than accurate. In 1989 when they had two 
National leaders to consider, 25 per cent of Labor voters thought Bjelke-
Petersen colourless but 60 per cent thought Cooper was. Similarly between 
a fifth and a half of Liberal and National voters said that successive Labor 
leaders were colourless, the lowest proportions saying it of Wright in 1983 
(22 per cent of Liberals and 24 per cent of Nationals) and the highest of 
Warburton (63 per cent and 53 per cent respectively in 1985, 53 per cent 
and 51 per cent in 1986) and Goss (49 per cent and 56 per cent in 1989). 
Liberal voters were ready to say their own leader was colourless: 34 per 
cent said it of Edwards in 1978, 59 per cent of Knox in 1986, much the 
same figures as the National voters gave, though in 1989 National voters 
were much more likely (56 per cent) to find Innes colourless than were 
Liberal voters (29 per cent), the one instance of substantial difference. 
On the other hand, few Liberals or Nationals were prepared to say that 
Bjelke-Petersen was colourless. His highest score with Liberal voters was 
28 per cent (1977) and in all the other surveys below 20 per cent, down to 
6 per cent in 1989. With National voters he did even better, a highest 
score of 13 per cent in 1983, best nil (with a small number of respondents) 
in 1989. This difference from the Labor voters confirms the partisan 
nature of the item. Cooper in 1989 did relatively badly: 37 per cent of 
Liberal voters and 22 per cent of National voters thought him colourless, 
but not as badly as with the Labor voters and with the undecideds (58 per 
cent). 
The two remaining items, "stubborn" and "cunning", are less clear-cut. 
Some respondents might think them useful attributes in a political leader, 
others might regard them as moral weaknesses. The data on "stubborn" 
responses in Table 2.6 show extraordinarily little difference of opinion 
among the four blocs of voters. All were likely to think Bjelke-Petersen 
stubborn; the lowest rating was 85 per cent of National voters at the 
Redcliffe by-election. As to the three leaders competing at the 1989 
election, the figures show remarkable unanimity. Goss rates 57 per cent 
with Liberal voters, 56 per cent with National voters, 55 per cent with 
Labor voters and 54 per cent with undecideds. Innes rates 38 per cent with 
Labor voters, 34 per cent with Liberal voters, 33 per cent with National 
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voters, and 46 per cent with undecideds - slightly up on the other three 
groups. Only on Cooper is there much difference of opinion: Liberal 
voters at 60 per cent and National voters at 61 per cent are less mchned to 
agree with Labor voters at 80 per cent and undecideds at 77 per cent. 
Table 2.6 "Stubborn" party leader responses by voting intention, 1977-1989 
Leader 
Labor 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
Liberal 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
National 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
Bums 
Bums 
Casey 
Casey 
Wright 
Warburton 
Warburton 
Goss 
Knox 
Edwards 
Edwards 
Edwards 
White 
Knox 
Knox 
Innes 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
Cooper 
Labor 
% 
46.2 
49.2 
50.6 
50.6 
46.7 
38.7 
40.0 
54.9 
28.7 
19.7 
41.8 
40.0 
64.9 
40.0 
40.0 
37.6 
97.5 
98.4 
96.2 
94.3 
94.1 
96.2 
100.0 
98.8 
80.3 
Voting 
Liberal 
% 
56.9 
30.2 
48.9 
48.9 
51.1 
55.6 
33.6 
57.1 
21.3 
32.1 
42.5 
39.4 
61.7 
37.0 
37.3 
34.3 
91.0 
96.2 
85.1 
90.9 
91.5 
100.0 
97.3 
100.0 
60.0 
intention 
National 
% 
48.8 
25.0 
52.6 
52.6 
64.8 
45.4 
58.5 
55.6 
16.7 
0 
26.3 
-
73.2 
45.4 
44.6 
33.3 
85.7 
85.0 
100.0 
-
90.9 
93.8 
88.9 
61.1 
Undecided 
% 
42.7 
55.6 
45.7 
45.7 
48.0 
25.0 
45.2 
53.8 
10.3 
22.2 
22.9 
412 
68.0 
35.0 
41.9 
46.1 
86.3 
94.4 
94.3 
100.0 
100.0 
90.0 
lOOO 
92.3 
76.9 
"Cunning" has a more partisan connotation; data are in Table 2.7. 
National and Liberal voters are more likely to think Labor leaders are 
cunning; sometimes the undecideds go along with the coalition voters but 
not invariably. Only about a third of respondents in any category are likely 
to think the Liberal leader of the day is cunning; Liberal voters are very 
slightly less likely than Labor voters to think it. A substantial majority, 
however, say it of Bjelke-Petersen: Labor voters solidly. Liberal voters 
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only slightly less, National voters rather more after the coalition breaks up, 
undecideds as solidly as if they were Labor voters. 
Table 2.7 "Cunning" party leader responses by voting intention, 1977-1989 
Leader 
Labor 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
Liberal 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
National 
1977 
1978by 
1979by 
1980 
1983 
1985by 
1986 
1989 
Bums 
Bums 
Casey 
Casey 
Wright 
Warburton 
Warburton 
Goss 
Knox 
Edwards 
Edwards 
Edwards 
White 
Knox 
Knox 
Innes 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
B-Petersen 
Cooper 
Labor 
% 
36.4 
42.6 
38.0 
42.9 
37.3 
28.7 
33.0 
45.7 
34.6 
31.1 
41.8 
40.0 
28.9 
46.2 
36.0 
35.8 
88.2 
91.8 
92.4 
85.7 
91.6 
95.0 
96.0 
95.9 
75.7 
Voting 
Liberal 
% 
64.9 
62.3 
40.4 
33.3 
54.8 
37.0 
33.6 
71.4 
25.1 
24.5 
27.7 
32.3 
34.6 
40.7 
29.1 
22.9 
64.9 
69.8 
83.0 
80.9 
81.9 
85.2 
91.8 
82.9 
54.3 
intention 
National 
% 
63.1 
65.0 
57.9 
-
60.6 
51.5 
52.3 
50.0 
19.0 
25.0 
26.3 
-
45.1 
45.4 
35.4 
38.9 
57.1 
50.0 
68.4 
-
85.9 
86.4 
78.5 
72.2 
50.0 
Undecided 
% 
44.4 
50.0 
22.9 
41.2 
54.0 
40.0 
41.9 
65.4 
17.9 
16.7 
28.6 
23.5 
30.0 
45.0 
41.9 
38.5 
72.6 
77.8 
80.0 
100.0 
88.0 
85.0 
93.5 
84,6 
80.8 
A positive image index, similar to that constructed for parties (see 
Chapter 1), was constructed for each of the party leaders. This was based 
on responses to the eleven items discussed above. "Yes" responses to the 
five positive items and "no" responses to the four negative items were 
given a score of one, and, for the purposes of this index, "no" responses to 
the two ambivalent items were also given a score of one; all other 
responses were scored as zero. The range of possible scores was zero to 
eleven. Figures 2.1 to 2.3 show the mean image scores of each of the 
three party leaders at the eight elections covered by this study, for 
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respondents from each of the three major parties and from all respondents. 
In reading these graphs it should be noted that there are no data from 
National party voters for 1980. 
Up to and including 1979, voters from each of the three major parties 
registered image scores for the Labor leader, Burns, which were remarkably 
similar (see Figure 2.1). With the election of Casey as leader. Labor party 
voters' image of their leader rose sharply and continued to do so through 
the 1983 election when the party was under the leadership of Wright. At 
the 1985 Redlands by-election, with Warburton as leader, the image 
slumped but rose again in 1986, still with Warburton as leader, and again, 
slightly, in 1989. Although it reached its highest point in 1989 with Goss 
as leader this was only marginally higher than the level reached in 1983 
under Wright. Images of the ALP leader among Liberal and National party 
voters were fairly stable up to 1979 when they began to diverge slightly. 
In 1986 the Liberals image score of the ALP leader was almost two points 
higher (on the eleven point scale) than that of the Nationals but by 1989 
the scores of the two parties had converged again. 
Labor Leader 
Positive Image 
1989 
' National 
Figure 2.1 Positive image scores for the ALP leader by intending voters for each of the 
three major parties and total voters. 
As was the case with the Labor leader, voters from all three major 
parties rated the Liberal leader at approximately the same level in 1977 
when Knox was leader and again in 1978 when the party leadership passed 
to Edwards (see Figure 2.2). From this point onwards the three parties 
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diverged with a sharp rise among Liberal and National voters and a much 
smaller rise among Labor voters. National voters' image of the Liberal 
leader plunged in 1983 when White took over as leader but rose again in 
1985 with the return of Knox, whereas that same election saw a 
considerable drop in the Liberals' image of their leader. By 1986 Knox 
had recovered his position in the eyes of Liberal voters and a further rise 
in their assessment of their leader brought it to its highest level in 1989 
when Innes led the party at the election. At this time the image scores of 
National and Labor voters had converged at a level approximately two 
points below the Liberal score. 
Liberal Leader 
Positive Image 
Figure 2.2 Positive image scores for the Liberal party leader by intending voters for each 
of the three major parties and total voters 
In 1977 the National party leader also was rated at approximately the 
same level by intending voters from all three major parties (see Figure 2.3). 
There was some divergence in 1978 at which point National voters rated 
Bjelke-Petersen lower than did either Liberal or Labor voters. However, 
in 1979 National voters estimate of their leader rose to its highest point, 
after which it declined steadily except for a slight rise in 1986. Even the 
replacement of Bjelke-Petersen with Cooper did not halt this decline. The 
improved image of Bjelke-Petersen among National voters in 1979 was 
countered by a decline among Liberal and Labor voters. While his image 
recovered slightly in 1980, it declined steadily from then onwards, although 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
4i Rosemary Whip and Colin A Hughes 
the advent of Cooper led to a very slight recovery in the National party 
leader image among both Liberal and Labor voters in 1989. 
National Leader 
Positive Image 
Figure 2.3 Positive image scores for the National party leader by intending voters for each 
of the three major parties and total voters 
Party Leaders 
Positive Image 
1977 1978 1979 1988 1983 1985 1986 1989 
Figure 2.4 Positive image scores for the leaders of each of the three major parties by those 
intendmg to vote for them "^  ' 
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Figure 2.4 shows the images of each party leader held by intending 
voters for that party. In 1977 the National leader was held in greatest 
esteem with the ALP leader next and the Liberal leader held in lowest 
esteem. Changes in the leadership of the Labor and Liberal parties over 
the ensuing years saw some chopping and changing of these placings and 
by 1986 the Labor leader scored highest followed by the Liberal leader and 
then the National leader. In 1989, with three new party leaders, the 
differences between scores had increased, with Labor and Liberal leaders 
improving their position and the National leader's position declining. 
The change in relative positions since 1977 came about as a result of 
considerable increases in the image scores of Labor leaders (by just under 
three points) and Liberal leaders (by just over two points), while the 
National party leader suffered a slight decline. 
Leadership changes 
Up to this point attention has been directed to the items repeated in each 
survey to trace the evolution of the composite image of successive party 
leaders, or in the case of the Nationals the unchanging image of Sir Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen. However changes of leaders sometimes took place close 
enough to one of the surveys to warrant including an item or two about the 
events or implications of that change. The resulting data may cast further 
light on what electors may have looked for in a party leader and how they 
rated particular leaders in that context. 
In the 1978 Sherwood by-election survey, respondents were asked 
about the recent replacement as Liberal leader of Knox by Edwards. Most 
thought Edwards would be more effective: 72 per cent of Labor voters, 68 
per cent of Liberal voters, 53 per cent of undecideds, 50 per cent of 
National voters. Most had an opinion on the matter: "don't know" 
responses ranged from 8 per cent of Labor voters to 19 per cent of 
undecideds. When asked for their reasons in coming to the conclusion they 
had reached, either that Edwards would be more effective than Knox or 
that he would not, those reasons were more likely to concern Edwards: 75 
per cent of undecideds, 70 per cent of Liberal voters, 59 per cent of 
National voters and 56 per cent of Labor voters focussed on Edwards rather 
than Knox. Whether this was because he had been the winner or was the 
more interesting political figure can only be guessed at. Just over half of 
the respondents - 65 per cent of National voters, 54 per cent of Liberal 
voters, 52 per cent of Labor voters and 50 per cent of undecideds -
referred to political rather than personal considerations in their explanation. 
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The two questions were repeated at the 1979 Redcliffe by-election 
when the "don't know" responses were more numerous, now ranging 
between 13 per cent of Liberal voters and 31 per cent of undecideds, and 
the proportion thinking Edwards more effective had declined to 46 per cent 
of Labor voters (down 26 percentage points), 60 per cent of Liberal voters 
(down only 8 points), 32 per cent of National voters (down 18 points) and 
34 per cent of undecideds (down 16 points). Again one could only pess 
whether this indicates that familiarity had diminished Edwards' reputation, 
or Knox's failings were now being forgotten or appeared in a different light 
compared to more experience of Edwards as leader, or there were long-
term differences between Sherwood and Redcliffe, or that the two by-
election campaigns had different effects on voters' short-term perceptions 
of the two Liberal leaders. Given the frequency with which party leaders 
are changed, in other states and federally as well as in Queensland, often 
with the hope of immediate political benefits, it could be useful to know 
more about how electors assess such events. 
Asked for their reasons, respondents were again more likely to refer to 
Edwards but the proportions had drifted around somewhat: Liberals were 
relatively unchanged at 68 per cent (down to 2 percentage points), but 
National voters had gone down to 50 per cent (down 9 points) and 
undecideds to 52 per cent (down 23 points) whilst Labor voters had gone 
up to 70 per cent (up 14 points). More striking is the decline in the 
proportion of coalition voters mentioning political considerations rather 
than personal factors in preferring either Knox or Edwards; whilst the 
undecideds and Labor voters remained more or less constant at 52 per cent 
and 54 per cent respectively. National voters went down to 29 per cent 
(down 36 percentage points) and Liberal voters to 26 per cent (down 28 
points). Possibly the political circumstances of a leadership change fade 
more quickly in electors' minds, leaving the personal aspects to last a while 
longer, or perhaps the longer the new leader is in place the more personal 
characteristics get established with the public. 
By 1979 there had been also a recent change in the leadership of the 
Labor party, and so the same items were repeated for the replacement of 
Burns by Casey. Compared to the Edwards/Knox match in 1978 there was 
less enthusiasm for the new leader: 52 per cent of Labor voters, 47 per cent 
of Liberal voters, 68 per cent of National voters and 46 per cent of 
undecideds thought Casey would be more effective. Again most 
respondents had an opinion though the "don't know" responses were 
somewhat higher than they had been in 1978 - from 13 per cent of Labor 
voters to 40 per cent of undecideds. But responses were less focussed on 
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challenger Casey than they had been on challenger Edwards: 60 per cent 
of National voters, 53 per cent of undecideds, 52 per cent of Labor voters 
and 29 per cent of Liberal voters mentioned Casey considerations rather 
than Burns considerations. And they were much less concerned with 
political, rather than personal, considerations: only 41 per cent of Labor 
voters, 35 per cent of undecideds, 31 per cent of Liberal voters, 20 per cent 
of National voters mentioned political matters. 
The 1983 survey followed another change of leaders in the Liberal 
party; this time Edwards was replaced by White. A preliminary question 
was asked, "How do you feel about the way in which Llew Edwards was 
replaced as leader of the Liberal party?" Most respondents had an attitude: 
only 7 per cent of National voters, 20 per cent of Liberal voters and 
undecideds, and 26 per cent of Labor voters said they were indifferent or 
didn't know. Rates of approval varied: 44 per cent of Labor voters 
approved, 27 per cent of Liberal voters and 26 per cent of undecideds, only 
17 per cent of Nationals. Correspondingly disapproval varied from 69 per 
cent of National voters, through 37 per cent of Liberal voters and 38 per 
cent of undecideds, to 24 per cent of Labor voters. A handful gave 
hedging answers which can be characterised as "necessary but unfortunate": 
11 per cent of Liberal voters, 4 per cent of National voters and 
undecideds, 3 per cent of Labor voters. The coup that made White leader 
had been directed at the National party, its leader and its role in the 
coalition, so naturally enough National voters disapproved of the change. 
Any trouble in the coalition was welcome to some Labor voters but they 
were short of a majority. 
The regular question as to who was the more effective leader for the 
Liberals, Edwards or White, produced fewer opinions than previously, with 
14 per cent of National voters, 29 per cent of Liberal voters, 34 per cent 
of Labor voters and 38 per cent of undecideds saying they didn't know or 
it was too soon to judge. Among those who did have an opinion, there 
was more polarisation than on the Knox/Edwards changeover: only 7 per 
cent of National voters expected White to be more effective, 79 per cent 
did not, whilst 47 per cent of Labor voters did and 19 per cent did not. 
Caught in the middle, 39 per cent of Liberal voters and 36 per cent of 
undecideds favoured White, 32 per cent and 26 per cent respectively 
backed Edwards. Asked why they held that opinion, those with responses 
generally referred to White rather than Edwards: 84 per cent of Labor 
voters, 81 per cent of Liberal voters, 75 per cent of undecideds, 72 per cent 
of National voters. The events that contributed to the ending of the 
coalition had given White a high profile in state politics. 
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The final case of leadership change in the survey data concerns the 
National party's overthrow of, first, Bjelke-Petersen and then Ahern. 
Asked initially, "Since the last state election in 1986, there have been 
changes in the leadership of the National party. Have you followed those 
changes very closely, closely, not very closely or not at all?", almost two-
thirds of the respondents replied that they had followed closely or very 
closely, less than one in ten said that they had not followed events at all. 
Labor voters (72 per cent) and Liberal voters (69 per cent) were more 
likely to say that they had followed closely or very closely than were 
National voters (44 per cent) or undecideds (46 per cent). 
Table 2.8 Assessments of effectiveness of Bjelke-Petersen, Ahem and Cooper by voting 
intention, 1989 
Effectiveness 
Ahem over Bjelke-Petersen 
More 
Same 
Less 
Cooper over Ahem 
More 
Same 
Less 
Labor 
% 
50.9 
12.1 
37.0 
16.2 
17.3 
64.7 
Voting 
Liberal 
% 
25.7 
17.1 
54.3 
22.9 
28.6 
45.7 
intention 
National 
% 
5.6 
22.2 
66.7 
55.5 
22.2 
11.1 
Undecided 
% 
26.9 
11.5 
53.8 
26.9 
42.0 
26.9 
Respondents were then asked to rate the effectiveness of, first Ahern 
against Bjelke-Petersen, and then of Cooper against Ahern. The data 
appear in Table 2.8. Unfortunately the Bjelke-Petersen/Ahern contest is 
now being viewed with the events of Ahern's brief leadership and ouster 
by Cooper in mind. It may be that Ahern's poor figures reflect his 
subsequent problems, and that there had been a honeymoon period in 
which he compared more favourably with Bjelke-Petersen. However, 
given the solidity and consistency of support for Bjelke-Petersen among 
National voters, this may not have been the case, and perhaps National 
voters were aghast from the time that Sir Joh was toppled and only 
partially reassured when Cooper replaced the man who ejected their hero. 
Labor voters may not have been the best of judges because the ending of 
the Bjelke-Petersen era was so much in the interest of the party they 
supported, and the advent of Cooper might have been seen as something 
of a restoration. Liberal voters were more likely to think Ahern less 
effective than Bjelke-Petersen and Cooper less effective than Ahem but 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Leader Images 53 
the undecideds who agreed with the Liberals on the first changeover were 
not as certain about the second. 
Conclusions 
What general conclusions can be draw about the part that the party leaders 
might have had in shaping Queensland politics for the 1989 election? It 
certainly appears that the arrival of Wayne Goss and Russell Cooper meant 
that major changes were afoot and would flow on into the election. Angus 
Innes was only one more in a line of unsuccessful Liberal leaders, 
invariably overshadowed by the dominant National leader on their right, 
not only rated poorly by their Labor opponents and, particularly after the 
coalition ended, by National voters as well, but not very well regarded by 
even their own Liberal voters. With all categories of voters Goss was 
clearly an improvement on his predecessors, with the possible exception of 
Wright who figures in only one survey and whose staying power may 
therefore be suspect. Cooper had a more difficult act to follow with 
Bjelke-Petersen, but that handicap may have been exacerbated by the 
intervening problems with Ahern's accession and removal. 
If Cooper, or Gunn for that matter, had stepped quietly into Sir Job's 
shoes, had received the old man's benediction and the support of a united 
party which, even if some MLAs had voted for an alternative candidate, 
could have rallied behind the winner, might the gap in perceptions between 
Bjelke-Petersen and Cooper shown in the 1989 data have been reduced 
substantially? As Chapter 6 will show, it is by no means certain where the 
blame, or the greater part of it, for the first bloody and damaging coup lies. 
Perhaps those forces within the National party which pressed Bjelke-
Petersen to go and go soon threw away their greatest political asset. 
Perhaps by trying to strike back at his tormentors Sir Joh ended up 
seriously damaging the image of the strong, competent National party 
leader which had been such a critical factor in the party's long run of 
success. 
Finally, whilst the ending of the coalition had an effect on how party 
leaders were viewed, it was a limited effect. It made no difference to 
Labor voters; it did not make Liberal or National voters look more 
favourably on Labor leaders. All that it did was sour Liberal/National 
relations slightly so that each bloc of voters was marginally more inclined 
to think ill of their former ally's leader, but not that much and not if the 
element in the leader's image was already clear and enduring as so much 
of Bjelke-Petersen's public reputation had become over the years. 
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Elections are, however, about more than party images and leaders' 
images. They can be about issues, and the final question to be asked of 
the 1977-1989 data is what issues were raised at these elections and by-
elections, and how did they change over time, if at all. The subject is 
pursued in Chapter 3. 
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ELECTION ISSUES 
Rosemary Whip, John Western and David John Gow 
There can be little doubt that the most important issue in the 1989 
Queensland state election was corruption. The Labor party identified 
cormption, education, family budgets and the environment as issues in the 
election campaign but it was on the issue of corruption that greatest 
emphasis was placed. The party pushed the corruption theme from the 
beginning of the campaign, emphasising both the responsibility of the 
National party government for the corruption which the Fitzgerald Inquiry 
had uncovered, and the unlikelihood of a National party government 
implementing the reforms recommended by Fitzgerald. Pursuing this issue 
in his address to the Queensland Press Club on 29 November, Wayne Goss 
warned that the Nationals, if given a further term in government, would 
attempt to thwart and frustrate the reform process. 
The National party made every effort to steer the election campaign 
away from the issue of corruption. The new premier, Russell Cooper, 
claimed early in the campaign that corruption would not be an election 
issue, but, as a Courier-Mail editorial (7 November 1989) pointed out, this 
was wishful thinking on the part of the Nationals. Efforts of the National 
party to bring other issues to the fore were, for the most part, unsuccessful. 
Attempts to make morals a significant issue in the campaign, aided by the 
right wing fundamentalist Logos Foundation (see Chapter 8), foundered 
in the face of warnings from the major churches that "the morals campaign 
should not be permitted to bury the corruption issue", and criticism of the 
Nationals' attempts in this direction.^ 
The main issue on which the Nationals pinned their electoral hopes was 
the high rate of mortgage repayments faced by home owners. Both the 
National and Liberal parties pushed this issue, particularly after the South 
Australian state election resulted in a significant swing against the Labor 
government the week before the Queensland election. However, their 
efforts were undermined when the federal opposition's finance spokesman. 
Senator John Stone, said that interest rates would remain high for some 
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time no matter who was in power and that it would be irresponsible to 
promise otherwise.^ 
Climbing on the environmental bandwagon, the National party 
attempted to win the green vote and at the same time strengthen its niral 
power base with a plan to distribute three million free trees to land holders 
and land care groups, and a promise to increase the area of the state 
designated as National Park to 5 per cent within ten years. The latter was 
an attempt to counter the Labor party's promise of an increase to 4 per cent 
within three years. On this issue also, the Nationals efforts were 
undermined; the Austrahan Conservation Foundation president, Peter 
Garrett, claimed that the re-election of the National party would bring 
about an "orgy" of destruction on the Queensland coast, and stated that 
while he was delighted with the Labor party's response to the "log of 
claims" on environmental issues, he was dismayed at the poor response of 
the National party.^ 
In the last weeks of the campaign the National party launched an 
advertising campaign concentrating on its own economic record, and 
continued its efforts to move corruption off the election agenda. Late in 
November Cooper claimed that the Fitzgerald Inquiry had produced little 
real evidence and some of its allegations \Vere no more than smears. He 
also maintained that corruption was not an election issue because the 
government had implemented the main recommendations of the Fitzgerald 
Report. 
The Liberal party attempted to keep a foot in each camp. It promised 
to implement the recommendations of the Fitzgerald Report and 
campaigned on the issue of corruption. In doing so it was to some extent 
constrained by the fact that up until the break up of the coalition in 1983 
it had been part of a government now widely considered to be responsible 
for allowing corruption to flourish in the state. Like the National party it 
campaigned strongly against the Labor party on the issue of home interest 
rates, promising a $25 a week cash bonus to be paid from 1 January 1990 
for as many as 80,000 Queensland families affected by high interest rates, 
a move subsequently followed, in slighdy different forms, by both the 
National and Labor parties. 
Despite attempts to divert attention from the issue of corruption, the 
Labor party continued on course. Although Goss admitted that high home 
interest rates were hurting Queensland families and promised that a Labor 
Government would provide up to $60 a month in means tested mortgage 
assistance, he rejected claims that the issue would affect the Labor party's 
chances in the election. The polls supported his stand: an AGB:McNair 
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irvey conducted early in November for the Courier-Mail found that only 
per cent of respondents considered housing to be a major issue in the 
ection. Corruption and state economic management were the main issues 
f concern to voters.'* 
The Courier-Mail editorial of 28 November summed up the question 
f election issues: 
The real issue in the Queensland election is not 
interest rates, which is a question of national 
economic management. It is how the voters 
assess the record of National Party 
administration. The Nationals have been in 
office in Queensland for three decades. The state 
of affairs in Queensland government is nobody's 
responsibility but the National Party's. 
The corruption that flourished under the Nationals 
counts heavily against the Queensland 
Government. 
[ followed with a second editorial on 1 December, the day prior to the 
lection, which claimed that "the significant issues of this campaign have 
een cormption, as revealed by the Fitzgerald Report, and the performance 
f the Government". 
A similar view of the major election issues was held by the sample of 
oters in the electoral districts of Ashgrove, Greenslopes and Yeronga 
iterviewed during the weekend prior to the election. In response to a 
uestion asking what they considered to be the most important issue in the 
oming state election, 54 per cent of the sample named corruption and a 
irther 8 per cent identified the not unrelated issue of the need for a 
hange of government. Only 6 per cent of voters saw home interest rates 
s the major issue, although among the 10 per cent who were undecided 
bout how they would vote this was the most frequently mentioned issue 
n per cent) closely followed by corruption (23 per cent). 
Table 3.1 lists the issues identified as most important and the proportion 
f voters from each of the three major parties who perceived each to be the 
lost important issue in the election. Although the amount of emphasis on 
articular issues varied, depending on the voting intention of the 
;spondents, corruption was the most frequently identified issue among 
aters from all three major political parties. Perception of corruption as an 
sue was highest among Labor voters, 66 per cent of whom identified it. 
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compared with 29 per cent of Liberal voters and 22 per cent of those 
intending to vote for the National party. However, this consensus did not 
extend to the second most frequently identified issue; among Labor voters 
this was the need for a change of government (11 per cent), among Liberal 
voters it was economic issues (14 per cent) and among National voters it 
was interest rates (17 per cent). Interest rates were considerably less 
important among Liberal voters (9 per cent), and of little importance at all 
to Labor voters (2 per cent). 
Table 3.1 Issues perceived as most important by voting intention, 1989 
Issue 
Corruption 
Change of government 
Interest rates 
Other economic issues 
Environment 
Education 
Electoral boundaries 
Other issues 
No issues 
Labor 
% 
66.5 
11.0 
2.3 
1.2 
2.3 
2.9 
2.9 
9.2 
1.7 
Liberal 
% 
28.6 
2.9 
8.6 
14.3 
5.7 
2.9 
2.9 
25.7 
8.6 
National 
% 
22.2 
0 
16.7 
11.1 
i« 
0 
0 
33.3 
ll.l 
Among those voters who saw corruption as the most important issue, 
71 per cent said they felt very strongly about the issue and a further 24 per 
cent said they felt fairly strongly about it. However, this strength of 
feeling varied depending on voting intention; only half those intending to 
vote Liberal felt very strongly about corruption compared with 
approximately three quarters of Labor and National party voters.' 
Respondents were also asked what other issues they considered 
important in the state election. In addition to the high proportion of voters 
who had identified corruption as the most important issue, a further 25 per 
cent, who had identified some other issue as most important, saw 
corruption as an additional issue in the election. This brought the 
proportion of the sample for whom corruption was an election issue to 79 
per cent. 
Table 3.2 lists additional issues identified as important by voters from 
each of the three major parties. Corruption is the most frequently 
mentioned of these issues among Labor and Liberal voters and comes 
second to home interest rates among National voters. 
It is evident that in spite of the efforts of the National party to play 
down the corruption issue during the election campaign it was seen as an 
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issue of importance even among a fairly high proportion of the party's 
supporters, equalling interest rates as an issue; over all 39 per cent of those 
intending to vote for the National party identified each of these issues. It 
is interesting to note, also, that the question of morals, on which the 
National party attempted to run during the election campaign, was not 
identified as an election issue by any National voters, although it was the 
second most frequently mentioned additional issue among Liberal voters. 
Table 3.2 Other issues perceived as important by voting intention, 1989 
Issue 
Corruption 
Education 
Environment 
Anti-government issues 
Electoral boundaries 
Social issues 
Interest rates 
Change of goverrmient 
Economic issues 
Moral issues 
No issues 
Labor 
% 
30.0 
22.5 
19.7 
11.6 
13.3 
9.8 
8.1 
10.4 
6.4 
2.3 
31.2 
Liberal 
% 
22.9 
8.6 
11.4 
11.4 
2.9 
14.3 
8.6 
0 
5.7 
17.1 
34.3 
National 
% 
16.7 
11.1 
11.1 
11.1 
0 
11.1 
22.2 
5.6 
5.6 
0 
55.6 
The emphasis on corruption as an issue among the voters in the survey 
sample is echoed in the responses of candidates in the 1989 Queensland 
state election. Data from a survey of candidates (see Chapter 10) show 
that for 70 per cent of them corruption was the most important issue, while 
a further 13 per cent listed corruption among a variety of other issues 
perceived as being important in the campaign. As might be expected, the 
highest proportion of such responses came from Labor candidates; 80 per 
cent identified cormption as the most important issue. Liberal candidates 
were not far behind with 74 per cent, while 61 per cent of National 
candidates and 47 per cent of the independents and candidates for minor 
parties saw corruption as the most important election issue. 
Although the dominance of corruption as an issue in the 1989 election 
owed much to the findings of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, it was not an entirely 
new issue on the Queensland electoral scene. Corruption had been 
identified as the most important issue among a sample of voters 
interviewed prior to the 1986 election and there is some evidence of 
concern on the part of voters interviewed prior to earlier elections. In the 
following pages the issues perceived as most important by samples of 
voters interviewed immediately prior to the four state elections 1977-1986 
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and the three by-elections (Sherwood, Redcliffe, Redlands) are examined 
and an attempt is made to trace the emergence of corruption as an election 
issue. 
1977 
By 1977 the coalition parties had been in power in Queensland for twenty 
years, and the 1974 election had brought about a significant realignment of 
voter support from the Labor party to both the Liberal and National 
parties.* Following a campaign in which the state Labor party was linked 
to the increasingly unpopular federal Labor government led by Whitlam, 
the number of Labor representatives in the Queensland parliament was 
reduced by two-thirds to eleven. 
In the 1977 election campaign the coalition parties campaigned on their 
record of achievement in government and promised even better things to 
come. The Labor party emphasised the high level of unemployment in 
Queensland, but it also raised the issue of the style of government of the 
coalition and the premier, Joh Bjelke-Petersen, who had led the National 
party since 1968. In his policy speech, delivered on 21 October 1977, the 
Labor leader, Tom Burns, warned against "the danger to democracy of a 
one sided parliament with excessive power vested in a premier eager to 
exploit and abuse it", and pointed out that on three occasions during the 
previous fourteen months parliament had changed and back dated laws to 
protect members of the National and Liberal parties, on two of the three 
occasions for the purpose of "saving their seats from their own 
indiscretions". He also raised the issue of civil liberties following 
government legislation against street marches which had removed the right 
of appeal to the courts against police decisions.^ 
During the weekend prior to the election a survey was conducted of a 
sample of voters in the metropolitan electorates of Bulimba, Chatsworth 
and Ipswich West. Voters were asked what they considered to be the most 
important issue in the coming election. Their responses are listed in Table 
3.3 which shows the frequency with which each of the issues was 
identified as the most important in the election by those who intended 
voting for one of the three major parties. The issue of unemployment 
stands out as the most important among supporters of all three parties, and 
among the 13 per cent of the sample who were undecided about their vote. 
Although the Labor voters placed greatest emphasis on this issue (it was 
mentioned by 47 per cent), 31 per cent of Liberal voters and 36 per cent 
of National voters also saw it as the most important issue. 
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The remaining issues were evaluated differently, depending on voting 
intention. Civil liberties was the second most frequently identified issue 
among Labor supporters (11 per cent), inflation among Liberals (15 per 
cent), and uranium mining among those intending to vote for the National 
party (6 per cent). Concern about the performance of the premier, rated 
third in importance by Labor voters (6 per cent), was rated as of least 
importance by supporters of the coalition parties. 
Table 3.3 Issues perceived as most important by voting intention, 1977 
Labor Liberal National 
Issue % % % 
Unemployment 46.9 31.3 35.7 
Civil liberties 11.1 5.7 4.8 
hiflation 5.7 14.7 4.8 
Premier's performance 6.4 3.3 1.2 
Uranium mining 4.2 4.7 6.0 
Other issues 13.2 24.2 31.0 
No issues 12.5 16.1 16.7 
1978 
The by-election in the Liberal held seat of Sherwood resulted from the 
retirement for health reasons of the sitting member, John Herbert, who had 
held the seat since 1956. Herbert was a popular local member who had 
been a minister since 1965; at the time of his retirement he held the 
portfolio of Sport, Community and Welfare Se'^ices. 
The Liberal party campaign in the by-election consisted largely of 
attacks, some quite vitriolic, on the premier and the National party, which 
the Liberal leader, Llew Edwards, described as a sectional party in spite of 
its change of name. The National party campaigned on the issue of the 
premier's strong leadership and the quality of government provided by the 
party. While the coalition partners attacked one another directly and 
indirectly, the Labor party campaign emphasised national economic issues, 
particularly increased taxes and unemployment, as well as various state and 
local issues.^  
A survey of a sample of voters in Sherwood indicated that the election 
was dominated by local issues in the eyes of Liberal and National voters 
at least. As Table 3.4 shows, 34 per cent of Liberal voters and 30 per cent 
of National voters identified issues specific to the Sherwood electorate as 
the most important in the election; many Liberal voters saw the main issue 
as the replacement of Herbert with another good local member, namely 
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Angus Innes. Among Labor voters, however, the issue most frequently 
identified as most important was the performance of the government, and 
in particular the conduct of the National party and the premier (21 per 
cent). This was followed closely by civil liberties which 20 per cent of 
Labor voters identified as most important. This issue was of importance 
to very few Liberal voters and did not rate a mention among those 
intending to vote for the National party. 
Table 3.4 Issues perceived as most important by voting intention, 1978 
Labor Liberal National 
Issue % % % 
Local issues 
Civil liberties 
Government performance 
Unemployment 
Other issues 
No issues 
14.8 
19.7 
21.3 
8.2 
19.7 
16.4 
34.0 
3.8 
5.7 
7.5 
17.0 
32.1 
30.0 
0 
10.0 
5.0 
30.0 
25,0 
Unemployment, the issue of major concern in the state election a year 
earlier, was of comparatively minor concern to the voters of Sherwood. 
The explanation for this may lie in the prosperous middle-class character 
of the electorate and in the tendency in by-elections for emphasis to be 
placed on local issues. 
1979 
The Redcliffe by-election, which resulted from the retirement of National 
party member and Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, Jim Houghton, 
was one of two by-elections held on 1 September 1979. The other was in 
the Nationals' seat of Gympie which they were in no danger of losing. 
Redcliffe, however, was a different matter. The Liberals had contested the 
seat in the 1977 state election in a hard fought and often bitter stmggle 
which their candidate, Terry WTiite, had come within 400 votes of winning. 
White was standing again as the Liberal candidate and it was clear that this 
by-election would place considerable strain on relations between the 
coalition partners. 
Both the Liberal and National Parties had important reasons for needing 
to win. The Nationals needed to reassert their influence in the metropolitan 
area after having lost, in the 1977 state election, much of the ground 
gained in 1974, and having performed poorly in the Sherwood by-election 
in 1978. They also needed to dispel doubts about Bjelke-Petersen's 
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popularity among metropolitan voters. The Liberal party needed to 
demonstrate that its policy of standing Liberal candidates against sitting 
Nationals, endorsed at the party's annual state convention in 1976 and 
reaffirmed at the 1978 convention, was viable. It was particularly 
important that it win Redcliffe where there was no incumbent National 
member. 
For the Labor party too the by-election was important for it was seen 
as a test of the popularity of the party's new leader, Ed Casey, who had 
replaced Tom Burns after the Sherwood by-election. Furthermore, success 
in Redcliffe would be a much needed morale booster to the strife torn 
party. 
Having concluded that there appeared to be few matters of dominant 
concern to the voters, the parties campaigned on a variety of issues. All 
three major parties promised to create local youth employment 
opportunities. The Labor party advocated pension indexation, facilities for 
youth and tourism, and improved staffing levels at the Redcliffe hospital, 
and emphasised the party's ability to provide responsible government, while 
the Liberal party campaigned on pensions and improvement of the 
coordinated bus/train service to Brisbane. The National party focused on 
lower personal taxation and improved transport for Redcliffe, in particular 
the provision of a rail link between Redcliffe and Brisbane. This was a 
plan of long standing, resurrected once more for the by-election and 
regarded with some cynicism by Redcliffe residents. A cartoon by Alan 
Moir, in the Courier-Mail during the week prior to the election, in which 
it was referred to as the "ghost train" because "it'll be spirited away after 
September 1", probably reflected the view of much of the electorate. 
The findings of a survey of Redcliffe voters supported the view of the 
parties that there were few major issues of concern to the electorate. The 
five categories of issues elicited from the sample are listed in Table 3.5. 
Among Labor and Liberal voters the most frequently identified issues were 
local ones; 25 per cent of Labor voters and 32 per cent of Liberal voters 
identified a local issue as most important. National party voters gave equal 
emphasis to local issues and unemployment, each issue being identified by 
21 per cent. The most significant component of the "local issues" category 
was the rail link; for each of the three parties more than half of those who 
identified a local issue as being most important chose this one. Local 
issues were also the most frequently mentioned as most important among 
the 17 per cent of the sample who had not yet decided how they would 
vote. 
Unemployment rated equal first among National party voters, was the 
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second most frequently mentioned issue among L^bor voters (20 per cent) 
and was equal second with political strategy among Liberal voters; each of 
these two issues was seen as most important by 13 per cent of Liberals. 
The issue of political strategy was also seen as most important by 10 per 
cent of Labor voters and 10 per cent of National voters. Its emergence as 
an issue is presumably a reflection of the strategic importance of the by-
election to all three parties. 
Table 3.5 Issues perceived as most important by voting intention, 1979 
Issue 
Local issues 
Unemployment 
Federal issues 
Political strategy 
Honest/responsible government 
Other issues 
No issues 
Labor 
% 
25.3 
20.3 
17.7 
10.1 
6.3 
2.5 
17.7 
Liberal 
% 
31.9 
12.8 
6.4 
12.8 
8.5 
4.3 
23.4 
National 
% 
21.1 
21.1 
15i 
10.5 
10.5 
10.5 
10.5 
1980 
The campaign for the 1980 state election was conducted in an atmosphere 
of increasing tension between the National and Liberal parties. In July 
1980 the National party state conference had been the forum for continued 
attacks on the Liberal party organisation and for Joh Bjelke-Petersen's 
assertion that he and his party were prepared to govern alone after the 
election if necessary. 
In their election campaign the Nationals pushed the issue of tax reform, 
advocating a reduction in personal income tax to a flat rate of 20 per cent 
to be achieved within three years. They also campaigned on the state 
government's record of economic prosperity and the promise of continuing 
development within Queensland. The Liberal party emphasised the need 
for the more democratic and less authoritarian style of government which 
they would provide, and promised to introduce a public accounts committee 
and to do away with "jobs for the boys". The Labor party had little to 
offer by way of election promises, not surprising given the state of disarray 
in which it found itself at that time. 
At the 1979 by-election the Liberals had won the seat of Redcliffe by 
only a narrow margin. Nevertheless, although the Nationals stood 
candidates against sitting Liberals in five seats in the 1980 election, they 
did not contest Redcliffe. Early speculation that they would run a 
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"glamour candidate" against the sitting Liberal member, Terry White, came 
to nothing and the election in Redcliffe turned out to be a simple two-way 
contest between the Liberal and Labor parties. 
The issues perceived as most important by a sample of Redcliffe voters 
were, in order of importance, unemployment, style of government, 
economic issues and social issues; see Table 3.6. Just over a fifth of the 
sample claimed that there were no issues of importance in the election. 
Unemployment was the most frequently identified issue among both Liberal 
voters (26 per cent) and Labor voters (39 per cent) (see Table 3.6). It was 
also the most frequently mentioned issue among undecided voters who 
comprised a little under 10 per cent of the sample. Among Liberal voters 
economic issues were next most important (20 per cent), followed by style 
of government, a comment on the Bjelke-Petersen approach to democracy 
(15 per cent). Among Labor voters this issue ranked next in importance 
to unemployment at 14 per cent although in fact a slightly higher 
proportion of Liberal voters expressed concern about it. 
Table 3.6 Issues perceived as most important by voting intention, 1980 
Labor Liberal 
Issue % % 
Unemployment 38.6 26.3 
Style of govenmient 14.3 15.2 
Economic issues 7.1 20.2 
Social issues 11.4 6.1 
Other issues 4.3 12.1 
No issues 24.3 20.2 
1983 
The strain in relations between the Liberal and National parties, evident in 
the 1980 election campaign, reached crisis point in August 1983 and 
culminating in the break up of the coalition on 19 August and the 
formation of a National minority government. The election on 22 October 
was seen by many as primarily a battle between the former coalition 
partners rather than the usual contest of conservative government and 
Labor opposition. 
The National party, campaigning with the slogan, "Now, more than 
ever, Queensland needs Joh and the Nationals", concentrated on the 
benefits which had accrued to Queensland under the Bjelke-Petersen 
government, and failed to acknowledge that any contributions were made 
by the Liberals in over 26 years of coalition government. 
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The Liberals under their new leader, Terry White, campaigned with the 
slogan "The Liberals fight for your rights". They emphasised jobs, tax 
relief, support for small business and health and housing policies for 
families, and argued that the National party was concerned with the 
interests' of a relatively small and financially privileged section of the 
community. They also promised a range of reforms: of the parliamentary 
and electoral systems, street march laws, and the judicial system. 
The Labor party campaign had begun well before the election date was 
announced, with over a dozen individual launches of policy. The campaign 
proper covered housing, employment, welfare and education, as well as 
targeting the concerns of small business and women's issues. Having 
overcome its internal problems since federal intervention in the state branch 
in 1981, the party chose the campaign slogan, "A New Direction", and 
presented itself to the voters as the only party able to provide stable 
government; consequently, the Labor campaign emphasised the themes of 
leadership and stability.' 
During the weekend prior to the election, samples of voters were 
interviewed in two Liberal-held electorates, Sherwood and Redcliffe, which 
had previously been surveyed. Sherwood, a seat which had been held by 
the Liberals since its inception, was expected to remain in their hands, but 
there was some suggestion that the Liberal leader, Terry White, who had 
been the catalyst of the coalition crisis, was in danger of losing Redcliffe.'" 
The voters in these two electorates identified a wide range of issues; see 
Table 3.7. Among voters from all three major parties unemployment was 
seen as the most important issue, as it was by the 9 per cent of the sample 
who were undecided about how they were going to vote. This issue was 
identified as most important by 40 per cent of Labor voters, 33 per cent of 
Liberal voters, and 35 per cent of National voters. Among Liberals and 
Nationals, the next most frequently identified issue was stable government, 
mentioned by 18 per cent of both. Among Labor voters, however, concern 
about democracy in Queensland was the second most frequently mentioned 
issue (14 per cent). This was followed by the need for a change of 
government, mentioned by 10 per cent of Labor voters. Some Liberal 
voters also indicated concern about the state of democracy in Queensland 
(8 per cent), but very few identified the need for a change of government 
as an election issue. A small proportion of Labor and Liberal voters 
identified accountability of the government, or more accurately, the lack of 
it, as an issue. These issues - democracy, accountability and the need for 
a change of government - did not rate as issues among National party 
voters. 
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In this survey, voters were also asked if there were any issues, in 
addition to the one they identified as most important, which they 
considered were important in the election. The range of additional issues 
identified closely resembled the most important issues. The most 
frequently mentioned of additional issues among Liberal and National 
voters were economic issues while among Labor voters social issues were 
nominated. Unemployment was the second most frequently mentioned 
issue among voters from all three parties. Issues which did not feature 
among those identified as most important were education, mentioned by 11 
per cent of Labor voters, 12 per cent of Liberals and by only 3 per cent of 
those intending to vote for the National party, and federal issues identified 
by 8 per cent of Labor voters, 8 per cent of Liberal voters and 11 per cent 
of National voters. As was the case with the most important issue, 
identification of stable government as an additional issue was most 
common among National voters (11 per cent), while Labor voters most 
commonly identified democracy (15 per cent), accountability (8 per cent) 
and the need for a change of government (7.6 per cent) as additional 
issues. There were few mentions of these issues among Liberal voters, and 
virtually none at all among Nationals. 
Table 3.7 Issues perceived as most important by voting intention, 1983 
Labor Liberal National 
Issue % % % 
Unemployment 39.6 32.0 35.2 
Stable government 8.9 17.6 18.3 
Queensland democracy 13.8 8.5 1.4 
Economic issues 4.0 12.2 9.9 
Social issues 7.1 6.4 7.0 
Change of government 1Q.2 0,5 0 
Socialism 0.4 4.3 8.5 
Accountability 2.7 3.7 0 
Other issues 8.0 10.1 11.3 
No issues 5.3 4.8 8.4 
1985 
On 10 September 1985, John Goleby, National party member for the seat 
of Redlands, and Minister for Water Resources and Maritime Services, died 
in a tractor accident on his property, thus precipitating a by-election in the 
bayside electorate he had held for the previous eleven years. 
Although the Redlands electoral district borders Brisbane it has its own 
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shire council and is not yet a part of the Brisbane metropolitan staUstical 
area It is an area renown for horticulture but, although this remains the 
major industry, it has increasingly become a dormitory suburb for the three 
contiguous cities, Brisbane, Logan City and the Gold Coast." However, 
in spite of its being on Brisbane's doorstep, it was described at the time of 
the by-election as "different" and even "remote".'^ 
The by-election, like that in Redcliffe six years earlier, was important 
for all three major parties. It was important for the National party that it 
retain the seat because of its small parliamentary majority. At the time of 
Goleby's death the state of the parties in the Queensland parliament was 
Nationals 43, Labor 32, Liberals 6 and Independents 1. The loss of 
Redlands would reduce the National party's already dangerously small 
majority to one. The Liberals, reduced to six parliamentary members at the 
1983 election, needed to win the seat to demonstrate their political 
rehabilitation and provide some hope that they might regain some of their 
lost ground in the state election due the following year. The Labor party 
needed to win Redlands to distract attention from the rather messy pre-
selection contest which had resulted in Con Sciacca's endorsement as the 
Labor candidate for the by-election over state party secretary, Peter 
Beattie, and to vindicate the judgement of the Labor leader, Nev 
Warburton, on this issue." 
The National party campaign opened with promises from the premier 
of a hospital for the Redlands area, extra police, a new school and 
improved railway services. Inspecting work on the rail line to Wellington 
Point on 22 October, he promised that trains would be running to 
Cleveland within fifteen months. 
The Liberal party campaign drew attention to the problems of the 
National party government. Sir William Knox, the Liberal party leader, 
claimed that the Queensland government was lurching from crisis to crisis 
and described it as the worst government in recent memory. Calhng on the 
premier to step down, he detailed government excesses, fumbling, alleged 
ministerial impropriety, economic set backs and a lack of leadership, and 
claimed that the government had committed twenty-one specified gaffes 
in the preceding twelve months. These included increases in compulsory 
third party insurance, abortion clinic raids, the sugar industry crisis, the fire 
levy fiasco. Expo 88 finances, and maladministration of the Health 
Department.'" The premier retaliated by attacking the Liberal party, 
describing its members as socialists because of the number of times they 
had supported the Labor party in the parliament. 
The Labor party highlighted the performance of the government, in 
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addition to campaigning on local issues, for example the need for better 
public transport in the area which lacked weekend bus services. The party 
criticised the National party's commitments to the Redlands area, claiming 
that they could not be fulfilled or were recycled promises; for example, 
Sciacca maintained that the late member had promised Redlands a hospital 
in 1980. 
A survey of a sample of Redlands voters indicated that local issues were 
again of major concern to the electorate, particularly among Labor and 
National voters; 45 per cent of Labor voters and 43 per cent of National 
voters identified local issues as most important, as did 26 per cent of 
Liberal voters (see Table 3.8). Although some voters mentioned the need 
for better public transport and the rail link with Brisbane, the local issue 
of concern to the vast majority of voters from all parties was the promised 
Redlands hospital. This was also the most frequently mentioned issue 
among the 9 per cent of the sample who were still undecided about how 
they would vote.'^ 
Table 3.8 Issues perceived as most important by voting intention, 1985 
Labor Liberal National 
Issue % % % 
Local issues 45.0 26.0 42.2 
Performance of 
Goverament/prem ier 
Honesty 
Economic issues 
Other issues 
No issues 
Among Labor voters, the second most frequently mentioned issue was 
the performance of the government and/or the premier (19 per cent), 
followed by economic issues (9 per cent) and honesty in government and 
on the part of political candidates. Among Liberal voters the government 
and/or the premier's performance and economic issues were equal second 
in frequency of identification, followed by honesty. Among National 
voters this issue rated second in importance (15 per cent), followed by 
economic issues (3 per cent); the issue of the performance of the 
government and/or the premier hardly rated a mention. However, many 
National party voters identified as most important a wide range of issues 
which have been categorised under "other issues". 
In response to a question about what other issues they perceived as 
important in the election, Redlands voters mentioned, in order of 
18,8 
6.3 
8.8 
13,8 
7.5 
14.8 
7.4 
i+.i 
222 
14.8 
1.5 
15.2 
3.0 
36.4 
1.5 
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importance, local issues, education, the performance of the government 
and/or the premier and social issues. Although very few National party 
voters had identified the government or the premier's performance as the 
most important issue in the by-election, 12 per cent of them identified it 
as an additional issue. So also did 15 per cent of Liberal voters and 6 per 
cent of Labor voters. 
1986 
At the 1986 election the National party found itself in an uncomfortable 
position. No longer in coalition with the Liberals, the Nationals had to 
defend their record in government in their own right and it had proven to 
be not a particularly impressive record, particularly in the area of economic 
management. The National party campaign followed the usual formula of 
promoting Queensland, attacking the federal government in Canberra and 
accusing critics of being anti-Queensland and anti-progress. The party's 
slogan on this occasion was "Queensland - There's never been a greater 
need", promoting the idea that the interests of the National party and the 
state went hand in hand. The campaign attacked both the Liberal and 
Labor parties, and emphasised federal issues to distract attention from the 
record of the Bjelke-Petersen government. 
The Liberal party campaign was based on the conviction that there 
would be a Liberal resurgence, and the Liberal leader. Sir William Knox, 
promised to introduce a fair election bill. Both the Liberal and Labor 
parties campaigned on the issues of corruption and cronyism within the 
government, a focus given legitimacy when, shortly before the election, a 
National party trustee, Sir Roderick Proctor, claimed during an interview 
on the ABC's Carlton-Walsh Report that the state government was guilty 
of cronyism and had made a charade of public tendering.'^ The issue of 
corruption was kept to the forefront of the campaign when it was 
confirmed that Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen had received an out of court 
settlement of $400,000 from Alan Bond in his defamation action brought 
against Bond's QTQ Channel Nine. 
Although these allegations rocked the party and disrupted the campaign, 
the Nationals had a strong issue, the threat of instability, on which to fall 
back. As at the 1983 election, voters were confronted with the choice of 
a Labor government, a National government, or a hung parliament. This 
issue was pushed relentlessly by both the Labor party and by the Nationals, 
to the considerable detriment of the Liberal party. 
During the campaign, a survey in the electoral districts of Aspley and 
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Toowong, both held by the Nationals but previously Liberal, clearly 
indicated an important issue in the election to be corruption, cronyism and 
lack of accountability (see Table 3.9). Forty per cent of Labor voters 
identified this as did 30 per cent of Liberal voters and 12 per cent of 
National voters. Among the 9 per cent of undecided voters it was equal 
in importance with the need for stable government. Economic issues were 
most frequently identified by National voters as most important (26 per 
cent), followed by the need for stable government (23 per cent). Among 
Labor voters the premier's performance was the second most frequently 
identified issue (11 per cent), followed by unemployment and the need for 
a change of government, while Liberal voters rated economic issues second 
(14 per cent), followed by the need for stable government and the need for 
a change of government, each identified by 13 per cent. 
Table 3.9 Issue perceived as most important by voting intention, 1986 
Labor Liberal National 
Issue % % % 
Corruption etc. 40.0 30.0 12.3 
Economic issues 6.0 13.6 26.2 
Stable government 4.0 12,7 23.1 
Change of government 8.0 12.7 1.5 
Unemployment 9.0 5.5 9.2 
Social issues 6.0 7.3 0 
Electoral boundaries 6.0 3.6 IS 
Premier's performance 11.0 0.0 0 
Other issues 7.0 8.2 16.9 
No issues 3.0 6.4 9.2 
Other issues identified as important in the election included all those 
seen as most important, as well as social issues and the environment. 
Economic issues were most frequently nominated as additional issues by 
Liberal and National party voters while among Labor voters, corruption, 
cronyism and lack of accountability came first. 
It is clear that corruption had become an issue of some importance in 
the 1986 election. With cronyism and lack of accountability it was 
identified as the most important issue in the election by 30 per cent of 
voters from the three major parties. Although concerns about corruption 
were not sufficiently widely spread within the electorate to disadvantage 
the Nationals - in fact they increased their majority in the parliament -
nevertheless these concerns provided a basis on which the revelations of 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry were able to build, leading to the downfall of the 
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National party at the 1989 election. 
The Emergence of the Corruption Issue 
During the twelve years from 1977 to 1989 a variety of issues were of 
concern to Queensland voters. As might be expected over such a length 
of time, some of the issues of primary concern changed from one election 
to another. The issues perceived as the most important by the sample of 
voters interviewed prior to all state elections and three by-elections 
between 1977 and 1989 are summarised in Table 3.10. 
Some issues were of perennial concern. For example, concern about 
economic issues remained fairly constant; it appeared at all electoral events 
except the Sherwood and Redcliffe by-elections of 1978 and 1979. The 
proportion of voters identifying economic concerns as of most importance 
ranged from a high of 15 per cent in the 1980 state election campaign to 
a low of 7 per cent in the Redlands election campaign of 1985. However, 
throughout the time period under consideration, it was never perceived as 
important among Labor voters to the extent that it was among supporters 
of the Liberal and National parties. 
Voter perceptions of the unemployment issue followed a quite different 
pattern. During the 1977 state election campaign it was the issue most 
frequently identified as most important; 40 per cent of voters from the 
three major parfies identified it in this way and among voters from each of 
the three parties it ranked well ahead of any other issue. Although it was 
less frequently identified as the most important issue in the by-elections 
when local issues were a major concern, at the 1980 and 1983 state 
elections concern about unemployment continued to be high. In 1980, 31 
per cent and in 1983, 36 per cent of voters saw it as the most important 
issue. In the 1986 election, however, concern about unemployment had 
dropped to 7 per cent and by 1989 it had disappeared as an election issue. 
One possible reason for this may have been the increasing concern about 
corruption in Queensland which emerged as an issue in the 1986 and 1989 
elections, and the growing perception that, at best, it had been allowed to 
flourish under the conservative government, and at worst, some government 
members had been actively involved. 
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Concerns about the conduct of the government and the premier, Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen, had been expressed by some voters throughout the period 
from 1977 to 1989. In 1977, 5 per cent of all voters saw the government's 
or the premier's performance as the most important issue in the election 
campaign; this encompassed a variety of more specific concerns such as 
the state of democracy in Queensland and the lack of accountability on the 
part of the government. A further 9 per cent of voters saw the 
government's disregard for civil liberties as the most important issue. By 
the time of the Sherwood by-election the following year these proportions 
had increased to 8 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. By 1980 the most 
important issue for 15 per cent of voters was the performance of the 
government or the premier. This dropped slightly to 13 per cent at the 
time of the 1983 state election campaign, but a further 6 per cent of voters 
identified the need for a change of government as the most important 
issue. Up to this point of time such concerns were expressed mainly by 
Labor voters, to a lesser extent by Liberal voters and rarely, if at all, by 
National voters. 
By 1986 corrupfion, in conjunction with cronyism and lack of 
accountability, had emerged as the most important issue, perceived as such 
not only by 40 per cent of Labor voters and 30 per cent of Liberal voters, 
but also by 12 per cent of National voters themselves. Related issues 
identified as most important at this time, mostly by Labor voters but to 
some extent by Liberal voters, were the need for a change of government, 
concern about unfair electoral boundaries and disquiet about the premier's 
performance. 
It seems that the increasing concern with the issue of the government's 
and the premier's performance, particularly in relation to accountability, the 
provision of democratic government, cronyism and outright corruption 
provided a lead up to the 1989 election campaign in which over half the 
voters, including 22 per cent of the Nationals' supporters, perceived 
corruption as the most important issue, and a further 8 per cent and 4 per 
cent of voters respectively, identified the related issues of the need for a 
change of government and the need for fair electoral boundaries as the 
most important issues in the campaign. 
The Effects of the Corruption Issue 
To pursue the corruption issue further, the 1989 survey respondents were 
divided into three groups on the basis of their responses to five 
questionnaire items: the issue they had identified as most important in the 
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1989 election, how strongly they felt about that issue, how closely they had 
followed the Fitzgerald Inquiry, how surprised they had been to hear about 
cormption in high places, and how important they thought corruption was 
to others in the electorate. 
The first group was comprised of those respondents who identified 
corruphon or honesty in government or the Fitzgerald reforms as the most 
important issue, felt very strongly about that issue, had followed the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry closely or very closely, were not at all surprised to hear 
about corruption and thought corruption was perceived as an important 
issue by most other people. Fifty-five respondents (20 per cent) were in 
this high corruption concern group. The second group was comprised of 
those who identified corruption or one of the two related issues as most 
important and felt very strongly about it but did not respond in the same 
way as the first group on all three remaining items. This medium 
cormption concern group contained forty-eight respondents (18 per cent). 
The remaining 167 respondents (62 per cent) constituted the third group. 
While their score on the five items puts them in the low corruption concern 
category, it must be noted that most indicated some concern for corruption 
on one or two of the five items. The results, by voting intention, appear 
in Table 3.11. 
Table 3.11 Level of corruption concern by voting intention, 1989 
Level of Concern 
High 
Medium 
Low 
n 
Labor 
% 
28.9 
20.2 
50,9 
(173) 
Liberal 
% 
0 
14.3 
85,7 
(35) 
National 
% 
0 
16,7 
83.3 
(18) 
Undecided 
% 
11.5 
3.9 
84.6 
(26) 
It would appear that cormption was primarily a Labor issue, with the 
other groups of voters having minimal interest in the subject; no intending 
Liberal or National voters indicated high concern about corruption. 
However, when respondents' vote at the 1986 state election is considered 
a slightly different picture emerges. 
As indicated in Table 3.12, 15 per cent of 1986 Liberal voters and 6 per 
cent of 1986 National voters fall in the high corruption concern category. 
As these individuals did not intend voting Liberal or National in 1989 (see 
Table 3.11) it appears likely that they were recruits to the Labor Party. 
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Table 3.12 Level of corruption concern by previous (1986) vote, 1989 ^ 
Previous Vote 
Labor Liberal National Undecided 
Level of concern % 
High 31.0 14,9 5.7 25.9 
Medium 18.1 11-3 13-2 22.3 
Low 50,9 63.8 81.1 51,6 
(116) (47) (53) (5) 
Table 3.13 suggests that this was in fact the case; these data show the 
level of corruption concern among those respondents who indicated that 
they intended changing their vote in 1989. Twenty-eight per cent of 
Liberals and 18 per cent of Nationals who were changing their vote to 
Labor in 1989 fell in the high corruption concern category. A further 24 
per cent of Liberals and 18 per cent of Nationals indicated a medium level 
of concern. If we assume that this accounts for their change of vote we are 
left with the further question of why the 63 per cent of 1986 Liberals and 
47 per cent of 1986 Nationals who had only a weak concern about 
corruption intended changing their vote to Labor in 1989. 
Table 3.13 Vote, 1986, vote intention, 1989, and corruption concern, 1989 
Vote - 1986, 1989 
Labor, Labor 
Liberal, Labor 
National, Labor 
Other, Labor 
Liberal, Liberal 
National, National 
National, Liberal 
Liberal, National 
Labor, Liberal/National 
Other, Liberal/National 
High 
% 
32,1 
28,0 
18.2 
20.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Level of Corruption Concern 
Medium 
% 
18.7 
24.0 
18.2 
30,0 
21,4 
23,1 
11.1 
0 
0 
0 
Low 
% 
49.1 
48.0 
63.6 
50,0 
78,6 
76.9 
88.9 
100.1 
100.0 
100,0 
n 
112 
25 
11 
20 
14 
13 
16 
1 
3 
1 
Although concern about corruption and/or dishonesty was the most 
frequently mentioned single reason offered for changing their vote by 
respondents who had not voted for the ALP in 1986 but intended doing so 
in 1989, this accounted for only 13 per cent of prospective ALP recruits. 
The remaining 87 per cent gave a wide range of reasons. A considerably 
higher proportion (32 per cent) of constant ALP voters - those who had 
voted ALP in 1986 and intended doing so again in 1989 - scored high on 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Election Issues 77 
the corruption measure than of recruits - those who intended changing 
their vote to ALP in 1989 - (23 per cent). Among low corruption concern 
scorers the difference between constant ALP voters and recruits was much 
less (49 per cent to 52 per cent respectively). 
It might be expected that those respondents who exhibited a high level 
of cormption concern would have different views of the parties and their 
leaders than those whose concern about corruption was low. Some 
differences are indeed apparent in the case of parties. The party image 
scores, discussed in Chapter 1, show differences in party evaluation 
between these two groups, as indicated in Table 3.14. On an eight point 
scale the mean Labor party score of those with high corruption concern is 
higher by two points than that of those with a low level of corruption 
concern. The Liberal and the National parties, on the other hand, are rated 
higher by those who show less concern for corruption. Nevertheless, the 
Labor party is rated higher than both the Liberal and National parties by 
both high and low corruption groups. 
Table 3.14 Party image scores of high and low corruption concern voters 
Level of Corruption Concern 
Party High Low 
Labor 6.2 4.1 
Liberal 2.2 3.4 
National 1.7 2.6 
n (55) (167) 
Table 3.15 carries this analysis further, presenting party image scores 
for two groups of ALP voters - the constants and the recruits - by their 
level of concern about corruption. The ALP is most highly regarded by 
constant supporters with a high level of corruption concern, and slightly 
less so by those with a low level of concern. 
Table 3.15 Party image scores of constant ALP supporters and of ALP recruits by 
cormption concern 
Type of ALP suppporters 
Level of concern 
Party 
Labor 
Liberal 
National 
n 
Constants 
High 
7.0 
2.0 
2.1 
(36) 
Low 
6,2 
1,8 
2,4 
(55) 
High 
5.2 
i;3 
2.6 
(13) 
Recruits 
Low 
5.2 
1.9 
2.4 
(29) 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
78 Rosemary Whip, John Western and David John Gow 
Recruits were less enthusiastic about the ALP than the constant 
supporters were, but their image scores were not affected by their level of 
concern about corruption. The two conservative parties have a poor image 
in the eyes of constant ALP supporters and recruits alike: level of concern 
about corruption appears to have had no substantial affect on these image 
scores. Differences in perceptions of party leaders (discussed in Chapter 
2) are also apparent, depending on level of concern about cormption. 
Respondents who have a high level of concern about corruption rate Goss 
higher than do those who have a low level of concern, whereas they rate 
both Cooper and Bjelke-Petersen lower than do those with low corruption 
concern. Innes is rated about the same by both groups; see Table 3.18. 
Table 3.16 Party leader image scores of high and low corruption concern voters 
Level of corruption concern 
Party leader High Low 
Goss 8.6 7.1 
Innes 5.5 5.6 
Cooper 3.0 39 
Bjelke-Petersen 3.2 4.1 
Further analysis along lines similar to those for party images is 
presented in Table 3.17. Goss scores higher with all four groups than any 
of the other leaders (better by a minimum of two points on an eleven point 
scale than Innes, his closest rival). He is most highly regarded among 
constants with a high level of concern about corruption. Innes also is most 
highly regarded by this group, whereas Cooper and Bjelke-Petersen, 
somewhat anomalously, are most highly regarded by recruits with a high 
level of corruption concern. 
Table 3.17 Party leader image scores of constant ALP supporters and of ALP recruits by 
corruption concern 
Type of ALP supporters 
Level of concern 
Party leader 
Goss 
Innes 
Cooper 
Bjclke-Pctersen 
High 
9.1 
5.2 
2.9 
3.0 
Constants 
Low 
8.0 
5.2 
2,9 
3.1 
High 
7.8 
5.3 
3.9 
4.2 
Recruits 
Low 
8.4 
S.3 
3,4 
3.4 
Of the eleven items used in the leader image index the one most closely 
related to the issue of corruption was that to do with the honesty of the 
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leaders. Table 3.18 indicates a marked difference in the way in which 
respondents with high and low corruption concern rate the leaders on this 
characteristic. 
Table 3.18 Perceptions of the honesty of the party leaders by respondents with high and 
low levels of corruption concern 
Level of Corruption Concern 
High Low 
Party leader % % 
Goss 85.6 63.4 
Innes 61.8 49.7 
Cooper 23.6 35.3 
Bjelke-Petersen 5.4 23.3 
Goss is perceived as honest by a considerably higher proportion of those 
respondents with a high level of corruption concern than by those with a 
low level of concern (by 22 percentage points), as also is Innes (by 12 
percentage points). Cooper, on the other hand, rates better with those 
whose concern about corruption is low (by 12 percentage points), as does 
Bjelke-Petersen (by 18 percentage points). However, even among those 
with a low level of concern about corruption, Goss is perceived as honest 
by almost twice as many respondents as Cooper and well over twice as 
many as Bjelke-Petersen. 
This group is also the one which perceives Innes as most honest 
although the proportion who do so is over 30 percentage points lower than 
that for Goss. Cboper and Bjelke-Petersen find their greatest support 
among recruits with a low level of concern about corruption, but its level 
is below that of Innes and well below that of Goss for the same group. 
Table 3.19 Perceptions of the honesty of the party leaders of constant ALP supporters and 
ALP recmits by level of corruption concern 
Type of ALP supporters 
Level of concern 
Patty leader 
Goss 
Innes 
Cooper 
Bjelke-Petersen 
High 
% 
97.2 
63.9 
22.2 
5.6 
Constants 
Low 
% 
81.8 
47.3 
23.6 
12.7 
High 
% 
76.9 
61.5 
30.8 
1.1 
Recruits 
Low 
% 
89.7 
58.6 
37.0 
20.7 
Among ALP voters only (see Table 3.19) Goss is perceived as honest 
by a considerably higher proportion of voters in all four groups (constant 
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ALP voters with high and low levels of corruption concern and recruits 
with high and low levels of corruption concern) than any of the othei 
leaders. This perception is highest among constants with a high level oi 
corruption concern. 
Conclusions 
Although the data suggest that the issue of corruption did not contribute 
directly to individuals' recruitment to the Labor party to any great extent, 
it was, nevertheless, an all pervasive issue in the election campaign. In 
spite of the recurring observation that Australian elections have become 
highly orchestrated contests between competing images of leaders rather 
than contests between competing policies and party platforms, the 1989 
Queensland state election was about an issue - corruption; the relevance 
of leaders and parties was subordinate to, yet a product of this one issue. 
What distinguished the events leading up to the 1989 election, and 
accounted in no small way for the prominence of corruption on the election 
agenda, was the Fitzgerald Inquiry. Corruption was not a new issue in 
Queensland elections, as this chapter has demonstrated, but it was the 
Inquiry and the Fitzgerald Report which focussed attention on it. The 
Report, as expected, identified high level impropriety and corruption in the 
police force, the executive and the judiciary during the time that Bjelke-
Petersen was in power. However, it might be argued that it was the timing 
of the Report - only five months before the election - as much as its 
content, that influenced events because there was not time for Bjelke-
Petersen's heirs to distance themselves from the errors of the past. 
The timing and content of the Fitzgerald Report set the agenda for the 
election. Its release marked the unofficial beginning of the ALP election 
campaign and its findings defined the theme of the election as cormption. 
Consequently, throughout the period from the presentation of the report in 
July to the election in December, Goss was able to campaign with an 
election agenda set by Fitzgerald-related themes, with corruption as the 
dominant issue and institutional reforms as the counter-point. 
Corruption was not simply an election issue in the 1989 campaign; it 
functioned as a cognitive schema that thoroughly dominated the way in 
which issues, and images of leaders and parties were structured and 
assessed, and then influenced the casting of a ballot. 
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4 
THE CAMPAIGN 
Peter Coaldrake 
Crises for the Nationals 
The continuing crises which had plagued the National party for more 
than two years meant that Queensland had been in constant campaign 
mode for many months prior to the formal announcement of 2 
December as the election date by the newly-installed premier, Russell 
Cboper. Those crises began with the moment in December 1986, just a 
few short weeks after the Nationals' state election win, when premier Sir 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen took the improbable step of announcing his bid for 
the prime ministership. Although this initially attracted national 
curiosity, the campaign stalled within a few months on account of its 
lack of public support and failure to mobilise a nationally-based 
infrastmcture. 
For a pohtician as accustomed to success as Joh Bjelke-Petersen, the 
failure of the "Joh for PM" campaign was deeply humiliating. His 
actions also destabilised the federal non-Labor parties as they 
marshalled their forces for the 1987 federal election campaign and 
Bjelke-Petersen himself was subsequently blamed by many Coalition 
supporters for their defeat. Furthermore, Bjelke-Petersen's Canberra 
aspirations distracted his attention away from his on-going obligations 
as premier and treasurer. His government became subject to increasing 
criticism regarding its ability or willingness to deal with problems 
associated with the narrow structural base of Queensland's economy, 
while Sir Job's absences promoting his campaign inevitably focussed 
attention not only on his continued interest in the premiership, but also 
on the issue of the National party's future leadership. Thus the events 
associated with Sir Job's prime ministerial bid derailed his personal 
standing and seriously weakened the standing of his government. 
Meanwhile opinion poll evidence confirmed that the National party 
needed to modernise its policies, yet there was also a recognition, even 
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inside the party, that this was unlikely to occur while Bjelke-Petersen 
remained as leader. 
Friction was also created within the Bjelke-Petersen cabinet by the 
premier's anointing of Bill Gunn as the next premier. Gunn, while 
obviously grateful for Sir Job's blessing, was nevertheless sensitive to 
the public perception of himself as a Bjelke-Petersen clone. During his 
lengthy stints as acting premier Gunn took a number of steps to distance 
himself from his leader, the most significant being his part in 
establishing the Fitzgerald Inquiry and supporting its work. Another 
was his decision to nominate Sir Robert Sparkes for another term as 
party president, despite Bjelke-Petersen's opposition to Sir Robert with 
whom he had been in conflict for some time, particularly over the 
timing of the premier's departure from state politics. Sir Robert was 
aware of opinion poll evidence signalling a decline in support for Sir 
Joh and this encouraged a much closer questioning of the premier's 
performance and political judgment by the party organisation, a 
questioning deeply resented by Sir Joh himself. 
Bjelke-Petersen's difficulties worsened. At the National party's state 
council meeting at Rockhampton in October 1987 the premier bitterly 
contested a motion, which the state council subsequently endorsed, that 
ministers be required to step down from their portfolios a reasonable 
time before their retirement. The premier in turn indicated his 
disillusionment with the party. The events which took place at the 
meeting confirmed to Bjelke-Petersen that his party no longer 
appreciated him in the manner he believed it should. He and Sir Robert 
Sparkes were urged to cease hostilities but within a matter of days after 
the meeting Sir Joh renewed his criticism of the party president and, in a 
misguided ploy to keep the premiership secure, threatened to call a snap 
election to take the party down with him if it moved against him. 
These actions only served to underline party and public concern 
about Bjelke-Petersen's performance and judgment. On 8 October Sir 
Joh, now aware that his party had tired of his antics, blunted any 
immediate threat to his position by announcing (almost twelve months in 
advance) his preferred retirement date of 8 August 1988, his twentieth 
anniversary as premier. 
Although the event was still some months off, Sir Job's deparhire 
from state politics now seemed assured. In preparation, the National 
party, at its annual state conference at Townsville in November 1987, 
set about the task of preparing for the post-Bjelke-Petersen era. In 
policy terms this translated into endorsement of the position of Sir 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
The Campaign 87 
Robert Sparkes, and rejection of Sir Job's, on a number of issues. These 
included the introduction of condom-vending machines, some 
liberalisation of the party's stance on prostitution, provision of sex 
education during school hours, and the establishment of a foreign-
owned land register. Sir Joh was also rebuffed by the state conference 
on his insistence that Japanese developer Yohachiro Iwasaki be given 
trusteeship of land proposed as national park near Iwasaki's holiday 
resort at Yeppoon on the central Queensland coast. Even worse for Sir 
Job's authority. Sir Robert Sparkes was re-elected as party president, 
with some 80 per cent of the votes cast. 
The 1987 state conference left Sir Joh even more embittered and, in 
the subsequent weeks, the Nationals were engulfed by a series of crises 
which finally led to Bjelke-Petersen's departure firom politics. It was a 
forced departure, and very quickly Sir Joh made it plain that the party's 
agony would not end with his retirement, that he would neither accept 
the newly-installed Mike Ahern as premier nor forgive Sparkes for his 
involvement in the events which forced Sir Job's exit. Even more 
worrying for the Nationals, Bjelke-Petersen waged his campaign as 
publicly and as bitterly as possible and, in doing so, reinforced the 
image of party disunity. His cause was assisted by several of his former 
ministerial colleagues who were dropped from cabinet by the new 
premier: Lin Powell, Don Lane, Russ Hinze and Yvonne Chapman. 
From the start of his premiership Mike Ahern therefore had to contend 
with internal party hostilities which were unprecedented for the 
Queensland Nationals. These hostilities were also extremely dangerous 
for the Nationals who had long made much of their reputation as the 
only party in Queensland able to offer stable and cohesive leadership. 
Quite apart from their internal haemorrhaging, the Nationals had to 
contend with the revelations of the Fitzgerald Inquiry. While Sir Joh 
had long paraded his party and government as actively and often 
forcefully protecting Queensland's political and moral virtue, the 
reputation of his administration crumbled before the revelations of 
cormption. As it closed the Bjelke-Petersen era was now widely viewed 
as a period when both personal and institutional corruption had been 
allowed to flourish unchecked, a view reinforced when some of those 
allegedly involved publicly admitted their guilt. 
Mike Ahern, who had clashed with Sir Joh on a number of previous 
occasions, sought to distinguish his administration from that of his 
predecessor. In particular, he strongly supported the Fitzgerald Inquiry's 
lines of investigation. This was a bold strategy, yet a chancy one for he 
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was still vulnerable to the criticism levelled by his political opponents 
that he was guilty by association. He had been a National MLA for 
twenty years, eight of which he had served as a minister in the Bjelke-
Petersen cabinet and his opponents in the Labor and Liberal parties 
frequently reminded electors of that record. 
Ahern also had to contend with internal party problems directly 
stemming from the Fitzgerald Inquiry. The continuing revelations of 
corruption seriously undermined the capacity of the government to 
govern and threatened party unity. The view was held in some quarters 
of the National party that the decision to establish the Fitzgerald Inquiry 
had been a terrible mistake, and the party's continued support of its work 
constituted political suicide. What had started out as a limited probe 
into allegations of police misconduct had become a wide-ranging 
investigation into how the business of government had been conducted 
in Queensland over a very long time. 
The sustained impetus of the Fitzgerald Inquiry thus affected a series 
of troublesome pressure points inside the National party. Key 
individuals and groups inside the party, or close to it, who had been part 
of the previous decision-making processes, were threatened by any 
attempt to expose the way in which the government had previously 
operated. Pressure from those quarters made it difficult for the party to 
maintain a united front, while a real risk emerged that unless Ahern and 
Gunn were able to control the fallout, the party could implode. 
The Nationals' massive problems were not even confined to the 
corruption issue. Mike Ahern had pledged in advance that he would 
implement the Fitzgerald Report in its entirety. That pledge now 
committed his government to follow Fitzgerald's recommendation to 
conduct a review of the state's electoral boundaries. Such a review was 
hardly likely to gladden those in the National party who had worked so 
long to retain the State's controversial zonal electoral structiire. For his 
part Ahern insisted that the Nationals were not conceding any change of 
view about the zonal arrangements, and that they would strongly defend 
the retention of that system. Nonetheless, the fact that the Fitzgerald 
Report drew prominent attention to the electoral system did much to 
influence public perceptions about the need to alter the zonal stmchire. 
Opinion polls reflected this shift, a shift which was taking place only a 
year after Queenslanders declined (along with electors in other states) to 
support a federal referendum on the issue of one vote-one value as the 
electoral basis for all houses of parliament in Australia except the 
federal Senate. 
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While Ahern would have been discomforted by the prospect of a 
review of the state's electoral system, it is to his credit that, in the face 
of mounting concern within his own party, he maintained a strong 
commitment to implement the Fitzgerald Report even though the effects 
of Fitzgerald's investigation were hindering the capacity of his 
government to govern. Not only had two senior ministers been sidelined 
while their activities were being investigated by Fitzgerald (Russ Hinze 
and Don Lane), the Police Commissioner, Sir Terence Lewis, had been 
forced to step down, and the business dealings and style of the former 
premier himself had been subject to close and embarrassing public 
scrutiny. 
Ahem Overthrown 
Politically brave though some of his colleagues considered him, others 
in the National party regarded Mike Ahern's behaviour as either naive or 
muddled. There also was a sense that the party was heading toward 
pohtical oblivion unless some dramatic turnaround in its fortunes could 
be effected within a very short period of time. The Fitzgerald Report 
had been released in July 1989, and the election was due before the end 
of the year. 
Mike Ahern was unable to contain the damage. The Nationals 
suffered a continuing deterioration in their level of support, with poll 
evidence suggesting that this had been reduced to about half that secured 
at the 1986 state election. Ahern's personal stocks were also declining, 
while the seriousness of the situation was confirmed by very large 
swings against the party in three by-elections. The most recent was in 
the metropolitan seat of Merthyr, where the Liberal party's Santo 
Santoro won the seat previously held by Don Lane, who had originally 
won it as a Liberal. The National party's vote collapsed dreadfully in 
Merthyr even though a high profile candidate, Betty Byrne Henderson, 
had been secured and an expensive campaign waged. 
Within a short period two attempts were made within the 
parliamentary party to remove Ahern as premier. The first, in late 
August, was unsuccessful. On that occasion Russell Cooper, a well 
regarded but still relatively inexperienced minister in the cabinet, offered 
himself as a candidate for leader, while Paul Clauson, the justice 
minister, stood for the deputy's post. The bid failed narrowly but, a few 
weeks later on 22 September, a second coup resulted in Russell Cooper 
winning the parliamentary leadership and premiership. Again the 
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margin was narrow, though this time the challenger's bid was assisted by 
the support of deputy premier Bill Gunn (who then managed to retain 
the deputy's job) and another senior minister, Vince Lester. 
While the majority of the parliamentary members of the National 
party obviously believed that the election of Russell Cooper could 
provide the party with a fresh start, the fact that the coup had failed on 
its first attempt, and that the deciding margin on both occasions had 
been slim, indicated that the party was deeply divided. The fact, too, 
that the removal of the party leader was effected so close to the start of 
the formal election campaign, and that the action was apparently 
sanctioned by party headquarters, suggested that the party had lost its 
collective nerve. 
Labor's Mobilisation 
For many years the Australian Labor Party in Queensland had behaved 
not as a viable alternative government but as a group seemingly content 
to be in permanent opposition. By the community the ALP was 
perceived to be directing most of its attentions inward, and was 
dismissed for having failed to take its opposition role seriously. Despite 
the difficulties faced by the Nationals during their initial term of office 
in their own right after 1983, at the subsequent election in 1986 Labor 
failed to make headway. Both its votes and its seat numbers slipped, 
and there was little prospect of improvement. The adequacy of the 
parliamentary leadership of the party was questioned and broader issues 
confronting Labor in any bid to improve its electoral attractiveness were 
canvassed. 
In March 1988 Wayne Goss was elected parliamentary leader of the 
Labor party, a choice viewed as recognition by Labor itself of Goss's 
personal standing, and as an indicator that the party was at last prepared 
to bury factional hatchets to improve its electoral prospects. Although 
the improvement in the party's fortunes thereafter was slow, it was 
nevertheless steady. It was clearly secured on Goss's political back and 
in this regard there is an interesting comparison with Sir Joh Bjelke-
Petersen's career: it was under Sir Job's leadership that the Nationals 
managed to double their share of the primary vote from 20 per cent in 
1972 to almost 40 per cent in 1986. Perhaps Goss could achieve similar 
results for his party. 
Labor's stocks were still very low at the time Goss assumed the 
leadership, and the party obviously would require a long-term campaign 
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to win office. In July 1988 the first phase of this campaign opened. 
Strong emphasis was placed in an electronic media campaign on Goss 
himself and on the identification of the Labor party with stronger 
economic growth and development, in particular, the creation of more 
jobs and better paid jobs. That mid-term campaign was successful in so 
far as it attempted to highlight Labor's new leadership strength and to 
juxtapose the obvious difficulties the Nationals were having at the time 
with their new premier, Mike Ahern. 
In late 1988, the second phase of Labor's campaign was launched. 
Bnital in the directness of its approach, this campaign was predicated on 
the revelations before the Fitzgerald Inquiry which had linked the 
Nationals directly with corruption and tarnished the reputation of the 
government. The activities of Don Lane and Russ Hinze in particular 
had attracted massive media coverage, and this phase of the campaign 
sought to confirm cormption not only as a major issue, but corruption as 
an issue directiy linked to the administration of the state by the 
Nationals and the Liberals as well. The campaign utilised the theme 
"hear no evil, see no evil" and reminded the electorate of Mike Ahern's 
twenty years in government and eight years in Cabinet, and the state 
Liberal party's long-term participation in coalition government prior to 
1983. 
In July 1989 Labor launched the third phase of its campaign, which 
continued the promotion of the leadership issue as well as developing 
policies for education and law enforcement. These latter areas had been 
targeted by Labor following the party's receipt of market research 
indicating significant levels of community concern about the tertiary 
entrance (TE) score system for entry into higher education, and about 
education and police and law enforcement issues generally. 
In an unusual move Labor decided to unveil its election campaign 
theme not at the outset of the formal campaign itself but six months 
before the scheduled election, in May 1989. The slogan "Wayne Goss 
and Labor. The only change for the better" sought to portray Labor as 
the only party capable of bringing real change to Queensland which, by 
now, had been paralysed by successive political crises for almost two 
years. Not only did this campaign promote Goss as the leader able to 
provide that new direction, it depicted the Liberals as ill-equipped to 
provide the fundamental shift now required. 
Two other themes emerged during the final three months prior to the 
commencement of the formal election campaign. The first, which 
argued that Goss and his team should be given the chance to govern for 
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a single term, was directed toward voters who traditionally had always 
voted for the non-Labor parties but who were now exasperated by the 
difficulties faced by the Nationals and the Liberals in attempting to work 
harmoniously. The second was the proposition that a vote for the 
Liberals was really only a vote for the Nationals. Not surprisingly, this 
drew considerable flak from the Liberals who were forced to contest the 
claim and to reiterate their independence of their former coalition 
parties. 
Liberals in the Crossfire 
Life had not been easy for the state Liberals since 1983. At first they 
preferred to believe that it was simply a matter of time before they were 
recalled to coalition. However, both Labor and the Nationals had other 
ideas and so the Liberals found themselves attacked by Labor as 
irrelevant conservative bridesmaids and by the Nationals as lightweights 
unsure of their priorities and dismptive in their approach to government. 
The Liberals - stretched for campaign funds and with a geographically-
limited party infrastructure - were caught in the crossfire. They had 
responded to this situation during the 1986 state campaign by promising 
a return to trust and integrity in government. But on that occasion the 
strategy backfired, and the Liberals were squeezed out in a polarised 
contest. 
Despite that failure, the Liberals approached the 1989 campaign with 
considerably more confidence. The extent of the difficulties confronting 
the Nationals encouraged Liberals to believe that they could secure 
significant seat and vote increases, even though their ability to translate 
vote gains into a major net seat increase was still limited by the zonal 
electoral system and by the party's organisational weakness outside the 
south-east. 
As the election campaign approached, a more immediate menace for 
the Liberals emerged with the very real prospect of an almost total 
collapse of the National party's metropolitan vote. In a number of seats 
the Liberals were threatened by the combination of a Labor surge and a 
collapse of the National party's primary count. In 1983 and 1986 the 
Nationals had won a number of seats on Liberal second preferences, but 
there was now a real chance that with the support levels of the two 
non-Labor parties reversed, the Liberals would be denied a significant 
National party primary vote which would subsequently transfer to them 
via the distribution of preferences. 
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In the event a total of 334 candidates contested the 89 electoral 
districts, compared with 292 in 1986. The ALP fielded one candidate 
for each seat, while the Nationals - despite some difficulties in 
attracting candidates in the metropolitan area - contested 85 seats. The 
Liberals endorsed 77 candidates covering 76 electoral districts (two 
candidates were pre-selected for Pine Rivers) while there were a total of 
83 independent and minor party candidates. A total of 43 women 
contested the election, 17 of whom were endorsed by the ALP, and eight 
each by the National and Liberal parties. 
The Final Campaign Phase 
The Nationals' position was undoubtedly desperate, but they were not 
about to forfeit government readily. They changed leaders just prior to 
the campaign in an effort to regroup, presumably also hoping for at least 
a short media honeymoon for their new leader. In opting to launch their 
campaign ten days before either Labor or the Liberals, the Nationals 
hoped to seize the initiative. They also chose a campaign theme "Keep 
Queensland Strong and Free. Vote National" which reminded electors 
of how the party had for so long been portrayed. Yet it was a highly 
risky theme because events in Queensland over the preceding two years 
had very badly tarnished the National party's credibility as a government 
capable of providing stable leadership. 
The Nationals may have been fortunate that the special prosecutor, 
Doug Dmmmond QC, decided to postpone charges against a number of 
present or past ministers until after the election. Yet speculation 
regarding the identity of the individuals involved may have been as 
damaging as if charges had actually been laid against some of them. 
Russell Cooper dealt with the corruption issue by continually 
asserting that it was now an issue in the past. State parliament, just 
prior to the election campaign, had passed two major pieces of 
Fitzgerald-related legislation which established the Criminal Justice 
Commission and the Electoral and Administrative Review Commission. 
Yet despite these important initiatives, as well as the earlier move by 
Mike Ahern to establish a parliamentary public accounts committee, the 
Nationals could do littie to disassociate themselves from the party's past. 
Nor was their task in this respect made any easier by the continuing 
portrayal of Russell Cooper as a second Bjelke-Petersen. This depiction 
may have been regarded as helpful in "the bush" but it was also 
extremely damaging insofar as it suggested that little had changed in the 
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National party if it was prepared, in the wake of the Fitzgerald Report, 
to endorse a Sir Joh-style leader. 
The Nationals' campaign was rugged and mostly negative in 
orientation. Not until the last week did the party make any real attempt 
to argue the positive aspects of its own case, and then the switch was 
made only after party headquarters had digested its market research. 
The Nationals focussed their campaign on the ALP as an un-
Queensland party in terms of its economic and social policies, and 
sought to associate the state ALP with the high interest rate policies of 
the federal Labor government. To a lesser extent the Nationals sought 
to counter the strong personal support now apparent for Wayne Goss by 
pointing to the presence in his shadow cabinet of three former leaders as 
well as other ex-union officials whom the Nationals sought to link to 
industrial unrest in the electricity industry several years previously. 
The Liberals faced a dilemma in selecting their campaign strategy. 
They wanted to emphasise their conservative credentials, and offer 
themselves as a genuine alternative for disenchanted National Party 
voters. Yet any association with the Nationals was likely to hurt them 
in their metropolitan power base. The Liberals finally opted for the 
campaign theme "Let's Put It Right" as a way of indicating their 
commitment to cleaning up cormption. 
Despite their determination to maintain a reasonable distance from 
the Nationals, it was that very issue which continually bedevilled the 
Liberal party's campaign. At the outset their leader, Angus Innes, 
attempted to deal with it by his bold announcement that the Liberal 
party would not enter into a coalition government unless it was the 
senior partner. However, seniority in a coalition normally requires one 
party to hold more seats than its coalition partner and, over the years, 
the Liberals had never enjoyed such ascendancy in Queensland. In fact, 
the zonal electoral system worked against the Liberals to the point 
where it was almost impossible for them to secure more seats than the 
Nationals, except in the event of a Labor victory. The Liberal position 
on the coalition issue represented a laudable aspiration but not 
necessarily a realistic one. 
Innes was questioned repeatedly by sceptical journalists about this 
pledge not to serve in a reconstructed coalition except as the senior 
partner. He might have been able to weather this probing except that, at 
a press interview in Stanthorpe, he responded to a hypothetical question 
about what might occur if the Liberals failed to secure seniority by 
indicating that in such a case the Liberals would occupy the 
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parliamentary crossbenches but they would support a non-Labor 
minority government. Innes claimed that his remarks were 
misinterpreted by the media but, whether or not that is the case, the 
incident proved badly damaging in its public perception. The Liberals 
were now more vulnerable than ever to Labor's claims that "a vote for 
the Liberals is a vote for the Nationals". 
Labor's campaign, by contrast with those of the two conservative 
parties, ran smoothly. It capitalised heavily on strong voter approval for 
the new leader, Wayne Goss, and the party's market research which 
showed strong public support for political change. In opting for the 
campaign theme "Wayne Goss and Labor. The Only Change for the 
Better" party strategists tapped both those elements, in the process 
implying that the Liberals represented no real change and that the 
Nationals were incapable of it. 
The manner in which the ALP campaign was waged in 1989 
suggested that the party had learnt from its past mistakes, and that it had 
developed an appreciation of those factors which had worked so well for 
the National party in previous campaigns. Labor's campaign, managed 
by the assistant state secretary, Wayne Swan, was tightly controlled and 
well financed - in part from ALP financial reserves (see Chapter 5). 
The party's campaign strategy also reflected an appreciation that the 
party needed to win seats in all parts of the state if it were to capture (or 
deserve to) the fifteen required to secure office. This "across the state" 
emphasis by Labor was evidenced by the heavy schedule of regional 
visits made by Goss and his team over at least a year leading up to the 
election, by the strong emphasis on regional and rural policies in Labor's 
platform, and by the strategic announcement during the campaign that 
Keith De Lacy, MLA for Cairns, would be treasurer in an incoming 
Labor government. 
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The factionalism of the Queensland branch of the Australian Labor Party 
(ALP) throughout the 1970s and 1980s is legendary in Austrahan 
politics. Matt Robbins late in 1987 accurately chronicled yet another 
bout of public infighting that had convulsed the Queensland Branch 
following the 1986 state election by quoting Scott Fitzgerald's line from 
The Great Gatsby, "So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back 
ceaselessly into the past", and observing that: "Fitzgerald could have 
composed these beautiful lines as a tribute to the Queensland ALP in 
honour of its determination this year to embark on another 30 years in 
Opposition."' 
The cumulative effect of a decade of fractiousness had by 1987 
produced an appalling image. Voters simply would not contemplate 
Labor because of "its factional brawling, its lack of policy appeal and 
direction and its current leadership".^ How and why, in the space of 
two years between October 1987 and December 1989, the ALP 
resurrected its political fortunes and formed the government of 
Queensland is as much a story of party management, campaign planning 
and leadership superiority as it is the story of National party collapse 
and the Fitzgerald Inquiry. 
Labor won because it was able to implement a disciplined and 
planned strategy over an eighteen months period with each stage of the 
campaign taking it to a higher level of support and closer to victory. 
That victory was never at any stage inevitable or certain for there was a 
widely held belief in the community, and among its opinion leaders, that 
Labor would not win in 1989, not even if the Fitzgerald Inquiry slashed 
the Nationals support down the middle. The gerrymander was simply 
too great; the number of seats required too many and the Liberals were 
too well positioned to take up the slack created by a National collapse. 
The result in 1989, it was said, would be a coalition (whether National-
Liberal or Liberal-National remained to be seen) with Labor well 
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positioned for next time around. This view was conventional wisdom 
even within large sections of the Labour Movement. 
To win Labor required fifteen seats. It targeted twenty-two which 
are listed in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Labor's target seats and primary and two-party preferred votes 1986 
Electorate Primary vote Two-party preferred vote 
% % 
Priority 1 - 2 2 seats 
46.3 46.3 
44.7 48.0 
37.4 48,0 
43.5 44.6 
42.6 45.5 
49.3 49.3 
45.5 47,3 
46.0 46.0 
41.0 46.3 
37.2 46.5 
40.6 42,3 
38.3 45,6 
40.3 44.4 
37.4 43.1 
38.0 40.8 
39,2 39,2 
39.1 43.1 
37,4 41,1 
39.8 46.2 
32,1 43.8 
38.4 42,5 
37.6 42,4 
37.4 44,5 
36.6 45.8 
33.7 43.3 
29.1 38,4 
41.7 41,7 
33,6 41.1 
32.8 40.1 
31.1 35.5 
Approximately half of the targeted seats were located outside the 
metropolitan area and in two-party preferred terms a swing of 5.5 
percentage points was required though in reality it was much more. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
g 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Warrego 
Ashgrove 
Broadsound 
Nundah 
Stafford 
Maryborough 
Mount Isa 
Barron River 
Mulgrave 
Pine Rivers 
Redcliffe 
Townsville 
Yeronga 
Glasshouse 
Whitsunday 
Flinders 
Hinchinbrook 
Tablelands 
Redlands 
Springwood 
Isis 
Toowoomba North 
Priority 2 - 8 seats 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
fi 
7 
8 
Mansfield 
Greenslopes 
Mount Giavatt 
Callide 
Mlrani 
Currumbin 
Nerang 
Fassifem 
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The impending collapse of the Nationals meant that in some crucial 
three-cornered contests Labor would be denied Liberal preference 
leakage and would require large primary swings to cross the line with 
the expected minimal leakage of National preferences. For example, in 
Pine Rivers, a National held seat, a two-party preferred swing of 3.5 
percentage points was required, but in primary terms a swing of 12 
percentage points was more realistic. 
In the metropolitan area opinion leaders wrote off Labor's prospects 
in a number of seats, decreeing that Labor could not win marginal 
Liberal seats like Nundah, Stafford and Ashgrove and that it was the 
Liberals who would win marginal National seats like Pine Rivers and 
Springwood when the National vote went down. In the country. Labor's 
chances were perceived to be better because of the absence of a 
traditional Liberal base on which the ALP had previously relied by way 
of preferences. 
Labor was aware it could not afford to stumble, given the formidable 
hurdles it faced. First and foremost, party cohesion and unity had to be 
restored within the parliamentary and organisational wings. Second, 
Labor had to mount the most effective and professional campaign of its 
hundred year history. Third, Labor had to develop and select the best 
policies and candidates and marshall all available resources behind the 
campaign. Fourth, Labor's parliamentary and organisational leadership 
had to prepare and execute, at the central and local level and over an 
eighteen month period, a campaign of unprecedented intensity. Hard 
work and leadership by example were the key to linking these four aims 
to produce electoral victories in at least fifteen seats across the state. So 
far was Labor behind the eightball, if it failed to meet all these 
objectives simultaneously the vacuum left by the Nationals would again 
be filled by the Liberals, as had been the case throughout 1987 and early 
1988 in the opinion polls and at the by-elections. 
In the event. Labor presented itself as a positive alternative and the 
Liberals did not. The success of Labor's attack on the Liberals proved to 
be the major achievement of its campaign as it marginalised the Liberal 
party by tying it inextricably to the Nationals, whilst at the same time 
building up a positive Labor image based on strength of leadership, 
party unity and policy alternatives. 
Labor did not win by default for it capitalised on the National's 
corruption, discredited the Liberal alternative and outlined a positive 
Labor alternative. Nevertheless, its problems in the electorate were large. 
Selling the Labor alternative took a considerable amount of time to turn 
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pubhc opinion around and it was not until the first quarter of 1989 that 
voters began to recognise the Labor party had become a unified force 
with a will to win. 
The two major factors in the final victory were the leadership appeal 
of Wayne Goss and the unity and discipline of the party that flowed 
from the subjugation of factional conflict. Hard work, attention to 
planning and detail, the repetition of simple but central themes and the 
constant effort to be positive, distinguished Labor from its opponents in 
a way that the electorate must have approved. 
The Restoration of Party Unity 
The restoration of party unity underpinned Labor's campaign effort 
throughout 1988 and 1989. The turning point was the resignation from 
the parliamentary leadership of Neville Warburton and his replacement 
by Wayne Goss in March 1988. Thereafter throughout 1988 and 1989 
at the administrative and parliamentary level, spanning two-party 
conferences and numerous state council and administrative committee 
meetings, the Queensland branch of the ALP resolved difficult internal 
party problems maturely and away from the public spotiight. Such 
harmony was not easily achieved. The previous year, 1987, was, even 
by Queensland Labor standards, characterised by extraordinary displays 
of public infighting over such matters as the leadership of Neville 
Warburton, the disendorsement of Len Keogh as federal member for 
Bowman, controversy surrounding the public statements of the state 
secretary, Peter Beattie, and bitter conflict over new rules for state 
conference and state council. 
The stmctural foundation of the unity accomplished in 1988 and 
1989 came from a re-arrangement of internal power balances which 
were achieved immediately following the 1986 state election loss. At 
this time a new internal party majority called "the Alliance" was 
forged.^  Comprised of previously diametrically opposed factional 
opponents, the Centre and the Socialist Left, this body controlled 
internal party decision-making from late 1986 onwards into 1990. 
During the critical period of campaign planning and implementation it 
received strong support and goodwill from Labor Unity. The impetus for 
the Alliance's creation had been the 1986 state election result for Labor 
polled 41.8 per cent of the primary vote, 4.5 percentage points less than 
its post-split peak recorded in 1972 and the party's second worst result 
since the 1957 split and its fifth worst since 1909. 
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Labor party research prior to the 1986 election had indicated that 
electors wanted a change, they wanted to throw the Nationals out, but 
they had no faith in the Liberal or Labor alternatives; 89 per cent of 
swinging voters could not identify a single policy issue that Labor stood 
for. Labor's lacklustre performance in 1986 stemmed largely from a lack 
of specific policies, the poor image of the parliamentary wing and, most 
important of all, party disunity and factionalism. Labor's 1986 state 
election result was one of its own making and therefore entirely 
reversible if those problems could be solved. 
Throughout 1986 and yet again throughout 1987, the internal 
divisions within the National party and on-going revelations of 
corruption within the National party were so marked that Labor had a 
unique opportunity to reverse thirty years of electoral decline. It was 
against this background that senior members of the Centre and Socialist 
Left decided that stability must be brought to internal party affairs and 
urgent corrective action should be taken to revive the caucus and the 
party machine. At the end of 1986, there were four formally organised 
factions in Labor decision making bodies. 
First was the Old Guard or Labor Unity, Queensland Labor's oldest 
faction. In the 1960s it was equated with the left of the ALP, in the 
~80s it was synonymous with the right. It brought together mainly 
Trades and Labour Council unions and some members in the branches. 
In early 1980 it changed its name to Labor Unity and adhered to the 
national faction of that name headed by the prime minister, Bob Hawke. 
It dominated parliamentary representation both state and federal and had 
resisted federal intervention in 1980. Through the 1980s it commanded 
approximately 25 per cent of support on key decision-making party 
bodies. 
The Socialist Left was formed following intervention in 1980 when it 
split off from the reform movement which had supported federal 
intervention. It comprised left-wing unions from the Trades and Labour 
Council, like the Metal Workers, and left-leaning branch members. 
Throughout the 1980s it commanded more than of 30 per cent of 
support. 
Two other factions formed in the early 1980s, both remnants of the 
old reform group. One, the Centre faction, otherwise known as the 
AWU faction, was initially affiliated with the National Centre Left, but 
in the mid 1980s affiliated with the National Right. It was composed of 
branch members and unions like the Australian Workers Union and 
Shop Distributive and Allied Employees Association and it commanded 
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a third of the support at party conferences. The other, the Centre Left, 
commanded less than 10 per cent of party support and had no significant 
union support. 
Since intervention, at one time or another, all the factions had 
entered some form of alliance to gain the majority in key decision 
making bodies, with one notable exception - the Centre, or AWTJ, had 
never combined with the Socialist Left. Both these factions had little 
representation in the parliamentary wing and were critical of the 
performance of the Labor parliamentary caucus and party office. In pre-
selections for the 1986 state election both factions had been unsuccessful 
in gaining extra parliamentary representation and Labor Unity 
dominance of the caucus was maintained. 
The poor election result in 1986 was the catalyst that brought Centre 
and Socialist Left together, and hardened their determination to change 
Queensland Labor and mount a serious challenge for the state 
government. These two factions were dissatisfied with the administration 
of the party office, which was seen as self-preoccupied and remote from 
modern campaigning, and united in their belief that Labor could win, 
particularly if it rallied behind the parliamentary leadership and got 
down to some hard work. 
The Alliance saw the stabilisation of internal party affairs, the 
elevation of new talent to the party frontbench, and changes to personnel 
in party office as prerequisites to a serious challenge. Initially, its 
formation in November 1986 and the disendorsement of Len Keogh in 
Bowman resulted in a new round of party infighting throughout 1987 
referred to by Matt Robbins in the opening paragraph of this chapter. A 
vigorous public campaign was waged against the Alliance by Centre 
Left and some members of state caucus who feared disendorsement and 
the sack for the Centre Left state secretary, Peter BeaUie. This party 
infighting produced a new round of interventions from the federal 
executive through 1987. 
On 14 April 1987, following an earlier abortive meeting, the ALP 
federal executive brought down a series of decisions and agreements 
which reduced the power of the central electoral college, deferred the 
1987 state conference, dealt with the Bowman pre-selection fight, and 
achieved consensus on the replacement of officials in the party office." 
These federal interventions ceased early in 1988 after Neville 
Warburton's resignation from the leadership in March brought a new era 
of unity and purpose to the Queensland branch. Goss' ascension to the 
leadership satisfied Alliance demands for changes in the parliamentary 
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wing, while a broad party consensus was achieved for the replacement 
of state secretary Peter Beattie with Terry Hampson, and choice of 
Wayne Swan, the present writer, as campaign director, later that year. 
For their part, the Alliance agreed to accept the demands from sections 
of the national executive. Labor Unity and the Centre Left for the 
protection of sitting members of state parliament. 
This process is best summarised and chronicled in state president Ian 
McLean's address to state conference in May 1988: 
...the degree to which the National Executive is involved in 
the normal operation of this Branch is unnecessarily 
excessive. 
No other State Branch suffers continual intervention like 
Queensland. No other Branch would tolerate the level of 
intervention we have experienced. 
In recent years, Queensland pre-selections have been 
carried out by the National Executive. That body has also 
cancelled our conferences. 
Since April last year [1987], decisions of the Queensland 
Branch have had to be cleared with the National Executive. 
In recent weeks, the Executive Committee of the National 
Executive has toyed with the idea of appointing for us our 
Secretary and Assistant Secretary, putting in an 
administrator, endorsing the present State Secretary for a 
seat without even calling nominations, determining the 
timetable for pre-selections, and imposing new rules for 
pre-selection. 
Queensland delegates to the National Executive objected 
strongly to these moves, and the Executive Committee had 
a rethink of its position. 
It came up with a counter proposal to withdraw completely 
from intervention in Queensland and rescind previous 
decisions taken since April last year, provided that the 
National Executive imposition of one of three pre-selection 
arrangements was accepted. None of the three options 
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which were available conformed to the rules determined by 
the Branch, rules designed and introduced by Denis Murphy 
to allow an input in pre-selection from local members, the 
central organisation and unions. 
... and the National Executive have voted and determined 
that the pre-selection procedures to be used in Queensland 
in future provide for: 
"Any candidate polling more than 60% of the 
vote in the plebiscite for Labor-held seats, 
either State or Federal, will be endorsed 
without reference to the central college; and 
that the current Queensland rules will apply to 
all other State and Federal seats." 
That decision won't completely satisfy anyone. However, 
sitting members will be more relaxed. 
That decision of the National Executive is set in concrete. 
The view of this Conference would not have, nor will it 
now, influence that decision.^ 
Putting the rhetoric of the 1987 factional wars to one side, their real 
cause had been the threat to sitting members posed by the Alliance. 
The 60 per cent rule accepted by the Queensland Branch, amended from 
55 per cent in the original intervention in April 1987, removed much of 
the acrimony towards the Alliance. The 60 per cent rule meant that if 
anyone for pre-selection in a Labor held seat achieved 60 per cent of 
the local branch vote, that candidate was automatically endorsed and the 
central electoral college did not vote in that pre-selection. Sitiing 
members were the big winners and opponents of the Alliance thereafter 
withdrew their public criticisms and joined in a common purpose of 
planning to win office. Combined with the advent of Goss to the 
leadership, the preconditions for peace and harmony, for stable internal 
party affairs, were finally in place.^ 
The imposition of the 60 per cent rule signalled the end of the 
1987/88 interventions. All other rule matters of a contentious nature, 
pre-selections for safe and marginal seats and the change-over of 
officials in party office, were left in the hands of the state branch. 
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Following the parliamentary leadership change in March 1988, the 
national executive withdrew from fiirther active intervention in 
Queensland, this withdrawal being formalised at a national executive 
meeting on 26 April 1988. 
The party proceeded to put in place a plan to win state government 
through the stabilisation of party affairs. Central to this process was the 
party's decision to hold two-party conferences in 1988 - a mles 
conference in May to examine party structures and to elect the party 
administrative committee and other key decision-making bodies, to be 
followed by a conference in October dealing solely with policy matters. 
The May 1988 Party Conference 
At the previous party conference in Townsville in 1984, policy 
deliberations had been completely overshadowed and poisoned by 
intense factional fighting for senior party positions. By separating these 
two agendas and holding the rules conference in camera, the party hoped 
to avoid public bloodletting similar to that of 1984. The strategy 
worked and the conference proved a public relations triumph. Elections 
of senior officials were held without public acrimony and difficult issues 
were resolved with unanimity rarely seen in the previous decades. All 
three major factions were now united in their desire to win. 
A significant agenda of mles reform was processed with little 
organised opposition on the conference floor. Major changes included 
triennial party conferences and a new and expanded quarterly state 
council (both these bodies to be elected using federal electoral division 
boundaries rather than the state electoral district boundaries), and the 
creation of a streamlined policy committee structure with new powers 
and responsibilities. Potentially divisive matters such as the pre-
selection timetable for Labor held seats, for the election of a new state 
council to be held in July to elect a party secretary and assistant 
secretary, and a timetable for a subsequent policy conference were 
resolved unanimously. 
All three factions were determined to replace Peter Beattie as state 
secretary when his term ended at the state council meeting following the 
state conference. They believed that the existing party organisation 
would never work properly and there would never be stability because it 
was incapable and unwilling to join in a team effort to get the Goss 
government elected. Thus there could be no successful campaign if the 
changes that occurred in the parliamentary wing were not subsequentiy 
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reflected in the organisational wing. Behind the scenes Beattie resisted 
moves for his replacement and the election of a successor at the July 
state council. The party however, for its part, believed that the mid-
term campaign would not work if its carriage was placed in Beattie's 
hands. In the end Beattie had no choice but to capitulate and concede 
that he would not re-contest his position - to which he would not have 
been re-elected. 
In the elections for party positions on the party's administrative 
committee, the Alliance polled strongly with the Centre and the Left 
combined taking approximately 70 per cent of the positions. The new 
administrative committee now had a strong mandate and the majority 
required to get the party and the campaign up and running. 
The Campaign 
Immediately following the conference on 13 May, Wayne Swan was 
appointed chairperson of the campaign committee by the administrative 
committee. The appointment reflected the long standing agreement that 
Terry Hampson would replace Peter Beattie as state secretary when his 
term expired at the scheduled July state council and Swan would replace 
Hampson as assistant state secretary and campaign director. In effect, 
the state secretary's job was divided in half - with Swan presiding over 
political campaign activities and Hampson over party administration and 
membership. Such was the degree of harmony now prevailing in internal 
party affairs these two officials were elected unopposed at the 
subsequent state council meeting on 30 July 1988. 
The campaign began to deal with the backlog of campaign matters 
left on hold by the events of the previous twelve months: the 
appointment of market research and advertising agencies, the 
development of a list of priority seats and accompanying profiles, a 
mid-term campaign to launch Labor's new leadership and team, plans 
for the forthcoming South Coast by-election and the federal referendum 
campaign - as well as a budget to fund these activities. 
The mid-term campaign was vital. Labor's electoral stocks were low 
and party morale was still at rock bottom. Internal research conducted 
in June put Labor at only 38 per cent primary vote - 3 percentage 
points less than the 1986 result. The research report concluded: 
Labor has a long way to go in Queensland. The June survey 
revealed a 3% net loss in Labor's primary vote and a 1% 
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preferred vote loss since the November 1986 State Election. 
However the key factor in the survey has been the 
substantial decline in the position of the National Party and 
the consequent improvement of the Liberal vote. 
The Nationals have suffered in net terms a 6% loss in 
support since the State Election. The Liberals have seen 
their vote increase from 16.5% to 26.5% over the same 
period.' 
In short, while the Nationals were on the nose the Liberals were going 
great guns and Labor was down to its bedrock support. 
Labor had suffered a massive rejection in the March 1988 Brisbane 
City Council elections just a few days after the change in the Labor 
state leadership. Goss had no honeymoon period for Labor was still 
perceived as a divided, back-stabbing rabble going nowhere and out of 
touch. To the vast majority of the respondents the prospect of a Labor 
Government was inconceivable. As the party's pollster stated in the June 
1988 study: "Asking them [the swinging voters] to think about what 
Labor may stand for or do is like asking them about the dark side of the 
moon."^ 
There were very few grounds for optimism. One thing that was 
certain was that Sir Joh had left a vacuum in Queensland politics and a 
significant minority of voters saw Ahern as indecisive. There was a 
large and growing number of swinging voters in Queensland looking for 
strong leadership and a new direction. 
The only significant plus the Labor party had in the minds of 
swinging voters was Wayne Goss. As the June report concluded: 
"Voters still don't know that much about him [Goss], but what they 
know makes them favourably disposed towards him. He is regarded as 
the best Leader Labor has had."' 
Given the lack of credibility of the overall party image. Labor had no 
choice but to construct its campaign around Wayne Goss and his 
leadership strength as the only way to lift its vote in the short term. The 
strategy was therefore first of all to promote Goss, and secondly party 
unity had to be demonstrated by action. 
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The Mid-Term Campaign June-July 1988 
The mid-term campaign that was so urgently required commenced on 
30 June, 1988; it consisted of both paid and unpaid media promotion 
and centred on the slogan "Wayne Goss & Labor - a New Force for the 
Good of Queensland". Labor sought to promote itself as a positive 
alternative with a strong leader who stood for stronger economic growth 
and development. The paid campaign was accompanied by extensive 
media promotion statewide by the leader and his frontbench. 
The mid-term campaign catapulted Wayne Goss into the centre of 
the Queensland political stage. Its aim was to implant in the public 
mind the idea that Labor had strength of leadership as well as a viable 
policy alternative and it succeeded; by November Labor support in the 
electorate was up from the high 30s to low 40s. 
In addition to the mid-term campaign Labor undertook several more 
paid campaigns in the eighteen months prior to December 1989. Next 
came the "Hear No Evil, See No Evil" campaign in November 1988. 
Revelations at the Fitzgerald Inquiry in late 1988 had irretrievably 
tarnished the Nationals. The activities of former ministers Don Lane 
and Russ Hinze dominated the media and positioned corruption to be the 
major issue in state politics. To tie Ahern to the corruption that was now 
known to have flourished while he was in the cabinet. Labor produced a 
print and radio campaign that asked: "Oh Mr Ahern, How Could You?" 
Rather than a savage attack on Ahern, Labor used whimsy and humour 
to portray Ahern as wishy-washy and devoid of real leadership. 
This campaign was successful too for it reminded the electorate of 
Ahern's 20 years in the government, 8 years in coalition cabinets, as the 
formula hammered home, and started swinging voters thinking about the 
Liberal party's role in those coalition cabinets. This campaign laid the 
preliminary groundwork for the major attack on the Liberals later in 
1989. 
Labor quickly followed up this campaign in January 1989 with an 
unorthodox - because political advertising in the holiday period was 
unprecedented - campaign designed to instil in the electorate a belief 
that Labor was ready to govern. The themes of the campaign were 
threefold. First, Labor promoted the Party as being ready to govern 
with the leadership, team and policies that the state needed. Second, 
Labor highlighted its education policy with a launch of the "schools 
blueprint". Third, Labor attacked the National's $20 million expenditure 
on political advertising in 1988 as indicative of Ahern's twisted 
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priorities. 
In May Labor launched its final campaign slogan: "Wayne Goss & 
Labor - The Only Change for the Better". The 17 percentage points 
swing against the Nationals in the Merthyr by-election proved that the 
Ahern-led Nationals were dead in the water and had no chance of 
holding power in their own right. Some voters were moving from the 
Nationals, through the independents and then on to Labor. This was 
very encouraging for hopes that disillusioned conservatives were 
beginning to ignore the Liberal party. Labor chose to launch its election 
slogan at this time to capitalise on the mood for change developing in 
the electorate, and backed this campaign up with two ads - a positive ad 
about Labor's plans to enhance personal safety and a negative attack on 
the notion of a coalition. 
The final paid campaign Labor put to air followed Cooper's 
overthrow of Ahern and the turmoil that created in the National party. 
This development set the scene for Labor to run a mini-campaign 
emphasising two themes. The first capitalised upon the mood for change 
and featured Wayne Goss asking for one term to clean up the mess. 
This tack was so successful that it was incorporated in every piece of 
National party advertising during the election campaign. The second 
component of this campaign was the atiack on the Liberal party's 
credibility. An ad was produced that featured Sir Robert Sparkes and 
Professor Peter Coaldrake and left voters with only one conclusion -
that a vote for the Liberals would be a vote for the Nationals. Labor's 
pollsters judged this advertisement as having the highest recall of any 
they had ever measured in politics. In the end it was this slogan more 
than any other that knocked the Liberals out of the ring. Every time 
Angus Innes replied to it by saying "A vote for the Liberals is a vote for 
the Liberals", he was subliminally reinforcing Labor's message. 
In the final six week campaign period Labor concentrated on the 
issues of leadership, the family, corruption, education, the environment, 
and the weak Liberal alternative. Labor's commitment to ranning a 
positive campaign in this final period was a difficult decision -
particularly when they came under serious attack from the Nationals on 
"moral" issues. In the end, however, that campaign blew up on the 
conservatives and cost them key support, particularly in the metropolitan 
area. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
The Labor Party 109 
Campaign Resources 
The ability to mount so substantial and sustained a campaign depended 
ultimately on the resources the party was prepared to make available. 
The Labor party in Queensland has considerable capital resources -
resources which are tied up through party mles limiting access to the 
income derived from the assets. The mid-term campaign had 
demonstrated to the party what a realistically funded (cost around 
$400,000) political campaign could achieve. Without access to assets, 
the party set out to develop a budget which was realistic and matched 
the scale of the political task ahead of it but would have to be funded 
largely by borrowings and normal party fund-raising. 
In the 1986 state election, the party had spent approximately $1 
million but was outspent in the electronic media four to one. Labor 
recognised that they could never match the final electronic blitz of their 
opponents, but they could make up for it by spreading the available 
dollar over a longer time frame. Labor accordingly developed a 
completely new approach. Rather than delaying all paid media 
expenditure until the formal campaign period, a budget was developed 
and approved eighteen months out, based on the notion of paid media 
advertising taking place at regular intervals prior to the final election 
campaign. 
The budget was approved on 30 July 1988, the same day the 
campaign director was formally elected. The formal state council 
resolution allocating campaign resources reads: 
Labor stands on the threshold of winning government in 
Queensland. In view of the critical importance of the next 
state election to the future of Queensland, the Party adopts a 
draft budget in the vicinity of $3 million for the next State 
Election Campaign. That budget should be funded by: 
1. Contribution from the Labor Companies; 
2. A central fundraising campaign concentrating on 
unions, the public and business. 
To the extent that the budget requires a one-off injection of 
funds from the Labor Companies to meet part of the needs 
of the State Election Campaign, the State Council requests 
the Board to provide such monies. With this exception. 
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State Council reaffirms its previous decision that the Labor 
Companies allocate 50 percent of their annual profits, after 
tax, to the Labor Party. State Council calls on EECs, 
Branches, Trade Unions to immediately commence local 
fundraising efforts by adopting a fundraising plan for the 
next 12 months. As an incentive to local fundraising, no 
levies will be imposed on EECs for the 1989 State Election 
Campaign.^° 
Policies and Candidates 
Throughout the eighteen-month period Wayne Goss and his frontbench 
released extensive and detailed policies, particularly focusing on 
economic and regional development, anti-corruption measures, 
education and the environment. The October 1988 policy conference set 
the parameters and the tempo for these releases. The centre-piece of 
this conference was Labor's new approach to economic policy. Goss 
emphasised the need to promote economic growth in the private sector 
to create jobs and to finance improvements in education, health and 
welfare. The conference, which failed to excite the media, was the most 
successful in decades in policy terms as journalists complained that 
"peace had broken out"." 
Labor held and dominated the policy agenda at the macro and micro 
level throughout 1989 by the regular release of policy documents in key 
areas. These were designed for statewide coverage and backed up by 
frequent trips by the leader and his frontbench into all the targeted seats 
whilst the themes of these policies were reinforced through grass-roots 
campaigns mounted in each targeted seat, promoting the policy and the 
local candidate. 
The conference also played a major role in breaking Labor's 
traditional approach to pre-selection. Labor had always insisted that no 
person could nominate as a candidate for pre-selection unless they had 
three years continuous branch membership. This mle was a 
considerable hindrance to party officials head-hunting talented 
candidates for key marginal seats. Following the 1986 state election the 
then state secretary, Peter Beattie, had observed that "in a couple of 
crucial areas the endorsement of mediocre candidates cost us seats." If 
the party could not produce a new type of high profile candidate, 
particularly tapping more diverse backgrounds such as business, opinion 
leaders made it clear that Labor's efforts would not be viewed seriously. 
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As a result of considerable pressure from the campaign leadership, 
conference resolved (almost unanimously) to exempt candidates for pre-
selection from this requirement. As a result, candidates like Lesley 
Clark in Barron River, Gary Fenlon in Greenslopes, Judy Spence in 
Mount Gravatt, Matt Foley in Yeronga and Ken Davies in Townsville 
were ultimately selected as Labor candidates. In Labor's key targeted 
seats the average age of candidates was in the mid 30s. Sixteen had 
tertiary qualifications, nine were current or former aldermen or shire 
councillors, three owned or ran small businesses, and two were lawyers 
or barristers. 
Conclusions 
The ALP was ultimately successful in 1989 because the unity in the 
Party allowed Wayne Goss to assert leadership skills superior to his 
opponents'. His intelligence, tenacity and tactical sense anchored the 
Labor campaign. The Nationals and the Liberals did not fall apart 
solely because of Fitzgerald and the coalition dilemma. Goss used the 
cormption issue to put forward a positive program of reform built on 
leadership strength and strong policy alternatives. 
The ALP campaign targeted the Liberals on the question whether or 
not they would enter into a coalition with the Nationals and targeted the 
Nationals' responsibility for corruption over 32 years. Conservative 
disarray greatly assisted Labor, but Labor's united performance and 
Goss' relentless pursuit of the issues were largely responsible for the 
Nationals' and Liberals' poor performances and chaotic campaigns. 
In 1983 the conservatives had fallen apart but then Labor was still 
faction-ridden and without a coherent policy alternative, and therefore 
unable to take advantage of their opponents' temporary misfortunes. 
Labor's pressure pushed the Nationals into replacing Ahern because 
Goss had simply inflicted too much damage on their leader for him to 
continue. Labor pressure forced the Liberal party into first declaring it 
would not serve with the Nationals in a coalition, and then into stating 
they would not serve unless they were the senior partner. The Nationals' 
leadership change and the Liberals' bungling severely undermined 
conservative credibility and at the same time created further tensions 
within conservative ranks through which Labor could drive its campaign. 
In the end the Labor victory occurred because Labor put its house in 
order with the right leadership and the right campaign while its 
opponents simply buckled under the pressure. 
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THE NATIONAL PARTY 
Margaret Bridson Cribb 
h is part of the received wisdom about electoral behaviour in Australia 
that voters are thought to look for, and give their support to, those 
political parties which exhibit strong and stable leadership. Sudden and 
unanticipated changes in the top echelon of a party, particularly if these 
take place just prior to an election, are considered detrimental to 
electoral success. Weak or unstable leadership, continuous irresolution in 
government or internal party disunity are all seen as harmful. While 
aberrations from these axioms can be found in contemporary Australian 
pohtical history, for most of this century, Queenslanders have given 
their support to the political party which best exhibited the traits of 
strength, forceful leadership and internal stability. 
Strange, then, to find the National party proceeding, in the twenty-
two months prior to the 1989 state election, to turn these established 
principles on their head. During that period, it changed its 
parliamentary leaders twice - from Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen (forced out 
on 1 December 1987) to Michael Ahern (ousted 21 September 1989 
only eight weeks before the election) to Russell Cooper. At least five 
Cabinet re-shuffles, most of them major, added to the sense of political 
unreality which began to pervade the conservative side of Queensland 
politics. To compound these follies, both Ahern and Cooper came to 
the leadership by way of internal party coups, each of which created 
factions and further disunity within a party which had been noted for its 
cohesion and solidarity and for public loyalty to its leadership. 
Yet even these rapid leadership changes with their concomitant blood 
letting do not account entirely for such a swift dissipation of the party's 
electoral support as came about, support which had swept it back into 
government, again in its own right, as recenUy as 22 October 1986. 
Other reasons must be sought for Labor's landslide victory three years 
later, which stripped the National party of 23 seats and sent it into 
Opposition for the first time since 1957. 
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The National Party Decline 
While it is not possible to date precisely the beginning of the National 
party's decline, its success in 1986 may well have been the start of its 
undoing. In that election a weak Liberal party scarcely improved its 
position; the Labor party lost two seats, with its vote dropping 2.6 
percentage points. Both parties seemed set for another lengthy period in 
opposition. With nothing, apparently, to fear at home and urged on by a 
small coterie of advisers in no way representative of mainstream 
National party or electoral thinking, Bjelke-Petersen gave free rein to 
his ambitions to extend his hegemony further afield. He embarked on 
the disastrous Joh-for-Canberra campaign, designed to take over the 
national leadership of the conservative parties. This precipitated the 
temporary termination of the federal coalition, led to rancorous conflict 
between the Queensland branch and the federal National party, and went 
a long way to ensuring that the Liberals lost the 1987 federal election. 
Within Queensland, his ill-fated adventurism gave the electorate its 
first clear view of the cracks which had appeared in the party's facade of 
unity and loyalty. Deep seated ill-feeling developed between those 
federal National party parliamentarians who had supported the Joh 
putsch for Canberra, and those who had been appalled by it and by its 
deleterious effect, for their party, on the outcome of the federal election 
and on the electorate's perception of the Queensland branch. Conflict 
arose within the party organisation along similar lines, while that 
between the party president. Sir Robert Sparkes, and the premier proved 
to be irreconcilable. 
Long-serving and successful populist leaders like Sir Joh Bjelke-
Petersen can present their supporters and particularly their organisational 
leadership with problems. For many years the Queensland branch had 
capitalised on the proven vote-getting abilities of the premier and his 
wife, "Lady Flo". Indeed, in the 1980s, the Nationals' election 
campaigns were planned and executed entirely around the "Joh for 
Queensland" theme. So much reliance had been placed upon his 
electoral credibility that party members and certainly the premier himself 
came to believe that he alone could ensure electoral victory for the 
party. 
However, in 1986 Bjelke-Petersen was seventy-five years of age, 
though seemingly hale and hearty physically, and was harbouring no 
thoughts of standing aside. The organisational leaders, whilst colluding 
in the deification of the premier, had long concluded that the removal of 
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so dominant a leader from the political scene would require careful 
planning, timing and execution. If any harmful effects on the party and 
its voting support were to be kept to a minimum, then early 
identification of the heir-apparent was essential, as was the ability to 
give the new leader sufficient time to establish himself in the eyes of the 
electorate before formally taking over the reins. 
Bjelke-Petersen's co-operation in such planning was never 
forthcoming. Like many such leaders, he had seen to it that no rivals 
for his position ever arose. Loyalty to himself above all else was the 
only prerequisite for cabinet office under his regime. WTiile it was 
National party custom for the succession to pass smoothly to the deputy, 
the incumbent deputy premier, in this case Bill Gunn, was only nine 
years younger that his leader. It was anticipated that the position 
ultimately would pass to a much younger person; every other premier in 
the country at that time was Bjelke-Petersen's junior by more than 
twenty years. 
With the premier refusing, either publicly or in private, to 
countenance any thought of retirement, and given the increasing 
unpredictability of his political judgment and behaviour, his 
parhamentary party finally found its collective courage and forced him, 
under threat of immediate removal as leader, to set a date for retirement. 
The date agreed was 8 August 1988 which would mark Bjelke-
Petersen's completion of twenty years as leader of his party and of the 
state. 
The available evidence strongly suggests that no further move against 
him was contemplated by any of his parliamentary colleagues, and it 
was accepted by the party that his premiership should be allowed to run 
its course until the following August. It is now held, in some quarters, 
that the premier had no intention of honouring his promise to stand 
down at that time. Whether this be true or not, he certainly moved 
swiftly against those he saw as the instigators of the plan to bring about 
his political demise. 
He sought the Governor's approval to reconstitute his ministry totally 
and to withdraw the commissions of five of his ministers - Ahern, 
Austin, Gunn, Muntz and McKechnie. When Sir Walter Campbell 
counselled second thoughts, Bjelke-Petersen agreed to dismiss only 
three, Ahern, Austin and McKechnie, all of whom had refused to 
resign.' They were replaced by two new ministers, Lingard and 
Simpson, who held office only momentarily as this final act of 
irrationality on the premier's part proved too much for his parliamentary 
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party. It voted unanimously to remove him and Ahern was elected to 
the leadership, with Gunn retained as deputy. Bjelke-Petersen was to 
remain Ahern's nemesis, however, throughout his premiership. 
Ahern's Inheritance 
Bjelke-Petersen and his last government left other legacies to their 
successors which were to affect their ability to win the 1989 election. 
In its final years, it seemed clear to many party members and to the 
discerning among the electorate that his government had become 
arrogant and self-serving. Recommendations of those of the party's 
policy committees which were still functioning were ignored, as were 
many of those from central council and conference meetings; 
correspondence from constituents frequently went unanswered; members' 
complaints were treated with scant courtesy, while any group or meml A 
of the public who had the temerity to state an opposing view to the 
government's on any issue was held up to general ridicule. 
The last Bjelke-Petersen government suffered also from inertia and 
from a failure to perceive and to satisfy the interests of a society which 
had changed considerably. The premier himself had grown remote from 
much of the decision-making process. His ministers, unaccustomed to 
exercising an independent initiative, moved belatedly to take action in 
areas such as education, police and the environment where growing 
numbers of the electorate were pressing for reform. The premier, too, 
had preferred not to continue his predecessors' ban on ministers, 
including himself, holding private interests which conceivably might 
conflict with their public duties and responsibilities. 
The Ahern inheritance included the Fitzgerald Inquiry, which he 
welcomed and supported in every way. It was to touch, frequently to 
his detriment, everything he did as premier, and to represent an ever 
present danger to his leadership and to his party. His positive approach 
to the enquiry provided him with an opportunity to distance his own 
government from the Bjelke-Petersen regime, yet his pledge to 
implement, sight unseen, all Fitzgerald's recommendations alienated 
many in both wings of the party. 
As the evidence unfolded, it had a traumatic effect on the party's 
self-confidence and its electoral credibility which Ahern could do little 
to mitigate. The National party had long seen itself as the only party of 
integrity on the political scene and, particularly under Bjelke-Petersen, 
sought to occupy the moral high-ground. Evidence, as it emerged, of the 
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apparent systematic use of public office for personal gain by a number 
of senior ministers and by some of Bjelke-Petersen's highly placed 
appointees; of political patronage allied with rampant cronyism; of a 
widespread misuse of the institutions of government; all were to have a 
chilling effect on the party's electoral prospects. 
Ahern had taken office determined to introduce a different style of 
government, one that would emphasise accountability above all else. 
Queenslanders were urged to share his "vision of excellence" for the 
state, and the government's media releases were now studded with the 
words "responsive" and "consult" as well as "accountable". He 
established the long-awaited public accounts committee, another 
committee on public works, created a register of pecuniary interests for 
all members of parliament, and laid down, for the first time, guidelines 
on ministerial expenses. While measures such as these provided 
tangible proof of the new premier's personal commitment to responsible, 
accountable government in the present and for the future, they could not 
off-set the destabilising effect on his party of the revelations about the 
past coming from the Fitzgerald Inquiry. 
The premier also introduced some mild social reforms, such as 
legalisation of condom-vending machines and the teaching of human 
relations courses in school hours. These set against him the 
fundamentalist Christians in the party, who were numerically strong in 
some National party electorates, including Ahern's, and were already 
bitter at Bjelke-Petersen's removal. Their ally. Speaker Lin Powell, was 
a rallying point for Ahern's critics within the parliamentary party, while 
his highly publicised resignation from parliament and the National party 
over a similar, minor social issue added more fuel to the fires of party 
discontent. 
As Ahern's term as premier progressed, much of the early good will 
towards his leadership dissipated as consensus became synonymous with 
indecisive government. His habit of changing his mind was seen at its 
worst over daylight saving when having stated categorically one day that 
the party's long-standing policy of no daylight saving would be adhered 
to, the next day he forced upon an outraged party his decision to trial 
daylight saving in the summer of 1989-1990. It was a high price to pay 
in party disunity for the possible retention of the party's six seats on the 
Gold Coast where the most vociferous lobby for daylight saving was 
located. 
While much of the government's apparent loss of control over the 
political agenda can be traced to the Fitzgerald Inquiry, two other factors 
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which previously could have been discounted now came into play. 
What had once been a generally docile, not to say compliant, media, 
easily distracted from too close a scrutiny of the government and its 
ministers, now examined closely every action, every decision, often with 
a marked degree of hostility. A seemingly united Labor party, led by a 
new and assertive leader in Wayne Goss, added its voice to the 
mounting criticism of the government and the National party. The 
opinion polls began to record a consistently upward movement in 
support for the ALP, and for the Nationals a corresponding and ominous 
decline. For the first time in many years, the opposition was perceived 
as a credible and a viable alternative government. 
Seen from the point of view of senior National party figures, who 
were striving frantically to hold the party together and to inject some 
element of stability into the government and the political scene 
generally, 1989 was a nightmare year, made even more horrific by the 
knowledge that the electorate had to be faced before its end. As the 
events of that year unfolded the party was forced to prepare two 
separate election strategies, only one of which was ever presented to the 
public. 
At the start of 1989, the worst of the Ahern government's problems 
were yet to come. Fitzgerald was yet to report, and while the daily 
revelations of his inquiry provided priceless ammunition for the A.L.P. 
and other opponents of the government, the obvious sincerity of Ahern's 
commitment to fully implement all of Fitzgerald's recommendations, 
once these were known, still offered some hope that he and his 
government might manage to escape the wrath of the people of 
Queensland. 
Consequentiy, plans were set in train, with some confidence on 
Ahern's part, for the election which he then contemplated calling for 
mid-November.^ The theme chosen was "Making it Right", as best 
expressing not only Ahern's conscious desire to distance himself and his 
government from the excesses of the Bjelke-Petersen regime but also as 
an assertion of his commitment to Fitzgerald. The emphasis was to be 
on a new era and a new, accountable leader, and on "Quality 
Queensland, the state with so much going for it".^  The July National 
party conference in Brisbane endorsed this strategy, and radio and 
television advertisements were produced built around Ahern offering the 
voters the opportunity for "an era of accountability and some change".'' 
A considerable quantity of posters and other campaign literature was 
prepared based on the same themes and a small mid-term campaign was 
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run at conference time. Throughout this period, public stress was laid 
also on the fact that it had been the National party which had the 
courage to set up the Fitzgerald Inquiry and to give the commissioner 
every requested support. 
The party secretariat, however, was finding long-term planning for 
the election both difficult and risky. An undercurrent of dissent, coming 
from both wings of the party, was detected at the July conference and it 
swelled alarmingly as time went by. Party branches, it was claimed, 
liked Ahern, thought him honest and wanted him to succeed, but they 
were becoming disenchanted with his leadership on two major counts: 
the weakness, inconsistency and irresolution of his views and his 
actions, and the perceptions that he was changing the direction of the 
party. Their impression of his indecisiveness was reinforced by the 
Labor party which, to destabilise his leadership even further, mounted 
clever propaganda directed at the Ahern government's propensity for 
setting up committees to look into matters of moment rather than itself 
acting firmly and decisively upon them. 
Daylight saving was the one issue above all others which appeared to 
accentuate Ahern's leadership failings and provided the trigger for the 
first Cooper challenge to his leadership. While the latter publicly 
accepted, with outward grace and generosity, the failure of the motion 
for a leadership spill, lost 26-21 in the party room on 29 August, Ahern 
was less magnanimous. Uncharacteristically, he made a remark which 
indicated the extent to which he had been affected by the months of 
stress and pressure on his leadership: "It's worthy of comment for me to 
say 1 think that the coup planners were not as good as I was in my day. 
My coup was more successful."^ This assertion did nothing to endear 
him to his enemies and thoroughly disappointed his most ardent 
supporters. 
Within the party it was apparent that the leadership question had not 
been laid to rest by Cooper's abortive attempt, and organisation of the 
electoral campaign came to a halt pending the final outcome. Ahern 
continued to find loyal adherents in both wings of the party, but 
dissatisfaction with his style of leadership mounted. Complaints about 
and evidence for his alleged deficiencies were said to be pouring into 
the party secretariat. On the economic front it seemed that the corporate 
and business sector no longer believed that a National party government 
was the one to get things done in Queensland. The long-running and 
vexatious dispute over rail freights between the mining industry and the 
government remained unresolved. No new mine had been opened for 
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more than a decade because, it was suggested, of government 
irresolution and treasury intransigence. 
Indeed, the business community saw Ahern as the prisoner of the 
Treasury Department rather than its master. It was critical of the budget 
which had received a good press when, as treasurer, he brought it down 
on 7 September. Though it had provided for some economic growth, it 
was seen as being too devoted to some of the social infrastructures, such 
as education, police and the family, and insufficient in providing stimuli 
for the state's economy which was suffering from a serious downturn. 
While expectations had been built up by Ahern's staff for the 
government's Economic Development Strategy, business was 
disappointed when it was unveiled, believing it offered them nothing 
tangible for the future. If these criticisms illustrate accurately the 
thinking of most of the corporate and business sector, then they go a 
long way to explaining the rapid decline in the previously active and 
substantial membership of the party's Business branch and its failure to 
provide no more than an insignificant proportion of its accustomed 
financial contribution to the election campaign. 
There is no doubt that the party's president. Sir Robert Sparkes, did 
receive during this period a significant number of communications from 
branches and members, deeply concerned about the party's electoral 
survival and condemning Ahern's leadership. Ahern himself believes 
this to have been one manifestation of an orchestrated campaign against 
him directed not only through the grass-roots of the party, but also 
located in Parliament House where some of his opponents were working 
to "dump" Fitzgerald's recommendations. 
Cooper Talies Over 
In what can only be assumed to have been a last, desperate gamble to 
save its traditional country seats, the organisation moved against the 
premier. At a meeting at party headquarters, Sir Robert and a senior 
vice-president. Sir Charles Holm, attempted to persuade Ahern to stand 
down. When he refused, the party chieftains threw their support behind 
a renewed challenge from Cooper. This was successful and on 21 
September 1989 Ahern was ousted from the leadership. Once again the 
new leader failed to attract the unanimous support of his colleagues, 
twenty-one out of the forty-seven preferring to stick with Ahern. 
It might be thought to pass all belief that someone as politically 
astute and experienced as Sir Robert Sparkes could have believed that 
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the electoral tide now flowing swiftly against his party would be 
stemmed at the eleventh hour by a new leader, even by one who bore a 
passing resemblance to Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen. Russell Cooper, a 
wealthy Wallumbilla grazier, had been the member for Roma only since 
1983. Under Ahern he had a rapid rise into the ministerial ranks and 
had attracted favourable publicity as a forceful and ambitious minister 
for corrective services. He was, however, inexperienced, politically 
naive in many respects and not well known outside the rural 
establishment. 
Table 6.1 indicates, nevertheless, the rapid decline in Ahern's 
approval rating in the last three months of his premiership, though with 
marginally higher support in the country than in the metropolitan area. 
At the same time the Nationals' vote had slipped from 31 per cent 
(January-February 1988) to 19 per cent in the July-August 1989 survey, 
with 25 per cent support in the country and only 12 per cent in 
Brisbane. In reality these figures may not have reflected the true 
situation. The party was conducting its own survey research in 
individual electorates across the state with results which may have been 
so alarming as to convince it to take a last despairing chance on a 
change of leadership. 
Table 6.1 Ahem Approval Ratings, : 
Approve 
Disapprove 
Undecided 
Total 
Jan-
Feb 
'88 
% 
65 
14 
21 
100 
Mar- May-
Apr June 
'88 '88 
% % 
63 52 
21 32 
16 16 
100 100 
1988-19J 
July 
Aug 
'88 
% 
50 
36 
14 
100 
i9 
Sept 
-Oct 
'88 
% 
50 
36 
14 
100 
Nov-
Dec 
'88 
% 
51 
36 
13 
100 
Jan 
Feb 
'89 
% 
44 
45 
11 
100 
-Mar 
Apr 
'89 
% 
43 
46 
11 
100 
May 
June-
'89 
% 
42 
46 
12 
100 
July 
Aug 
'89 
% 
37 
54 
9 
100 
Source: Morgan Gallup Poll, Finding No. 1890, published in Bulletin, 13 September 1989 
Ahern however, is convinced that under his leadership and with the 
"Making it Right" campaign, the party would have performed 
significantly better in the election. He cites as evidence the results of a 
poll which he commissioned at his own expense from Reark Research. 
In this telephone survey (2 December) 540 respondents, randomly 
selected, who had voted already that day and for a party other than the 
National party, were asked whether they would have changed their vote 
to National had Ahern been leading the party. Of the 271 Brisbane and 
269 other-Queensland respondents, 14 per cent in each case answered in 
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the affirmative. . . . 
Certainly Cooper's approval rating in the polls never reached that of 
Ahern, as he was deprived of the honeymoon period usually granted to 
new leaders by the public and the media. Table 6.2 indicates his ratings 
in the Morgan Gallup poll while another survey published in the 
Courier-Mail the day before the election noted that only 17 per cent 
believed that Cooper would make the best premier (12 per cent in 
Brisbane, 21 per cent the rest of Queensland) as against 52 per cent for 
Labor leader Goss and 14 per cent for the Liberals' Innes. 
Table 6.2 Cooper Approval Ratings, 1989 
Approve 
Disapprove 
Undecided 
Make a better 
Nov 25/26 
Nov 29 
Nov 30/Dec 1 
premier 
Sept 23, 
Oct 21 '89 
% 
25 
42 
33 
21 (Brisbane 
20 (Brisbane 
18 (Brisbane 
14, 
11, 
9, 
Country 27) 
Country 26) 
Country 25) 
Oct 28, 
Nov 11, '89 
% 
26 
52 
22 
Source: Morgan Gallup Poll, Bulletin, 8 November, 15 November, 5 December 1989; 
Morgan Gallup Poll conducted for the Nine Network, 2 December 1989. 
Election Strategy 
Among the planners of the Cooper election campaign, opinion was 
divided on the strategy to be followed. It was argued, for example, that 
the consequences of the Fitzgerald Inquiry should be met head on and 
dealt with; apologies made on behalf of the whole party for the past 
improprieties of some individuals; assurances given in tangible forms 
that the Nationals would act positively to bring about far reaching 
change and to provide better, more responsible government. However, 
even if the party believed it could start afresh under Cooper, with a new 
image emphasising strength and decisiveness, he himself was not yet 
prepared to acknowledge the need for, let alone to ask, public 
forgiveness for the past misdeeds of others. 
In some of his early public statements as leader, Cooper appeared to 
be repudiating both full implementation of Fitzgerald's recommendations 
and the seriousness of the evidence of corruption brought to light during 
the inquiry. Two of his ministers, Yvonne Chapman and Vince Lester, 
subsequently made similar remarks which brought into question the 
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sincerity of the Nationals' resolve to clear up corruption. The ensuing 
public outcry, however, convinced the party that it would be 
counterproductive to direct campaign strategy along those lines. 
Cormption was now seen clearly to be the major issue most 
influencing voter intentions. In a series of polls conducted for and 
published by the Courier-Mail between 3 November and 1 December, 
the four highest-rating of all the issues said to be having a major 
influence were, in order of importance, corruption, the government's 
record, implementation of the Fitzgerald report and economic 
management - all of which had negative connotations for the National 
party. Even more worrying were the results of the breakdown into the 
causes of cormption which were concerning voters. In the first poll, 60 
per cent of respondents had most disquiet about cormption in the police 
force, 49 per cent among politicians, and 29 per cent among government 
ministers. In the ensuing month, the relative importance of these 
indicators altered significanUy, so that, on polling eve, 65 per cent were 
concerned about corruption among politicians, 57 percent corruption 
among police and 45 per cent corruption among government ministers. 
Under these circumstances, there was little of a positive nature 
remaining to the National party upon which to build a successful 
election campaign. No longer could it stand on its record in government 
as it had done to good effect at previous elections. 
Consequently, it was decided to revive the tactics used in the past by 
Bjelke-Petersen to destabilise Labor's electoral challenge. The 
Nationals' on-ground research indicated that voters were unaware of 
what the party saw as the negatives in Labor's policies: the proposed 
abolition of the anti-strike legislation, for example, and of voluntary 
employment agreements. These were to be highlighted and Labor's 
hidden agenda on social issues - matters which, though dealt with in 
Labor's platform, were not being brought forward during its campaign, 
pertaining to abortion, homosexuality and censorship - was to be 
exposed and attacked. 
The strategy almost misfired before it had been developed fully. 
Student actors who participated in the production of a television 
commercial leaked its content to the media. The theme targeted Labor's 
alleged policy on homosexuality, portraying a Brisbane version of 
Sydney's annual "Gay" Mardi Gras and asserting that under a Labor 
government this would be a yearly event. The resultant furore, 
atypically, worked to the detriment of the Nationals rather than the ALP. 
The National party claims that the commercial was part of a total 
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package prepared by one of the agencies tendering for its advertising 
campaign and that there never had been any intention to use such 
material on television. 
Be that as it may, Cooper's policy speech took up the same and 
similar themes. As the Courier-Mail editorialised: "The National party 
has clearly decided that there is some political mileage to be gained by 
adopting a hard-line, right-wing fundamentalist approach to social 
issues".* This approach included introduction of even tougher anti-drug 
and censorship legislation, including some to deal with pornographic 
rock music. The remainder of the policy speech was much as usual: 
more economic development, including a super Department of State 
Development; a tougher stance on industrial relations; money for 
infrastructure such as roads and transport; and no new taxes. As with 
the other major parties, a sop was given to the environmentalists - a 
tree-planting exercise called "Caring for Our Countryside". Inevitably, 
however, with the exception of its dyed-in-the-wool supporters, 
promises for the future made little impression on an electorate now more 
concerned with the government's past actions. 
Cooper's attempts to divert public attention to social and moral issues 
attracted support from an unusual quarter. The Logos Foundation, 
directed by an extreme right-wing minister, Howard Carter, head of an 
obscure sect, the Covenant Evangelical Church, began an expensive 
advertising campaign directed against pornography, homosexuality, 
abortion on demand and the absence of capital punishment, which the 
Foundation asserted were the key issues of the campaign. In reaction, 
the leaders of the major churches issued a joint statement warning their 
members not to lose sight of corruption or be distracted by other issues 
from pursuing the cleansing process. Cooper, already in trouble for his 
support for re-introduction of the death penalty, atiacked the churches' 
stand, claiming corruption took many forms. He urged all practising 
Christians to examine the ALP's stance on moral issues. While these 
actions may have gladdened the hearts of fundamentalist Christians, his 
continual attempts to obfuscate the issue of political corruption seemed 
to be counter-productive with the wider electorate. 
Hanging over the party's head since late July had been the 
Damoclean sword of an investigation into ministerial expenses by the 
special prosecutor, Doug Drummond, Q.C. This had arisen from 
admissions made by former transport minister, Don Lane, in evidence 
before the Fitzgerald Inquiry, that he and numerous other ministers had 
misused consi.stently their ministerial allowances iind expense accounts. 
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Ahern had agreed to the investigation, pledging that all the necessary 
records would be made available to Drummond who decided that his 
inquiry would go back no further than 30 June 1980. As the election 
approached, mmours began to circulate widely as to who had been 
cleared by Dmmmond and who was still under examination. 
After Drummond sent letters to a number of persons confirming that 
they had no charges to answer, it became clear that some present and 
past ministers were still under investigation: Hinze, Lane, Austin, Muntz, 
Harvey and Gibbs. The first two had left Parliament and their seats had 
been filled already at by-elections. Austin resigned on 26 October but 
the fate of the remaining three placed the party in a quandary. If they 
resigned, the party would have to find replacement candidates at short 
notice; if they remained, they would have to fight the election under a 
cloud. In the event, Muntz resigned on 2 November, with the intention 
of contesting his seat of Whitsunday as an independent. The following 
day Drummond confirmed that, to preserve the presumption of 
innocence, he would not launch any prosecutions prior to the election. 
On this basis, Harvey and Gibbs declined to stand down. The Liberal 
party, in a burst of self-righteousness, decided to direct its preferences 
to the ALP in Gibbs' electorate of Albert. 
The National party went into the election with an unprecedented 
number of vacant seats. Eariier in the year, McKechnie (Carnarvon), 
Tenni (Barron River) and Rowe (Hinchinbrook) had confirmed their 
intention to retire at the election; Simpson (Cooroora) made a similar 
decision in September, in disgust at Ahern's leadership and the change 
of party direction, while Glasson (Gregory) later took the same road, 
troubled by Cooper's overthrow of Ahern. Powell's seat of Isis, where 
he too was standing as an independent, had not been filled, and 
candidates also had to be found at the eleventh hour to replace Austin 
(Nicklin) and Muntz (Whitsunday). 
In many of these electorates, candidates had not been selected early 
enough to give them sufficient time to make themselves known to the 
voters, while the last minute pre-selections compounded the party's 
problems, particularly when they took place in areas where the 
membership was factionalised already by earlier events. This was seen 
most clearly on the Sunshine Coast, north of Brisbane in the three 
adjoining electoral districts of Cooroora, Nicklin and Ahern's own seat 
of Landsborough. Here the anti-Ahern/pro-Bjelke-Petersen feeling 
expressed itself in defections from the Nationals to the Liberal party. 
Councillor Bob King, deputy chairman of the Maroochy shire and a 
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senior 
National party office holder in the Cooroora electorate council, 
stood for the Liberals in Nicklin, while another party member, Allen 
Low, ran under the Liberal banner in Cooroora. In Landsborough, one 
of Ahern's party officials, Santo Ferraro, opposed him as an 
"Independent Conservative". The same group, which Sir Joh publicly 
supported and which was said to represent his faction in the party, also 
put up a candidate in Nicklin. 
Nicklin was the electoral district in which the problems associated 
with the late selection of candidates were the most troublesome and 
observable. At the 1986 election, Austin had been pre-selected as an 
outsider over local candidates. This had caused resentment among 
members, already sceptical about Austin's conversion to the National 
party after the 1983 election. They believed that he had been foisted 
upon them by the party hierarchy, anxious to find him a safe- seat after 
his own electoral district, Wavell, had disappeared in the 1985 
redistribution. Austin's replacement in Nicklin was another outsider, 
Neil Turner, a former National minister and member for Warrego in the 
west of the state, who had retired from parliament in 1986. Though the 
party secretariat denied that it had been overly influential in the 
selection process, many local members either resigned from the party or 
failed to put their customary effort into the Nicklin or other campaigns. 
Conclusions 
The National party believes it lost the election on 10 October, the day 
that Liberal leader Angus Innes made his famous speech at Stanthorpe 
in which he said that "the Liberal Party will not serve in any 
government unless it is the senior partner",^ and went on to raise the 
possibility of seeking a mandate to form a minority government if the 
Liberals failed to gain sufficient seats to give them seniority. With a 
few ill-chosen words, Innes raised for the voters the spectre of 
instability of government. While it was patently clear that the National 
party could not win government in its own right, it was highly 
improbable that the Liberals, for all their confidence, would gain more 
seats than the Nationals. With a coalition ruled out so categorically, the 
available options for the electors now seemed to be either a hung 
parliament with the possibility of an early poll or the election of a Labor 
government. 
In the event, sufficient voters took the latter option to ensure a 
resounding victory for the ALP. It virtually swept the board with fifty-
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four seats and 51 per cent of the vote. The National party retained 
twenty-six seats and 23.7 per cent of the vote, mainly in the country 
areas, the Liberals nine and 20.9 per cent. The Nationals had no longer 
been able to offer themselves to the electors as the party of stability, 
strength in leadership and integrity; of unity and purpose; of getting 
things done for Queensland. In its policies the National party had 
shown itself no longer fully in tune with the needs and the interests of 
even a substantial minority of Queenslanders. Above all else, its leaders 
had been displayed as venal and corrupt. That it could have won more 
seats, except for the non-performance on the day of the Liberal party, 
was cold comfort to a party struggling to come to grips with the trauma 
of loss of government. Isis was lost by only 18 votes, Whitsunday by 7 
votes and Nicklin by 4 votes (before the Court of Disputed Returns 
recounted); when they were needed. Liberal preferences simply did not 
hold up for the Nationals. The difference between defeat and victory 
was 2552 votes spread over twelve electorates. 
In the end, Mike Ahern was wrong. Almost two years earlier, he 
had hailed his accession to the premiership as the end of the Bjelke-
Petersen era. That came only in December 1989, when the first Labor 
government since 1957 was returned to office. 
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THE LIBERAL PARTY 
Paul Reynolds 
While the Queensland Liberal party's coalition arrangement with the 
Country (later National) party from 1957 to 1983 had been something of 
a mixed blessing for the Liberals when in government, its legacy had, by 
the 1980s become a positive embarrassment. In coalition the Liberals had 
been the minority party despite, for most of the period, outpoUing the 
Nationals. Owing to the zonal system of vote weightage operating in 
Queensland, this popular vote never translated into the requisite number of 
seats to give the Liberals the dominance in government they so desperately 
sought. The rather paltry compensation they received was the holding by 
the Liberal leader of the deputy premiership and the treasury portfolio, 
while another eight, or more usually seven, senior Liberals held a variety 
of other ministries, most often those associated with the "problem" areas 
of government. The Nationals arrogated to themselves those portfolios 
with high profiles, high expenditure levels and the best possibilities for 
patronage. 
Prior to the ascendancy of Joh Bjelke-Petersen, relations between the 
two parties had been reasonably amicable. Liberal ministers were apt to 
stress the virtues of united and stable coalition government during the 
election campaigns of the 1960s.^  They contented themselves with the 
expectation that demographic change would give them majority party 
status, A change from first-past-the-post to preferential voting prior to 
the 1963 state election was seen as a necessary prerequisite to bring this 
about, as well as aligning Queensland electorally with other states. This 
harmony in government ranks was, however, placed under increasing strain 
during the 1970s for a variety of reasons. 
The 1970s 
The National Party was not content to remain a rural party and see its 
electoral base dwindle with rural depopulation. From the eariy 1970s il 
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actively pursued the goal of becoming Queensland's major conservative 
party. To this end it engaged in a process of organisational, financial, and 
electoral transformation, the details of which have been discussed 
elsewhere.^  Inevitably the two partners were brought into conflict as the 
Nationals began to encroach on electoral territory previously the preserve 
of the Liberals in Brisbane and the provincial cities. From 1974 this meant 
contesting such seats held by the ALP, using the excuse that three-
cornered contests in such areas would "maximise the anti-Labor vote". 
There was little evidence to support such a claim, but it served to justify 
the Nationals' attempting to construct an urban political base, while 
simultaneously acquiring an urban profile and courting urban business 
interests.^  
After the retirement of Sir Gordon Chalk, the Liberal leadership was not 
perceived as being strong enough either to assert a distinctive Liberal 
presence in Parliament, cabinet and the joint party room,"* or to moderate 
the excesses of the Bjelke-Petersen and Hinze brand of authoritarian 
populism. Urban Liberals were disturbed by events such as the 
government's anti-street march legislation for the 1977 election, the 
politicisation of the police force by National ministers, the demolition of 
the Bellevue Hotel, and the general lack of attention given to quality of life 
issues covering policy areas concerning the environment and national 
estate. 
Liberal ministers were seen as weak, unwilling and/or unable to 
withstand the premier's blandishments, while the Nationals ruthlessly used 
their numbers to out vote the Liberals in cabinet and the joint party room. 
Liberal policies were considered expendable where they clashed with the 
Nationals' concept of realpolitik and led directly to a division between 
Liberal frontbenchers and backbenchers. The latter increasingly urged 
Liberal policies on government, being concerned over parliamentary reform 
and governmental accountability and uneasy about the government's 
propensity to intmde into economic and business life.^  Liberal ministers 
tended to respond by urging a pro-coalition position on their backbench 
colleagues, apparentiy believing that, in the last analysis, it was better to 
have a secondary role in government than to be excluded from its ranks 
entirely. 
By the 1980 election, both these developments were beginning to have 
an impact on the electorate. The Nationals were on the march in urban 
seats, and while as yet unsuccessful, were mounting ever stronger 
challenges in some Liberal electorates, particularly Aspley, Greenslopes, 
Mount Gravatt and Toowong. Public opinion, as measured by the opinion 
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polls, seemed confused as to what the Liberals stood for and how they 
differed from the Nationals, while tending to see them as irrelevant in a 
state dominated by Bjelke-Petersen and the National machine.^ 
At one level the Liberals had become prisoners of their own history and 
organisational development. One of Menzies' cardinal propositions when 
founding the Liberal Party in 1944 was his insistence that the 
organisational wing of the party could not direct either the parliamentary 
party or its leadership. He had both witnessed, and been a victim of 
machinations from these quarters during the days of the United Australia 
Party, while he had always been critical of the situation in the ALP where, 
at least in theory, the parliamentary Labor party was bound by both ALP 
conference decisions and executive direction. 
By the 1976 Liberal conference in Toowoomba, a major split had 
occurred between sections of the organisation and state parliamentary 
leadership. Spurred on by the Young Liberal Movement, itself the chief 
recruiting ground for the backbench rebels, the conference adopted policies 
at variance with many National policies and attitudes, particularly with 
regard to three-cornered contests, thereby overriding the leadership which 
attempted to placate delegates with familiar stories of coalition 
accomplishments and dire warnings about placing too much strain on the 
government.^ Such opposition within the ranks of the Liberals did not 
augur well for the party as it moved into the 1980s. 
The 1980s 
A second Menzian legacy was the comparatively unfettered nature of the 
Liberal leadership. The parliamentary leader was to be undisputed leader 
of the whole party, a position which could not be usurped by the 
organisational president. This leadership role was designed by Menzies for 
himself, and worked best when the leader was able to exert his authority 
over all sections of the party. However, when the leader lacked this 
capacity, lines of authority broke down. In this event the leader possessed 
very few resources, finding it difficult to manage the party according to the 
prescriptive model. Both Knox, and later Edwards, despite being diligent 
and competent ministers, were unable to press Liberal policies in 
government or to moderate the increasing authoritarianism of Bjelke-
Petersen and his lieutenants. Observing this trend, backbenchers began to 
assert that their leaders were unable, as well as unwilling, to carry out that 
role; that they actually preferred to support, or at least acquiesce, rather 
than to challenge or confront. The reinforcement of these perceptions of 
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weakness in leadership led to further alienation between leader and party. 
Hence Knox was overturned by the backbench in favour of Edwards and, 
when he failed to perform according to their expectations, leadership 
emerged as a crucial component in the debacle which led to the fall of the 
coalition in 1983.* Thereafter, leadership problems continued to haunt the 
Liberals for the rest of the decade, surfacing once more during the 1989 
campaign. 
The events of 1983 then exerted a profound influence on the Liberal 
party by sealing its electoral and political fate for the 1980s and beyond. 
Electorally they were forced to fight on two fronts, having to carve out a 
distinctive position for themselves in contradistinction to both the Nationals 
and Labor. Their lack of success in this task can be traced to their failure 
to develop a strong class base. By contrast, when Labor was decimated in 
1974, it was reduced to its core working-class seats in Brisbane and the 
larger provincial cities. From this heartiand it rebuilt its electoral base 
"outwards", even though it took another three elections before the size of 
the Labor caucus again approached that of 1972-1974. 
Labor's other advantage in the 1970s lay in its being the only party in 
opposition. As the ALP has been a crucial political force in state and 
federal politics since the 1890s, it possessed an ideological position, an 
organisational base and a constitutional role. All three gave it a measure 
of credibility, together with the resources and motivation to reorganise. 
When federal intervention in the state branch occurred between 1979 and 
1981,' Labor's process of organisational restmcturing was complete and 
the party began to address itself to pursuing a revival in its electoral 
fortunes sufficient to take it into government. That process is described in 
Chapter 5. 
Compared to Labor a decade earlier, the Liberals were, in the 1980s, 
particularly disadvantaged. Theoretically, previous coalition agreements 
had prevented them from expanding beyond Brisbane and provincial city 
electorates. But their chief difficulty was that in these seats they competed 
directly with Labor. The ALP held working-class Brisbane electorates, the 
Liberals middle-class, with the competition being for mixed-class and 
outer urban seats. In the provincial cities Labor was impregnable, save 
only for those few towns lacking a large blue collar work-force such as 
Toowoomba or, as in Mount Isa, where a sufficient tract of mral hinterland 
was grafted on to the town to tip the balance. 
Attempts to break out of this electoral encirclement and take the 
political contest to National areas failed for two frirther reasons. First, the 
Nationals had established a pattern of voter loyalty, even in the urban. 
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non-Brisbane, south-eastern zone seats, being able to paint the Liberals as 
both latecomers and interlopers. Small town business and social networks, 
together with the ubiquitous service clubs, were dominated by National 
supporters or sympathisers and so a possible Liberal recruiting ground had 
been pre-empted. The alternative political training ground for mral and 
small town electorates, local government, was similarly largely under de 
facto National control, especially as largesse generated by the state 
government was spread unashamedly to towns and shires known to be 
controlled by National party members and their allies. 
The second reason for the failure of the Liberals to expand their base 
was predicated upon the first, namely their lack of any significant 
organisational infrastructure outside Brisbane. Persistent neglect by 
Brisbane headquarters, indicated by an unwillingness on the part of 
successive state directors to establish and nurture regional organisations, 
had the effect of handing over these areas to National or Labor domination. 
Those non-Brisbane seats occasionally held by the Liberals were won 
through connectional politics, where class or regional forces were 
temporarily overridden.^° Electoral districts such as Lockyer (Chalk), 
Bowen (Delamothe), Ipswich (Edwards), Townsville (Scott-Young), Mount 
Isa (Beard), Southport (White), Surfers' Paradise (Bishop) and 
Maryborough (Alison first Liberal, then National) had, at various times, a 
history of Liberal incumbency. But in no case was the Liberal member able 
to establish a lien on the seat in favour of a successor. The holding of 
such seats can be attributed to the Liberal member possessing a sufficiently 
important local profile and personal connections to detach temporarily, 
sufficient support from Labor and/or the Nationals to win on one or other 
of those parties' preferences. Labor would generally (with the notable 
exceptions of Southport and Surfers' Paradise in 1980) give the Liberals 
their second preferences, while the Nationals invariably did so. 
The Liberals then had come to resemble a minor party competing in a 
two-party system. As with the British SDLP, they lacked a cohesive 
regional or class base. Their vaguely progressive policies, while paying 
ritual heed to the slogans of free enterprise economics, generally had a low 
rate of recognition. Their leaders were seen as decent, but lacking in 
political force or substance, and, outside the metropolitan area, their seats 
were held randomly and by chance owing to a local worthy who could 
temporarily, and often by a small margin, override the more impersonal 
social factors which generally predict voting behaviour. Where class-based 
Labor seats were taken, they reverted to class type upon Liberal defeat or 
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retirement (Mount Isa, Maryborough, Ipswich and Townsville) while the 
others reverted to the Nationals. 
The Liberals then approached the 1989 poll from a somewhat 
ambiguous position. In 1986 they had hoped for a recovery from their 
electoral nadir of 1983, but such recovery as they experienced proved 
modest indeed. From their 1983 low of 14.4 per cent, their primary vote 
climbed to 16.4 per cent, winning them Ashgrove and Mount Isa from 
Labor and regaining Toowong from the Nationals. In Brisbane itself their 
vote actually declined slightly, from 28.1 per cent to 27 per cent, although 
in the arc of outer Brisbane electorates they fared rather better, rising from 
12.8 per cent to 20.5 per cent. However, in the most galling result, their 
vote fell further in those six urban seats taken by the Nationals", and 
only Toowong was retaken. They continued to hold a skeletal urban 
political base with remote Mount Isa the only non-Brisbane possession. 
The one significant advance the Liberals did make after 1983 occurred 
at the 1985 Brisbane city council elections when Labor's twenty-four year 
domination of municipal government was broken by the return of a Liberal 
aldermanic majority, whilst the lack-lustre ALP lord mayor was also 
beaten by the Liberals' high profile Sallyanne Atkinson. The position was 
consolidated three years later when the majority was retained and Atkinson 
defeated her Labor challenger by a 2:1 margin. As Sallyanne Atkinson 
was undoubtedly the Queensland Liberal success story of the 1980s, it was 
not long before there were moves to translate her from local to state, or 
federal, politics. The continued paucity of leadership talent in the Liberal 
party in George Street, or even Canberra, explains the serious consideration 
that was given to removing her from the level of government where she 
had estabhshed an unchallenged ascendancy. The record after 1983 told 
its own story. After that election, the depleted party soon dropped White 
to re-cycle Knox who led them into the 1986 election and then stepped 
aside for White's former deputy, Angus Innes, the first Liberal leader since 
1957 who possessed no ministerial experience. Paralleling this 
development, the ALP's leader, Neville Warburton, stood aside for Wayne 
Goss, while the Nationals were convulsed in ti^o bouts of bitter infighting, 
replacing Bjelke-Petersen with Mike Ahern and, only weeks before the 
election, Ahern by Russell Cooper. ^ ^ 
Innes, however, failed to make a sufficient impression on the electorate. 
His leadership presence remained indistinct, as final opinion polls showed 
that 27 per cent of voters still could not decide whether they approved or 
disapproved of him as Liberal leader." In this he personified his party's 
dilemma. The Westminster system fails to accord a meaningful role to the 
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party or parties which occupy neither the treasury nor opposition benches. 
Third parties are irrelevant to the parliamentary process unless the 
government fails to command an overall majority on the floor of the 
House. The Nationals possessed such a majority after 1983, thanks to the 
desertions from Liberal ranks of Lane and Austin. In 1986 they 
strengthened their majority via the 1985 redistribution which increased the 
Legislative Assembly from eight-two to eighty-nine seats, thereby creating 
a greater number of safe seats, a development particulariy beneficial to the 
government. The Liberals therefore continued to occupy the political 
wasteland of the cross-benches while the electorate remained polarised 
between the parties of continuous government (National) and perpetual 
opposition (Labor). It was difficult to discover any reason for voting 
Liberal, apart from habit in the western suburbs of Brisbane together with 
Hamilton, Ascot and Clayfield or through connectional aberrations in 
Mount Isa. 
Early in the campaign a group of Brisbane business people decided that 
the Liberals would be more successful if they were led by the Lord Mayor. 
The plan apparently was to pre-select her for Yeronga, finally vacated by 
its long-serving, ex-ministerial incumbent. Norm Lee. Labor was seen as 
the probable winner in Yeronga, hence Atkinson's nomination would both 
secure that seat while spearheading the attempt to regain the remaining 
National seats in the city. The prospect of having a leader who had yet to 
win a parliamentary place did not weaken this group's enthusiasm, nor did 
the likely political damage it would cause in the electorate if Innes was not 
persuaded to vacate his leadership voluntarily. Such disarray, occurring at 
the start of a crucial campaign, could only diminish, rather than enhance, 
the Liberals' electoral prospects. It also did not appear to have occurred to 
supporters of this plan that a lord mayor of Brisbane might have very little 
electoral impact in provincial city or rural electorates or that the last 
attempt to translate a popular lord mayor, Clem Jones, into state politics 
had failed in the very same electorate. After some hesitation the lord 
mayor proclaimed that she would remain in local government and offered 
Innes her loyalty and support. The Liberals had at least been spared a bout 
of leadership bloodletting, but at the cost of some initial destabilisation of 
Innes. 
The 1989 Election Campaign 
For all parties the campaign proper was dominated by the aftermath of the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry and the contents of his report handed to the government 
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on 3 July 1989. The polls tracked a movement of voters from the 
government which, together with Ahern's non-authoritarian but indecisive 
style of leadership, caused the Nationals to despatch him (see Chapter 6). 
This act at least had the virtue of stemming the stream of vitriolic abuse 
directed by Bjelke-Petersen at Ahern and the National party president, Sir 
Robert Sparkes. 
The Liberals undertook a campaign which stressed honesty and 
accountability in government. They rather riskily reminded voters of the 
stand they claimed to have taken on these issues in 1983 (specifically on 
the establishment of a public accounts committee) and pointed out that, 
save for Lane and Austin whom they disowned, all their former ministers 
had been cleared by the special prosecutor's office of possible misuse of 
ministerial expense accounts. They thus attempted to profit from the 
Nationals' implication in corruption and malpractice, whilst refusing to 
believe that this would cause electors finally to turn to the ALP. Their 
stance was designed to capture that section of the conservative vote which 
was detachable from the Nationals over Fitzgerald-generated issues. 
In framing this strategy they took encouragement from the results of 
two by-elections held during the Fitzgerald Inquiry. Ahern had stood aside 
Hinze and Lane after allegations had been made against both. Hinze 
resigned from South Coast in 1988, and Lane from Merthyr in 1989; both 
were safe non-Labor electorates. The South Coast by-election in August 
1988 saw the Liberal vote rise from 19.7 per cent to 28.9 per cent, while 
both the National and ALP votes fell, respectively, by 18.8 percentage 
points and 8.2 percentage points to 30.4 per cent and 22.9 per cent. 
Independents and minor party candidates secured 17.8 per cent. The 
National candidate scraped back on preferences. Nine months later, in 
Merthyr the Liberals were successful, revenging themselves on Lane who, 
in 1983, had held it as a Liberal candidate before deserting to the Nationals 
after the election. The Liberal vote rose by 3.8 percentage points to 35.9 
per cent, the Nationals dropped by 16.8 points to 16.0 per cent, while 
Labor support was all but static, rising by 0.2 of a percentage point to 32.7 
per cent. 
Both results heartened the Liberals who felt they would now benefit 
from the evident widespread disenchantment with the Nationals occasioned 
by the Fitzgerald revelations. While they stressed their commitment to 
honesty in government, they alleged that Labor was still hopelessly 
faction-ridden and that Wayne Goss was under union domination. 
However, for this second strand of campaigning their television 
commercials, which were amateurish and lacked any persuasive force, were 
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widely derided. Throughout the campaign the polls showed that Labor was 
headed for victory, and hence Liberal propaganda in this vein smacked of 
political desperation. Labor factions had been disciplined since 1983 while, 
given both the low standing of Innes and the high standing of Goss in the 
leadership approval polls, mounting such personalised attacks cost the 
Liberals credibility they could ill-afford to lose. While their campaign was 
at least better than the sorry National effort predicting a "Gay" Mardi Gras 
in Brisbane if Labor came to power, both anti-Labor parties lost political 
ground in resorting to such far-fetched attempts to smear their common 
foe. 
As to their anti-National campaign, both Innes and his party realised 
that for the campaign's duration he would be hounded by reporters over 
whether, and on what terms, the Liberals would return to coalition with the 
Nationals. In a generally effective pre-emptive strike, a Liberal press 
release was issued on the eve of the campaign declaring that there would 
be no coalition unless the Liberals were its senior partner. Apart from the 
noticeable lapse in the middle of the campaign at Stanthorpe when Innes 
and his deputy, Peter Beard, foolishly speculated to reporters as to whether 
this would hold in the event of a hung parliament, he continued to reiterate 
this position adding, ad nauseam, that the Liberals would govern in their 
own right. This claim was however, so palpably improbable, given the 
results in 1983 and 1986 that few, apart from Innes himself, believed it. All 
political leaders, in the midst of hard fought campaigns, apparently feel the 
need to believe their own rhetoric and Innes was, in 1989, no exception. 
As "evidence" for his contention, Innes referred to the supposed 
superiority of Liberal policies, but more, to the many so-called "quality 
candidates" they claimed to have pre-selected in Brisbane and for targeted 
National and Labor seats elsewhere. This latter claim amply disclosed how 
dependent upon the vagaries of connectional politics the Liberals had 
become. Such candidates were to be elected, not because they were 
Liberals but because the party hoped that, as well known local identities, 
their very nomination would, in their areas, override traditional National or 
Labor loyalties. It was to be a vain hope. Such was the magnitude of the 
swing to Labor that none of the candidates was elected, while Mount Isa 
was lost in a massive anti-Liberal swing .of 23.5 percentage points, 
dividing 14.5 percentage points to Labor (which re-took it) and 9.0 
percentage points to the Nationals. Moreover, those seats actually won by 
the Liberals were taken for rather more prosaic reasons, namely because, 
as at the two recent by-elections. Labor was perceived as having no chance 
of victory in such seats. Hence any anti-National vote in these seats went 
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disproportionately to the Liberals, who reaped the benefit of the sentiment 
that, at all costs, the Nationals must go. In this sense then, Liberal gains 
were by default, while the pattern of their losses revealed more accurately 
the electoral position they held in Queensland politics. 
As a general summary. Labor lost no seats, but gained twenty four; the 
Nationals won none, but lost twenty-two and the Liberals gained five and 
lost seven. The win of Merthyr in May had sent the Liberals into the 
election holding eleven seats. Of these they retained only four: Merthyr 
(+6.4 percentage points in the primary vote), Moggill (+1.4), Toowong 
(+1.2) and Sherwood (with a swing against Innes of 4.2). They won five 
National seats, Aspley in Brisbane (+5.3), the Gold Coast seats of 
Curmmbin (+16.4), Nerang (+9.6) and South Coast (+8.4), together with 
Nicklin (+4.3) on the Sunshine Coast which was subsequently lost again 
in the Court on Disputed Returns. 
Overriding these modest gains was the loss of six seats in Brisbane to 
the ALP, plus Mount Isa. The losses were Ashgrove (-7.5 percentage 
points) which had been won by Labor in 1983, re-taken by the Liberals in 
1986 and re-captured by the former member for South Brisbane and future 
Speaker, Jim Fouras. Stafford (+3.7) had been won in 1974 by Terry 
Gygar who became one of the 1983 backbench rebels. He lost it in 1983 
to then ALP president, Denis Murphy, who died soon after. Gygar re-took 
it in the subsequent by-election, only to lose it in 1989. Knox's seat of 
Nundah (+1.0), won and held by him continuously since 1957 fell, as did 
White's seat of Redcliffe (+2.9). Yeronga was lost (+3.3) to a high profile 
Labor barrister. Matt Foley, while Mount Coot-tha, substantially altered in 
1985 and won in 1986 by the former Queensland Teachers' Union 
president, Lyle Schuntner, was lost despite a +3.9 percentage points swing. 
Paradoxically the Liberals lost these six seats despite primary vote 
swings to them in all but Ashgrove. This is explained by the collapse of 
the National primary vote, so that the Liberals, while being the Nationals' 
residual legatee, did not have their votes inflated sufficiently to withstand 
the Labor tide. In fact Liberal past successes in these seats had been 
jerrybuiU, a factor particularly in evidence in 1986. That such seats 
seemed (apart from Mount Coot-tha) superficially strong Liberal territory 
was due to their possessing long-serving Liberal incumbents. All six had 
been retained in 1986 only on National preferences as, by then, the Liberal 
primary vote had fallen well below that for Labor.'" In 1989 the 
National outflow made for Labor first preference victories. Prior to 1989 
the Liberals held ten, or 30 per cent, of the Brisbane seats; after 1989 this 
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total had been halved, despite another slight Brisbane-wide swing to them 
of 2 percentage points in votes. 
It was only further afield, on the Gold and Sunshine Coasts, that the 
Liberals made significant headway. The six Gold Coast seats registered a 
Liberal swing of 9.7 percentage points, topped by an aggregate 10.5 
percentage points swing on the Sunshine Coast. Four of their nine seats 
now lay outside Brisbane, compared to one out of eleven prior to the 
election. While seats the Liberals lost were convincingly won by Labor 
without preference distribution, all the Liberal gains from the Nationals 
were the result of preference distribution and, in three of the five seats, 
extremely close ones at that. After preference allocation in Aspley, the 
Liberal majority was 51.2 per cent (464 votes), in Curmmbin, 50.9 per cent 
(409), and in Nerang, 51.4 per cent (676). Only Nicklin with 58.3 per cent 
(4030) and South Coast 57.7 per cent (3724) could be classed as solid 
gains, and the first of these proved ephemeral. 
Thus, after two more elections since 1983, there was still no evidence 
for a Liberal revival. The party held only three more seats than it did after 
1983 - two after the Court of Disputed Returns - with a net loss of two 
over 1986. As its popular vote in Queensland now stands at 20.9 per cent 
(compared to 14.4 per cent in 1983 and 16.4 per cent in 1986), it has been 
confirmed as a permanent minor force in state politics. A previously 
suggested pattern'^ has thus been reinforced. As with the Canadian 
Liberal party in British Columbia, so the Queensland Liberal party seems 
destined to maintain a state presence primarily as a political machine for 
contesting this state's federal elections. Its immediate challenge has less to 
do with pursuing the mirage of gaining a significant role in State politics 
and more to do with ensuring that its weakness at state level does not 
further erode its federal credibility.'* 
Postscript 
The magnitude of the landslide which brought Labor to power had a 
differential impact upon all parties. The ALP had to grapple with the long 
forgotten realities of power while the Nationals were forced to adjust to the 
trauma of opposition and the sudden loss of governmental privileges and 
resources. The Liberals faced a different dilemma. Their losses were such 
that their defeated members effectively snapped the last links between the 
party and coalition government. Apart from Innes, who had been a 
coalition backbencher between 1978 and 1983, the Liberals were now a 
party of political neophytes. Two thirds of them (six out of nine) were 
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elected for the first time in 1989, while another, Santo Santoro, had entered 
Pariiament only seven months earlier at the Merthyr by-election. Their 
deputy leader had lost his seat, while only Innes and Denver Beanland had 
any parhamentary experience - the latter having served for one term only, 
although he had been previously a Brisbane city councillor and, for a year, 
deputy lord mayor. Moreover, the pattern of Liberal gains had seen them 
translated from being a Brisbane based party to one whose strength was 
now in large part on the Gold and Sunshine Coasts, having exchanged their 
urban metropolitan base for a regional urban one. Nevertheless they 
continued to be locked into the south-east corner of the state. 
With a net loss of two seats (compared to 1986) and a drastically 
altered balance of support, the Liberals had suffered a defeat almost as 
severe as that they had sustained in 1983, and one which represented a 
retreat from their modest recovery of 1986." After an electoral defeat the 
first item on the Liberals' agenda, at both state and federal levels, is a 
change in the leadership. Queensland in 1990 was no exception. After 
1986 Knox had given way to Innes in the hope that a younger leader would 
be able to rebuild the party's political stocks and profit from the difficulties 
which plagued the Nationals after the 1987 federal election. 
Disenchantment with the Nationals, fuelled by the Fitzgerald Inquiry 
revelations, swung electoral opinion firmly behind the ALP as the only 
viable political alternative for government.'* In retrospect there seemed 
little that the Liberals could do to alter this situation, save where Labor was 
not perceived as a viable alternative, namely on the Gold and Sunshine 
Coasts. While the Liberals performed well enough in these areas, as 
suggested above their winning margins were hardly decisive in these seats 
where their support should have been maximised. Consequently Innes was 
under pressure to step aside. 
He remained leader for the first session of the new parliament, but 
resigned both the leadership and his seat of Sherwood on 11 May 1990, 
some five days after the former premier, Mike Ahern, vacated his seat of 
Landsborough. Innes cited personal reasons, a wish to return to the bar 
and to spend more time with his family. In this he was publicly supported 
by his wife. A more cynical interpretation was that both Innes and Ahern 
were leaving at a particularly opportune time. New federal taxation laws 
were to come into effect on 1 July 1990, to increase the tax payable on 
lump sum superannuation payouts. This construction was advanced by the 
premier who refused to advise the writs be issued for the two by-elections 
before 1 July in case further long-serving members of the opposition chose 
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to resign prior to 30 June. In the event, none did so, and the two by-
elections were scheduled for 28 July 1990. 
Labor chose not to nominate for either contest, citing lack of funds 
owing to the expensive nature of the state election and the probability that 
these seats would cease to exist after the Electoral and Administrative 
Review Commission report on state electoral boundaries was handed down 
(expected in October or November 1990). Others, including the deputy 
leader of the National party, Bob Borbridge, alleged, plausibly, that Labor's 
stance was a calculated ploy to maximize competition, and therefore 
disharmony, between the Nationals and Liberals." The Labor candidates 
for both seats in 1989 re-nominated for the by-elections as Independent 
Labor Candidates, while the Nationals ignored Sherwood even though the 
Liberals stood in Landsborough. 
Table 7.1 By-election Results, 1990 
Party Sherwood Landsborough 
% % 
Liberal 50,2 30.5 
National - 25.0 
Independent Labor 40,3 19.1 
A.D. 6.5 5,1 
Others 2.9 20.3 
The Liberals won Sherwood on primary votes, despite a 3.7 percentage 
points fall in Innes' 1989 vote. Peter Pyke, the popular Labor candidate, 
who might have unseated Innes had Sherwood been other than a two-party 
contest in 1989, suffered a 5.8 percentage points decline. One surprise was 
the weak showing of the Australian Democrats who, in 1978, when Innes 
won Sherwood in earlier by-election, had outpolled the Nationals.^" Thus 
the by-election again confirmed Sherwood as safe Liberal territory. 
Landsborough had experienced occasional three-cornered contests since 
1966 when an Independent Liberal had won 20 per cent of the primary 
vote, although subsequent official Liberal forays in 1972 and 1980 had 
done little to destabilise Ahern.^' However in 1989, the Liberals had 
apparently won the adjacent seat of Nicklin while, in the 1990 federal 
election, they had won the overlapping federal division of Fairfax, thereby 
preventing the Nationals' John Stone from moving to the House of 
Representatives from the Senate.^ ^ 
The Liberals consequently held strong hopes of capturing 
Landsborough. Psychologically a victory would be important as it would 
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raise their state parliamentary strength to ten seats, thereby granting them 
official status as a political party in the Legislative Assembly. The results 
recorded an increase in the Liberal vote of 13.5 percentage points; the 
National vote fell by 14.5 percentage points while the Labor vote halved 
for the Independent Labor candidate, down 20.9 percentage points. A local 
high profile right wing independent, Sawyer, collected 16.6 per cent. 
When preferences were allocated, his preferences flowed 16 per cent to 
Labor, 23 per cent to the Nationals and 62 per cent to the Liberals. 
Independent Labor preferences were the last to be distributed, 20 per cent 
to National, 80 per cent to the Liberals. The final result gave 
Landsborough to the Liberals with 64.5 per cent of the total vote, while the 
Nationals collected only 35.5 per cent. Thus, a quarter of a century after 
their first abortive attempt, the Liberals captured Landsborough and, for the 
moment, completed the Nationals' rout on the Sunshine Coast. 
When Innes retired, the parliamentary Liberals elected Denver Beanland 
as leader and David Watson as his deputy. Although Watson was newly 
elected in 1989 for Moggill, he had served a term, between 1984 and 1987, 
in the House of Representatives as MHR for Forde which he lost to the 
ALP in 1987. The government had accorded the Liberals party status after 
1989, despite their numbers, but had added the rider that, should a coalition 
be formed in opposition, "the provision of staff and resources [will be] 
subject to review"^ .^ Thus the opposition side of Queensland politics 
continued to be bedevilled by the state of National-Liberal relations. 
The Liberals, despite their disappointing results in 1989, continue to be 
sustained by the hope that they are poised to become Queensland's major 
anti-Labor party. They have pursued this mirage since 1957, when they 
expected to be favoured by demographic changes as rural depopulation 
swelled the numbers in provincial and metropolitan centres. The 
"gerrymander", together with the political ascendancy of the Nationals 
under Bjelke-Petersen from 1977 to 1983, kept the Liberals to junior party 
status in the coalition. They then descended to minor party status in the 
elections of 1983 and 1986. Their hopes however revived in 1989. After 
three decades of largely unsuccessful attempts to wrest seats from the 
Nationals in three-cornered contests, the breakthrough finally occurred with 
their re-capturing National Brisbane seats (Toowong, 1986; Merthyr and 
Aspley, 1989) and their victories on the Gold and Sunshine Coasts. Their 
latest win in Landsborough demonstrated that, even in 1990, the National 
vote was continuing to fall. The Liberals in the Nationals' urban (but not 
Brisbane) strongholds were in a favourable position to profit from this 
decline. 
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More importantly, the Liberals' hope for the status of major non-Labor 
party was now pinned on the Electoral and Administrative Review 
Commission's investigation of state electoral boundaries. At the time of 
writing, FARC's final report is pending, but it is widely anticipated that 
EARC will recommend the abolition of the zonal system. Were this to 
occur, then it would require a comprehensive revision of all boundaries. 
This latter exercise would be profoundly influenced by the number of 
electoral districts recommended (currently eighty-nine), the size of the 
quota struck for the electorates and the tolerance allowable for enrolment 
deviation from the quota. 
Should EARC also recommend an independent Electoral Commission, 
along the lines of that in place for federal elections and State elections 
elsewhere, such a fair and politically non-manipulable system should 
establish a "level electoral playing field" for all parties. The Liberals then 
would aim for a strategy to contain the Nationals within a greatly reduced 
group of rural electorates while targeting conservative provincial and urban 
voters. Such optimism however presupposes that, for 1992, the Liberals 
will have developed the policies, organisational infrastructure, leadership 
credibility and political reputation forged from parliamentary performance, 
to realise this goal. At present, with a low profile leader and an untried 
parliamentary team, facing a National party determined to rebuild outwards 
from its rural heartland and a politically dominant government led by a 
popular premier, this would seem to be a political task of Herculean 
proportions. 
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MINOR PARTIES AND MAJOR PRESSURE 
GROUPS 
Rae Wear 
It would be easy to overlook the part played by minor parties in the 
1989 Queensland election. The progressive unfolding of the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry drama and its findings and recommendations focussed attention 
on the leading players in Queensland politics and pushed the minor 
participants into the shadows. The real possibility of a change of 
government after thirty-two years meant that media and voter attention 
was concentrated on the three major parties. 
Despite this, minor parties and independents received an increase in 
the percentage of the vote when compared with their 1986 resuUs. In 
1989, minor parties and independents received 4.6 per cent of the vote; 
in 1986, they polled 2.5 per cent. To a considerable extent this 
improved result can be explained by the significant increase in the 
number of the small party and independent candidates. In 1986, there 
were fifty-one such candidates; in 1989, this had increased to eighty-
three. The increase undoubtedly reflected the volatility of the electoral 
climate in Queensland, where the issues of corruption, and to a lesser 
extent the environment, loosened party ties. Overall, the Labor party 
received a high degree of support from independents. Greens and 
Democrats. The non-Labor parties benefited from the preferences of 
right-wing groups such as the Call to Australia party and the Citizens 
Electoral Councils. 
Whilst the role of the minor parties was small, the part played by 
two major pressure groups was more significant. Both the Logos 
Foundation and Green Challenge adopted similar strategies in order to 
bring issues which they deemed to be important to the attention of 
candidates and voters. 
The minor parties which contested the 1989 election ranged from 
those with one or two candidates, such as Greypower, the United 
Peoples party and the Australian Alliance, to the comparatively well 
establi.shed Australian Democrats. In between were those like the Call 
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to Australia party and the Citizens Electoral Councils. The United 
Peoples party, whose preferences favoured Labor, stood a candidate in 
Gympie. Greypower contested Bundaberg, and the Australian Alliance, 
which ran on an anti-corruption, sustainable development platform, 
fielded two candidates (in Albert and Manly) and has since disbanded. 
Preferences were not counted in any of these seats. 
The December 1989 elections proved disappointing for the 
Queensland branch of the Democrats. Despite a vote of confidence in 
them by the Green Challenge conservation group,' the Democrats 
received only 0.4 per cent of the vote, suffering a loss of 0.2 of a 
percentage point. The party stood candidates in seven marginal seats -
Curmmbin, Glass House, Manly, Nicklin, Redlands, Southport and 
Stafford, compared with a field of sixteen in 1986. They had trouble 
getting publicity during the election campaign, especially from the 
metropolitan media, and failed to divert attention from the three major 
parties. For the Democrats, the major campaign issues were electoral 
reform, the economy, the environment and social justice. These were 
also key issues for the Labor Party, so that it was difficult for the 
Democrats to make the running on them. The Democrats usually poll 
well when voters are disillusioned with all major parties and are seeking 
either another alternative or to register a protest vote. In 1989 the 
disillusionment of Queensland voters was clearly with the Nationals, and 
the Labor Party was the direct and principal beneficiary. In six of the 
seven seats in which they stood (the exception was Manly which the 
Democrats believed they had a chance of winning), the Democrats 
directed their preferences to Labor after Democrat questioning of the 
three main parties indicated that the Labor Party shared many of 
concerns of the Queensland Democrats. The Labor party also profited 
from the preferences of the various "green" candidates, who stood as a 
heterogeneous group of independents, rather than as members of a 
united "Green" party. 
On the right of the political spectmm were the Reverend Fred Nile's 
Call to Australia party and the Citizens Electoral Councils. The Call to 
Australia party stood candidates in Aspley, Caboolture, and Glass House 
where its candidate was Rona Joyner, a former National Party member 
and a familiar figure from right-wing of Queensland politics who had 
played a prominent role in two groups influential during the Bjelke-
Petersen premiership, the Society to Outiaw Pornography (STOP) and 
the Committee Against Regressive Education (CARE). These groups, 
and indeed Joyner herself, found an affinity with Sir Joh who shared 
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their strict religious fundamentalism.^ However, with the pohtical 
demise of Sir Joh, and the media focus on the leading parties and the 
results of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, Joyner and her colleagues in the Call 
To Austialia party received littie attention. In 1989, groups such as this 
generally found themselves out of step with the mood of the majority of 
electors. 
The other group on the right, the Citizens Electoral Councils, stood 
eight candidates - in Barambah, Broadsound, Fassifern, Maryborough, 
Peak Downs, Rockhampton North and Tablelands - and received 0.6 per 
cent of the vote, fractionally more than the Democrats. According to 
their members, the CECs do not constitute a political party; rather they 
provide an alternative to the party system. Their greatest electoral 
triumph occurred when the CEC candidate, Trevor Perrett, won a by-
election for Sir Joh's seat of Barambah on his retirement in 1988. 
Subsequently, however, Perrett returned to the National party and held 
Barambah for them in 1989 though his win as a CEC candidate, and the 
publicity the groups received over their advocacy of citizen-initiated 
referendums, gave them a higher profile than they otherwise might have 
anticipated. The citizen-initiated referendums proposed would be based 
on the Swiss system which permits concerned citizens to petition for a 
referendum if they want to alter legislation or initiate laws. As well as 
supporting the implementation of "the voters' veto", the CECs, like 
many groups on the extreme right, favour conspiracy theories of history 
as the following explanation for the formation of the Barambah Electoral 
Council illustrates: "It was formed because of the realisation that all the 
political parties slavishly served their international. New World Order 
Masters ... The One World Government Agenda of the Fabians, Rhodes 
Scholars and others has never been put to the people ..."^ 
Thus the 1989 Queensland election saw small-party candidates from 
both the left and the right ends of the political spectrum and the 
intervention of two pressure groups, Green Challenge and the Logos 
Foundation. Both pressure groups attempted to influence the election 
agenda, using similar strategies of polling the major parties on various 
issues and then publicising the results. Despite the fact that the Logos 
campaign was the more lavish of the two, and pushed a traditionally 
popular tough stand on moral issues, it was Green Challenge who, in 
post-Fitzgerald Queensland, seemed to have struck the more responsive 
chord in the electorate. 
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Green Challenge 
The campaign mounted by Green Challenge in the 1989 election had as 
its centre-piece a log of claims containing 103 proposals which was 
submitted to all major political parties and the results subsequently 
publicised. As well as dealing with environmental issues, the Green 
Challenge log of claims covered issues such as electoral reform based 
on "one vote, one value", the introduction of freedom of information 
legislation and the enactment of a WTiistieblowers Protection Act based 
on the U.S. model. In the environment and conservation area, key items 
were environmental education and advocacy, Aborigines and Torres 
Strait Islanders, heritage legislation, the greenhouse effect, ozone 
depletion, recycling, energy conservation, toxic and hazardous materials 
and waste, pollution, nuclear issues such as declaring Queensland a 
nuclear free zone, land-use planning, raral lands management, coastal 
development and the marine environment, the Great Barrier Reef, water 
resource management, national parks, wildlife and endangered species, 
forestry, rainforests, the wet tropics of Queensland, Cape York peninsula 
and mining and mineral resources.'* Green Challenge also submitted 
shorter questionnaires to candidates in marginal seats. These 
questionnaires were tailored to meet regional conditions; for example, 
the questionnaire submitted to candidates in the electorates of 
Toowoomba North and Toowoomba South sought their opinions on 
local issues such as the sub-division of the Toowoomba Range and the 
protection of stands of timber within the city boundary. Candidates 
were also asked to respond to statements of a more general nature, such 
as the following declaration on the role of the politician: "The politician 
has a particular social responsibility to promote social attitudes which 
reject consumerism in favour of life goals which are intrinsically 
healthier, more socially rewarding and less damaging to the natural 
environment."' 
Whilst Green Challenge declared itself satisfied with the responses of 
Labor, who gave commitments on all but seven points on the log of 
claims, and the Democrats who had given unqualified support on every 
issue, it was disappointed by the responses of the Liberal and National 
parties. The Liberals agreed with approximately a quarter of the 
proposals, but the Nationals were prepared to give unqualified support to 
only six items. As a consequence, Green Challenge supported Democrat 
and Labor candidates, campaigning in fifteen marginal electorates in 
support of the ALP. Although submitting the log of claims to party 
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leaders and publicising the results formed the centre-piece of the Green 
Challenge campaign, the group also organised a major march and "rally 
for change" of about 5,000 members of environmental groups and 
supporters in Brisbane. 
Green Challenge was formed by a combination of the Australian 
Conservation Foundation, the Australian Littoral Society, the Queensland 
Conservation Council, the Rainforest Conservation Society, the 
Wilderness Society, and the Wildlife Preservation Society of 
Queensland, as well as interested individuals and representatives from 
other community groups. Its formation signalled a further development 
in the short history of green politics in this country.^ It drew inspiration 
from the recent success of the Tasmanian Greens and the fact that 
environmental issues were clearly important to many voters. 
Although Green Challenge did not run its own candidates in the 
election, there were a number of independent candidates who ran as 
"greens" thereby producing a rather confusing situation. Green 
Challenge gave support to three Green Independent candidates, in 
Broadsound, Cook and South Brisbane.^ However, Green Challenge's 
campaign co-ordinator referred to "Independent Green" candidates in the 
election as "self-appointed opportunists" who had no formal links with 
the conservation movement.^ The fact that Green Challenge was an 
umbrella movement covering groups with a wide range of interests and 
philosophical positions meant that the potential for friction always 
existed. In one electorate, Green Challenge workers with Liberal Party 
affiliations reportedly declined to hand out material recommending 
support for Labor. 
In response to pressure from the environmental movement and the 
increasing importance of such issues to the electors, the three main 
parties attempted to prove their environmental credentials. Labor 
promised policies to preserve northern rainforests and to protect the 
coastline, a native flora and fauna conservation program, recycling 
programs and the introduction of a "green seal" for environmentally safe 
products. It also promised to end the controversial Wolffdene Dam 
project, to clean up toxic waste in the Brisbane suburb of Kingston and 
to close the Redbank radioactive dump; all these issues had provoked 
vocal opposition to the National party government. The Liberal party 
featured policies which promised to double the number of national 
parks, provide stronger penalties for polluters, and implement a coastal 
management survey. The Nationals promised a 5 per cent increase in 
the state's National Parks, beach protection plans and a "Caring for Our 
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Countryside" tree planting program. However, for the Liberals, and 
especially the Nationals, it was a case of too little, too late. The 
Nationals appeared out of step with the electorate on environmental 
issues, and instead concentrated a large part of their campaign on the 
traditional moral values which had served them well in the past. This 
concern with moral values was shared with the Logos Foundation, which 
like Green Challenge, submitted a questionnaire to the leaders and 
candidates from all political parties. 
The Logos Foundation 
Right-wing fundamentalist groups have always found a niche in 
Queensland politics, although it is quite likely that the publicity they 
have generated and the influence they have brought to bear on the 
National party government have been out of all proportion to their actual 
community support. In 1989 the principal organ of fundamentalism in 
the electoral arena was the Logos Foundation,'' based in the provincial 
city of Toowoomba and purporting to speak for the "silent majority" of 
Queensland voters, which attempted to place selected moral issues at the 
centre of the 1989 election campaign agenda. The Foundation's leader, 
Howard Carter, speaking at a public rally in Toowoomba on 1 
November, claimed that his organisation, in endeavouring to influence 
the election agenda, was "seeking to unite Christians, conservatives and 
the concerned around the priority of Values rather than see them divided 
over secondary issues like the environment, the Fitzgerald Report and so 
on". Carter claimed that the Fitzgerald Report's emphasis on systems 
would not produce moral change and that the Report "only skims the 
surface, and, in fact, sidesteps the very issues we are concerned 
about".'" The four key issues selected by the Foundation as of primary 
concern were pornography, abortion, homosexuality and capital 
punishment. In full page newspaper advertisements prior to the election, 
the Logos Foundation put the following four statements to the three 
main party leaders and candidates and asked for their responses: 
I support the removal of pornography from public displays. 
I support the aboHtion of abortion on demand. 
I support capital punishment for premeditated murder. 
I believe homosexual acts should remain a criminal offence. 
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The choice of questions reflects the preoccupation of the Foundation 
with a narrow range of moral issues, mostly of a sexual nature. The 
Liberal and National parties responded to the questionnaire. Labor 
declined to do so. 
The Logos Foundation had been established in 1966 in New Zealand 
by Howard Carter, a former Baptist minister. Logos has been described 
as "a Christian non-denominational 'think-tank' in the field of applied 
Christianity"." It is affiliated with the Covenant Evangelical Church 
where worship is charismatic and evangelical. Other affiliations are 
more difficult to trace. One link which surfaces persistently is with the 
American Christian Reconstructionist Movement. Although Logos 
denies the existence of any affiliation or formal link, research carried out 
by The Uniting Church indicates similarities in the philosophies of both 
movements.'^ The Christian Reconstructionists, led by the Reverend 
Rousas Rushdoony, advocate the rejection of representative democracy 
and pluralism in favour of a society reconstmcted on Old Testament 
lines and they favour a New Right economic agenda and a strict sexual 
morality. Logos has also been linked with the League of Rights which 
shares Logos' enthusiasm for citizen-initiated referendums. Despite 
many similarities, however, the two organisations start from different 
philosophical bases, Logos in the Old Testament and the League of 
Rights in Douglas Social Credit and pre-war anti-semitism. 
The Logos foundation's first foray into Queensland politics was 
centred on a campaign for Voters' Veto which it launched in 1988 with 
support from prominent right-wing figures, businessman Paul Terry and 
Mrs Jackie Butler, the editor of Wake Up Australia and chair of the 
Council For a Free Australia. It also campaigned vigorously for a "No" 
vote, during the 1988 constitutional referendums, distributing over a 
million pieces of literature at an estimated cost of $97,000.'^ 
The Logos Foundation campaign during the 1989 state election was 
similarly costly. It received support from many of the fundamentalist 
churches, such as Christian Outreach, and from within the National 
party. The justice minister, Ian Henderson, was an open supporter of 
the Logos position''* and the National party campaign echoed a number 
of the Logos Foundation's concerns. A strong emphasis on traditional 
moral values had served the Nationals well in the past, but in 1989 this 
strategy was neutralised by Fitzgerald Inquiry revelations about 
corruption which made it seem hypocritical in the extreme for a party as 
tainted by the smell of corruption as the Nationals to try to take the high 
moral ground. Moreover, the Logos campaign was opposed by the 
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leaders of mainstream Christian churches when Roman Catholic, 
Anglican, Uniting, Baptist and Lutheran church leaders all condemned 
the narrow focus of the Logos campaign in the light of the prevailing 
cormption revealed by Fitzgerald. 
For the first time in many decades, the Nationals and the small 
parties and pressure groups from the fundamentalist right found 
themselves out of touch with the majority of Queensland voters and it 
was only in their rural heartiand that support for these groups and their 
ideas remained. The key to this shift was clearly the Fitzgerald Report 
and its revelations of cormption, a factor which the Logos Foundation in 
its campaign on moral issues severely underestimated. In deciding not 
to mn a similar campaign in Queensland for the 1990 federal election. 
Logos appears implicitly to have acknowledged this. Green Challenge 
and Labor, on the other hand, were more attuned to the mood of the 
electorate. Concern with environmental issues, such as damage to the 
ozone layer, has been mounting for many years so that interest in the 
environment is no longer the preserve of an eccentric few, a fact which 
Green Challenge, Labor and the Democrats all recognised, and the 1990 
federal campaign subsequently confirmed. 
Notes 
1, R. Gubby, "Democrats best for Queensland's environment, say greens", Courier-
Mail, 13 November 1989. 
2, M. Cribb, "Queensland", in B. Costar and D, Woodward, eds.. Country To National, 
(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1985), 
3, L. Oakes, "The might of the far right". The Bulletin, 27 September 1988, p,28 
4. Green Challenge, A Log of Claims, October 1989. 
5. Toowoomba Green Challenge, Candidates Environment Questionnaire, 1989, 
6. For an overview of green politics in Australia, see D, Hutton, "What Is Green 
Politics?' in D, Hutton ed,. Green Politics in Australia, (North Ryde; Angus and 
Robertson, 1987), pp 1-33, 
T- Media release, "Greenies to target Toowoomba in state election. Green Challenge, 
Toowoomba, 1989. 
8. "Green candidates have "philosophical problem'", Courier-Mail, 30 November 
1989. 
?• I am grateful to Lin Boyle and the Toowoomba Chronicle for access to their files in 
the Logos Foundation, and also to John Woodley for providing material based on 
research by The Uniting Church into Logos. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
152 Rae Wear 
10, Quoted in B, Watson, "600 attend rally to hear Logos values outlined", Toowoomba 
Chronicle, 2 November 1989, 
11, "Logos brings 250 members to city", Toowoomba Chronicle, 27 February 1988, 
12, See N, Buch, "No Link, Mr, Carter?", TTie Logos Foundation And the League of 
Rights, Social Responsibility Section, Queensland Synod, The Uniting Church in 
Australia, May 1989, 
13, L, Boyle, "Politics and society", Toowoomba Chronicle, 21 April 1989, 
14, "Corruption a key issue at election - churches", Courier-Mail, 6 November 1989, 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
MEDIA COVERAGE 
Lawrence Apps and John Henningham 
Labor, and in particular its leader, Wayne Goss, received a "dream run" 
from the news media during the 1989 campaign. This undoubtedly 
reflected a desire on the part of journalists generally for an end to the 
Nationals' reign. But most of the troubles of the conservative parties 
were of their own making, while Labor capitalised on their disarray with 
a superb campaign. 
The election was always going to be extremely difficult for the 
National party to win. Certainly it had little chance of being returned to 
government in its own right. The mood for change showed up clearly 
and consistently in the polls and reflected widespread reaction against 
systemic cormption and maladministration. The National party's attempts 
to counter hostile or negative community perceptions were fmstrated by 
having to deal constantly with new bushfires which attracted 
embarrassing and unwanted media attention. 
In such an election climate. Labor had only to avoid making mistakes 
to position itself for victory. But it did much more than this. It ran a 
meticulously planned and professional campaign from the time Wayne 
Goss took up the party leadership in March 1988, concentrating on 
building up support in the country areas and attracting favourable local 
media coverage. By the time the election was called. Labor was ideally 
placed to run a vigorous and positive campaign and to exploit the media 
attention drawn by a government in disarray. With the Nationals on the 
defensive long before the election date was known media coverage 
tended to favour Labor. Corruption became the dominant issue, while 
the opposition's detailed policy platform and its rather shadowy shadow 
cabinet avoided media focus and the Liberals seemed to become lost in 
the wake of the other main parties. 
Within this broader context and with bad stories breaking regularly 
for the Nationals, party policies and election issues received less media 
attention than they should have, or probably would have, had 1989 been 
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a normal election. Routine "follow the leader" reporting became the 
dominant mode of coverage at the expense of deeper analysis of issues. 
Examination of alternative policies was trivialised, encouragement of 
meaningful debate was rare, and there was insufficient sustained 
questioning of leaders. 
In such an environment, television's superficiality and glibness 
became manifest. As the dominant supplier of election material to 
voters, television news and current affairs programmers failed yet again 
to exploit the medium to make sense of the campaign and to cater for 
viewers' functions as citizens. This media vacuum becomes all the more 
pronounced given the potential of television in the hands of a thoroughly 
prepared, disciplined and professional party campaign management team. 
Party Perceptions 
Asked after the election about the role of television in the campaign, 
Labor's campaign director Wayne Swan said that his party had tried to 
maximise the advantages offered by statewide television news bulletins, 
particularly to offset the negative image the party perceived it had 
received in Brisbane's daily press in the lead-up to the campaign: "If we 
got 30 seconds on television, that was infinitely more valuable than a 
story in print". Swan explained that because newspapers do not 
communicate as directly as television and because market research 
shows television is the most powerful medium. Labor tried to use the 
medium to reach the swinging voter: "Television is the most important 
medium in trying to talk to swinging voters - most swinging voters 
don't read newspapers". 
The Liberal party also believed it was treated better by the broadcast 
media. In his post-mortem of the media's handling of the election, the 
then state director of the Liberal party, David Eraser, said: "Television 
and radio coverage was more satisfactory [than print] in terms of 
amount of coverage". 
Claims of media bias emerged during the first week of the campaign, 
with members of the National party government targeting the 
Courier-Mail and the ABC's 7.30 Report. The former premier, Mike 
Ahern, accused the Courier of a vendetta against the Nationals, while 
one government member claimed that media entrepreneur Rupert 
Murdoch was personally masterminding an anti-National campaign. It 
must be noted, however, that most Brisbane print media had supported 
the Nationals editorially on the proposed referendum to extend the 
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Government's term so that electoral boundaries could be redrawn; 
Murdoch media were split on the issue. 
In post-election comments, both the Labor party and the Liberal 
party were consistent in their criticisms of Brisbane's daily newspapers. 
David Fraser criticised both the Courier-Mail and the Sun, with the Sun 
the subject of a specific complaint by the party to the Australian Press 
Council concerning an allegation that a story was "manufactured". Of 
the Courier-Mail, Fraser said the Liberal Party believed "the newspaper 
did not give the amount of coverage to which we were entitled". 
Wayne Swan said his party had no criticism of media coverage 
during the campaign itself, but that Goss "didn't get a fair go" from 
Brisbane's dailies from March 1988 to June/July 1989. Swan claimed 
that throughout this period Labor's media coverage was influenced by 
the belief within Queensland Newspapers and Sun Newspapers that 
Labor could not win the election. "The biggest problem was knocking 
over the perception that we couldn't win", he said. "We could never get 
our policies covered". The party frequently complained about the 
coverage to both Brisbane newspaper organisations. To counter what it 
perceived to be poor coverage in the Brisbane print media during this 
period, the party concentrated on the regional press and, especially, on 
television, choosing to ignore Brisbane's daily press until the campaign 
proper was under way. 
The Nationals had problems of a very different nature: too much of 
the wrong sort of publicity. Throughout the campaign, the Nationals 
were on the defensive for while they received an enormous proportion 
of total space and airtime, most of this cast them in a negative light, as 
they were pilloried successively by Labor, Liberals, environmentalists, 
churches, unions, and even businessmen and former supporters. The 
police special branch files was just one of many stories the Nationals 
obviously would have preferred had not happened - together with their 
leadership problems, the resignations of ministers, the continuing dispute 
with the Liberals, friction with the mainstream churches, and general 
Fitzgerald Inquiry aftermath. An especially damaging blow to both 
conservative parties was the recommendation of two senior Liberals that 
their supporters should record a one-off vote for Labor so that 
Queensland could be cleaned up. 
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The Impact of the Fitzgerald Report 
At the opening of the campaign, the crucial unknown for all parties was 
the extent to which the Fitzgerald Report and the issues of cormption 
and electoral reform would affect votes. Most newspapers have assumed 
that what a commentator with the Australian called "the Fitzgerald 
factor" would dominate the election. This view was confirmed by the 
result of the Courier's poll (3 November), which identified cormption as 
the major issue on voters' minds. And when the Nationals attempted to 
downplay the importance of corruption, they were roundly criticised by 
church leaders and a Courier-Mail editorial. 
Leading interstate newspapers declared their positions early and in no 
uncertain terms: "The Nationals deserve to lose office. The party has run 
a disgraceful government", editorialised the Sydney Morning Herald the 
day after the poll was announced. Melbourne's Age declared that the 
Nationals were incapable of the cleansing needed in Queensland. 
Brisbane newspapers did not show such a level of editorial commitment 
until the final week, arguably an appropriate stance for local newspapers 
engaged as participants as well as observers of a campaign. But 
although their judgments and endorsements were saved until the end, by 
the second week of the campaign the direction of newspaper opinion 
was clear. As reflected both in leading articles (editorials) and in 
comment pieces, newspapers seemed firmly set against the National 
party. For example, the Nationals' campaign launch received a dmbbing 
in the Courier-Mail (10 November), while the theme of cormption 
became dominant in leading articles. Issues raised by the National party 
received a mention by major print and broadcast media, but failed to 
develop any momentum - for example, morality, mortgage rates, the 
environment, law and order, the family. In a long and comprehensive 
editorial on the eve of the election, the Courier-Mail gave its 
endorsement to Labor - an unprecedented decision for this newspaper. 
The Sun however remained uncommitted. 
A notable conservative attempt to move moral issues onto the agenda 
was that of the Logos Foundation, a private religious lobby with right-
wing and United States links. A costly advertising campaign highlighted 
politicians' views on abortion, homosexuality, pornography and capital 
punishment, and put the view that these issues were fundamentally more 
important than the Fitzgerald Report. Most news media were curiously 
slow in investigating the background and aims of the Logos group, 
although newspaper pieces appeared after initial probing by the ABC's 
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7.30 Report. But what benefits the Nationals might have hoped to gain 
from the Logos campaign were dashed by decisive interventions from 
two quarters: Labor strategists advised candidates not to co-operate with 
the Logos questionnaires, and the mainstream churches dissociated 
themselves from the Logos campaign. 
Media Coverage of the Campaign 
Television news services dutifully followed the three leaders around the 
state for the encapsulated two minutes a night of images and one-liners. 
Their coverage was fair - or at least even-handed - but at a time like 
this the void in local commercial current affairs was sadly obvious: the 
ABC had the field to itself. The daily television news spectacle of 
on-the-mn instant media conferences yielding a few quick "grabs" of 
interview material is no substitute for extended dialogue with the leaders 
before a mass audience. Such close scmtiny of candidates belongs on 
prime time commercial television as much as on the ABC. 
It has been Queenslanders' loss to have had most of their 
locally-produced commercial television current affairs programs 
replaced by Sydney-based programs. In the last week of the campaign, 
for example, it took until Thursday for the top-rating A Current Affair 
to discover the Queensland election, when it gave 5 minutes 55 seconds 
to the leaders' policies. By contrast, the previous night, Ronald and 
Nancy Reagan's views on astrology and hair styles were given 6 minutes 
7 seconds. It should be noted, however, that one of the major scoops of 
the campaign belonged to A Current Affair - the story of the police 
special branch's secret files. 
The absence of local current affairs programs shows the need for 
initiatives by commercial television managements such as the production 
of special prime-time programs on the election - for example, weekly 
"election specials" during the campaign where the alternative leaders are 
questioned extensively on their policies and philosophies. It is ironic that 
the stations were, as usual, prepared to spend substantial sums of money 
for extensive election night coverage, but did nothing outside the news 
framework to help enlighten their viewers during the campaign itself. 
Such a neglect is not unique to Queensland, but reflects the national 
pattern in commercial television. 
Even within the constraints of news, commercial television news 
bulletins gave a nightly average of only 3 minutes 3 seconds to the 
election campaign from Monday to Thursday of the final week -
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absurdly brief, particularly when sport received an average of 4 minutes 
38 seconds (inflated by Channel lO's total of 6 minutes 45 seconds). 
Even worse, ABC television news gave an average of only 2 minutes 34 
seconds to the election over the same period - and was eclipsed by 
sport at 3 minutes 36 seconds. Doubtless the ABC would argue that its 
election coverage must be looked at overall and not just limited to the 
news, and that in this light the nightiy coverage on the 7.30 Report 
provided a comprehensive coverage. But the concept of "package" 
programming, whether on the ABC or the commercials, offers too 
convenient a rationalisation for news not fulfilling its responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, the ABC's dominance of current affairs was particulariy 
to be regretted given the local 7.30 Report's highly critical stance 
towards the Nationals which was combined with a rather more tolerant 
attitude towards Labor. The 7.30 Report did not have a kind word to say 
about any aspect of the National party and ridiculed the Nationals' 
campaign launch (9 November). 
By contrast, the program's coverage of the prime minister's visit to 
Mount Isa (11 November) was a gift to Labor during its only 
embarrassing situation in the whole campaign. Hawke's trip was his one 
and only invitation to help Queensland Labor, the result of Goss 
minders' assessment that Hawke would attract unwelcome attention to 
the federal Labor government's unpopularity over such issues as high 
interest rates and the long-running air pilots' dispute, the government's 
handling of which was criticised by the Mount Isa Trades and Labor 
Council. All but ignoring such interesting issues, the 7.30 Report gave 
Hawke almost three minutes of unedited "talking head" air time -
extraordinarily generous in television terms - for him to heap calumny 
on the National party. A much better coverage was presented on ABC 
News and on the commercial channels' news programs. 
Labor's Dream Run 
In addition to the 7.30 Report, various media presented flattering 
portraits of Wayne Goss, the Labor leader- (for example, the Financial 
Review, the Bulletin), emphasising his personality, ambitions and so on. 
As we have said, he received a dream mn throughout the campaign and 
while this might have been a reflection both of Labor's more 
professional campaign management and of the conservative parties' 
litany of embarrassments and disasters, it also gave the appearance of 
the media being soft on Labor. ABC radio stood out among the media 
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as presenting daily in-depth analyses of seats, policies, issues, 
candidates and leaders. Indeed this forum provided Goss with one of 
his toughest interviews (on 4QR's Late Edition). 
But most media did not persist with or gave little attention to issues 
which were problematic for Labor - for example, acting federal 
treasurer Dawkins' guarded criticisms (18 November) of state-based 
mortgage relief packages. News media normally highlight differences 
between state and federal wings of the same party, but this story was 
widely ignored. The lack of a continuing process of public interviews 
resulted in very late attention to some important questions, for example, 
Goss's industrial relations policy, and his attempt to reconcile Labor's 
one vote, one value policy with his commitment to follow the electoral 
and administrative review commission (EARC) recommendations, 
whatever they might be. 
Labor also benefited from a succession of incidents where the media 
were accused of quoting politicians or officials out of context. 
Television news programs, in particular, were rather gung-ho in some of 
their methods. The most prominent victim was the Liberal leader, Angus 
Innes. Journalists seized on Innes's admission that, if the Nationals were 
a minority government, the Liberals would, from the cross-benches, 
allow them to govern. Innes was naive in accusing the media of getting 
it all wrong ("Media not balanced - Innes", Courier-Mail 16 
November). This was, after all, the first concession by the Liberals as to 
what they would do in the quite possible event of no party winning a 
majority and journalists acted properly in reporting this prominently. But 
some - particularly interstate Fairfax media - acted less properly in 
implying that Innes was conceding that the Liberals would lose the 
election {Financial Review, the Age) or that the Liberals had undertaken 
to "back Cooper" {Sydney Morning Herald). 
A. valid complaint against quoting out of context came from the 
former Queensland coordinator-general. Sir Sydney Schubert, who on 
the 7.30 Report described Wayne Goss, as a dynamic leader. As the 
state's former top'public servant, and one who worked closely with the 
National party government, Schubert's favourable remarks about Goss 
were newsworthy, but many serious distortions occurred in the reporting 
process. For example, Channel 9's news cited Sir Sydney's "endorsement 
of Wayne Goss", while Channel 10 said: "Sir Joh's former right-hand 
man backs Labor". Not one television news bulletin, including the 
ABC's, included Sir Sydney's important qualification immediately 
following his comments on Goss's leadership qualities: "That's not to say 
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the other leaders haven't got it. But he does have them, yes". 
Another public figure to be stung was the newly-installed police 
commissioner, Noel Newnham. At fault were two television news 
reports. ABC news and Channel 9 both showed Mr Newnham saying: 
"There is nothing in there about political affiliations. There's nothing 
about trade union affiliations and there's nothing in there about whether 
somebody wants to stand up and criticise institutions in this country". 
In the context of the television stories, and apparentiy as Goss 
understood them (when reacting to them critically), the comments 
referred to the special branch files themselves. But in fact the 
commissioner's statement referred to criteria he had just outiined for 
deciding which files would be kept. These criteria were: protection of 
life and property, preservation of peace, enforcement of the laws and 
detection of offenders. 
These examples emphasise the danger of television news bulletins 
using very brief selected extracts from media conferences or interviews 
("grabs" as they are called in the industry), stripping them of the context 
in which the remarks were made, and distorting their meaning in the 
process. 
The Great Debate 
The "Last Great Debate", on the morning of the last day of the 
campaign, was a very worthy effort by ABC television and radio, 
although the format needed tighter control: participants' inexperience in 
conducting such a debate was obvious, with lack of follow-up and 
sustained questioning of candidates' weaknesses. The one hour proved to 
be far too brief, but the questioning was generally effective and each 
would-be premier was quizzed on his weak points. 
Surprisingly, Goss performed less well than might have been 
expected under the spotlight of scrutiny from journalists and the other 
leaders. Had this weakness been revealed and probed eariier under more 
intense questioning by journalists, the effect on the campaign might have 
been significant. On the other hand, perhaps the debate format made 
Goss seem uncomfortable or he was simply was being extremely 
cautious, knowing he had not yet put a foot wrong in the campaign. 
It is regrettable this debate was scheduled for so late in the 
campaign. The detailed examination of the leaders attempted in the 
debate would have been better instituted earlier, in prime time, and more 
than once. Journalists in all media would then have had the chance to 
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analyse the candidates' commitments, probing contradictions or 
questionable assertions, and developing more lines of inquiry. This was 
the first major public forum for sustained interrogation of the leaders: as 
it turned out, not surprisingly, some new stories broke as a result of the 
event, although far too late in the campaign for these to develop any 
impact. Whether all three party leaders would have agreed to participate 
in a more demanding process is unknown. 
Conclusions 
In summary, the media were perhaps too easy on Labor. However, this 
must be seen in the context of a superb campaign by the opposition and 
too many mistakes by their opponents. Certainly the print media gave 
considerable space to the campaign, with coverage increasing 
proportionately as momentum built up according to pre-conceived 
strategies. But television is the medium of modern election campaigns, 
despite the paradox that television news coverage is skimpy in 
comparison with print. If television stations take seriously the claim of 
their news and current affairs departments that their overriding 
responsibility is to inform, the quality of campaign coverage needs a 
substantial boost to accord with television's pivotal role in elections. 
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THE CANDIDATES 
Rosemary Whip 
The 1989 Queensland state election was contested by a record 334 
candidates, a considerable increase over the 292 who had contested the 
1986 election. Some of this increase resulted from the larger number of 
seats contested by the Liberal Party - 77 in 1989 compared with 63 in 
1986 - although this was partiy offset by a reduction in the number of 
National candidates - 85 in 1989 compared with 89 in 1986.^  Most of the 
increase in candidates, however, was the result of an increase in the 
number of independent and minor party candidates, up from 51 in 1986 to 
83 in 1989. While some of these contested the election because of a 
concern for the environment, many others appear to have done so because 
they were disillusioned with party politics. For example, one of the 
respondents to the survey discussed in this chapter claimed to be "fed up 
with the power plays of the political parties" and "tired of having the 
political power brokers determine our future", while another explained that 
he had left his party because "party loyalty and discipline came before 
justice, truth and being fair dinkum". 
The 83 independent and minor party candidates came disproportionately 
from the "urban" (south-eastern other than Brisbane and provincial city) 
and, to a lesser extent, the "rural" (western and far northern and countiy) 
electorates. The 26 Brisbane electorates produced only 13 independent and 
minor party candidates compared with 44 from the 38 "urban" electorates 
and 26 from the 25 "rural" electorates. 
The 1989 election also saw a record number of women standing as 
candidates. Although there had been at least one female candidate in every 
state election from 1932 onwards, numbers remained low and did not reach 
double figures until the 1972 election when a total of twelve women stood. 
In 1980 the number jumped to 29, and, after a drop in 1983, increased in 
1986 to 35 and again in 1989 when a total of 43 women contested the 
election. Seventeen of these were Labor Party candidates (one a sitting 
member), eight were Nationals (five of whom were sitting members), eight 
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were Liberals, and the remaining ten were independents or minor party 
candidates. 
In all, 75 of the 334 candidates were sitting members of parliament. 
Their distribution across the three major parties refl.ected the strength of the 
parties in parliament prior to the election - 40 National, 25 Labor and nine 
Liberal. There was also one independent, Geoff Muntz, who had resigned 
from the National Party on 2 November 1989. Muntz claimed that his 
resignation was prompted by "a scurrilous campaign of innuendo, unfair 
comment and malicious gossip" resulting from the special prosecutor's 
failure to clear him from charges of misuse of ministerial expenses.^ It was 
generally assumed that he stood as an independent, thereby facing almost 
certain defeat, to fulfil parliamentary superannuation requirements and thus 
guarantee his superannuation entitlements.^ There was also one former 
member standing as an independent; the former minister for education and 
member for Isis, Lin Powell, who had resigned from parliament and from 
the National party in July 1989, contested his old seat as an independent 
candidate. 
The remaining candidates - those who were not members of the 
Legislative Assembly - came from a variety of occupational backgrounds.'' 
Among ALP candidates who were not incumbents the most common 
occupational category was that of professionals (36 per cent), followed by 
managerial occupations at 30 per cent. National and Liberal party non-
incumbents, on the other hand, came predominantly from managerial 
occupations - 44 per cent and 41 per cent respectively - followed by 
clerical and sales workers in the case of the National party (18 per cent) 
and professionals in the case of the Liberals (26 per cent). Among 
independent and minor party candidates, managerial occupations formed the 
modal group (26 per cent), followed by professionals (17 per cent); they 
also accounted for the highest proportion of retirees (10 per cent). 
The information concerning candidates provided so far is readily 
available from the public record but it is rather limited. In order to gain 
additional information concerning the candidates who contested the 1989 
election a survey was carried out in early 1990. Questionnaires were 
mailed to all candidates with requests for their co-operation in completing 
and returning them. The questionnaires sought information concerning 
candidates' political backgrounds, how they became candidates, their 
campaign experiences, their views on election issues, and their 
demographic characteristics. 
The response rate overall was 61 per cent. The highest response rate 
came from independent and minor party candidates (68 per cent), followed 
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by Labor candidates (66 per cent), Liberals (56 per cent) and Nationals (54 
per cent). Geographically, the response rate was highest from candidates 
in "rural" electorates, those in the western and far northern and country 
zones, (66 per cent) followed by "urban" electorates, those in the south 
eastern zone, excluding Brisbane, and the provincial city zone, (61 per 
cent), with Brisbane electorates providing the lowest response rate (56 per 
cent). Overall, the return rate was slightly higher among male candidates 
(62 per cent) than among female candidates (56 per cent) but this varied 
from party to party. The response rate from women was higher among 
National candidates (63 per cent compared to 53 per cent) and among 
independent and minor party candidates (80 per cent compared to 67 per 
cent), and lower among ALP candidates (59 per cent compared to 65 per 
cent). The lowest response rate of all came from Liberal women 
candidates; only one of the eight responded to the questionnaire. 
Among candidates from the three major parties the response rate was 
higher from those who were successful (61 per cent) than from those who 
were not (53 per cent). This difference was insignificant among ALP 
candidates (67 per cent compared to 66 per cent); it was greater among 
National candidates (62 per cent compared to 48 per cent) and greatest 
among Liberals (51 per cent compared to 22 per cent). Indeed, only two 
of the nine Liberals who were successful in the election (both new 
members) responded and one senior Liberal declined to complete the 
questionnaire on the grounds that it was not his practice to respond to 
questionnaires seeking "what is essentially private information". 
The remainder of this chapter provides details of the 1989 state election 
candidates based on some of the data collected by the survey. 
Political Backgrounds 
Among those respondents who contested the state election as candidates for 
the three major parties, there was a wide range of political experience. 
Length of party membership ranged from one year or less - all three 
parties fielded candidates who had joined the party in 1989 - to forty years 
in the case of one ALP respondent. The average length of party 
membership was approximately fourteen years among ALP and National 
respondents and approximately nine years among Liberals. 
All three parties endorsed some candidates who had at one time been 
members of some other political party. This was most common among the 
Liberals, eleven of whom (26 per cent) had been members of another party; 
nine had been National party members, one an Australian Democrat and 
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one a member of the Australia party. Five Nationals (11 per cent) had also 
been members of another party - three in the Liberal Party, one in the ALP 
and one in the Australia party - as had two ALP respondents (3 per cent) 
- one each in the Australia party and the Australian Democrats. However, 
the highest level of former party membership occurred among the 
independent and minor party respondents, 39 per cent of whom had been 
members of one of the three major parties. Nine of these had been ALP 
members, eight had been Nationals and five had been Liberals. 
Respondents from the three major parties had participated in a variety 
of political activities prior to their endorsement as candidates. As 
indicated in Table 10.1, the most frequent activities among ALP 
respondents were handing out how-to-vote cards, distributing pamphlets 
and attending political meetings, in that order. These same three activities 
were also the most frequent among National and Liberal respondents 
although the order of frequency was different - attendance at political 
meetings was the most frequent activity for both these groups, followed by 
handing out how-to-vote cards and distributing pamphlets. The incidence 
of candidates who had been involved in none of these activities prior to 
their nomination was considerably lower among ALP respondents (only 2 
per cent) than among Nationals (15 per cent) or Liberals (19 per cent). 
Table 10.1 Political activities prior to candidacy by party affiliation 
Activity ALP National Liberal 
% % % 
Attended political meetings 65 
Spoke publicly for party 37 
Worked in the party office 14 
Canvassed 44 
Distributed pamphlets 72 
Distributed how-to-vote cards 81 
Collected money for the party 44 
Managed campaigns 35 
No political activity 2 
(59) 
In addition to involvement in the activities listed in Table 10.1, more 
than half the respondents from each of the three major parties had held 
party office prior to becoming candidates. The incidence of this was 
highest among Liberals (60 per cent), while among National and ALP 
respondents it was 54 and 53 per cent respectively. 
Prior to their first candidacy, 29 per cent of all respondents had been 
80 
35 
15 
35 
37 
72 
26 
30 
15 
(46) 
72 
37 
21 
33 
40 
56 
21 
37 
19 
(43) 
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members of trade unions. As might be expected, such membership was 
high among ALP respondents (68 per cent, almost half of whom had been 
office holders), and low among Nationals and Liberals (8 per cent and 7 
per cent respectively). Trade union membership among independent and 
minor party respondents was 19 per cent. 
Overall, 24 per cent of respondents had experience in local government 
prior to their endorsement. Surprisingly, this was most common among 
ALP respondents, 36 per cent of whom had been members of local 
government councils, followed by 24 per cent of Nationals and 21 per cent 
of Liberals. It was least common among independent and minor party 
respondents, only 14 per cent of whom had local government experience. 
Almost a quarter of all respondents (22 per cent) came from families 
with a record of political and/or public service: 31 per cent of ALP 
respondents came from such families, 28 per cent of Nationals, 14 per cent 
of Liberals and 16 per cent of independent and minor party respondents. 
In the vast majority of cases, the family member involved had been the 
father, grandfather or another male relative of the respondent. AUhough 
the differences in the political backgrounds among respondents from each 
of the three major parties are not extreme, it does appear, on the basis of 
these data, that Liberal candidates were slightly less politically active prior 
to their candidacy than their counterparts in the ALP and the National 
party. 
Becoming a Candidate 
For the majority of respondents representing political parties, gaining 
endorsement as a candidate did not involve competition. However, 41 per 
cent of those from the three major parties did face a pre-selection contest. 
This occurred most frequently in the case of Liberals, 49 per cent of whom 
faced a contest, followed by Nationals at 30 per cent and ALP respondents 
at 25 per cent. The level of competition for Liberal party pre-selection 
might suggest that quite a number of Liberals believed the rhetoric 
concerning the party's election chances. A more likely explanation, 
however, lies in the fact that there were few sitting members among the 
Liberals and therefore fewer constraints on pre-selection contests. 
Most of those respondents whose nomination was contested appear to 
have had a realistic view of their chances of success; 78 per cent thought 
they were certain to win or would probably win party endorsement. This 
was highest among ALP respondents (87 per cent), while 76 per cent of 
Liberals and 57 per cent of Nationals had also assessed their chances in 
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this way. Only two respondents, one Labor, who was subsequently elected 
to parliament, and one Liberal, who was not, had expected that they would 
not win endorsement. The remainder had considered that they might 
possibly win. 
Ten per cent of respondents had made earlier, unsuccessful attempts to 
gain pre-selection for a state seat. The proportion from each of the major 
parties was approximately the same. In addition, 11 per cent of 
independent and minor party respondents had sought party pre-selection 
unsuccessfully at some time in the past. 
The respondents were asked what qualities they thought a good 
candidate should have. The most frequently identified qualities are listed 
in Table 10.2; overall, honesty was the most frequently identified quality. 
However, perceptions of what were the most important qualities differed 
from party to party. As Table 10.2 indicates, the group to whom honesty 
was most important was the independent and minor party respondents, 47 
per cent of whom mentioned it, compared with 37 per cent of Liberals, 35 
per cent of Nationals and 24 per cent of ALP respondents. Nevertheless, 
among Nationals honesty was the most frequently identified quality of a 
good candidate. 
Table 10.2 Qualities of a good candidate by party affiliation 
Quality 
Independents/ 
ALP National Liberal minor parties Total 
Honesty 
Communication 
skills 
Community 
involvement 
Concern for 
other 
Ability to relate 
to people 
Hard work 
Intelligence 
n 
24 
39 
15 
31 
27 
29 
12 
(59) 
35 
28 
33 
11 
11 
9 
4 
(46) 
37 
26 
40 
5 
IS 
12 
14 
(43) 
47 
m 
11 
w 
4 
3, 
4 
(57) 
39 
m 
m 
m 
15 
n 
•g 
(205) 
The emphasis on honesty on the part of National respondents is not 
surprising given the climate in which the election was conducted, but not 
everyone saw honesty as an asset. One respondent, who listed honesty, 
dedication, community involvement, the capacity for hard work, and self 
confidence as the necessary qualities for a good candidate, suggested as 
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alternative qualities "ruthlessness and the ability to lie successfully". 
Another reported that during the campaign she responded to a question 
concerning her honesty by saying that she was honest only to be told that 
in that case she would "do no good in state politics". Yet another 
respondent questioned whether the qualities which make a good candidate 
necessarily make a good member of parliament. 
Whereas the three most important qualities in the eyes of both Nationals 
and Liberals were honesty, communication skills and community 
involvement, though not in that order, ALP respondents had different 
priorities. Communication skills was the most frequently identified quality 
(39 per cent) followed by concern for others (31 per cent) and hard work 
(29 per cent). 
Respondents' perceptions of the reasons for their own endorsement as 
candidates did not match closely their perceptions of the qualities which 
went toward making a good candidate. The reasons for which respondents 
from the three major parties thought they had been endorsed were, in order 
of the frequency with which they were identified, community involvement, 
party and/or political involvement, occupational skills, communication 
skills and education. Among Liberals and Nationals, community 
involvement was the factor most frequently identified as contributing to 
their endorsement (33 per cent and 44 per cent, respectively), whereas 
among ALP respondents it was party and/or political involvement (31 per 
cent) with community involvement a close second. 
Some indication of the level of community involvement of respondents 
can be gained from an examination of their involvement in voluntary or 
community organisations prior to their candidacy: 48 per cent of all 
respondents were in sporting clubs, 44 per cent in community improvement 
groups, 40 per cent in service organisations, 35 per cent in institutional 
groups such as hospital boards and parent-teacher associations, and 26 per 
cent in religious groups. Among Nationals service group membership was 
the most prevalent type of community involvement (54 per cent), among 
Liberals, sporting club membership (72 per cent), while among ALP 
respondents it was membership of community improvement groups (44 per 
cent). This was also the most prevalent type of group membership among 
independent and minor party respondents (44 per cent). 
Overall, Liberal respondents had the highest level of involvement in 
such groups, followed by Nationals, with ALP and independent and minor 
party candidates equal third. 
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The Campaign 
(Campaign funding for candidates in the 1989 election appears to have 
come from a variety of sources. Among respondents to the questionnaire, 
the most frequently identified source was personal funds (68 per cent), 
followed by party organisations (50 per cent), interested individuals (41 per 
cent), friends (31 per cent) and private industry (13 per cent); 16 per cent 
of respondents mentioned a variety of other sources. 
Respondents from some parties mentioned certain sources of funds 
considerably more frequently than did the respondents from other parties. 
Among ALP respondents personal funds and party funds were the most 
frequentiy mentioned (both 69 per cent), followed by funding from 
interested individuals (47 per cent), friends (29 per cent) and private 
industry (17 per cent). Nationals, on the other hand, identified party 
funding most frequently (76 per cent), followed by funding from interested 
individuals (41 per cent), personal funds (39 per cent), funding from 
friends (13 per cent) and from private industry (9 per cent). A massive 91 
per cent of Liberals identified personal funds as a source of campaign 
funding, followed by funds from friends (47 per cent), interested 
individuals and the party organisation (both 44 per cent), and private 
industry (21 per cent). 
As might be expected, the most frequentiy identified source of funding 
among independent and minor party candidates was personal funds (72 per 
cent) followed by funding from friends (37 per cent), interested individuals 
(32 per cent) and private industry (5 per cent). It is interesting to note that 
the 9 per cent of Nationals who identified private industry as a source of 
campaign funding is only slightly higher than this, and lower than the 21 
per cent of Liberals and 17 per cent of ALP respondents. Further, no 
Nationals identified private industry as the main source of campaign 
funding. 
Not all sources of campaign funding contributed at the same rates; some 
were clearly more important than others and these differed from one party 
to another. For 53 per cent of ALP respondents and 70 per cent of 
Nationals the most important source was, as might be expected, the party 
organisation. For most independent and minor party respondents the most 
important source was personal funds (62 per cent), again as might be 
expected. However, personal funds were also the most important source 
of funds for 44 per cent of Liberals, compared with only 17 per cent of 
ALP respondents and 5 per cent of Nationals. Only 5 per cent of Liberals 
identified the party organisation as the most important source of campaign 
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funding. Whether this apparent lack of financial support from the party 
contributed to the poor showing of some Liberal candidates or resulted 
from a realistic assessment of their chances on the part of the party 
organisation is not clear. 
Expectations about the outcome of the election varied from party to 
party. ALP respondents appear to have had a more realistic perception of 
their chances than their conservative counterparts: only 21 per cent of 
unsuccessful ALP respondents had thought they were certain to be elected 
or would probably be elected compared with 37 per cent of respondents 
from each of the National and Liberal parties. Surprisingly, 11 per cent of 
independent and minor party respondents also assessed their chances in this 
way while a further 37 per cent thought that they might possibly be 
elected. One independent accounted for his expectations as follows: "1 
had calculated that I'd come in second of the four candidates and then win 
on preferences." Others blamed lack of media coverage - one described 
it as a "deliberate media black ban on independent candidates" - for their 
failure. 
Election Issues 
As we saw in Chapter 3, the most important issue in the 1989 state election 
was corruption; 57 per cent of voters interviewed just prior to the election, 
who intended voting for one of the three major parties, nominated 
corruption as the most important issue. Among candidates for the three 
major parties the proportion nominating cormption as the most important 
issue was considerably higher.' For 72 per cent of respondents from these 
parties the most important election issue was cormption while for a further 
18 per cent it was a related issue such as the need for honest government, 
the performance of the government, or the need for a change of 
government. Corruption was also seen as the most important issue by 65 
per cent of independent and minor party respondents, while a further 12 per 
cent saw one of the related issues as being most important. 
Feelings about corruption as an election issue were strongest among 
ALP respondents, 80 per cent of whom saw it as the most important issue, 
while a further 19 per cent identified one of the related issues, and 
similarly 74 per cent of Liberal respondents named corruption as most 
important with another 23 per cent naming a related issue. Among 
National respondents, however, the proportion who considered the most 
important issue to be cormption was less - 61 per cent with a further 11 
per cent identifying one of the related issues. 
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As with respondents in the electoral survey reported in Chapter 3, 
candidates were also asked about other issues that were important in the 
state election. The most frequently identified issues were the environment, 
the performance of the government, interest rates, education, leadership, 
cormption and rural issues, in that order. However, as Table 10.3 
indicates, priorities differed from party to party. Among ALP respondents 
the environment was the most frequently mentioned of these other issues 
(51 per cent). It was also the most frequently mentioned issue among 
independent and minor party respondents although it was only mentioned 
by 19 per cent of this group. Among National and Liberal respondents the 
environment was not a high priority, mentioned by only 11 per cent and 16 
per cent respectively. Nationals gave highest priority to interest rates (24 
per cent) followed by the performance of the government (17 per cent) 
while among Liberals this issue got top priority (30 per cent) with interest 
rates second (19 per cent). Among the seven most frequently mentioned 
"other" issues, rural issues came last for each of the four groups of 
respondents; among National respondents, the traditional party of rural 
Queenslanders, they did not rate a mention. 
Table 103 Additional election issues by party affiliation 
Issue 
Environment 
Government 
performance 
Interest rates 
Education 
Leadership 
Corruption 
Rural issues 
n 
ALP 
% 
51 
39 
7 
37 
22 
10 
7 
(59) 
National 
% 
11 
17 
24 
7 
7 
13 
0 
(46) 
Liberal 
% 
16 
m 
If 
5 
f 
14 
1 
(43) 
Independent/ 
minor party 
% 
19 
M 
11 
S 
7 
f 
4 
(57) 
Total 
% 
26 
25 
16 
15 
12 
10 
3 
(205) 
Demographic Characteristics 
In the last part of this chapter the demographic characteristics of the 
respondents will be considered in an attempt to provide a composite picture 
of the candidates who contested the 1989 election. 
The respondents ranged in age from 19 (one National and one Liberal) 
to 86 (a minor party respondent). However, the average age of respondents 
varied little across parties. It was 43 for ALP respondents, 44 for Liberals 
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and 46 for both Nationals and independent and minor party respondents. 
This similarity of age across parties belies the common impression of the 
National party as a collection of individuals of advanced age and out of 
touch, and may reflect a move to endorse younger candidates. The choice 
of Lawrence Springborg, a twenty-one year old farmer, for the ultra safe 
National seat of Carnarvon, over five older contenders,* would support this 
interpretation. 
The majority of respondents were native to Queensland. This 
proportion was highest among the Nationals (74 per cent) followed by ALP 
respondents (67 per cent) while 53 per cent of Liberals and 54 per cent of 
independent and minor party respondents were Queensland born. Of the 
remaining respondents, most were born elsewhere in Australia but a small 
proportion (6 per cent) were born overseas, mostly in the United Kingdom 
or other commonwealth countries. The proportion of respondents who 
were not Australian born was highest among Liberals (16 per cent) and 
lowest among Nationals (4 per cent). 
The educational level of the respondents was comparatively high; more 
than half (59 per cent) had completed senior or its equivalent and only 10 
per cent had only primary school education. The proportion with senior 
level education was highest among Liberal respondents (76 per cent) and 
lowest among Nationals (51 per cent). Among ALP and independent and 
minor party respondents the proportions were 56 per cent and 54 per cent 
respectively. 
Most respondents were well equipped with post-secondary 
qualifications (see Table 10.4): 35 per cent had a university degree, in 
some cases a higher degree, and a further 14 per cent had a diploma. Only 
20 per cent had no post-secondary qualifications. 
Table 10.4 Post-secondary qualifications by party affiliation 
Qualification 
Higher degree 
Degree 
Diploma 
Professional training 
Trade certificate 
No qualifications 
n 
ALP 
% 
7 
31 
IS 
12 
18 
18 
(55) 
National 
% 
2 
19 
9 
28 
14 
28 
(43) 
Liberal 
% 
14 
38 
12 
17 
2 
17 
(42) 
Independent/ 
Minor party 
% 
9 
20 
If 
20 
15 
17 
(54) 
Total 
% 
7 
27 
14 
19 
13 
20 
(194) 
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This group came somewhat more from among National party 
respondents, 28 per cent of whom had no post-secondary qualifications, 
compared with 18 per cent of ALP respondents and 17 per cent each of 
Liberals and independent and minor party respondents. At the other 
extreme, those with degrees, including higher degrees, came 
disproportionately from among Liberals (52 per cent) followed by ALP 
respondents (38 per cent), independent and minor party candidates (29 per 
cent) and Nationals (21 per cent). 
Although the Nationals are the least well qualified, particularly in terms 
of degrees and diplomas, of the four groups, their post-secondary 
quahfications, like their educational levels, belie the common image of the 
National party member of parliament. What we have here may be further 
evidence of the party's attempts to change that image. In the event, 
however, any efforts by the National party to project, by way of its 
candidates, an image more in keeping with the times were swamped by the 
cormption issue. 
Notes 
The Nationals contested 88 seats in 1986; they did not stand a candidate in Sherwood 
but stood two in Springwood. 
Australian, 3 November 1989. 
Ihjd. 
Information concerning occupations of candidates is based on the occupation given to 
the state electoral office at the time of nomination. In some cases lack of detail 
concerning precise occupational roles has made the classification of occupations 
somewhat arbitrary. 
This difference may be explained in part by the fact that the survey of candidates was 
conducted after the election when it was clear just how much impact the corruption 
issue had on the election outcome. 
Sunday Mail, 22 October 1989. 
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THE RESULTS 
Colin A Hughes 
Exceptionally among the Australian states, Queensland elections have 
long had two dimensions. One is the long-running contest between the 
Australian Labor party (ALP) and its two principal opponents, the 
National (previously Country) party and the Liberal party. That is the 
norm of Australian politics. The other dimension is the contest for 
dominance within the anti-Labor alternative between the Nationals and 
Liberals that has already figured prominentiy in this book. The final 
break-up of the National-Liberal coalition in 1983 did not initially have 
much impact on the first dimension, though it did shift the balance of 
power between the former partners considerably and speedily. 
Labor's Handicap 
To examine the Labor/anti-Labor contest first, the 1970s had opened 
with the ALP clambering back to within striking distance of the 
coalition after it had collapsed in the 1957 split. At the 1969 election its 
primary vote (45.0 per cent) had passed the Coalition's (44.9 per cent) 
for the first time since the split; by the 1972 election its primary vote 
was well in front, 46.8 per cent to 42.2 per cent. However its success 
in votes was not yet translating into seats; in 1969 Labor could manage 
only thirty-one seats to the coalition's forty-five, in 1972 only thirty-
three to the coalition's forty-seven. One problem was the continuing 
presence of the Democratic Labor party (DLP) whose last sitting 
member retired from the Legislative Assembly at the 1972 election. The 
DLP could still draw better than 7.0 per cent of the primary vote and 
then deliver the subsequent preferences solidly to the coalition. Another 
problem for the ALP was the possibility that the coalition's manipulation 
of the electoral zoning system and the boundaries which resulted 
handicapped their chances of ever winning a majority of seats. That 
vexed question which consumed so many pages of print over the period 
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leed not be reopened here, for the 1989 result settled it finally, leaving 
he only uncertainty the size of the handicap which Labor undoubtedly 
suffered. 
The ALP's performance in 1972 proved to be a false dawn. It had 
X)incided with the advent of the Whitiam government in Canberra, and 
disappeared as quickly as that government's popularity crashed. In 1974 
premier Bjelke-Petersen called an early election to capitalise on the 
federal ALP's unpopularity and the electoral dividends were huge. 
/Uthough Labor's primary vote of 36.0 per cent was noticeably better 
than the 28.9 per cent it had obtained in 1957 after the split, it secured 
only eleven seats out of eighty-two compared to twenty out of seventy-
five in 1957. The painful reconstmction of the previous fifteen years 
had been swept away overnight and a new climb back from defeat was 
necessary. The one benefit had been the disappearance of the DLP. 
Unlike the 1957-1972 cycle during which Labor's share of the 
primary vote and its number of seats had improved at each successive 
election, the 1974-1986 cycle was irregular as to movement in votes and 
not particularly encouraging as to seats. 
Table 11.1 Primary votes (%), seats and two-party-preferred votes (%), 1974-1989 
Primary votes 
1974 
1977 
1980 
1983 
1986 
1989 
Seats 
1974 
1977 
1980 
1983 
1986 
1989 
Two-party-preferred 
1974 
1977 
1980 
1983 
1986 
1989 
Labor 
36.0 
42 .S 
41.5 
44.0 
41.3 
50.3 
11 
23 
25 
32 
30 
54 
votes 
National 
27.9 
27.1 
27.9 
38.9 
39.6 
24.1 
39 
35 
35 
41 
49 
26* 
Labor 
38.5 
45.4 
4S.3 
46.6 
46.0 
54.3 
Liberal 
31.1 
25.2 
26.9 
14.9 
16.5 
21.1 
m 
24. 
21 
# 
IB 
:§* 
Others 
5.0 
4.8 
3.7 
2.2 
2.5 
4.5 
2 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
Coalition 
61.5 
54.6 
54.7 
53.4 
54.0 
45.7 
* 27 and 8 respectively after the Court of Disputed Returns recount in Nicklin 
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Table 11.1 sets out the pattern in primary votes, seats and two-
party-preferred votes as Labor went from the trough of 1974 to the 
victory of 1989. The ALP's increase in primary vote between 1986 and 
1989, 9 percentage points, was almost as large as its crash between 1972 
and 1974, 10.8 percentage points; its gain of twenty-four seats at the 
1989 election was slightly larger than its loss of twenty-two seats at the 
1974 election, albeit in a larger Legislative Assembly of eighty-nine 
seats compared to 1974's eighty-two. Further, because the Liberal party 
had been so reduced at the 1983 and 1986 elections as to leave 
something resembling a two-party contest between Nationals and Labor 
at subsequent elections, the decline of the National Party in 1989 was 
comparable to, or even slightly worse than, that experienced by the ALP 
in 1974, down 15.5 percentage points in primary vote with a loss of 
twenty-three seats. The implication of such comparisons is that parties 
defeated that badly do come back, but it takes time to do so. 
The Scale of 1989 Victory 
It is clear that 1989 was for Queensland an electoral upheaval of 
considerable size, the sort of thing that occurs relatively rarely on the 
Australian political scene. Comparisons should be based on comparable 
statistics and here the two-party-preferred vote is useful because it 
forces voting outcomes into the either/or of either the ALP or the 
coalition which has been effectively the choice of governments in the 
post-world war two era. Whilst the Queensland ALP's gain of 8.3 
percentage points in 1989 is less than its loss of 10.2 points in 1974 it 
was rather better than its recovery of 6.9 points in 1977. Compared to 
what has happened in other States, it is on a par with the Wranslide of 
1978 when the ALP in New South Wales picked up 9.1 points and the 
Unsworth debacle of 1988 when it lost 8.5 points, or the Corcoran fiasco 
in South Australia in 1979 when the ALP lost 8.4 points, but well short 
of Bolte's incredible gain of 14.6 points in Victoria in 1955. Usually 
Australian elections record modest swings back and forth; only one in 
five exceeds 5 percentage points in magnitude. 
If one is seeking similar electoral phenomena for comparative 
purposes, that is a Labor challenger turning out an entrenched coalition 
or Liberal government, the usual form is to make up the ground required 
over two successive elections. In Victoria the ALP picked up 5.3 points 
in 1979, then a further 4.3 points in 1982, to eject Bolte's successors; in 
Western Australia it took 3.3 percentage points in 1980 and then another 
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5.9 points in 1983 to remove Court's heirs. Similarly, at the federal 
level the ALP built on 7.1 percentage points in 1969 and 2.5 points in 
1972 and later on 4.2 points in 1980 and 3.6 points in 1983 to bring the 
Whitiam and Hawke governments respectively to office. What 
happened in Queensland in 1989, Goss' victory in a single bound, was 
exceptional. Why it happened has been discussed in detail in Parts I 
and the earlier chapters of Part II. It remains to trace exactly how it 
happened. 
Table 11.2 sets out the two-party-preferred swings to the ALP in 
each electoral district, with the electoral districts grouped (i) into their 
electoral zone (with the large south-eastern zone divided into Brisbane 
and other) and (ii) by the party which had won the seat in 1986 - since 
when only one seat had changed hands, Merthyr going from National to 
Liberal at a by-election. For convenience of reference, the south-
eastern and provincial cities zones will be bracketed as the "urban" 
zones and the country and western and far northern zones as the "rural 
zones", though the demarcation is far from sharp when distinct urban 
centers such as Mount Isa, Warwick and Gympie and urban overspill 
from provincial cities such as Cairns, Rockhampton and Toowoomba are 
to be found in the "rural" zones. 
Table 11.2 Swings to ALP, 1986-1989 
Labor 
Brisbane 
Everton 
Brisbane Central 
South Brisbane 
Wolston 
Manly 
Archerfield 
Salisbury 
Lytton 
Bulimba 
Windsor 
Nudgee 
Chatsworth 
Sandgate 
Other south-eastern 
Logan 
Caboolture 
Woodridge 
Murrumba 
Ipswich 
+11.9 
+10.2 
+ 9.2 
+ 9.1 
+ 8.4 
+ 7.7 
+ 7.4 
+ 6.5 
+ 6.3 
+ 5.9 
+ 5.7 
+ 5.0 
+ 3.9 
1 
+11.9 
+ 97 
+ 8.8 
+ 7.6 
+ 4.9 
Party winning seat 
National 
Greenslopes 
Mount Gravatt 
Mansfield 
Merthyr* 
Aspley 
Albert 
Cooroora 
Fassifem 
Springwood 
Pine Rivers 
in 1986 
+11.0 
+ 8,8 
+ 7.9 
+ 5.5 
+ 2.9 
+22.8 
+12.2 
+11.4 
+10.8 
+10.7 
Moggill 
Toowong 
Yeronga 
Mount Coot-
Sherwood 
Nundah 
Stafford 
Ashgrove 
Redcliffe 
Liberal 
+17.1 
+17.1 
+15.1 
-tha +14.0 
+13.8 
+13.7 
+12.1 
+ 8.8 
+10.4 
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Table 11.2 continued 
Labor 
Ipswich West 
Provincial cities 
Port Curtis 
Thuringowa 
Mackay 
Townsville East 
Cairns 
Rockhampton 
Bundaberg 
Rockhampton North 
+ 0.9 
+15.2 
+ 9.1 
+ 7.4 
+ 7.1 
+ 6.7 
+ 5.6 
+ 2.9 
- 1.8 
Western & far northern 
Cook 
Peak Downs 
Country 
Bowen 
Mourilyan 
- 7 . 8 
+ 8.2 
+10.3 
+ 6.7 
Party wiiming seat in 
National 
Redlands 
Somerset 
Surfers Paradise 
Glass House 
Nerang 
Southport 
Toowoomba North 
Currumbin 
Lockyer 
1986 
+10.0 
+10.0 
+ 9.5 
+ 8.5 
+ 8.5 
+ 8.5 
1 +8.5 
+ 8.0 
+ 7.1 
Toowoomba South + 6.7 
South Coast 
Landsborough 
Nicklin 
Barron River 
Townsville 
Isis 
Whitsunday 
Maryborough 
Flinders 
Gregory 
Balonne 
Warrego 
Roma 
Callide 
Carnarvon 
Warwick 
Cunningham 
Gympie 
Burnett 
Tablelands 
Hinchinbrook 
Mulgrave 
Barambah 
Burdekin 
Mirani 
Broadsound 
Auburn 
Condamine 
+ 6.0 
+ 5.7 
+ 2.6 
+11.6 
+ 8.4 
+ 7.2 
+ 7.1 
+ 2.1 
Liberal 
+ 8.7 Mount Isa + 12.7 
+ 6.6 
+ 3.5 
+ 0.4 
- 3 7 
+ 8.9 
+ 8.2 
+ 8.1 
+ 8.0 
+ 7.8 
+ 6.9 
+ 6.3 
+ 5.5 
+ 5.4 
+ 5.3 
+ 5.0 
+ 4.8 
+ 4.7 
+ 4.4 
+ 3.1 
Liberal after 1989 by-election 
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The New Electoral Map 
Table 11.2 also incidentally indicates the relative zonal strengths of the 
three parties prior to and following the 1989 election. Before the 
election the Liberals were locked up in Brisbane with only two of their 
seats, contiguous Redcliffe and far distant Mount Isa, outside the 
Brisbane city council's boundaries. Labor was somewhat better off, 
being largely confined to Brisbane and the provincial cities plus half a 
dozen districts contiguous to Brisbane in the rest of the south-east, and 
the three northern districts of Bowen and Mourilyan (country zone) and 
Cook (western and far northern zone). The Nationals were the most 
evenly spread, the one tmly state-wide party. Admittedly they still had 
only four seats in Brisbane, but they held the great majority in the 
south-eastern zone outside Brisbane and in the "rural" zones, plus 
another five from the provincial cities. 
After the 1989 election, however, the picture is very different. The 
National party has been driven out of Brisbane and the provincial cities 
entirely, and in the south-east outside Brisbane its strength is much 
diminished with only seven seats (eight after the Nicklin result was 
altered in the Court of Disputed Returns) instead of eighteen. But in the 
two "rural" zones it lost merely two seats. In 1986 the "urban" zones 
had accounted for well over half of National seats, twenty-eight against 
the twenty-one coming from the "rural" zones; in 1989 the "urban" 
zones accounted for less than a third, seven (eight after Nicklin changed) 
against nineteen from the "rural". The Liberal party was altered just as 
dramatically though on a smaller scale. It lost five of its nine Brisbane 
seats to the ALP, and the two outside Brisbane as well, but won one 
Brisbane and four (three after Nicklin) other south-east seats from the 
Nationals, to finish somewhat less Brisbane-concentrated than 
previously - but not very much (see Chapter 7). 
The Labor party's character changed less, despite the magnitude of its 
gains. It now holds every provincial cities zone seat, and almost all in 
Brisbane - twenty-one to the Liberals' five. Having won seven seats 
from the Nationals and one from the Liberals, it now has more than half 
the seats in the rest of the south-eastern zone - fourteen to the 
Nationals' seven (eight after Nicklin) and the Liberals' four (or three). 
But it scored only three of its twenty-four gains in the western and far 
northern (one) and country (two) zones which still remain 
overwhelmingly the preserve of the National party. 
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Table 11.2 may mask significant variations with detail, so Table 11.3 
shows only average swings for each zonal category of electoral district. 
Labor's biggest swings came in Liberal-held electoral districts, whilst 
apart from the three seats it already held and the Liberals' one seat 
which it won, it did not do quite so well in the two "rural" zones. 
Table 113 Average swings to ALP, 1986-1989 
Zone 
Brisbane 
Other south-eastern 
Provincial cities 
Western & far northern 
Country 
% 
7.5 
7.3 
6.5 
-7.8 
8.5 
Labor 
n 
13 
6 
8 
1 
2 
Party winning seats in 
National 
% 
7.2 
9.3 
7.3 
14.0 
6.2 
n 
5 
18 
5 
6 
15 
1986 
Liberal 
% n 
14.0 8 
10.4 1 
_ _ 
12.7 1 
-
At the individual electoral district level there were few aberrant 
results. One was Albert which recorded by far the largest swing to the 
ALP because Liberal preferences were explicitly directed to the Labor 
candidate; there were three that went contrary to the tide and recorded a 
reduced Labor share of the two-party-preferred vote for local reasons. 
With one exception. Liberal-held districts recorded above average 
swings to the ALP which is indicative of the party's weak electoral 
performance. 
Competition Between Partners 
To turn now to the second dimension of electoral politics, the 
competition between the two anti-Labor parties, once more a long time 
perspective is desirable. Prior to the mid-1960s and the start of "the 
three-cornered contest" era, the Country party (as the Nationals then 
were) and the Liberal party kept very much to their own territories. 
However, once the Liberals moved against Country party-held seats, 
and the Country party counter-attacked into Liberal-held seats, such 
contests became common, then the norm, and finally almost universal. 
Table 11.4 sets out two measures of the amount of competition that 
prevailed. They indicate the level of competition for each party.' The 
first statistic is the percentage of electoral districts which each party 
contested which were also contested by the other party. Thus if every 
Liberal candidate had a National opponent the figure would be 100.0 per 
cent in the Liberal column. However such a measure, reflecting as it 
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does only seats contested, could be misleading, especially when one 
party's contestants may be relatively concentrated in weighted electoral 
districts. A corrective is provided in the second measure which is the 
percentage of each party's total vote cast in those contests in which the 
other anti-Labor party was involved. Consequently, if one party 
avoided its opponents' safest seats, the percentage in this column would 
be Ukely to be less than in the previous column showing the percentage 
of seats contested. Where once only some Liberal supporters and some 
National supporters confronted each other, eventually such clashes 
became general and the hostilities spread from the state sphere where 
they had been generated initially to the federal sphere where they were 
unwelcome to the national leaderships of both parties. 
Table 11.4 National-Liberal Competition. Percentages of electorates contested by 
each party also contested by the other party and percentages of votes received by each 
party in those contests, state and federal, 1966-1990 
Liberal National 
Seats Votes Seats Votes 
SUte 
1966 
1969 
1972 
1974 
1977 
1980 
1983 
1986 
1989 
Federal 
1966 
1969 
1972 
1974 
1975 
1977 
1980 
1983 
1984 
1987 
1990 
If competition between the two anti-Labor parties in Queensland 
became general in the 1970s and 1980s, did either party win? An 
answer covering the same period as Table 11.4 would be voluminous. 
17.8 
15.9 
34.0 
39.6 
47.1 
57.8 
81.1 
98.4 
94.7 
9.1 
0 
38.5 
50.0 
58.3 
33.3 
23.1 
53.8 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
9.1 
8.3 
20.8 
23.0 
27.6 
39.9 
65.6 
94.6 
90.7 
3.8 
0 
26.4 
38.1 
43.3 
20.1 
8.6 
57.9 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
21.6 
17.9 
40.9 
43.7 
44.4 
66.1 
59.7 
70.5 
84.7 
12.5 
0 
45.5 
50.0 
53.8 
36.4 
33.3 
58.3 
87.5 
100.0 
91.7 
18.7 
16.1 
33.9 
30.9 
33.1 
65.4 
55,7 
67.0 
81.2 
47 
0 
42.6 
24.6 
28.4 
17.9 
22.3 
25,2 
76.6 
100.0 
79.3 
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For current purposes it is sufficient to say that for the most part the 
National Party won, and then pick up the story at the previous election 
in 1986 when the Nationals, to the surprise of many, retained office 
without having to re-establish a coalition. Table 11.5 provides data for 
both elections, 1986 and 1989, at the level of individual electoral 
districts which now have been grouped together in what it is thought 
will be relevant blocs. (The data concern only the anti-Labor vote, and 
consequently the cut-up of the unimpressive combined vote in a safe 
ALP electoral district and the cut-up of an overwhelming combined 
vote in a district that would be hopeless for the ALP are 
indistinguishable.) 
The 1986 column shows that only in the four Brisbane blocs was 
there still much of a contest with the Nationals at or below 55 per cent 
of the combined vote. In only one of the four blocs are the Liberals 
ahead - and there by barely 5 percentage points. Elsewhere throughout 
the state the Nationals have two-thirds or three-quarters of the 
combined vote, or are so firmly on top that the lack of Liberal 
candidates prevents the calculation even being made. However, a 
second glance at Table 11.5, now at the 1989 column, shows that some 
massive changes have taken place. 
Table 11.5 National share of National and liberal votes combined 1986-1989 state 
elections 
Electoral district 1986 1989 
Albert* 72.2 51.5 
Currumbin* 74.2 40.2 
Nerang* 70.9 47.3 
South Coast* 71.3 49.9 
Southport 68.4 50.7 
Surfers Paradise 71.3 51.3 
GOLD COAST 71.3 48.6 
Logan 68.7 38.6 
Redlands* 72.6 54.7 
Springwood* 61.5 49.6 
Woodridge 64.2 35.9 
SOUTHERN CORRIDOR 67.0 46.3 
Archerfield 56.6 33.8 
Ipswich 57.0 NA 
Ipswich West 59.4 NA 
Mansfield* 58.4 55.5 
Mount Gravatt* 51.4 39.0 
Salisbury 55.1 28.1 
Sherwood NA NA 
BRISBANE SOUTHWEST** 55.1 40.1 
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Table 11.5 continued 
Electoral district 1986 1989 
Bulimba 58.5 36.2 
Oiatsworth 55.1 26.6 
Greenslopes* 53.5 29.2 
Lytton 63.6 41.3 
Manly 57.9 47.0 
South Brisbane 56.9 37.1 
Yeronga 45,1 22,9 
BRISBANE SOUTH 55,3 33,8 
Aspley' 51.6 30.6 
Brisbane Central 56.9 31.7 
Merthyr* 50.5 21.2 
Nudgee 56,8 34.9 
Nundah 40,4 20.0 
Sandgate 60.4 33.5 
BRISBANE NORTHEAST 52.5 28.4 
Ashgrove 49.7 16.7 
Everton 44.9 182 
Moggill 41.7 21.9 
Mount Coot-tha 46.3 19.9 
Stafford 48.8 23.0 
Toowong 41,4 16.9 
BRISBANE NORTHWEST 45.1 19,5 
Caboolture NA 37,5 
Murrumba 61,1 35.2 
Pine Rivers* 56,5 58.3 
Redcliffe 35,0 12,8 
NORTHERN CORRIDOR** 49,9 34,0 
Cooroora* 77,2 50.1 
Glass House* 77,8 57.1 
Landsborough 74,3 70.0 
Nicklin 71,9 50.8 
SUNSHINE COAST 75,1 57,9 
Barambah NA 78.9 
Burnett NA 85.3 
Fassifem 74.4 58,9 
Gympie 84,7 81,6 
Lockyer 76.2 70.4 
Somerset NA 69.4 
SOUTHEAST RURAL** 77,7 68.0 
Carnarvon NA 76.1 
Condamine NA NA 
Cunningham NA 66.3 
Toowoomba North* 76.2 53.1 
Toowomba South 71,8 64.9 
Warwick NA 70,9 
DARLING DOWNS NA NA 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
184 Colin A Hughes 
Table 11.5 continued 
Electoral district 1986 1989 
Balonne 
Flinders 
Gregory 
Mount Isa 
Peak Downs 
Roma 
Warrego 
WESTERN 
Bundaberg 
Isis* 
Maryborough* 
WIDE BAY 
Auburn 
Broadsound* 
Callide 
Port Curtis 
Rockampton 
Rockhampton North 
CENTRAL 
Bowen 
Burdekin 
Mackay 
Mirani 
Thuringowa 
Townsville* 
Townsville East 
Whitsunday* 
MID-NORTH** 
Barron River* 
Cairns 
Cook 
Hinchinbrook 
Mourilyan 
Mulgrave* 
Tablelands 
FAR-NORTH 
NA 
NA 
NA 
43,0 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
85,5 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
61,2 
83,5 
84,2 
NA 
65,8 
59.2 
66.1 
84,1 
73,1 
NA 
NA 
NA 
80,4 
77.2 
71,9 
86,3 
NA 
NA 
92.6 
NA 
19.1 
NA 
NA 
90.4 
NA 
75.0 
70.7 
82.0 
NA 
NA 
89.6 
NA 
NA 
NA 
73.6 
NA 
NA 
67.6 
73.6 
84.4 
57.7 
57.4 
66.0 
60.8 
63.0 
70,9 
NA 
75.8 
62.7 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
* Lost by National Party 
** Comprising only electoral districts which were comparable 1986-89 
Before discussing the movement between 1986 and 1989 from the 
National Party to the Liberal Party, it might be asked whether this shift 
of support within the ranks of anti-Labor voters relates particularly to 
the circumstances of the 1989 State election, for example to the issues, 
or the leaders or the candidates available in that campaign. Some 
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relevant evidence is provided by the federal election outcomes over 
approximately the same period when different issues, leaders and 
candidates were involved. Table 11.6 provides data for the 1987 and 
1990 federal elections with the Commonwealth electoral divisions 
allocated, very roughly, to the same geographical areas as were used in 
Table 11.5. 
Table 11.6 National share of National and Liberal votes combined 1987-1990 federal 
elections 
Electoral division 1987 1990 
9.0 
10.8 
9,9 
16.6 
7.7 
12,0 
7,5 
10.8 
9.9 
m 
4,9 
6,5 
8,9 
7,7 
8,2 
7,9 
12.1 
10.4 
50.6 
40,6 
46,0 
28,7 
40.9 
33,5 
78,0 
NA 
NA 
NA 
78,2 
42,3 
NA 
70,4 
47.7 
79,1 
87.0 
McPherson 
Moncrieff 
GOLD COAST 
Bowman 
Fadden 
SOUTHERN CORRIDOR 
Forde 
Oxley 
BRISBANE SOUTHWEST 
Griffith 
Moreton 
BRISBANE SOUTH 
Ulley 
Fetrie 
BRISBANE NORTHEAST 
Brisbane 
Ryan 
BRISBANE NORTHWEST 
Fairfax 
Fisher 
37.0 
40,9 
38.8 
44,0 
31.1 
37.1 
25.3 
57.8 
39.3 
36,7 
22,0 
28,4 
36,4 
30,1 
33,0 
32,6 
24,1 
27.6 
69.8 
74.9 
NORTHERN CORRIDOR & SUNSHINE COAST 72,3 
Groom 
Rankin 
DARLING DOWNS & SOUTHEAST RURAL 
Hinkler 
Wide Bay 
WIDE BAY 
Capricomia 
Dawson 
Herbert 
CENTRAL & MID-NORTH 
Kennedy 
Leichhardt 
Maranoa 
FAR-NORTH & WESTERN 
78.5 
63.0 
73.3 
88,5 
86,9 
87.7 
77.8 
86.7 
63,3 
76.5 
86,2 
79,1 
86,9 
84.5 
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The absence of Liberal candidates from some outlying seats leaves 
gaps in each set of the data, but there is still a common pattern between 
the two tables (which, it should always be remembered, when read 
together make only approximate matches of voting areas). In Brisbane 
itself, the area of the city council, the National party went from 
approximate equality (51.7 per cent of their combined vote in the four 
blocs of seats) with the Liberals at the state level to being merely a 
strong challenger (29.6 per cent of the combined vote), whilst at the 
federal level it dropped from being a strong challenger (31.8 per cent of 
the combined vote) to no more than a fringe phenomenon (8.6 per cent). 
In each sphere, state and federal alike, about one in four or five of 
erstwhile coalition voters in Brisbane moved their vote from the 
Nationals to the Liberals. 
Elsewhere in the urbanised parts of the south-eastern zone the 
pattern was very similar. South of Brisbane, in the southern corridor 
and Gold Coast, at the state level the Nationals declined from 
dominance (69.8 per cent) to equality (47.8 per cent) and at the federal 
level from being a strong challenger (38.1 per cent) to fringe 
phenomenon (10.7 per cent). North of Brisbane, in the northern corridor 
and Sunshine Coast, the Nationals have dropped from dominance (66.3 
per cent state, 72.3 per cent federal) to equality in both spheres (48.7 per 
cent state, 46.0 per cent federal). In both areas, as in Brisbane, about 
one in four or five of erstwhile coalition voters changed support at the 
two elections, 1989 and 1990. 
However further afield, west of Ipswich and north of Noosa, the 
Liberal gains, where they were recorded because a Liberal candidate was 
available, are more modest. At the state level, two provincial cities, 
Toowoomba and Mackay, show a drift from the Nationals to the 
Liberals, but Townsville does not, and other provincial cities tike 
Rockhampton and Bundaberg were, no doubt wisely, avoided by the 
Liberals. Mount Isa is the exceptional case, for there an incumbent 
Liberal could have attracted National voters in the face of a strong, and 
in the outcome successful, Labor challenge but seemingly did not. 
If the intention of those Nationals who effected the coup that 
replaced Ahern with Cooper had been to f^ ll back in good order on the 
party's electoral heartland, they were vindicated. Labor gains of seats 
were kept to pure and mixed or fringe provincial city seats 
(Maryborough, Isis, Broadsound, Whitsunday, Townsville, Barron 
River, Mulgrave, Toowoomba North); losses of support to the Liberals 
were damaging or threatening for the National party's future only in the 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
The Results 187 
south-east. 
On the other hand, it would have to be asked whether the removal of 
Ahern opened the way for the Liberals to do as well as they did in the 
south-eastern zone outside Brisbane. The National seats, and indeed the 
level of the National vote, in the Brisbane city council area had been a 
mushroom growth of the last few elections, but the strips north and 
south of Brisbane had been traditional National (or Country party) 
territory which had grown in enrolments and number of electoral 
districts with the upsurge in population. Its erosion was far more 
threatening to the long-term future of the National party than any events 
in Brisbane might be. 
1956 and 1989 Compared 
Finally, to return to the most striking feature of the 1989 election, it was 
a Labor victory, the first since 1956. How then did it compare with 
1956 in scale and its geography? Table 11.7 uses the two-party-
preferred vote, and the four zones of the Hanlon redistribution of 1949 
to aggregate electoral districts because the arbitrary character of the 
more recent provincial cities zone boundaries would make conversion of 
the 1956 results into the 1989 boundaries much more difficult, if not 
impossible. Numbers of votes as well as percentages are given to 
indicate the shift in relative strengths among those four zones over the 
intervening thirty-three-year period as well. 
Table 11.7 Two-party-preferred votes, 1956 and 1989 
Zone 
Brisbane 
South-east 
Northern 
Western 
STATE 
n 
151,482 
128,287 
53,242 
32,826 
365,837 
Labor 
% 
52.8 
47.0 
56.1 
60,6 
51.6 
1956 
Coalition 
n 
135,242 
144,875 
41,621 
21,376 
343,114 
% 
47.2 
53.0 
43,9 
39,4 
48.4 
n 
296,959 
394,218 
123,286 
36,926 
851,389 
1985 
Labor 
% 
59.8 
50.8 
56.0 
44.9 
54.1 
) 
Coalition 
n 
199,868 
381,366 
96,982 
45,268 
723,484 
% 
40.2 
49.2 
44.0 
55.1 
45.9 
Table 11.7 shows cleady why the Hanlon redistribution had so 
favoured western and northern seats in its allocation of zonal 
weightages, and why the Labor and National parties have changed 
places on the subject since then. In 1989 Brisbane was almost as solid 
(59.8 per cent) for the ALP as the west (60.6 per cent) had been in 
1956, but 1989 Brisbane contains twenty-six seats - compared to 
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twenty-four in 1956 - and the west (as defined by the Hanlon zone 
boundaries) has only nine seats in 1989 - compared to eleven in 1956 
The ALP did better state-wide in 1989, up 2.5 percentage points over 
1956, but that statistic covers a variety of regional developments: much 
better in Brisbane, up 7 points; rather better in the south-east, up 3.8 
points; no change in the north, down 0.1 of a point; and slumped in the 
west, down 15.7 points. 
But relativities have moved substantially too. The Brisbane zone 
equivalent had increased in enrolments by 73.3 per cent, the south-east 
by 183.9 per cent, the north by 132.2 per cent, and the west by 51.6 per 
cent. For the Nationals the good news was that they still had 
representation in the more rapidly growing north and south-east, for the 
Liberals that they now had some support outside Brisbane, for the ALP 
that they were comfortably ahead in two areas, level in the third, and 
trailed only in that zone which had been the cradle of the party but a 
hundred years on gave very little help to the Labor cause. 
Notes 
Colin A. Hughes, "In the constituencies; competition with the Liberal Party", in 
Brian Costar and Dennis Woodward, eds, Country to National: Australian rural 
politics and beyond (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp.35-53. 
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TRANSITION TO GOVERNMENT 
Patrick Weller 
New governments face two immediate issues: how to take over the reins 
of government, and how to shape the machinery of that government. 
Neither can be postponed. As a consequence, decisions made before the 
election on the structures of the public sector will have a continuing 
impact on the processes of government. 
Transition must be almost immediate. Premiers and prime ministers 
do not have the luxury of an American president who has almost three 
months between the election victory and the ascension into office. The 
take-over is likely to take at most five or six days, and possibly far less. 
A formal transition will have to wait until ministers are selected; in the 
case of a Labor government, caucus has the nominal power to select 
ministers, so the actual transfer of power must wait until a meeting of 
caucus can be convened to choose - or legitimise - the selected group. 
But in practice an elected leader may - indeed must - plan to make 
changes in the first few days after the election. 
Timing is crucial because a premier seldom has such flexibility as in 
those first few days - a flexibility that is created by the aura of victory 
and the absence of existing ministerial empires and egos. It is far easier 
to establish new bureaucratic structures and to introduce improved 
processes in the vacuum that exists during a change of government. A 
transition therefore requires planning if its advantages are to be 
maximised. 
That plan must pay particular attention to the machinery of 
government. If the new government is to make any changes, then those 
plans must be thought through before government is won. Yet that is 
far from easy because the available designs for machinery of 
government are both uncertain and ambivalent. Both history and theory 
can provide examples, but no clear principles. After a sensitive and 
comprehensive survey of machinery of government changes in Britain 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
192 Patrick Weller 
from 1960 to 1983, Christopher Pollitt identifies four "principles" for 
determining the arrangements of departments: 
(1) the functional principle, whereby departments provide 
particular services to the community as a whole; 
(2) the like-with-like principle, to provide coherence and 
homogeneity, so that services to government or 
money matters could be grouped; 
(3) the cabinet representation principle, to ensure that all 
the activities of government are directiy represented 
around the cabinet table; and 
(4) the principle that small cabinets function better, both 
by allowing a better quality of debate and by making 
the coordination of policies and the strategic direction 
of government easier.' 
None of these principles by themselves are necessarily decisive, or even 
predominant, in explaining machinery of government changes. Indeed, 
as Pollitt recognises, the principles are so vague that they may be used 
at the same time to justify several different and indeed contradictory 
structures. For instance, does the like-with-like principle refer to 
money, services, routine or politically sensitive "likes"? 
Nevertheless, these design principles do provide a starting point and 
in practice they have been used as a basis for machinery of government 
changes. Two examples of decisive changes can make the point. The 
in-coming Conservative government in Britain in 1970 published a 
white paper, Tlie Reorganisation of Central Government (Cmnd 4506). 
Its objectives were to 
improve the quality of policy formulation by 
presenting cabinet and ministers with well-defined 
options; 
improve the framework by matching the field of 
responsibility of government departments to coherent 
fields of policy and administration; 
ensure the government machine responds and adapts 
to new demands. 
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The logic of that reorganisation led to reliance on three of the four 
design principles: functional homogeneity, cabinet representation and a 
small cabinet. The outcome was fewer and larger departments. 
In 1987 the Australian federal government followed the same route.^ 
In previous governments many of the less significant departments had 
been unrepresented in cabinet, except where their ministers were co-
opted for a discussion. Hawke chose to follow the route of a function 
allocation of responsibilities, and full representation in cabinet of all 
departments. The number of departments was reduced to sixteen, 
through a process of amalgamation, and cabinet membership was set at 
seventeen (with one minister without a department). 
In each of these cases machinery of government decisions were 
determined by a combination of functional logic and demands for 
cabinet representation. Unfortunately, although in both cases the initial 
results were dramatic, a careful calculation of costs and benefits has 
remained elusive because of the difficulty of assessing precisely the 
impact of changes in areas of administration that are under constant 
change and liable to pressure from a variety of different sources. 
Yet even the two examples of substantial change referred to here do 
not give easy explanations of when changes should be made. The 
Conservative white paper was issued four months after the party won 
power, and was based on work completed in opposition; it was known 
to have Heath's personal support. It was then implemented. Hawke's 
1987 changes took place after his third electoral victory, but before the 
re-election of the ministry - during that vacuum that allows a successful 
leader the greatest flexibility. It was said to be the brainchild of the 
secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. It had not 
been the subject of long debate. Although Hawke was criticised for 
failing to consult his colleagues, his dramatic actions illustrate the 
degree to which decisions on machinery of government are the 
prerogative of prime ministers and premiers. These examples provide 
pointers to change - some design principles, some illustrations of 
optimal times to act; but they cannot offer clearcut models to follow. 
To these general issues must be added the particular circumstances of 
Queensland in 1989. Out of office for over thirty years, there was no 
potential minister with experience of governing, or even of sitting on the 
state backbench under a Labor ministry. There was a total lack of 
communal experience, even to the extent of knowing the location of the 
cabinet room. This problem was exacerbated by the refusal of the 
National government to allow the Labor leaders any consultation with 
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the public service for the discussion of their plans. Such consultations 
have now become conventional in most parliamentary systems at every 
election to allow smooth transitions, but not in Queensland. The 
consequence was that any contacts which did occur were either 
roundabout or unofficial. Incoming ministers did not know their likely 
departmental heads. 
Besides, after so long in opposition and faced with problems of 
overcoming an electoral gerrymander. Labor's primary focus was 
winning. Policy-making in opposition was concerned to develop 
proposals that satisfied the requirements of the media and the pressure 
groups. In a party with limited experience, the quality of particular 
policies depended heavily on the availability of advisers who could 
assist. Policy implementation after the election could be left until the 
election was won. The consequence was that some of the many policy 
statements were more firmly based than others. Fortunately the policy 
on the public sector. Making Government Work (MOW), was one of the 
most carefully drafted. 
Preparing for Government 
The policy on Making Government Work was launched at a public 
lecture at Griffith University in August 1989; the lecture was part of a 
series given by each of the state's political leaders. The policy itself was 
the consequence of six months' work. Goss' principal advisers were his 
personal staff and a small group of academics, with the practical 
experience of up to two decades of research and writing on public sector 
management and reform and with experience at both federal and state 
level and overseas. The reason for using academics was simple: they 
were the only people outside the public service who had the necessary 
expertise and whose services were available free. Oppositions go for 
advice where they can. The caucus had a transition to government 
committee that discussed a range of issues but it focussed on executive, 
rather than transitional, issues. The party had a policy committee. 
Expertise had to be grabbed where available. 
The first drafts were written almost as a general exercise as to what 
would be desirable, and then amended to take account of some political 
realities. It might have been preferable, for instance, to organise the 
public service into fourteen departments, but with a shadow cabinet of 
eighteen, it was not worth the potential instability threatening the future 
of four opposition frontbenchers might cause. Eighteen ministers meant 
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at least eighteen departments. The Fitzgerald Report recommended the 
separation of the Department of Justice and the Attorney-General; 
whether that split was logical in terms of public administration, the 
importance of the Fitzgerald Report gave the recommendation sanctity. 
From the beginning the public sector policy was based on four basic 
principles: 
(1) reassertion of proper cabinet control over the 
development of policy; 
(2) an end to fragmentation in the public sector; 
(3) the minimum number of departments possible, with 
each minister in control of a coordinated, linked and 
discrete set of functions; and 
(4) the introduction of proper performance review. 
The policy proposed the establishment of proper cabinet procedures, a 
cabinet committee system, and a process of monitoring of ministerial 
expenses. These principles were a combination of a desire for 
functional homogeneity and cabinet representation. Since the size of 
cabinet was determined by political considerations, there was an attempt 
to rationalise the departmental structure to logical form and to provide a 
more efficient delivery of advice to each minister by making them 
responsible for a single department. The policy proposed the 
consolidation of government activity into eighteen departments. Some 
proposals, like Transport, were designed to create coherence; others, like 
the incorporation of Works into Administrative Services, were designed 
to change the culture and approach because the Department of Works 
had served "as a political gravy line". 
In addition the policy committed the government to a reintroduction 
of the procedures of merit. It proposed the establishment of a Public 
Sector Management Commission (PSMC) to review the structure and 
management of the public sector. The PSMC would review the 
structures and then oversee the implementation of its recommendations. 
It was to seek greater efficiency and accountability; the public sector 
policy required "smarter administration, not more bureaucracy". The 
PSMC was designed to de-politicise the public sector, insist on the 
application of the merit principle, and establish a senior executive 
service and a chief executive service. 
Yet experience also indicated what might be avoided. Royal 
commissions were often lengthy and of dubious immediate value; 
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reforms stopped, to await the final report. However good the quality of 
the Coombs Report, its authors were not subsequently its implementors. 
There was a preference for the NSW Wilenski model, with interim 
reports and some evaluation of its progress, a type of rolling royal 
commission that could review and monitor progress while at the same 
time continuing its own operations. 
Preparation for a change of government is of course not exclusively 
the prerogative of the opposition. All public servants ought to be 
prepared for a change and senior officials should have ready for 
incoming ministers a strategy for the implementation of the party's 
policy. Given the veto by the incumbent National party government on 
contacts with the opposition, it is difficult to know how widespread the 
preparations were. In the Department of the Premier, one or two people 
had prepared briefing folders for the opposition, analysing and making 
recommendations on their machinery of government proposals. The 
Treasury Department too organised a sophisticated brief, looking both at 
machinery of government and economic matters. 
Additional initiatives were also to help the new government. In the 
two months before the election, an officer of the Premier's Department 
had begun the preparation of a cabinet handbook, designed to 
systematise the procedures of cabinet to ensure the better preparation of 
cabinet submissions, their circulation to ministers and proper 
consultation. The process of developing a cabinet handbook was thus 
begun under the National government, to be available for any new 
government in December. 
These documents on the structure of the public service did not 
establish the details of transition itself. In the weeks before the election, 
as the prospects of victory improved, a paper on the transition was 
prepared by the opposition leader's staff and other advisers. It proposed 
the establishment of two transition working parties to be known as the 
Machinery of Government committee (MOG) and the Ministerial Staff 
Review Panel (MSRP). Once victory was certain, the intention was to 
attempt to achieve five points: 
the creation of the proposed eighteen departments; 
the adoption of a cabinet system that requires due 
process; 
drafting of guidelines on ministerial expenses; 
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dispersement of existing ministerial staff and a 
screening process for all new ministerial 
appointments; and 
review of the appointments of senior officials. 
The transition paper included a timetable that in the event was adhered 
to closely. It was seen as important that the political leadership, not the 
public servants, set the timetable and controlled the agenda. What was 
essential was that the model of the rushed Whitlam-Barnard duumvirate 
of 1972 would not be adopted. Goss' victory speech on election night 
emphasised that a cautious approach would be adopted; he advised his 
ministers-elect to take a cold shower. The gradualist approach proposed 
by the transition paper was adopted. 
The First Week 
The MOG working party met for the first time on the evening of 
Sunday, 3 December. It then met at least daily, sometimes twice a day, 
for the next eight days. The group was given some dramatic publicity 
by the media. The Financial Review, for instance, declared: "When the 
Goss 'transition to government super team', as it is being dubbed in 
public service corridors, moved in yesterday, the alarm spread. Three of 
the team are academics - something of a rarity in past decision-making 
in Queensland." In fact the membership of the transition working party 
was floating, depending on the issue under discussion. It was based 
around a core of Goss' staff and outside advisers and, at different times, 
it included advisers from the Premier's department, the Treasury, the 
Crown Solicitor, and the office of Public Service Personnel 
Management. Further, the standing of the working party needs 
emphasising; it might have processed paper and come up with proposals, 
but its role was advisory. All final decisions were made by the 
premier-elect; machinery of government remained his prerogative. 
Priorities were determined by necessity: the swearing-in of ministers 
and the establishment of the structure of government. 
The first function of the MOG working party was to ensure that the 
machinery of government decisions set out in the policy paper were 
implemented in time for swearing-in of ministers. Four particular 
problems needed to be solved: when the swearing-in would take place; 
how many departments would exist; what impact would the changes 
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have on the statutory responsibilities wielded by some public servants; 
and what would happen to the contracts of senior public servants. 
The public servants attached to the working party were of course as 
inexperienced in organising transitions as the Labor party. For public 
servants in Queensland, changes of government had been rare: since 
1915, they occurred only in 1929, 1932 and 1957. Preparing massive 
changes to administrative arrangements for a new government was 
therefore a novelty. After some suggestions that five days would be 
required before the administrative arrangements would be ready, it was 
accepted that three days was adequate and that therefore the ministry 
could be sworn in on the Thursday, the day after the caucus had elected 
the ministry. That event, once announced, provided an unchangeable 
deadline which had to be met. 
The second issue was whether the ministers should be immediately 
sworn into the eighteen departments, or whether the reduction of 
departments should take place over a few months, in gradual stages. 
There was a perceived reluctance on behalf of senior public servants to 
move fast, with one early comment that "of course the ministers will be 
sworn into the twenty-nine departments". Goss' advisers then 
emphasised that the government had made the decision to establish 
eighteen departments and that the responsibility of the working party 
was to work out how to do it. 
That is not to say that the policy document was sacrosanct. Changes 
were made if the contrary argument was sensible. Official advice 
argued that a department of regional development was unlikely to be 
effective, as it would have few real functional responsibilities and would 
be constantly involved in the activities of other departments. That 
advice was accepted and a Bureau of Regional Development was 
attached instead to the portfolio of the treasurer, a northern minister with 
an understanding of regional pressures and the weight to ensure they 
were heard. A Bureau of Emergency Services was added to the police 
portfolio. To replace regional development, a Department of Land 
Management was carved out of the proposed Primary Industry 
Department. It was aLso agreed that, in the calculation of the promised 
eighteen departments, the Railways Departrrient (in practice a statutory 
agency) and the Auditor-General's Department (formally responsible to 
parliament) would not be counted. 
At the same time a group of ministers-to-be, led by the future 
treasurer, Keith De Lacy, prepared a set of guidelines for the oversight 
of ministerial expenses. With some National party former ministers 
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about to be charged with misuse of public funds, it was essential that a 
clear system prevented any repetition under the new government. The 
group recommended that a unit be established in Treasury to monitor the 
correct use of expense accounts. 
Two substantiative problems remained. First, some chief executive 
officers (CEOs) - such as the Surveyor-General or the head of the 
Department of Main Roads - had statutory responsibilities that were 
granted by statute to the holder of their office. Could they retain the 
statutory powers if they were not also chief executives? When some 
doubts were raised, an alternative strategy was proposed: the 
maintenance of the chief executives in shell departments without staff 
until legislation could be altered. It was radical, but had been pursued 
elsewhere: in Tasmania and in the skeleton departments created in the 
federal administration. The solution was feasible but unwieldy. Once 
proposed, it was found to be unnecessary; the officers' statutory powers 
could still be valid in the amalgamated departments. 
The second problem was the contracts of chief executives. All chief 
executives and the two ranks below had been put onto contract by the 
National government. The contracts of the chief executives included a 
detailed duty statement that prescribed the responsibility to act as chief 
executive of a particular department. The new government's plans to 
reduce the number of departments to eighteen would obviously affect 
the majority of departments. The question was raised whether, by 
altering the structure of departments, the government might also be 
breaching these contracts and might be liable to pay out the full amounts 
that the contracts promised if they were terminated by the government. 
Initially massive sums were mentioned, suggesting payouts of up to 
$700,000 per person. In practice that was a misleading figure, as much 
of the payout would have been superannuation entitlements from a fully 
paid-up scheme. Nevertheless the picture being presented suggested 
that, since the legal situation was uncertain, it might be preferable to 
delay changes until they could be negotiated with the chief executives. 
In effect the government was being told that, if it did not want law suits, 
it could only change the machinery of government with the consent of 
senior public servants. Such a course was regarded as unacceptable by 
the Labor leaders, particularly when the party had been to the electorate 
with a clear commitment to change in the public sector. It was decided 
to ignore the implicit threats, assuming that most chief executives would 
stay, and to deny that changes to the machinery of government 
constituted a breach of contract. 
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By Wednesday, all the substantial obstacles to the changes to the 
structures were overcome, with the last pieces of fine-tuning on the 
allocation of responsibilities determined by the premier. The 
administrative arrangements were explained to the incoming cabinet on 
the Wednesday evening, after the ministers had been elected and before 
they were sworn in on Thursday. 
Once the first priority, the departmental arrangements, had been 
settled, two other issues were discussed over the next three days - the 
appointment of directors-general and the cabinet procedures. Obviously 
the reduction in the number of departments would lead to a reduction in 
the number of chief executives. That was not to assume that all those 
so displaced were now out of a job; many retained the same level of 
responsibilities within larger departments, particularly in the case of 
Lands (with four former CEOs), Transport (two), and Primary Industry 
(three). Most of those accepted the right of the government to rearrange 
the administrative structures and continued to work with the larger 
department. Their salaries and entitlements were not affected by the 
changes. 
In a few cases and for a variety of reasons, the government chose to 
look for alternative employment for chief executives. In one or two 
cases the incoming minister had particular people that he wanted 
appointed. In one case the CEO very publicly had his contract signed 
by the former premier the day before the election; such an action was 
seen as indicating a distrust of the incoming government that was 
unacceptable. After some discussion - and amid last-minute hassles -
it was agreed that those CEOs who were not to be allocated immediately 
to head a department or part of a department would be sent on leave for 
six weeks. 
When they returned they were sent to the Government Research Unit 
(GRU), a section of the Department of Administrative Services, rather 
than be left with nothing to do. The GRU was housed with the Public 
Relations Media Office in reopened offices some distance from the main 
administrative buildings. The Media Office had been shifted as a means 
of illustrating publicly that the new government did not wish to be seen 
to use it. The GRU never had more than a few officers allocated to it. 
Nevertheless their relocation in the GRU, designed to house a range of 
officers for whom positions had not yet been found, was probably a 
mistake, both administratively and politically. Not only did it allow a 
constant reinforcement of each others' problems, it also provided an easy 
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target for political criticism. The federal model of an unattached list, 
with staff on full pay, might have been preferable. 
Several CEOs were unaffected by the changes, but there was a need 
for some appointments. All those taken from within the service - and 
all but one were - were appointed on the basis of their perceived ability. 
In some cases it was precisely their competence that had them shifted to 
difficult jobs. All were given acting appointments, with the intention 
that their performance could be reviewed in the first six months without 
the complications that had already been discovered with the earlier 
contracts. The impressions that the choices were intended to give were 
the combination of continuity and change, with much emphasis on 
continuity. Certainly in these CEO appointments there was no 
consideration of political affiliation or party service. 
The third priority in the first week was cabinet procedures. By 2 
December the process of drafting a new cabinet handbook had almost 
been finished, though there was a need to add sections that would take 
account of Labor party practices and the role of caucus. The substantial 
sections, dealing with the principles of cabinet government, the 
procedures for drafting and consultation, requirements for consultation 
and the conventions of cabinet government were complete. The 
handbook had not been drawn up ab initio; it relied heavily on practice 
in the federal arena and in other states. In each of those cases, their 
cabinet handbooks had distilled the experience of years. 
At the Wednesday meeting of ministers-elect the premier informed 
his colleagues that the adoption of the cabinet handbook would be the 
main business for the first cabinet meeting, and that its objective was to 
ensure that public servants fell into line with the party platform. Some 
changes were made to the draft handbook in the days before the cabinet 
met to take account of the premier's wishes, for essentially the cabinet 
handbook is the means whereby the premier determines the procedures 
of cabinet. 
Additionally the seating around the cabinet table was altered. 
Previously the premier and senior ministers had sat at the end of an oval 
table, leading to complaints that junior ministers were unable to 
participate in debate or even to discover what was decided. The premier 
decided to sit at the centre, with senior ministers both beside him and 
across the table, to prevent a coterie of ministers dominating discussion. 
On Monday, 11 December, the cabinet met for the first time; its 
eighteen ministers were sworn into eighteen departments; new directors-
general, some in an acting capacity, had been appointed; streamlined and 
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efficient cabinet procedures were adopted. The changes had been 
dramatic. 
And thus ended the first week. 
Maintaining the Momentum 
Those initial steps of course did not end the restmcturing. The first 
cabinet meeting established a cabinet machinery of government 
committee (MOG) that was to be responsible for maintaining progress 
and, soon afterwards, a Public Sector Management Commission (PSMC) 
implementation unit. In the next three months there were four main 
initiatives: 
the filling of ministerial staff positions; 
the initial review of the boards of statutory 
authorities; 
the review of progress in amalgamated departments; 
and 
the establishment of the PSMC. 
The PSMC implementation unit acted as a secretariat for MOG. The 
government was determined that positions on ministerial staff would not 
be used to reward unqualified party supporters. A ministerial staff 
review panel was established, chaired by the deputy premier, Tom 
Burns. All the positions of private secretary and press secretary were 
advertised nationally and a series of more than seventy interviews were 
held over two weeks. The consequence was twofold: some highly 
qualified people were appointed, often attracting former Queenslanders 
back to the state; and every choice had to be justified. At the same time 
alternative arrangements had to be made for the employment of the 
ministerial staff who had served former ministers. Those on contracts 
(some quite recently signed) left. Those who were permanent public 
servants were found positions in departments other than the one which 
their minister had headed and within a few weeks all were suitably 
placed. 
Second, over a period of three months, MOG reviewed the 
membership of all statutory boards. These bodies, particularly the 
boards of Suncorp, QIDC and the Queensland Events Corporation, had 
been filled with supporters and confidants of the National party. They 
were removed, with the first two boards mostly sacked in one hit. The 
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replacements were not known for their closeness to the Labor party 
(many had actually been office-holders under National governments in 
earlier years) but rather for their competence and likely ability to do the 
job. 
At the same time several apparent irregularities were discovered. The 
head of one statutory authority had signed his own generous contract; 
members of another authority's board had also paid themselves consult-
ing fees; the number of management and pubhc relations consultants 
was immense with consultancies worth $19 million completed since 1987 
and a further $10 million ongoing. Even if some use of consultants was 
justified, their long-term employment on a daily rate was not. Some cen-
tralised attempts to control them was instituted. 
MOG was also concerned to see that those departments which had 
been amalgamated were doing more than merely creating a federal 
structure. The combination of corporate services, the establishment of 
policy units, the rationalisation of the delivery of services, the 
introduction of common computer or personnel systems; these were all 
possible steps for the new departments to take. Some had greater 
problems than others; some were keener. All director-generals were 
required in February to meet, first with the implementation Unit to 
discuss their progress, then later, in the company of their minister with 
MOG to review their performance. Of course not all the benefits from 
such changes were likely to be seen for some time. The rationalisation 
of services in the regions cannot be completed in a matter of weeks. 
But the general directions were set. A few readjustments were made; 
thus CITEC, the government's computer advisory body, was moved from 
Manufacturing Industry to Administrative Services where it logically 
joined the other common services provided to government departments. 
Finally there was a need to establish the PSMC. The implementation 
unit coordinator, Dr Glyn Davis, convened a working party that included 
representatives from Premier's, the Office of Public Sector Personnel 
Management, Treasury, Industrial Relations and public sector unions, 
and met over a period of six weeks. Legislation to establish the 
commission was drawn up (it was the first legislation in Queensland's 
history to be gender-neutral in its wording: no small feat and one that 
required a directive to the parliamentary counsel from the premier) and 
an information booklet was printed. 
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The purposes of the PSMC were: 
(1) to run a structural review of departments and statutory 
agencies; 
(2) to establish a chief executive service (CES) and a 
senior executive service (SES); 
(3) to set standards for management and personnel 
practices and then to monitor their implementation; 
and 
(4) to act as a public service ombudsman for grievances 
and classifications to which end a commissioner of 
public service equity and a classifications review 
tribunal were created. 
The commission would be led by three full-time commissioners. After 
the reviews were completed, the commission would be scaled down in 
size to continue its monitoring and equity roles. 
Consultation with departments and unions was widespread. Several 
problems had to be solved: should the PSMC be responsible for all 
industrial relations in the public sector? Since by implication this might 
rapidly involve the premier in industrial disputes (as the minister 
responsible for the PSMC), it was decided not. The whole approach 
determined that the PSMC should not be a recreated Public Service 
Board. Its style was to be consultative and advisory; its determination 
was to allow ministers and director-generals to manage their 
departments. 
Negotiations with EARC ensured the functions of the two 
Commissions did not overlap. Essentially EARC was concerned with 
accountability and integrity, the PSMC with efficiency and economy. 
Although in one or two places the functions of the two appeared to 
overlap - such as the selection of chief executives - there was sufficient 
for both to do in areas of reform. 
The legislation was passed in March. With the establishment of the 
PSMC, and thus the implementation of the majority of the policy 
Making Government Work, the process of transition could be said to 
have been completed. Attention shifted to the performance of the 
government and its instrumentalities. 
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Assessment 
The transition to government provides several lessons. Not least is the 
need to avoid imposing post-hoc rationality on a process in which all 
participants were feeling their way carefully along an unexplored path. 
The most obvious lesson is that any incoming government needs to 
have planned for the transition in some detail. Governments must have 
a clear idea if they are to impose their wishes on a public sector that 
will have a preference for maintaining the status quo. In the Queensland 
case the planning initially was almost an academic exercise (in either 
sense of the term) because expectations of implementation were low; 
nevertheless it provided the stmcture and plans on which to work. It 
brings to mind Richard Grossman's quip: "The point of a manifesto is 
not to persuade the voters. The point of a manifesto is to give yourself 
an anchor when the civil service tries to go back on your word." The 
policy was probably read by few electors, but it provided a framework 
for which the government had a "mandate". When public servants 
raised questions, it was possible to respond that the policy was set. 
Comparative experience and knowledge was crucial. Understanding 
what had happened in the Commonwealth and in Tasmania offered clues 
that assisted overcoming obstacles in Queensland. Knowing what 
problems could be met meant knowing what to avoid. Queensland's 
problems may have been different but they were not unique. 
Speed was essential. The ability to make administrative changes 
before the shape of government was determined by the appointment of 
ministers gave the premier the capacity to put his stamp on the new 
government. Not all ministers-elect may have read the details of the 
machinery of government policy, but the premier's determination not to 
shift substantially from that publicly espoused policy meant that the 
proposals were not changed. 
It is also necessary to emphasise what the transition did not do. It 
was about administrative processes, about the way that the government 
was to be shaped and run. It had some symbolic impact, both in terms 
of the changing of names of departments and in the atmosphere it 
engendered. But the transition was not concerned with policy priorities 
or policy issues. They were to be the responsibility of ministers. 
The transition was thus concerned with the rapid but orderly taking 
over of power. Given the total lack of experience of those involved on 
all sides, what is perhaps the most surprising is that it occurred 
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comparatively smoothly. The changes proposed in opposition were 
considerable; they were achieved in government. 
Notes 
Christopher Pollitt, Manipulating the Machine : Changing the Pattern of Ministerial 
Departments, 1960-83 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp,159-60, 
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Public Administration, 54 (1987): 25-30, 
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PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONS OF REVIEW: 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION AND 
THE ELECTORAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
REVIEW COMMISSION 
John Wanna 
In Queensland parliamentary mechanisms of accountability and review have 
generally been eschewed by executive government. With no upper house, 
a distorted electoral system and a compliant bureaucracy, parliament 
became an encumbrance to Queensland governments. Executive 
government was more concerned with taking or avoiding decisions, rather 
than ceding decision-making to parliamentary bodies or having decisions 
scrutinised. 
This situation is not all that remarkable and a considerable literature 
already exists documenting the history of executive domination in 
Queensland. However, during 1989 and 1990 the political situation in 
Queensland changed markedly. As a result of extensive revelations of 
official cormption, the Queensland parliament established two standing 
pariiamentary commissions of review, one responsible for criminal justice 
and the other for electoral and administrative matters. Establishing these 
commissions was a traumatic political experience involving three 
governments and four different cabinets over the latter half of 1989. But 
creating these parliamentary commissions was not the end of the trauma. 
Living with these "permanent" commissions also proved stressful to the 
new Labor government. 
Furthermore, the Goss government introduced other complications into 
the picture. In early 1990 a third review commission was established, 
responsible for public sector management. This executive commission was 
less politically independent than the criminal justice or electoral and 
administrative commissions established following the exposure of official 
corruption. These three new commissions were seen by the Labor 
government as complementary, forming a "trilogy" of reform agents. 
However, the transition to government of the first Labor government in 
thirty-two years was marked by ambiguity and tension over the extent of 
executive power and the independence of the review commissions. 
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The Fitzgerald Inquiry 
Allegations of official corruption have often surfaced in Queensland. 
Sporadically these allegations have been accompanied by half-hearted 
media campaigns. In May 1987 a commission of inquiry was established 
to investigate specific allegations of police misconduct. These allegations 
stemmed from a more intense media interest in police cormption over the 
summer of 1986-1987 in which allegations from an ex-police 
"whistleblower" received much publicity. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
incumbent National party government announced that the commission of 
inquiry was to be headed by a politically independent Queen's Counsel, 
Tony Fitzgerald. This choice by the government had a major impact on 
the development of the inquiry and on the nature of the eventual 
recommendations. In particular, Fitzgerald extended his role beyond 
exposing official cormption to include a responsibility for devising a 
blueprint for reform of Queensland's political system. 
By 1987 the Queensland public had become rather cynical as to whether 
anything could be done to limit official cormption and reform the police. 
Previous commissions of inquiry relating to police misconduct were either 
frustrated as was the Gibbs inquiry in 1964 or were ignored by the 
government as were the Lucas and Sturgess inquiries.' Confidence was 
not enhanced after 1983 when the National party terminated its coalition 
agreement with the Liberals and formed a majority government by itself, 
and then again returned in their own right in 1986. By this time official 
corruption appeared, on the evidence given Fitzgerald, to involve the 
highest levels of the police along with some cabinet ministers. Queensland 
had not developed into a "crime state", but institutionaUsed corruption 
within the fabric of government was an accepted practice. 
On 3 July 1989, only months before a state election was due, the report 
of the inquiry was delivered to the then premier, Mike Ahern. In the report 
Fitzgerald presented his understanding of good government and ethical 
public administration, devoting about half of the 388 page volume to the 
police. The report was explicitly optimistic, reformist and prescriptive. In 
the final section of the report the specific recommendations were classified 
into three sections: electoral and administrative reform, criminal justice 
reform, and reform of the police force. In relation to the these 
recommendations two "permanent" bodies were recommended: the 
Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (EARC) and the 
Criminal Justice Commission (CJC). Both were to be established with a 
specific charter, with wide if somewhat indeterminate powers and on-going 
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responsibility for implementing and monitoring the reform process. 
Pariiament should establish two standing parliamentary select committees 
to oversee, and liaise with, these commissions. According to Fitzgerald, 
EARC was required to report directly to the parliamentary committee, but 
in relation to the CJC, even though its operations would be overseen by the 
pariiamentary committee, the question of whether it reported directly to 
pariiament or to the committee was left open.^ 
In the first few months after its release the Fitzgerald Report was 
revered by urban Queenslanders and those in public office as the manifesto 
for a new era of accountability. There was an enormously receptive mood 
for change. Repeatedly publication runs of the report were sold out as 
soon as they became available. After the previous premier, Joh 
Bjelke-Petersen, the former police commissioner, Terence Lewis, and the 
subsequent police minister (later premier), Russell Cooper, all admitted that 
they had not read the 1985 report by Des Sturgess on sexual offences 
involving children, there was great pressure on public officials to 
demonstrate that they had read the Fitzgerald Report and could cite its 
recommendations.^  Nonetheless, there were some exceptions. As premier 
Russell Cooper later admitted, he had not read every word of the Fitzgerald 
Report and like many others he had not taken the time to read the 
appendices. But after years of flagrant corruption Queenslanders were 
anxious to seize the opportunity to clean up the system. Those in 
government were obliged to demonstrate their commitment to the 
"Fitzgerald reforms" and for a time felt unable to challenge any of its 
recommendations. Although some criticisms of Fitzgerald's findings were 
later expressed,'' the report assumed the status of holy writ within an 
insular and traditionally illiberal Queensland society. 
Beginning the Reform Process: EARC and CJC under the Ahem 
Government (July-September 1989) 
The credibility of the Ahern government was tied to the Fitzgerald 
commission. Ahern had publicly supported the Fitzgerald Inquiry 
throughout its lengthy hearings and was prepared to implement some 
reform of management and accountability in the public service, the police, 
pariiamentary procedures and cabinet. Mid-way through the inquiry 
hearings Ahern stood down the police commissioner. Sir Terence Lewis, 
and appointed his deputy, Ron Redmond, as acting commissioner. Ahern 
committed himself publicly to implementing the recommendations "lock, 
stock and barrel", a commitment that was to be popularly adopted over the 
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following months receiving prominence at street demonstrations and on car 
bumper stickers. Fitzgerald's staff pressed on with their investigations after 
the public hearings were suspended in December 1988 while the 
commissioner wrote the report. One group allowed to continue by the 
Ahern government was the "Fitzgerald Implementation Unit" attached to 
the Premier's Department. This implementation unit, led by a consultant 
to the Fitzgerald commission, Peter Forster, was responsible for ensuring 
that the legislation was prepared to establish EARC and the CJC. Another 
group emerged as the "commission of inquiry" on criminal justice matters, 
which continued investigations into corruption and maintained surveillance 
of suspects within and outside the police (this "commission" later became 
the nucleus of the CJC in late 1989). 
In July-August 1989 the premier, Mike Ahern, seemed prepared to 
implement some of the recommendations of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, while 
attempting to buy time until after the forthcoming state election. 
Advertisements were placed in the press for the chairmen (sic) and 
members of EARC and the CJC. Because of the party political sensitivity 
of electoral reform, EARC received far more political attention and public 
discussion in the months immediately following the release of the report. 
In August the premier introduced to parliament a bill to establish EARC. 
At the same time Ahern, together with the party's state president, Sir 
Robert Sparkes, was politically manoeuvring to delay electoral reform by 
announcing a state referendum to be held on 14 October 1989. The 
referendum was intended to ask the electorate "to extend the term of the 
present Parliament of Queensland to allow the Electoral and Administrative 
Review Commission to review the electoral system and carry out a 
redistribution of electoral boundaries as determined by the Commission for 
a date no later than July 7, 1990".^ 
An extension of six months was suggested on the grounds that EARC 
would require such a period to investigate the electoral system, recommend 
any reforms and implement the changes. As a political ploy the 
referendum made some sense, not least because the issue placed the Labor 
opposition in a seemingly no-win situation: either they supported the 
referendum and extended the government on a faint hope of electoral 
justice, or they opposed the referendum and faced the voters within months 
on the old malapportioned zonal system. If the referendum failed, which 
was likely, this would have sustained the Nationals' case for the 
continuance of the zonal system and discouraged them from accepting 
subsequently a much mooted recommendation for "one vote-one value" 
from EARC. With a referendum pending, Ahern presented parliament with 
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two versions of an electoral commission; one was contained in a draft bill 
written by a legislative draftsman working with the Fitzgerald 
implementation unit (the Electoral and Administrative Review Bill 1989), 
the other a watered down version called the Electoral and Administrative 
Review Commission Bill. This latter bill provided no administrative 
review functions or effective powers for the commission, but sought to 
establish a body to conduct the immediate electoral review. 
These events were all happening in a period of great political instability. 
Ahern had adopted the referendum idea as much against his own party as 
against the opposition. Without a significant power base in the party 
Ahern was vulnerable to internal opposition. Both Ahern and Sparkes saw 
the referendum proposal as a means of shoring up support for Ahern's 
leadership and for the consolidation of the reform agenda within the 
National party. However, this elaborate strategy came to nought when 
Ahern's minister of police, Russell Cooper, launched his first challenge for 
the premiership on 29-30 August 1989. After narrowly surviving, Ahern 
quickly abandoned the referendum proposal, claiming that within his own 
side of politics the political situation was too volatile for this strategy to 
succeed. 
The EARC bill presented to parliament on 8 August 1989 by Ahern was 
still nominally based on the draft piece of legislation prepared by the 
Fitzgerald implementation team. Yet this second EARC bill differed 
substantially from the one proposed by the Fitzgerald commission staff in 
many respects. In presenting the bill the premier questioned the power 
EARC should possess over electoral matters, and indicated that the 
government was not prepared to allow EARC to have powers over cabinet 
or pariiament. In contrast, the draft legislation had insisted that the 
recommendations of EARC should be "implemented forthwith upon 
presentation of the report". Ahern's more limited bill was designed to 
allow the incumbent government to retain control, rather than having 
electoral boundaries determined solely by an independent commission. The 
functions of the commission under this bill were related purely to electoral 
matters (zones, boundaries, distributions, and rolls), and made no mention 
of administrative review of government and the public sector. This was 
despite the fact that the earlier advertisements for the chairmen and 
members had indicated that "the Commission will be responsible for 
conducting major reviews of the machinery of Government and other 
administrative matters".^ Although the advertisements had held out this 
impression, the Queensland parliament was presented with no such 
proposal. 
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The bill tabled in parliament was also lacking the substantial powers 
written into the draft bill. In the draft bill EARC was intended to have 
extensive powers to pursue its investigations which included: to require 
information, secure relevant documents, enter public premises, enforce 
compliance of the commission's requirements, limit privileges, enable the 
commission's proceedings not to be bound by the rules or practices of other 
courts, issue summonses, and allow reimbursement or protection against 
victimisation for those assisting the commission. The Ahern bill contained 
none of these powers and provided only for commission reports to be 
tabled in parliament, not necessarily to be implemented. 
Significantly both versions of the bill specified that the existing number 
of eighty-nine Legislative Assembly seats be retained even if the zonal 
system was removed. The main constraint in the Ahern bill over the 
Fitzgerald draft bill was that the commission would have as its immediate 
function the investigation of the Legislative Assembly electoral system by 
31 March 1990. 
Applications for the chairs of both EARC and the CJC had been called, 
and a selection process undertaken, but final announcements were delayed 
by both the National party's political manoeuvres and the process of 
gaining all-party agreement on the top candidates. In the end, the 
appointment of chairs to both commissions was postponed until after the 
December 1989 election. However, in mid-September Ahern announced 
that the former Liberal deputy premier of Tasmania, Max Bingham, was 
appointed to head the commission of inquiry on criminal justice matters 
while awaiting confirmation following the election. No appointment to the 
EARC chair was made although the Ahern government had narrowed the 
short-list down to two candidates (former Commonwealth deputy 
ombudsman in Queensland David Robson and former Commonwealth 
crown solicitor Tom Sherman) with media speculation naming Tom 
Sherman as the more likely appointment. 
But while Ahern was experimenting with provisional reforms, he was 
overtaken by political events within his own party. Antipathy to his reform 
scenario continued to grow in the National party during 1989, eventually 
providing a slim majority to the previously disgruntled rural members and 
remaining Bjelke-Petersen partisans. In the end Ahern's commitment to 
the inchoate reform process cost him the premiership. Fearful of electoral 
defeat, the Nationals deposed Ahern in a messy leadership challenge and 
replaced him with a premier committed to re-establishing continuity and 
extolling executive authority. 
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The Cooper Premiership: the Return to Rural-Conservative 
Leadership to Contain the Reform Process (September - December 
1989) 
During 1989 the National party government was paralysed by indecision. 
Cabinet was divided, unable to make decisions across a range of policy 
areas, and lacking in experience with its new consensual mode of 
operation. The party's internal factionalism proved destractive as 
personalities rather than substantive policies dominated party politics. 
Within the National party, support weakened for the Ahern reform process 
and many Nationals turned their attention to seeking a viable contender 
with party support in the bush. Russell Cooper, from one of the smaller 
rural electoral districts, became a leadership hopeful as a result of internal 
perceptions of his decisiveness in crisis situations and his image as a strong 
minister. 
It took two leadership challenges from Cooper before he was successful 
in ousting Ahern from the premiership. Cooper's support came mainly 
from the more disaffected and conservative among the parliamentary party, 
together with the organisational wing of the party. Two key personalities 
who gave Cooper support in September 1989 were the party's president, 
Robert Sparkes, and the deputy premier. Bill Gunn. Both favoured a more 
limited reform agenda and saw Cooper as a leader more likely to maintain 
mral electoral support. Cooper's success was a desperate sign of frustration 
among the power brokers in the party over the inability of the 
parliamentary leadership to act decisively on policy matters because of 
their preoccupation with the Fitzgerald reforms. On achieving the 
premiership Cooper announced that the priorities of his government were 
to "depoliticise the Fitzgerald report", and emphasise economic growth, 
business confidence and services to the electorate.^ 
Cooper had an election due within months of becoming leader and his 
two-and-a-half-month premiership was faced with an irresolvable 
dilemma: his party wanted to present him as a "new Joh" who would 
sabotage the reform process, yet he was electorally constrained to 
demonstrate his intentions in pursuing the Fitzgerald reforms. Initially, his 
response was to stymie the reform process and reduce expectations. 
Accordingly, he refused to guarantee that the EARC bill would be passed 
by parliament before the impending election. His first administrative 
moves indicated that he intended to contain, if not reverse, the reform 
agenda, and sought to distance his government from the Fitzgerald Inquiry. 
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Eager to appear decisive he resorted to a tactic he had used eariier 
when police minister. Immediately following his coup, the new premier 
announced that a special premier's committee would be established to 
"supervise" the reforms so that the government could turn its attention to 
other matters. The Premier's Independent Commission for Change and 
Reform (PICCAR) was established in late September under the leadership 
of Jim Kennedy, a businessman who had eariier been used by Cooper to 
conduct a review of the state's prison system. Public reaction to the 
appointment of Kennedy's commission to oversee the Fitzgerald 
recommendations was hostile, with claims that PICCAR was a "sell-out", 
a "sham", and a "farce of the highest order and worthy of a Yes Minister 
script".* 
Cooper's strategy of downplaying the Fitzgerald reforms met with 
resistance from some of the key figures already appointed to implement the 
reform agenda. Early in Cooper's premiership, suggestions in the media 
that reform was being stifled produced a degree of pessimism from 
Bingham and Forster, and both contemplated resigning if the new 
government intended to prevent reform. Only one week after the 
premiership coup, a significant meeting took place between Bingham, 
Forster and Kennedy from PICCAR. Cooper was also due to attend this 
meeting but was late in keeping the appointment. In his absence the other 
three discussed their predicament. They collectively agreed to remain in 
their positions if the government was prepared to implement the reforms 
but, if not, then collectively to resign and cause a major embarrassment to 
the government. When Cooper finally arrived he was faced with a fait 
accompli. 
Within days Cooper pledged to implement all the existing Fitzgerald 
legislation by the end of October. At a Melbourne football club gathering, 
Fitzgerald himself added to the pressure on Cooper by admitting to being 
disillusioned with the outcomes of his inquiry and dubbing himself a fool 
for having accepted the inquiry task. But given the new public 
commitment by the premier from October to the election campaign of 
mid-November 1989 the government continued steps to establish the new 
commissions and parliamentary committees, and attempted to finalise two 
senior appointments to the criminal justice body and to head the Police 
Force. In early October 1989, after wide advertisement and careful 
screening, a new police commissioner, Noel Newnham from the Victorian 
police, was appointed for a three-year term. 
Shortly after Cooper assumed the premiership, the Labor and Liberal 
parties announced that they were not prepared to endorse the appointment 
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of Bingham to the CJC. Fitzgerald had recommended that both 
commission heads should receive all-party endorsement. Goss and the 
Liberal leader, Angus Innes, both withheld endorsement because they felt 
that they had not been given the chance to interview all short-listed 
candidates, and because at that stage the legislation was not passed by 
parhament. In early November (when the legislation had been passed) 
Cboper wrote to both Goss and Innes seeking their agreement to the 
immediate appointment of Bingham to the CJC. Innes agreed, but Goss 
took the view that the appointment should only be made following the 
election because any appointment in the campaign would turn in to a party 
political issue. 
The process of appointing a chair to EARC, once the various proposals 
for the legislation were released, proved even more difficult than the 
appointment to the CJC. In late September the top contender for the 
position of chair publicly withdrew his application. Sherman's reasons for 
withdrawing, once Cooper became Premier, were that PICCAR was 
established with powers to overrule the Fitzgerald commissions, and that 
the government had unnecessarily delayed the appointment of the chair to 
EARC. Sherman was finally persuaded to re-apply only after he had been 
assured that the government was prepared to implement the reforms, that 
the EARC legislation would be based essentially on the original draft bill, 
and that the role of PICCAR was modified. Press reports at the time 
suggested that National party ministers were still likely to block his 
appointment to the position.' 
Under Cooper's premiership, the Electoral and Administrative Review 
Act 1989 received assent on 25 October 1989. The final version of this act 
differed only slightiy from the original draft bill proposed by the Fitzgerald 
team. The commission's powers were restored, as were the administrative 
functions of the commission. But the objects of the new commission were 
limited to "systems, principles and practices" rather than with particular 
instances of "alleged inefficiency, dishonesty or partiality". Unlike some 
other administrative law tribunals, EARC was not authorised to "require or 
direct the alteration of systems, principles or practices or the revocation, 
reversal or alteration of any decision". Significantly the provision 
contained in the earlier bills for eighty-nine seats in the Legislative 
Assembly was dropped from the final EAR Act, allowing EARC to 
recommend "the number of electoral districts into which the State and each 
zone (if any) should be divided". However, in contrast to the draft bill 
which provided an automatic implementation of the commission's 
recommendations, the EAR Act allowed parliament either to implement the 
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recommendations directiy or to vary them "to the extent resolved upon by 
the Assembly". 
Once established EARC developed six functional areas, four of which 
comprised of research teams and the other two of administrative/operational 
units. During the first half of 1990, the state electoral and local 
government teams were particularly active working on tight schedules to 
produce reports. The public administration team and administrative law 
teams began work on a series of projects as well as holding public 
seminars. The first report of EARC was produced on the pecuniary 
interests of parliamentarians and their spouses. Moreover, the 
commissioners began a gmelling schedule of public hearings in relation to 
electoral systems. By May 1990 EARC had produced a series of issues 
papers on topics such as electoral reviews of the Legislative Assembly and 
local authorities, freedom of information, judicial review, the public 
assembly law, and of a joint electoral roll with the Commonwealth. In 
addition to the five commissioners EARC had a total of 32 staff by June 
1990. 
The Criminal Justice Act 1989 establishing the CJC and the 
parliamentary committee gained assent on 31 October 1989. The CJ Act 
had received far less public attention than the proposed legislation for 
EARC, first because it was of less immediate concern to the formal 
political system, and second because the CJC legislation was not tabled in 
parliament as early as the EARC bill. The proposed criminal justice 
legislation was only tabled on 5 October with but one week allowed for 
comment from interested organisations. Accordingly, the CJ Act did not 
receive the same response through submissions as did the EARC bill. This 
point is significant because many of the implications of the CJ Act were 
only later realised when the CJC was established. However, over fifty 
modifications to the legislation occurred in mid-October at a party meeting 
of government MLAs. Some of the main modifications concerned the 
reporting procedures to be followed by the CJC in relation to investigations 
into the operations of the courts and the judiciary. The legislation was 
amended so that the CJC could not itself move for the removal of members 
of the judiciary, including Supreme Court judges. 
In its final form the CJ Act provided for five divisions: Official 
Misconduct, Misconduct Tribunals, Witness Protection, Research and 
Co-ordination, and Intelligence Divisions. The CJC had the power to 
establish other divisions or organisational units, and subsequentiy did so to 
form a sixth division of administration and corporate services. The general 
responsibilities of the CJC were to acquire resources sufficient for the 
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efficient administration of criminal justice, to monitor and report on the 
effectiveness of the existing administration of criminal justice, to oversee 
criminal intelligence matters, to research into and propose reforms to 
criminal law and the enforcement of criminal justice, and to discharge 
functions not appropriate to the police force. The CJC was also given 
specific responsibilities in relation to the police. The commission was to 
monitor the performance of the police force, provide the police 
commissioner with policy directives (over policing priorities, education and 
training, methods of police operation, and the use of enforcement 
resources), oversee police reform, and report to the Legislative Assembly 
on the implementation of the recommendations of the Fitzgerald Inquiry. 
In the legislation the CJC was to report (with some exceptions) to the 
chairman of the parliamentary committee, the speaker of the Legislative 
Assembly, the minister (the premier) and, if the commission chose, to the 
principal officer of any unit of administration concerned with the subject 
matter of the report. On court procedures and the behaviour of the 
judiciary, the CJC was to report to the relevant head of the court concerned 
(eg. chief justice for the Supreme Court, chairman of the district courts for 
District Court matters). The CJC could also choose not to report on court 
matters where confidentiality needed to be strictly maintained. A report on 
a judge of the Supreme Court was not sufficient for a judge's removal from 
the bench, but such a report could trigger a special tribunal of judges from 
state or commonwealth superior courts established by the Legislative 
Assembly. This constituted an important weakening of the CJC, but of 
more long-term significance were the ambiguous relationships between the 
CJC and the police, and the CJC and the Parliamentary Criminal Justice 
Committee. 
As the election campaign commenced two significant issues surfaced 
affecting the Fitzgerald implementation unit, the state special prosecutor, 
the new police commissioner, and the CJC. The first issue, which rocked 
the National party ministry, concerned the investigations of the special 
prosecutor, Doug Drummond QC, into ministerial abuses of their expense 
accounts. Developing from Fitzgerald's own investigations, the special 
prosecutor had prepared cases against a number of ministers for 
misappropriation of expenses. There had been speculation for months 
about which ministers were implicated and the issue had arisen as one of 
the concerns in the change of leadership from Ahern to Cooper (in that 
many MLAs hoped that Cooper would propose legislation to validate all 
ministerial expenses retrospectively). Subsequently five ministers (Don 
Lane, Brian Austin, Ivan Gibbs, Geoffrey Muntz and Leisha Harvey) were 
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charged although Drummond waited until three days after the election to 
issue the summonses. 
The second issue concerned a decision taken by police minister, Vince 
Lester, and the police commissioner, Noel Newnham, not to abolish the 
Special Branch but to redirect its emphasis. This was contrary to 
Fitzgerald's recommendations. Lester and Newnham chose to depoliticise 
the activities of Special Branch and as part of this process the police 
commissioner decided to destroy almost 12,000 files some of which were 
on people with a political profile or who had publicly criticised the 
National party government. The CJC supervised the shredding process but 
received public criticism from many on whom files had been kept for not 
preserving the files for their inspection. Bingham played a conciliatory 
role throughout this period, implying that the Special Branch might 
continue, that files should properly be destroyed and that those remaining 
needed to be audited annually. Although something of a distraction in the 
election campaign, the files controversy began a process of testing how the 
CJC would react to specific policy matters that challenged Fitzgerald 
recommendations. 
The Goss Premiership: Further Consolidation of the Reform Agenda 
Amid Signs of Executive Frustration (December 1989-1990) 
Labor won a historic electoral victory on 2 December 1989 with 50.3 per 
cent of the vote. Once government had been won a series of decisions 
relating to the commissions had to be made, in particular the chairs and 
membership complement of both commissions required finalisation. On 21 
December 1989, the Goss government announced the confirmation of 
Bingham as chair of the CJC after serving for three months as chairman of 
a temporary commission of inquiry. This was a decision that some in the 
new Labor government were later to regret. After consultation with the 
other party leaders, the other four commissioners were appointed. The four 
ordinary commissioners were: James Barbeler (barrister), Dr Janet Irwin 
(M.D. and civil liberties activist), John Kelly (ex-department head) and 
Professor John Western (academic). Tom Sherman, was appointed 
chairman of EARC in December 1989 - and the remaining EARC 
commissioners were announced in the new year: Marie Watson Blake 
(Jetset Tours and Australian Tourist Commission), Virginia Hall (social 
worker and academic). Professor Colin Hughes (ex-Australian Electoral 
Commission and academic) and Brian Hunter (accountant and local 
government). 
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Also announced immediately following the election were the chairs of 
the two parliamentary committees. The previous state secretary of the 
Labor party, Peter Beattie, was appointed to head the Parliamentary 
Criminal Justice Committee (PCJC), a committee which according to 
Beattie had "one of the toughest jobs given to any parliamentary committee 
in Queensland's history".'" Civil liberties barrister Matt Foley was 
appointed to head the other Fitzgerald parliamentary body, the 
Pariiamentary Committee for Electoral and Administrative Review 
(PCEAR). When parliament resumed in March 1990 the remaining 
complement of both committees was finalised. The parliamentary members 
of the PCJC committee included: Mike Ahern (deputy chairman-National), 
Wendy Edmond (ALP), Bill Gunn (National), Santo Santoro (Liberal), 
Robert Schwarten (ALP) and Margaret Woodgate (ALP). After Ahern 
resigned from parliament in 1990 Bill Gunn became the deputy chair and 
Neville Harper the other National party representative. The PCEAR 
members were: Denver Beanland (Liberal), Dr Lesley Clark (ALP), Tony 
FitzGerald (National - no relation to Tony Fitzgerald QC), Molly Robson 
(ALP), Mark Stoneman (deputy chairman - National) and Rod Welford 
(ALP). 
During the first months of the Goss government the role of the 
chairmen of the parliamentary committees became politically pronounced. 
Both chairmen were newly elected members of parliament with no 
experience of parliamentary committees. The Labor party also placed 
pressure on both chairmen to modify the politically sensitive 
recommendations of the commissions. The party was concerned that the 
two chairmen take an active role in overseeing the activities and reports of 
the Fitzgerald commissions. Rumours circulated that Matt Foley had 
allegedly been told by senior party figures that his future depended on him 
keeping control of the process occurring between EARC, PCEAR and 
parliament, so that the eventual outcomes corresponded broadly with Labor 
Party policy. Peter Beattie similarly confirmed that he knew "that in Labor 
Party circles, my pursuing the Fitzgerald agenda hasn't done my position 
a great deal of good ... And it has been made clear to me by certain friends 
and colleagues that my ministerial hopes may well have evaporated in the 
immediate future".'' 
Those serving on the parliamentary committees also felt in a somewhat 
unenviable position. For them much was at stake, not only their own 
political careers but also the future of their parties. A number were new 
members of parliament inexperienced at committee work. On the 
government's side some were from marginal electorates, constraining their 
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capacity to take an independent stance on policy proposals likely to have 
electoral sensitivity (such as the decriminalisation of prostitution or 
homosexuality). Other members of the committees were prepared to 
consider selected aspects of the committees' work, and at the PCJC public 
hearings at which the issue of homosexual law reform was discussed some 
National members were reluctant to discuss the issue and at least one 
threatened to refuse to attend. 
In practice, then, the establishment of these significant institutional 
bodies as permanent "checks and balances" on executive power and 
administrative practice was not without controversy. One of the first issues 
to arise in February 1990 concerned the permanency of EARC. Modifying 
Fitzgerald's recommendation on the commission, the Labor premier queried 
whether the new commission in its present form would be retained in the 
future. Despite earlier maintaining that EARC would be permanent, Goss 
indicated in February 1990 that EARC would not necessarily become a 
permanent organisation, but that this would "largely depend on EARC". 
It was possible for instance for a narrower electoral commission to be 
established and for the administrative review functions of EARC to be 
given to a specialised body (as in an administrative review tribunal/council) 
or to a consolidated body responsible for public sector management. Both 
the chair of EARC and the chair of the PCEAR responded to the premier's 
comment by noting that it was too early to decide whether EARC should 
be a permanent body, but that such a decision should be taken in three 
years time by PCEAR when it was required by statute to review the 
Commission. Tom Sherman later publicly commented that as far as he was 
concerned the main tasks for which EARC was responsible could be 
despatched within three years, and that he was unlikely to remain in the 
position for longer than that. 
A second controversy arose over whether or not the government would 
necessarily accept without modification the recommendations from EARC 
in relation to the electoral system. Such recommendations would become 
contentious to the extent that they differed from Labor party policy or the 
wishes of the government. For instance, during the first half of 1990 there 
was much speculation that EARC could recommend a new zonal system, 
non-equal votes, non-compulsory voting, proportional representation, wide 
electoral tolerances or multi-member electorates. In the election campaign 
premier Goss made a commitment that his government would implement 
the decisions of the commission. But it was always problematic that while 
the parliamentary committee was formerly the body to report to parliament, 
the eventual recommendations presented to the Legislative Assembly could 
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be modified. Moreover, according to the EAR Act, the Legislative 
Assembly retained the power to vary the recommendations "in such 
particulars as the Assembly considers appropriate". 
The CJC also did not avoid conflict with the government. The Special 
Branch, in line with Labor policy, was abolished and replaced with a 
Ounter Terrorist Team (consisting of ten officers none of whom were 
from Special Branch). But, upon taking office Labor party sources claimed 
that the government intended to replace Bingham as head of the CJC with 
Tom Sherman.'^ When this report broke, the premier quickly moved to 
confirm that Bingham would be appointed, provided the other party leaders 
agreed. But as this confusion settled, the new police minister warned that 
Bingham would have to "fit in" with government policy and that as 
chairman of the CJC he had been given a brief as to what the minister 
wanted from him.'^ One of the first public reports issued by the CJC 
in June 1990 led the commission into conflict with the Goss cabinet. The 
report was largely written by the ex-Courier -Mail journaHst, Phil Dickie, 
who was attached to the Research and Co-ordination Division of the CJC. 
This report urged that poker machines only be allowed into Queensland 
under highly stringent regulations and only with the government acting as 
the purchasing agent. The CJC report suggested that Queensland could not 
introduce poker machines without risking further infiltration of organised 
crime. Indeed, the report argued that the gaming machine industry had 
"long established and well documented links" with organised criminal 
interests, and that given the high turnovers of cash the industry could be 
"expected to contribute to an increase in general criminal activity". This 
finding was uncomfortable for the government as it had given 
commitments to introduce the machines before the election. There was 
also some evidence that one of the new ministers had previously accepted 
campaign funds from the poker machine lobby whilst party leader. The 
CJC's report was sent to Peter Beattie as chair of the PCJC. As the chair 
of the committee and as a government member, Beattie was placed in an 
awkward position. Although a copy of the report was apparently sent to 
the speaker, Beattie chose to release the report to the media (rather than 
going through or waiting for parliament), while at the same time members 
of his party were casting doubt on the findings. 
Further strained relations emerged between the Labor government and 
the CJC over its powers in relation the general administrative agencies of 
the state. As part of a commitment to public sector reform, the Goss 
government established the Public Sector Management Commission 
(PSMC) in April 1990. The PSMC emerged not from the 
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recommendations of Fitzgerald but from the premier and his policy 
advisers. The premier saw the PSMC as "in line with the spirit of 
Fitzgerald" serving to "complete the trilogy of reform in Queensland". 
However, the two Fitzgerald commissions overlapped some of the potential 
responsibilities of the third reform commission, the PSMC. In the 
negotiations leading up to the passing of the PSMC bill in parliament, the 
CJC attempted to assert its responsibility for corruption and disciplinary 
matters across the entire spectrum of units of public administration. Some 
confusion crept in here because Fitzgerald had not envisaged the 
establishment of a commission specifically charged with public sector 
management. The PSMC advisers took the view that non-criminal matters 
relating to the general administrative units of public administration were 
more appropriately their responsibility. The conflict was never about the 
responsibility for criminal matters, but about standard disciplinary matters 
within the public sector. This conflict was only resolved with the 
intervention of the premier as the PSMC bill was before parliament. 
Moreover, the establishment of the PSMC clouded a number of issues 
in relation to EARC. Principal among these was the question of how far 
the responsibilities of EARC as an administrative review body extended vis 
a vis the new executive commission for public sector management. This 
point became particularly germane given that the PSMC in its first months 
of operation essentially pursued "review" functions. In Fitzgerald's 
recommendations EARC would have been responsible for the formulation 
of codes of conduct for public officials, for guidelines in respect of 
ministers involvement with public sector appointments, promotions, 
transfers and discipline, for the establishment of guidelines to govern the 
appointment of all chief executive positions in public administration, for 
the review of advertising of vacancies, and of the appointment and appeals 
against appointment of people to positions in the public service. The EAR 
Act also charged the commission with the responsibility to report on public 
sector matters with a view to achieving and maintaining "honesty, 
impartiality and efficiency" in the public administration of the state. The 
Act, moreover, required EARC to investigate the "whole or part of the 
public administration of the state" including the "distribution of the 
functions of units of public administration". Yet in September 1989 Goss 
as leader of the opposition had suggested that EARC would only be a 
monitoring agency whereas the PSMC would be concerned with the 
management of public sector bodies.''' This statement would appear to 
undermine the independence of EARC as a parliamentary commission 
fulfilling the requirements of its act. The chairman of EARC has attempted 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Parliamentary Commissions 223 
to resolve this problem of overlap by drawing a distinction between 
"review" and "reform" claiming that EARC's role was solely one of review 
and not reform." This did not address the reform intention of the 
Fitzgerald report written into the Act, nor did it adequately explain why the 
PSMC rather than EARC performed the "review" of the functions of units 
of public administration. 
Conclusions 
Queensland politics after the election of the Goss government were treated 
to the novelty of a government and its administration ostensibly committed 
to taking government propriety seriously. By a combination of bizarre 
circumstances the Fitzgerald reform process had emerged relatively intact 
from the end of the National party era. Partly this was due to the 
persistence a group of insiders committed to reform, and partly to the 
sustained pressure from sections of the public. Mis-management by the 
successive governments combined with the instability in the National party 
was also a major factor. But, significantly too, the reform push was 
maintained by a good deal of luck. 
The main responsibihty for implementing the Fitzgerald 
recommendations will be seen to have rested with the Goss government 
which in their transition to government indicated that they were prepared 
to take the steps required to meet many, if not most, of Fitzgerald's specific 
recommendations. So long as Labor enjoyed a long post-electoral 
honeymoon, and could hold the Nationals unambiguously responsible for 
the state of affairs in Queensland, their commitment to the reform process 
was untested. But even in the eariy months of 1990 it became clear that 
Labor's patience with the independent commissions was very thin indeed. 
The capacity of these commissions to impinge on executive power marked 
them out for a troubled existence in post-Fitzgerald Queensland politics. 
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REFORMING THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
Denise K Conroy and Douglas Blackmur 
Introduction 
Changes to be made to the public service were formulated in the Fitzgerald 
Report and in two Labor party policy documents. Sections 3.4 to 3.6 of 
the Fitzgerald Report concerned protection of individuals from the abuse 
of governmental powers and the reforms needed for the creation of a 
professional public service. Making Government Work and Return to 
Westminster, two documents produced by the Labor party in August 1989, 
outiined the changes that would be made to the machinery of government 
and to the public service by a Goss government. Their content reflected 
many of the issues previously raised in the Fitzgerald Report. 
The principles articulated in Making Government Work were the 
reassertion of proper cabinet control over the development of policy, an 
end to fragmentation of departmental/statutory authority organisational 
form, minimising the number of departments, and the introduction of 
performance review. The focus in these prescriptions was on planning and 
a reform of stmctures and processes to enhance the goals of efficiency, 
effectiveness and professionalism. A discussion of the machinery of 
government changes is included in Chapter 12 and they will not be 
examined here, but the alterations to the functions of departments and the 
amalgamations actually made are set out at the end of this Chapter. This 
first attempt at restmcturing is to be followed by the current review of the 
purpose, structure, functions and management of all Queensland public 
sector agencies by the Public Sector Management Commission (PSMC). 
The strategy for public service reform outlined in Return to Westminster 
reflected Labor's intention to "reunify the public service under Westminster 
principles, with an end to widespread employment contracts, 
corporatisation, privatisation, unnecessary consultancies and redundancies". 
The document also details the important role of both public sector unions, 
the case for government/business interchange, and the responsibility of the 
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PSMC in areas such as appeals, classifications, industrial relations and 
equal opportunity. 
Underpinning the planned reforms of the Queensland public service 
would be a rationalisation of the departmental structure to provide for 
coherent and effective administration, an independent and impartial public 
service, and a single, unified public service with a recognised career 
structure and opportunities for mobility across departments. To give effect 
to these principles, the Labor party made a commitment to rationalise the 
machinery of government, to implement the full range of Fitzgerald 
recommendations concerning accountability measures such as freedom of 
information legislation, and to introduce the necessary stmctures to ensure 
good management practices, security of employment, and guarantees of 
impartiality for the public service. Discussion in this chapter will be 
limited to public service changes underway at the time of the election and 
to those in the process of implementation by 30 June 1990. 
Structural Efficiency Principle 
There were, however, already forces at work in the public sector that had 
to be considered as well as the incoming government's policy 
commitments. During 1986 and 1987, in the context of mounting concern 
at the state of the Australian balance of payments, the then federal 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission indicated that it was developing 
a productivity-based wages system, the major elements of which were 
defined in the August 1988 national wage case decision. They included a 
structural efficiency principle (SEP) which provided that : "Increases in 
wages and salaries or improvements in conditions ... shall be justified if the 
union(s) party to an award formally agree(s) to co-operate positively in a 
fundamental review of that award with a view to implementing measures 
to improve the efficiency of industry and provide workers with access to 
more varied, fulfilling and better paid jobs."' This principle was 
subsequently adopted by the Queensland Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission (QICAC).^ 
Planning by both government and unions for the implementation of the 
SEP in the Queensland public sector began in October 1988 and continued 
throughout 1989. On the government side, the then office of Public 
Service Personnel Management prepared proposals for a revamped salary 
administration scheme, while certain public sector unions concentrated on 
the development of a uniform national strategy for award restructuring in 
the state public sectors. During October 1989 the unions decided the 
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general features of their preferred public sector award restructuring model, 
and agreement was reached between the government, the Trades and 
Labour Council (TLC) and the relevant unions over the broad principles 
which would govern award restructuring in the Queensland public sector.^ 
Negotiations over the details of changes to the salary administration 
scheme were simultaneously taking place. 
The QICAC reaffirmed its commitment to the SEP in the state wage 
case of 1989, and gave an undertaking that two wage adjustments of 3 per 
cent could be made to its awards if unions and employers continued to 
implement the SEP satisfactorily.'' This decision established a clear 
direction for future progress in award restructuring as QICAC required that 
parties to its awards consider "... establishing skill-related career paths 
which provide an incentive for workers to continue to participate in skill 
formation"; enhancing multi-skilling; creating appropriate relativities; 
adjusting working patterns in the interests of industry efficiency; ensuring 
that awards contained properly fixed minimum rates; and removing any 
discriminatory provisions from all awards and industrial agreements. 
Against this background, the TLC applied to QICAC in late November 
1989 for the first 3 per cent increase in respect of the Public Service 
Award-State (and related awards). The case was being heard when the 
ALP was elected to government on 2 December and the application was 
granted with effect from 27 November 1989. Under the wage-fixing 
principles, this meant that, if approved by the QICAC, the earliest date 
from which the second 3 per cent increase could be paid would be 27 May 
1990. This date set the limits of the planning horizon for most of the 
union and government officials who were involved in the public sector 
award restructuring exercise. 
QICAC's general expectations regarding the outcome of this process 
were contained in its November variations to the Public Service Award-
State. These variations, moreover, indicated clearly that, in order for the 
second 3 per cent wage increase to be sanctioned, the commission required 
an extensive study of all classifications in the award, that on this basis 
genuine efforts would be made to finalise a new classification structure and 
associated definitions, and that job functions in this structure would be 
described in relatively broad and generic terms.' 
In February 1990 the TLC and the Department of Employment, 
Vocational Education, Training and Industrial Relations (DEVETIR), the 
amalgamated department now responsible under the Statement of Intent for 
co-ordinating the public sector award restructuring process, reached 
agreement on a strategy for implementing the SEP.*" This strategy was 
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largely concerned with defining a committee structure through which 
implementation was to be managed. Matters of concern at departmental 
level, for example, were to be processed through a joint consultative 
committee (JCC) in each department on which both unions and 
management were represented. The deliberations of the JCCs were to be 
guided by shop floor initiatives generated from within a series of working 
parties. Emphasis in all of these organisational proposals was on joint 
union-management participation and on a consensual style of decision-
making. 
The Labor government endorsed the thrust of these arrangements, and 
the principles enunciated in the Statement of Intent, in early March 1990. 
It maintained, further, that "the structural efficiency exercise meshes very 
well indeed with the Government's public service reform policy".' Despite 
this rhetoric however, what was arguably the most critical phase in the 
process of public sector award restructuring stalled at this point. The delay 
occurred at the very time the government and the unions had to make 
substantial progress on the development and fine-tuning of a 
comprehensive restructuring model if QICAC's requirements for success in 
the second 3 per cent case were to have any chance of being met within 
a reasonable period. The industrial relations reality was that the longer this 
case was postponed, the less likely was it that retrospectivity to 27 May 
would be granted. In a climate of real wage restraint, union officials were 
not particularly happy with this prospect and they were also concerned lest 
any difficulties in obtaining the second 3 per cent seriously damage rank 
and file commitment to award restmcturing in future. 
One of the reasons for the delay was that the government's principal 
vehicle of public sector reform, the PSMC, did not commence its activities 
until April. Even then, given its legislative brief, implementation of the 
SEP was not the only item on the PSMC's agenda. The commissioners, 
moreover, were not well versed in matters of public sector industrial 
relations and it is possible that they did not place the same priority on 
award restructuring as did the TLC, the public sector unions, QICAC and 
DEVETIR. Under these circumstances, preliminary discussions over the 
detail of the public sector award restructuring model did not begin until 
very late in April. 
The negotiations were conducted within a remuneration system task 
force comprised of representatives of DEVETIR, PSMC and the major 
public sector unions. Although there were some differences in approach, 
the unions for all intents and purposes pursued a common agenda, their 
principal objective being to persuade the government to accept that 
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classifications in public sector awards ought to be defined in terms of 
skills' profiles (which specified the broad knowledge and capabilities 
required in each classification) as opposed to task or duty statements.^ In 
this way the unions hoped to mount an effective challenge to Taylorist 
principles of work organisation. Their preferred award restructuring model 
contained four skill streams: administrative/clerical, operational services, 
professional and technical; these streams were divided into levels which 
reflected the extent of broad-banding and multi-skilling which was 
considered appropriate to each. Other elements of the model included a 
pattern of relativities between the levels and streams and a series of broad 
skills' profiles. 
The PSMC, however, was reluctant to commit itself fully to a skills-
based approach to award restructuring. It seemed particularly concerned 
that acceptance of a principle that skills acquisition necessarily meant 
improved remuneration could have quite profound budgetary implications. 
U also appeared to underestimate the extent of the work the industrial 
commission expected of the parties to the Public Service Award-State 
before the second 3 per cent would be granted. After almost a month of 
sometimes quite acrimonious discussion with the unions,' the PSMC 
submitted a restmcturing document for cabinet ratification which was by 
and large a statement of broad principles and matters to be further 
negotiated. Although elements of the four stream model were included, 
there was disappointment in union ranks at the contents of the submission. 
When compared with the understandings they had reached with government 
officials in November 1989, there was littie in it which qualified as 
substantial progress in terms of the industrial commission's expectations. 
In its defence, it could be argued that the PSMC was poorly advised on 
this matter, but by the same token QICAC had defined its future 
restructuring requirements perfectly clearly when it awarded the first 3 per 
cent. The PSMC was also devoting considerable effort to the preparation 
of a green paper on the establishment of a Senior Executive Service (SES) 
in the public sector. The salary level at which the SES would commence 
had major implications for the dimensions of the professional and the 
administrative/clerical streams in any restructured public sector awards, but 
the PSMC was unwilling to nominate a figure during the May negotiations 
with the unions, especially in view of the possibility that this could have 
been revised in the light of public comment on the green paper. 
Some sections of union opinion were confident that obtaining the 
second 3 per cent would be a formality based on their reading of 
contemporary political/industrial circumstances. Although a minority view. 
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this attitude meant that not all senior union officials worked with the same 
urgency towards developing a new classification structure for public sector 
awards. The majority feeling, on the other hand, was one of pessimism 
and considerable frustration at what was seen to be a stalemate and this 
was accentuated by rank and file pressure. Between March and May, a 
SEP awareness program had been conducted throughout the public sector 
and JCCs had been established in all departments. Expectations were 
thereby raised, particularly by the awareness program which stressed the 
potential for union-management co-operation and grass-roots involvement 
in the whole process, so that some saw the award restructuring exercise as 
a unique opportunity to apply principles of industrial democracy in the 
Queensland public service. 
On 25 May the TLC sought a hearing date for the second 3 per cent 
wage claim in respect of the Public Service Award-State. Despite 
widespread agreement that in the circumstances any case would be flimsy 
at best, it was decided to proceed in order to test the reaction of QICAC 
to what had been negotiated with the PSMC and DEVETIR, and to secure 
27 May as the operative date for the second 3 per cent pay rise if and 
when it was awarded. Experienced union officials could, however, read the 
signs. In a series of restructuring hearings in the education industry 
QICAC was reaffirming that access to the second 3 per cent required award 
variations of substance. Descriptions of awareness programs, negotiation 
structures and processes, agreements on very broad principles, and 
undertakings to continue discussions - "wish and promise stuff" - would 
not be enough. 
This was confirmed by QICAC during a preliminary hearing on 6 June 
when it indicated that the second 3 per cent case ought to be based on 
evidence of substantial progress towards the development and testing of a 
new classification structure and of significant variations to specific awards. 
Tangible movement beyond the Statement Of Intent was required. The 
commission also expressed some concern that the unions, DEVETIR and 
PSMC were unable to resolve their differences over the question of 
whether public sector award restructuring would be task- or skills-based. 
Any lingering expectations that ratification of the claim, set down for 
hearing on 21 June, was a foregone conclusion should have been quickly 
dispelled by these observations from the bench. 
In the week preceding the preliminary hearing, DEVETIR had 
commenced the preparation of a new Structural Efficiency Implementation 
Agreement which would be, in effect, a consolidation of the matters agreed 
between the unions, DEVETIR and PSMC in the previous month's 
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negotiations. It revealed, however, an extensive lack of agreement on a 
wide variety of key issues such as the width of levels in the occupational 
streams, the method of assigning existing positions to these streams, and 
the principles of movement within and between the streams.'" Despite 
these (and other) obvious deficiencies, it was accepted that this document 
would underpin government and union submissions to the 21 June hearing 
in QICAC. There was, however, little confidence in union circles that it 
could bear the weight of the commission's expectations. 
This assessment proved to be accurate for the industrial commission did 
littie to conceal its disappointment at the nature of the case. The parties 
were chastised for failing to present agreed award variations and for failing 
to resolve their differences over the tasks versus skills issue: "How are you 
going to restmcture this award in relation to salaries and wages?... If you 
cannot... reach agreement in relation to that particular matter, how on earth 
can you ask me to accept all of the things that you have put to me as 
promises for the future?" An obviously less than pleased commissioner 
adjourned the case and advised the unions and government representatives 
"... to consider whether they should amend the application ... in a fashion 
that indicated restructuring is on"." 
Extensive discussions between DEVETIR, PSMC and union 
representatives then took place and by 26 June agreement had apparently 
been reached on a SEP implementation strategy based on the development 
of skills-related career paths.'^ The TLC was confident that this 
breakthrough would facilitate significant progress in negotiating Public 
Service Award-State classifications together with classifications in the 
increasingly sensitive areas of police and nursing but this optimism 
evaporated quickly. The PSMC refused to endorse the implementation 
document and proposed instead principles which emphasised "... the 
tasks/duties to be performed at the various classification levels".'^ 
Needless to say, the unions were furious at what they regarded as an 
"arbitrary retirement from an agreed position".'" 
In this climate, it was not surprising QICAC refused to grant the second 
3 per cent pay rise in a resumed hearing on 5 July. At a further hearing 
on 12 July, the government advocate continued to oppose the principle that 
salary progression within (and between) the proposed streams be governed 
purely on the basis of skills acquisition. Once again, QICAC declined to 
award the second 3 per cent and now moved to take greater control of the 
proceedings by convening a series of meetings to address the issues in 
dispute. 
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A compromise of sorts was fashioned during these discussions. There 
IS anecdotal evidence to the effect that growing union anger at the chaotic 
state of much of the public sector award restructuring process was 
attracting concern at the highest political level and that this was made 
known to the senior officials who were negotiating on behalf of the 
government. It also appears that union negotiators were prepared to 
concede some ground by modifying their previous insistence on the 
implementation of a pure skills-based restructuring model. Eventually 
agreement was reached to vary the Public Service Award-State by 
including: a detailed statement of the basic issues over which further 
discussions would occur; a timetable; transitional arrangements; a 
commitment to review the effectiveness of public sector education and 
training policies; comprehensive definitions of the features of the four 
classification streams; procedures for implementing new awards; and a set 
of principles which would govern the design of public sector career 
paths.'' Perhaps not surprisingly these principles made reference to both 
duties and skills. On this basis, the industrial commission granted the 
second 3 per cent pay rise in respect of the public service awards on 17 
July with the operative date set at 21 June 1990. At the time of writing 
(August 1990), however, major differences still exist over matters such as 
the nature and extent of the first level in the administrative/clerical stream, 
and over the principles of progression through the streams. In the short 
term, something approximating a tmce was declared as the government and 
the unions took stock of their experiences between the first and second 3 
per cent wage adjustments and considered the somewhat uncertain future 
of award restructuring in the public service. 
Departmental Reviews 
The goal of the government to "implement reforms to ensure a return to 
professional and independent public administration in Queensland" was 
assigned to the PSMC, a body charged with reviewing the purpose, 
structure, functions and management of all Queensland public sector 
organisations, establishing and administering management and personnel 
standards and systems, and administering and protecting merit and equity 
principles. As already mentioned, the machinery of government review has 
been completed and departments turned to finalising their organisational 
charts. The next step would be the structures review process to be 
conducted by the PSMC which would analyse the purpose, structure, 
functions and management of each department. The first departments to 
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be assessed were Treasury, the Department of the Premier, Economic and 
Trade Development, and the Department of Manufacturing and 
Commerce.'* 
The PSMC began by setting some general principles for departmental 
reviews: they would not exceed three months and the initial round of 
reviews would concentrate on ministerial departments and would be 
completed in two years. The focus would be on improvements in public 
administration and the process involves co-operation with each department 
in drawing up specific terms of reference, reaching agreement on 
recommendations, and having due regard to assessing client needs and 
views. The PSMC has stated that no specific agency review will be 
conducted in isolation from the overall review process and that it may 
undertake such functional reviews across agencies as are necessary (e.g. 
cash management, asset management, use of consultants, and preparation 
of annual reports). Full consultation with agency staff, trade unions, 
relevant professional and representative bodies and other stakeholders was 
guaranteed by the PSMC.'' 
The scope of these reviews is to be related to the effectiveness of an 
agency and its programs and to the efficiency of its operations. 
Assessment would be made of an agency's mission statement, goals and 
objectives, and whether there is any overlap or duplication of its functions 
(and whether it should shed or acquire functions); judgements would be 
made on operational efficiency, responsiveness to government policy, 
management direction and planning and general staffing issues. 
It could be anticipated that there will be some problems which the 
PSMC will encounter in following this ambitious programme. Firstly, any 
prospective change to organisational culture will be met with some 
suspicion and resistance. Secondly, there are a number of other major 
organisational reviews occurring - the management of information 
technology, a strategic audit of the Queensland Electricity Commission, an 
effectiveness review of the Queensland ports system and the recent review 
of the Small Business Development Corporation - and these will add to the 
stress on staff. Thirdly, there are dysfunctional consequences of these 
rapid and recurrent reviews not only for staff, but for their clients. The 
"costs" in terms of external impact will need to be demonstrated to be less 
than input costs, or the achievement of the major goals of efficiency and 
effectiveness may be negated by the very process designed to improve 
them. Regardless of these operational problems, it is doubtful whether the 
PSMC will be able to conduct these detailed reviews in such a tight time 
frame. 
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The government's model for reviews was based on experiences 
elsewhere in Australia. In Victoria, the recent reform emphasis has been 
on program budgeting, a refocussing of central agencies and a major 
review of stamtory authorities. Victoria also reviewed its Premier's 
Department, created a Department of Management and Budget and 
introduced a Senior Executive Service as well as significantiy increasing 
its staff levels. Changes at the federal level which provided the 
Queensland government with useful models were the Review of 
Commonwealth Administration by Reid (1983), the 1983 paper on 
Reforming the Australian Public Service, the Budget Reform paper (1984), 
Financial Management Improvement Plans (FMIP) introduced in 1983, 
reforms in personnel policies (1986), the Block efficiency scmtinies (1987) 
and the machinery of government changes through reduction in the number 
of departments and the functional regrouping of departments in 1987. 
Earlier reform exercises such as the Royal Commission on Australian 
Government Administration (Coombs Report, 1976), the Report of the 
Committee of Inquiry Into the Public Service of South Australia (Corbett 
Report, 1975) and the New South Wales Wilenski reviews. Directions for 
Change, (1977) and Unfinished Agenda (1982), have provided ideas on 
functional restmcturing/ amalgamation of departments, and personnel 
management especially as it relates to concepts of merit and equity. 
Personnel Management Reforms 
The major tenets of the PSMC's stated human resource management policy 
have been appointments and promotions based on merit, an improved job 
classification system, an improved appeals procedure, provision of a career 
structure by providing service-wide opportunities for advancement and a 
structured training program, equal employment opportunity and an 
assurance of procedural fairness in hearing and ruling on any complaints 
or grievances. Senior management will be given incentives for maximum 
performance and mobility through a chief executive service (CES) and a 
senior executive service (SES). Three matters which the PSMC has 
promised to address are the advertisement of all vacancies, the removal of 
limits to appeals against promotions, and the provision of independent 
bodies with decision-making powers to deal with appointments, 
promotions, appeals against promotions and disciplinary action. 
The twin goals of efficiency and effectiveness, combined with the 
principles of merit, equity and fairness, are related to these and other 
personnel issues. Equal opportunity and anti-discnmination legislation 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Reforming the Public Service 235 
were also put on the drawing board with the PSMC responsible for the 
former and the Attorney-General for the latter. The issues of contracts, 
special appointments and interchange were also brought under review by 
the PSMC. The Fitzgerald Report had suggested that contracts assist in 
achieving improved efficiency and productivity and provide for a greater 
opportunity for regular interchange of employees at senior levels between 
the public and private sectors. 
Perhaps the most controversial plan of the PSMC was the introduction 
of a CES and SES. According to the PSMC: 
the CES will include the most senior managers in the Queensland 
public sector with incentives for maximum performance, 
opportunities for mobility and an avenue for exchange between 
sectors. It will be backed by a SES, giving encouragement and 
recognition to the qualities required for effective management. 
Members of the CES and SES will be the driving force of the 
public sector. They will provide a skilled group capable of 
delivering sound policy and advice. The flexibility inherent in 
these services should also reduce the tendency for public sector 
managers to join one agency and stay in it for their entire career. 
Narrow visions do not make for innovative management.'^ 
John Halligan has argued that the SES concept is related to private 
sector management philosophies and efforts to extend political influence 
over the public service" and the PSMC chairman has indicated an 
awareness of the difficulties associated with SES initiatives elsewhere 
including generalists versus specialists, mobility, management of the 
scheme, and performance pay. The Queensland SES scheme is to address 
these concerns by incorporating provision for a professional stream to 
preserve a specialist talent bank. Mobility will be encouraged as part of 
an individual's development and an agency's flexibility, the management of 
the scheme through PSMC will presumably ensure the application of the 
merit principle and the development and co-ordination of redeployment, 
retraining and redundancy policies. Performance pay appears not to be a 
top priority.^ 
The PSMC also has responsibility for equity issues. It is concerned to 
eliminate existing discriminatory practices; redress discrepancies which 
result from previous discriminatory practices; and provide a monitoring 
mechanism to ensure that high equity standards are maintained.^' An 
analysis of Queensland Public Service Board Reports (at least to the year 
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to which they were last produced (1988)) shows that females predominated 
in the lower salary rates and in limited career occupational categories, 
thereby suggesting both vertical and horizontal segregation within the 
public service, but occupied only 4.5 per cent of senior positions in 1987-
1988. 
The state Treasury has developed guidelines for the development of 
performance indicators on effectiveness, social justice, operational 
efficiency, standards of service (quality to clients) and outcome 
efficiency.^ This may help to overcome the deficiencies of the previous 
system where the Auditor-General looked at compliance only and 
operational auditors looked at efficiency. However, the success of this 
program will depend on the introduction and quality of management 
information systems and the ability of managers to evaluate their programs 
in an objective way. Treasury has already been conducting seminars and 
workshops on program management, the budget process, performance 
evaluation and management information systems, and has held a meeting 
with academics and departments to identify available resources to 
undertake program evaluations. 
Conclusions 
One of the major issues in public sector reform in Queensland (as 
elsewhere in Australia) is the future of award restmcturing. The experience 
of the second 3 per cent negotiations was not particularly happy for all 
concerned. Many other serious issues, such as progressional principles and 
revisions to the public sector education and training arrangements, remain 
to be negotiated which suggests that public sector industrial relations could 
be an achilles heel of the Labor government. 
The changes being pursued by the Queensland Labor government at 
both the macro and micro levels of the public service are ambitious and 
extensive, but are not unique. They reflect the dominant themes found in 
public administration reforms throughout Australia and in other Western 
democratic societies. To some extent the proposed changes invoke a 
feeling of deja vu. Equal status for women, and the redress of 
discrimination amongst women in the public service were subjects of the 
1974 Commission of Inquiry into the Status of Women in Queensland. 
The 1987 Savage Report targeted improved performance of statutory 
authorities, elimination of duplication amongst departments, improved 
management performance of permanent heads streamlining of 
administrative processes. These issues are again on the agenda along with 
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more extensive personnel reforms. 
Changes to existing structures and processes, however, cannot be 
changed by edict, and will require a significant commitment to staff 
training, recruitment to fill the skills gaps, and to attending to grievances 
from disaffected incumbents or retrenched or redeployed staff. Cultural lag 
will be experienced for two to three years after the initial changes and staff 
morale is likely to remain low with each new change to stmcture or 
process. Some proposed changes may be counter productive - the merit 
principle and managerialism which are the bases for improved efficiency 
and effectiveness could be a threat to the pursuit of equity. 
The strategic goal under an equity model is equal access and this does 
not take account of the differences in home, and care for dependants, 
responsibilities. If the PSMC is to avoid the pitfalls which beset equity 
programmes then it needs to consider a modified approach by allowing for 
differences in operational styles between individuals and rewarding 
individual differences rather than forcing women. Aborigines, the disabled 
and persons of ethnic origin to fit some model or static norm. Unless 
differences are valued then there will be no gains by or for the groups 
which the equity program covers. Equity should be perceived as a human 
rights issue at an individual level and a management issue at an 
organisational level. Another possible threat to equity (as well as to the 
merit principle) could occur if preference clauses in awards are not 
interpreted in the spirit of these principles. 
As part of the PSMC's concern to improve efficiency and effectiveness, 
considerable attention will have to be devoted to improving training and 
career development systems. A useful model, and one which would set 
Queensland apart from other states, would be an integrated management 
training program, directed initially at senior management, and the 
completion of which is mandatory for consideration for promotion. To be 
effective, the integrated training programmes should be supplemented by 
skills courses covering core skills, elective skills and specialty skills. Such 
an approach would not only be innovative but would be a necessary 
complement to the introduction of a CES and SES, and to enhance the 
career development opportunities of all staff. Course needs would be 
identified as part of each individual's performance review (which itself may 
form part of performance assessment for remuneration purposes) and 
course completion could be monitored by the same process. It could be 
suggested that the training and staff development components of the PSMC 
reforms will be the most critical ones for the success of the others. 
Outside appointments, of which there have been a significant number 
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in senior positions since the change of government, are often viewed as a 
means of enriching the talent pool. When appointed on contracts, outside 
appointees are likely to either perform well to ensure an extension of the 
contract or to be looking to obtain employment elsewhere towards the end 
of their contract if renewable options have elapsed. In many ways, the 
system can be used as a substitute for the employment of consultants 
(which the new government is committed to reducing) with littie difference 
in outcomes. This system, however, can result in greater politicisation of 
the bureaucracy and in an increased dependence by administrators on their 
political masters. 
The greater use of staff interchange schemes or secondments could be 
a more appropriate means of bringing in outside expertise. The risk, 
however, is that if incumbents on leave of absence or secondment from 
their home organisation are paid salaries and benefits in excess of what 
they were earning, the temptation to make the transition permanent is 
considerable. The test of the efficacy of the PSMC and other departments 
which are seconding staff will be the extent to which there is evidence of 
appointments for party faithfuls, friends and relations without merit and the 
number of secondments and interchanges which are converted to permanent 
positions. If contracts are used for other than CES positions, then there is 
a real danger of reverting to a politicised public service with a concomitant 
dissipation of the notion of a career service and its traditional values. 
The challenges in personnel and other reforms in the public service are 
many and the PSMC commissioners encountered significant difficulties in 
their initial attempts at award restructuring largely due to their unfamiliarity 
with the detail of industrial relations matters and scope of the agenda which 
they were required to address. Differences of interpretation between the 
unions and the PSMC regarding the nature and purposes of award 
restructuring were also apparent. 
For the changes to each aspect of personnel management to be effective, 
they have to be introduced concurrently because of their inter-
dependencies. As well, the eariy introduction of FOI legislation and 
administrative review mechanisms may galvanise public confidence, but the 
number of reviews and related demands on the public service leads one to 
question whether it can cope comfortably. 
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APPENDIX 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Attorney-General 
Gains: 
Public Trust Office, Public Defender's Office and the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Scheme, Justices of the Peace 
Administration and Trust Accounts Administration from the 
Department of Justice, 
Loses: 
Old Art Gallery, Qld Cultural Centre Trust, Qld Museum, Qld 
Performing Arts Trust and State Library to: Premier, Economic 
and Trade Development 
Attorney General 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Auditor-General 
No change 
Auditor General 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Community Services 
Amalgamated: with Family Services 
Family Services and Aboriginal and Islander Affairs 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Emergency and Administrative Services 
Loses: 
Rural Fires Board, State Fire Services and Ambulance Services 
Board to Police Department 
Amalgamated: with Works Department 
Administrative Services 
Education 
Loses: 
Office of Sport and Recreation to Tourism, Sport and Racing 
* Education 
Existing Department Employment, Vocational Education & Training 
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Qianges Amalgamated: with Department of Industrial Affairs 
New Department Employment, Vocational Education, Training and Industrial 
Relations 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Existing Department 
New Department 
Existing Department 
Changes 
Environment and Conservation 
Gains: 
Cultural Records Act functions. Government Hydrauhcs 
Laboratory, Beach Protection functions. Approvals Engineering 
Service functions. Air Sea Rescue, Coast Guard and Lifesaver 
functions 
* Environment and Heritage 
Existing Department Family Services 
Changes Amalgamated: with Community Services 
New Department Family Services and Aboriginal and Islander Affairs 
Existing Department Forestry 
Changes Amalgamated: with Primary Industries and Water Resources 
New Department Primary Industries 
Existing Department Geographic Information 
Changes Amalgamated: with Valuer-General, Freehold Land Titles, and 
Lands Departments 
New Department Lands 
Harbours and Marine 
Loses: Boating and Fisheries Patrol to Primary Industries 
Amalgamated: with Main Roads and Transport 
New Department 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Existing Department 
Changes 
Transport 
Health 
No change 
* Health 
Industrial Affairs 
Loses: 
Consumer Affairs Bureau to Justice Department 
Amalgamated: with Department of Employment, Vocational 
Education and Training 
Employment, Vocational Education, Training and Industrial 
Relations 
Industry Development 
Loses: 
Queensland China Council 
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New Department 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Trade development functions and Business migration to: Premier, 
Economic and Trade Development, 
* Manufacturing & Commerce 
Justice and Corrective Services 
Loses: 
Public Trust Office, Public Defenders Office, Acts Sub-Program 
of the Legal and Executive Services Program (Justices of the 
Peace and Trust Accounts) and the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Scheme to Attorney General's Department 
Licensing Commission to Tourism, Sport and Racing 
Gains: 
Consumer Affairs Bureau from Industrial Affairs 
* Justice and Corrective Services 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Lands 
Amalgamated: with Geographic Information, Valuer-General and 
Freehold Land Titles Departments 
Lands 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Local Government 
Amalgamated: with Department of Housing 
Housing and Local Government 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Main Roads 
Loses: Racing Services to Tourism, Sport and Racing 
Amalgamated: with Harbours and Marine and Transport 
Transport 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Mines 
Loses; 
Office of Northern and Regional Development 
* Resource Industries 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Police 
Retains: State Emergency Services 
Gains: Chemical Hazards and Emergency Management Unit from 
Premier, Economic and Trade Development, 
Rural Fires Board, and State Fire Services and Ambulance 
Services Board from Emergency Adminisfrative Services. 
Creates: Bureau of Emergency Services 
* Police 
Existing Department Premier's 
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Changes 
New Department 
Gains: Queensland China Council, Trade development function 
and Business Migration from Industry Development 
Parts transfered to Attorney General relating to the Arts and parts 
formerly in Premier's (viz. Office of Heritage and Arts, Cultural 
Trust, Art Gallery, Museum, State Library) 
Creates: Office of Women's Affairs 
Loses: Chemical Hazards and Emergency Management Unit to 
Police, 
• Premier, Economic and Trade Development, 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Primary Industries 
Amalgamated: with Forestry and Water Resources Commission. 
Also has Boating and Fishery Patrol functions. 
Primary Industries 
Queensland Housing Commission 
Amalgamated: with Local Government 
Housing and Local Government 
Transport 
Amalgamated: with Main Roads and Harbours and Marine 
Loses: Office of Ethnic Affairs to Family Services and Aboriginal 
and Islander Affairs 
Transport 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Treasury 
Creates: Queensland Bureau of Regional Development (replacing 
Office of Northern and Regional Development) 
Gains: Office of Northern and Regional Development from Mines 
Department 
* Treasury 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Valuer-General 
Amalgamated: with Geographic Information, Lands and Freehold 
Land Titles Departments 
Lands 
Existing Department 
Changes 
New Department 
Water Resources Commission 
Amalgamated: with Primary Industries and Forestry 
Primary Industries 
Existing Department 
Changes 
Works 
Amalgamated: with Emergency and Administrative Services 
Department 
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New Department Administrative Services 
AMALGAMATIONS UNDER THE GOSS GOVERNMENT 
* Tourism, Sport & Includes Racing Services from Main Roads, Office of Sport, 
Racing Recreation and Division of Youth from Education, and the 
Licensing Commission from Justice and Corrective Services, 
* Primary Industries 
* Family Services and Includes Community Services function and Office of Ethnic 
Aboriginal and Islander Affairs, Creates Bureau of Ethnic 
Affairs, 
* Administrative Services Includes Works functions. Emergency Services and residual 
functions, 
* Transport Includes Main Roads and Harbours and Marine Functions, Had 
already included Railways. 
* Housing and Local 
Government 
* Lands Includes Geographic Information, Valuer-General and Freehold 
Land Titles functions 
* Employment, Vocational Includes Industrial Relations functions 
Education, Training and 
Industrial Relations 
* Queensland State Government Departments created under the new Goss Ministry on 7 
December 1989, 
Sources: Order in Council, 7 December 1989, Queensland Public Service Annual Staff Statistics 
1987-88 as adjusted for the Cooper Ministry changes. 
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INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS : THE RESTORATION 
OF ORDER AND PROCESS 
Paul Boreham 
Political and Legal Intervention in Industrial Relations under the 
National Party Government 
The Queensland parliament, in common with other state legislatures, has 
the constitutional authority to deal with all industrial matters within the 
boundaries of the state. Until the 1980s, such intervention had generally 
taken place through amendments to the state Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act or through representation to the award-making processes 
of the state industrial tribunals. State awards form the basis of specific 
industry and company awards thereby setting minimum pay and conditions 
for some 60 per cent of the Queensland workforce. The major task facing 
the Labor government on its election in 1989 was not to use these 
mechanisms to establish a more reformist industrial relations policy for 
Queensland, but to pick up the pieces of the formal system of industrial 
relations which had been fractured by successive political interventions 
during the 1980s. 
In summary, the changes that the National party government had 
wrought involved the most radical restructuring of industrial relations in the 
state since the establishment of conciliation and arbitration provisions under 
the Labor premiership of T.J. Ryan in 1916. These changes could be 
characterised as setting out to achieve order by force. Aggressive state 
action and the use of legal sanctions against trade unions had established 
a climate of overt anti-collectivism which reinforced an assumption of 
unitary management perspectives in employment relations. Increasingly, 
as the general secretary of the Trades and Labor Council was to put it, the 
trade union movement in Queensland was faced with the 
institutionalisation, through government legislation of fundamental anti-
union attitudes.^ The National party government had also promoted a 
situation in which the procedural pathways of conciliation and arbitration 
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were increasingly blocked and the industrial tribunals were themselves 
regularly bypassed. This was combined with capricious intervention by 
executive government which had seriously undermined the autonomy, 
independence and standing of the Industrial Commission. 
Two distinct political philosophies characterised the approach toward 
industrial relations of the National government from 1983 when it took 
control of the legislature on the break-up of the coalition. The first was 
a conservative strategy of ensuring, through legislative intervention, that the 
pursuit by trade unions of industrial change was strictly delimited. Both 
general legislative enactments such as the 1979 Essential Services Act, 
which was supported in parliament by the Liberal party, and the 1985 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act Amendment Act, and specific 
interventions such as the 1985 Electricity (Continuation of Supply) Act and 
the Electrical Authorities Industrial Causes Act and subsequent amendments 
were concerned with reregulation by government. The last two acts 
established a special tribunal, appointed at the absolute discretion of the 
Governor-in-Council, and from which no appeal was possible to a full 
bench of the Commission or to the Industrial Court. Various sections of 
the acts negated preference for unionists contained in any award or act; 
provided for deregistration of a union if some portion of the membership 
failed to comply with an order; defined as an illegal act counselling or 
abetting a strike; provided automatic penalties for strikes; and allowed the 
State of Queensland to bring actions against unions.^ The Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act Amendment Act further extended the 
definition of a strike to include "a performance of work in a manner other 
than that in which it is customarily performed" thereby making illegal 
almost any variation in the performance of work by employees which was 
directed at altering the terms of the employment relationship. More 
importantly, the legislation provided for the direct involvement of the 
cabinet in the process of industrial relations by conferring on it powers to 
suspend or cancel a union's registration and to set conditions for any 
subsequent re-registration.'* 
The use of these direct statutory provisions against trade unions was 
clearly viewed by its supporters as part of a new right anti-labour policy. 
Thus, the general manager of the South East Queensland Electricity Board, 
writing in an H.R. Nicholls Society publication, saw his role in the SEQEB 
dispute: "I am proud to be part of a 1985 select club like Mudginberri -
like Dollar Sweets - and 1 hope quite a few more in the future".^ 
However, those causes celebres for the new right had been mounted undei 
somewhat different auspices which allowed employers to sue at common 
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law for damages consequent upon industrial action. 
This was the second direction set by the National party government and 
was designed to empower employers to intervene individually in potential 
dispute situations through giving them ready access to injunctions against 
unions and individual workers. Legislation such as sections 45D and 45E 
of the Trade Practices Act and the Queensland Industrial (Commercial 
Practices) Act, proclaimed in 1985, emphasised property and contractual 
rights vested in individuals and eschewed recognition of collective rights 
and actions in defence of those rights, effectively curtailing the traditional 
strength of trade union action. The civil courts were thus increasingly seen 
to be the venues of an alternative system of deterrence directed at 
suppressing industrial action by labour unions. The transfer of powers 
from the jurisdiction of the state Industrial Commission was effected in the 
context of an explicit view on the part of the Bjelke-Petersen government 
that the Commission was not prepared sufficiently to regulate and control 
the activities of trade unions. The premier went as far as to suggest in an 
interview that the Commission "always gave the unions what they wanted" 
and asserted that it "needed its wings clipped".^ 
Amendments to the Industrial (Commercial Practices) Act in 1985 
extended its ambit to include crown employees and to cover strikes over 
union preference clauses, superannuation and demarcation disputes. Unions 
and individual workers were held liable for any dispute for which seven 
days notice was not given. A simplified process of obtaining injunctions 
and suing for damages was introduced and maximum penalties were raised 
to $250,000 for trade unions and $50,000 for individuals. Cases were to 
be heard in the Supreme Court not the Industrial Court. The legislation 
gave statutory authority to the common law position which extended the 
opportunities for an employer in Queensland to sue at common law for 
damages suffered consequent on industrial action. As Guille points out, 
there is a fundamental difference between this legislation and the state 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act: 
In issuing injunctions, the Court is only concerned with the 
question of whether or not an illegal act (that is a dispute or 
strike) is occurring or might occur. It cannot (even if so 
inclined) give weight to the nature of the issue involved or to 
the union's and workers' positions. There is no possibility that 
the Supreme Court could find there are justifiable strikes. 
Nor, moreover, can the Supreme Court issue an injunction 
ordering that workers stop industrial action subject to some 
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simultaneous and agreed action by employers. In this sense, 
the legislation is designed not to improve industrial relations 
but to control union behaviour.^ 
In summary, the government had provided employers with the means 
to repress industrial action and to limit the ability of trade unions to 
maintain the pay and employment conditions of their members. This had 
occurred in the context of political deals negotiated with entrepreneurs in 
the state's expanding tourism and hospitality industry and in other service 
industry sectors such as retailing. There was a clear intention in these 
arrangements to create the conditions for the flexible use of low-wage 
labour that would have been rejected or resisted by the Industrial 
Commission and the trade unions on grounds of equity and justice. 
The Public Sector 
The focus of contemporary debates about industrial relations and award 
restructuring had largely fallen on private industry. However, the radical 
stance adopted by the National party government toward public sector 
labour relations also provided special problems for the state public sector. 
These problems were exacerbated by a number of specific characteristics 
pertaining to public sector employment in Queensland. First, the nature of 
public service has promoted a belief that industrial action by public 
employees is essentially different from such activities in the private sector 
and should be treated differentiy and more severely by the law. This view 
is exemplified by the passage of the Essential Services Act which severely 
limited the legitimacy of industrial action by public sector unions.* The 
second factor is that there had been an uneasy tension in Queensland 
between the role of intermediary employing authorities such as the Public 
Service Board, part of whose objective was to depoliticise important 
aspects of government employment, and the increasing tendency toward 
politicisation and patronage in the public service. This had occurred to 
such an extent that senior appointments depended on political orientation 
or as Wiltshire put it more bluntly, "nobody reaches the top of the 
Queensland Public Service without having been subject to intense political 
scmtiny".' Third and finally, public sector employees are almost twice as 
likely to belong to trade unions as private sector employees, and virtually 
all public employees have award coverage. 
The regulated nature of public sector terms and conditions of 
employment thus provided a target for the proponents of "flexibility" and 
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"deregulation" within the National party government. The strategy adopted 
was to undermine the 1922 Public Service Act which was eventually 
abolished and replaced with the 1988 Public Service Management and 
Employment Act. This Act abolished the Public Service Board and 
devolved most personnel functions to departmental level giving chief 
executives recruitment and dismissal powers. It also allowed the Governor 
in Council to declare any position or class of positions to be subject to 
appointment on a contract basis and "not be subject to any industrial award 
or industrial agreement or any determination or rule of an industrial 
tribunal" (S.20.1[c]). In the first six months under the new legislation 
contracts were offered to all Band 2 and Band 3 public servants. The 
practice of declaring vacant positions to be placed on contract allowed 
ministers considerable discretion which was utilised in a number of well 
publicised redundancies and redeployments. 
In March 1987, the introduction of the two-tier wages system by the 
federal and subsequently state conciliation and arbitration commissions was 
to foreshadow a significant departure from established wage fixation 
mechanisms. It attempted to broaden the agenda of wage negotiations to 
include workplace change - a shift which was elaborated and refined by 
further federal and state industrial commission decisions in August and 
September 1988, and August and October 1989 which established the 
stmctural efficiency principle (SEP). The principle makes wage increases 
contingent upon a fundamental review of existing award arrangements to 
achieve a restmctured workplace with the review's focus on: reduction of 
outmoded job classifications and removal of impediments to multi-skilling; 
development of new skill-related career structures; provision of relevant 
training; and the elimination of discriminatory employment practices.^" 
Not surprisingly, the Queensland public service was ill-prepared for the 
two-tier system. As Nutter has recently commented, 
with the authority of the then Public Service Board under 
challenge, leading to its demise at the end of 1987, the sort of 
educational campaign necessary to achieve results was not 
possible [and] management, used to having change imposed 
from above, and being aware of the then Government's view 
about unions felt constrained in acknowledging their legitimate 
role. '^ 
In fact the Bjelke-Petersen government had treated the main public 
sector unions with contempt. The premier had refused to meet 
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representatives of the Professional Officers' Association for four years 
through December 1987 and it was only under pressure from the Trades 
and Labour Council and the state Industrial Commission that the 
government indicated any preparedness to meet about second tier wage 
negotiations.'^ At these meetings it became clear that neither side was 
prepared to consider broader aspects of restructuring and a view prevailed 
that exactly 4 per cent offsets would be negotiated for a 4 per cent 
increase. 
It was thus an environment of suspicion and hostility that had to be 
confronted if any real gains were to be made in the award restructuring 
arrangements under the structural efficiency principal enunciated in 1988 
and 1989. In the Queensland public sector radical changes in the 
management of public employment were also placed on the industrial 
relations agenda following the election of the new Labor government 
committed to public sector reform. One of the first major changes was the 
reduction in the number of government departments from twenty-nine to 
nineteen, including the amalgamation of the former Department of 
Employment, Vocational Education and Training and the Department of 
Industrial Affairs into a new Department of Employment, Vocational 
Education, Training and Industrial Relations. Indicative of some of the 
changes to follow was the appointment of a former general secretary of the 
Professional Officers Association, Barry Nutter, as head of the new 
department. Nutter resigned from the Queensland Industrial Commission 
to take the position and was replaced on the Commission by Glenys Fisher, 
the POA chief industrial officer and the first woman commissioner in the 
seventy-four year history of the state Commission. 
More importantly, legislation in the form of the Public Sector 
Management Commission Act, the stated intention of which was to 
"achieve efficiency, effectiveness, economy and impartiality in the 
management of the public sector of Queensland", was passed in April 
1990. The Public Sector Management Commission (PSMC) was given a 
significant role to play in public sector industrial relations in general as 
well as in the current process of public sector award restructuring. It was 
not surprising therefore that the public sector unions expressed a 
considerable degree of disquiet when no trade union representatives were 
appointed to the commission nor were any of the commissioners drawn 
from an industtial relations background." Part of the reason for this 
concern is that the chair of the commission who also chairs the 
remuneration system task force has a major role in consultation with the 
department and the public sector unions in constructing the new basis of 
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remuneration for restructured awards. Much of the debate on award 
restmcturing has centred on the unions' claims that classification 
descriptions in the restructured award should be skills based rather than 
task based (see Chapter 14). This principle has now been broadly accepted 
for Queensland public sector workers under the SEP. 
The award restructuring process in the public sector is a task of major 
proportions involving 150 awards and industrial agreements covering 
almost 90,000 employees. Notwithstanding the absence of union 
representatives on the PSMC itself, there has been considerable 
development of consultative machinery through the Joint Structural 
Efficiency Committee, a tripartite body set up to co-ordinate the 
restructuring process together with joint coordinating committees in the 
various departments. The consultative process has been extended to other 
aspects of structural change within the public sector. The restructuring of 
Queensland Railways, for example, has been addressed through a 
consultative committee at ministerial and executive level which comprises 
members of the railway unions as well as a nominee of the Trades and 
Labour Council. 
In conclusion, it must be noted that there are clearly profound changes 
taking place in the propensity of the Labor government to accord the public 
sector trade unions a role in the decision-making process concerning award 
restructuring. It would be premature, however, to view these changes as 
evidence of an increasing harmony between the labour movement and the 
Labor party. The relationship with the trade union movement takes place 
against a backdrop of the federal and state governments' microeconomic 
reform agenda. Initiatives in this area, such as the government's plan to 
corporatise a range of public services and utilities, are guided by the 
principle of giving the market a freer rein to determine resource allocation 
and labour market developments. This, in turn, places considerable 
pressure on the public sector to defend its role in an environment much 
more attuned to the needs of market efficiency and economy than to 
considerations of social equity and long term planning for full employment 
and economic development. The resolution of these issues may place 
considerable strains on the new-found unity of the government and the 
public sector unions - the more so to the extent that consultative 
mechanisms draw a divide between participation in industrial matters and 
participation in the broader development of economic policy, industry 
policy and labour market policy. 
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Voluntary Agreements, Employment Flexibility and the Hanger 
Inquiry 
The facilitation of what Mitchell" has termed extra arbitral processes and 
the fervour with which the National party government pursued a singular 
blend of deregulatory liberalism and reregulatory conservatism is most 
clearly evident in the legislative changes leading up to the introduction of 
voluntary employment agreements (VEAs) in 1987 and 1988.'^ First, the 
Industrial (Commercial Practices) Act was amended in 1987 to further 
extend the ambit of the legislation to disputes concerning "research or 
development" which encompassed virtually any change in organisation or 
technology. The legislation also required that seven days' notice of any 
intended strike action be given to the employer, the minister and to every 
person likely to suffer loss or damage by a strike who has previously given 
notice that he or she desires to be notified. The notification was required 
to specify the nature of the conduct which would constitute the strike. In 
the case of a successful defence by a trade union costs could not be 
awarded against those who brought the case. The minister was also 
empowered to give financial aid to persons seeking to bring proceedings 
under the Act. Other serendipitous interventions by the minister during 
1988 and 1989 such as the government payments of employers' legal costs 
through transfers to a peak business organisation and the establishment of 
a commission of inquiry into alleged trade union corruption chaired by a 
former Liberal member of the federal parliament, Marshall Cooke, QC, 
reinforced the impression that union-bashing in the style of the previous 
premier was moving to a new intensity. 
Concurrently with these changes the state government legislated through 
amendments to the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act and the 
Another Act Amendment Bill to replace industrial awards with "voluntary 
agreements". The Bill, as enacted in December 1987, provided for 
agreements between an employer and at least 60 per cent of employees in 
an enterprise or occupational calling. The contract would bind all 
employees in an enterprise not only those in favour of it. Furthermore, 
VEAs in new enterprises could be unilateral employer conditions with 
employment in the enterprise restricted to those people accepting the terms 
and conditions of the contract. The state Industrial Commission was vested 
with a supervisory jurisdiction, however the Bill rendered unions involved 
in disputes relating to contracts subject to the provisions (and potential 
penalties of $250,000) of the Industrial (Commercial Practices) Act. 
During the first twelve months of the operation of the new legislation 
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very few voluntary agreements were registered. As a result of the 
Commission applying its normal "public interest tests" to agreements, most 
failed.'* Two other significant agreements, those of Metway Bank and 
Power Brewing, were subject to protracted hearings. The newly-installed 
Ahern cabinet took the view that the state Industrial Commission and the 
unions were unreasonably frustrating the registration process and amended 
the Act in 1989 to allow for fast-tracking of VEA applications.'' The 
most notable amendments involved the removal of members of the state 
Industrial Commission from involvement in the registration process. With 
an even stronger anti-union conviction, the government abandoned its 
previously promoted safeguards of giving the Commission discretionary 
power to vet agreements on behalf of the public interest by removing these 
provisions from the Act and permitting automatic registration providing 
minimum statutory requirements were met. These amendments reinforced 
the rights of employers to lock out union intervention in enterprise based 
awards. So severe were these changes that even the Queensland 
Confederation of Industry described them as a "dramatic over-reaction".'* 
These interventions were indicative of the attitude prevailing in the late 
1980s and the circumstances in which, in July 1987, the Government 
commissioned a committee of inquiry chaired by R.l. Hanger, QC, an 
admitted conservative, to review the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act. It has been suggested that the review was intended to legitimise 
further anti-union legislation such as that contained in the Queensland 
government's submission to the inquiry which proposed the abolition of 
preference to unionists and the prohibition of closed shops. These 
proposals were not contained in the final report Hanger presented in 
November 1988, for which omission it drew considerable criticism from 
the government. The Hanger report was essentially a conservative 
document concerned with maintaining the integrity of the law and the 
centrality of procedures in industrial relations" and it was all the more 
surprising, therefore, that this report was to become the centrepiece of the 
Labor party's industrial relations policy for the 1989 state election 
campaign. What then were the main features of the Hanger report which 
made it so attractive to Labor? 
The Hanger inquiry had been restiicted in its terms of reference to the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act with VEAs and other "extra 
arbitral" legislation placed beyond its scope. Nevertheless, its report was 
wide-ranging and provided the basis for an entirely new Act. The report 
was firmly directed toward two central themes. First, it endorsed the 
centrality of the system of conciliation and arbitration to industrial relations 
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and sought to reintegrate the state system of standards and procedures. It 
advocated removing the possibility of ministerial intervention and would 
allow the court to make decisions on the basis of the evidence it chose to 
have put to it from the interested parties to a dispute. Second, it 
recognised the fact that "the present system is based on a system of 
unionism". It endorsed the importance of a well organised form of union 
representation to the health of the system and rejected demands which 
would have led to a destabilisation of that system through provisions for 
20 
enterprise unionism. 
The report made only limited overtures toward changing the conditions 
and organisation of work or facilitating progressive improvements in 
employment relations."' It allowed the Commission and those represented 
before it to have greater discretionary power (flexibility) in varying 
minimum standards which are set out in the Act with respect to hours of 
work, overtime and holiday pay. The report proposed that minimum 
standards would apply other than in cases of authorised agreements or 
arbitrated decisions. In summary, this was a conservative report about the 
process of industrial relations which tended to view the content of 
industrial relations in terms of the form and structure of institutional 
arrangements. Trade unions which regarded these arrangements as their 
major legitimate avenue to represent their members' interests in the 
industrial relations process were more than prepared to endorse such 
conclusions. However, those unions with more radical or even a reformist 
agenda should have had some concerns that the report was, understandably, 
silent on the important issues for the labour movement as to what questions 
were on the agenda for negotiation and to what extent the prerogatives of 
employers were open to legitimate contestation. 
The report was favourably received by the major employer groups as 
well as trade union organisations, but the Ahern government never 
implemented its findings, preferring instead to undertake further legislation 
consequent upon the departmental inquiry into VEAs which was outlined 
above. 
Labor's election platform pledged to overhaul the state's industrial 
relations laws along the lines recommended by Hanger. On its election to 
office in December 1989, one of the first acts of the new minister for 
employment, training and industrial relations was to reconvene the Hanger 
committee to advise on the drafting of new legislation. The supplementary 
report of the committee^^ was presented to the Goss government in April 
1990 and amending legislation in the form of a new Industrial Relations 
Act was introduced to parliament in May. The objects clause of the Act 
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indicated clearly the intent of the legislation which was to encourage "the 
orderiy conduct of industrial relations in Queensland ... in the interests of 
employers, employees and the community; ... the organisation of 
representative bodies of employers and employees; ... (and) respect of 
tribunal decisions". In the words of the minister, the legislation is designed 
to "restore to the Industrial Commission the role of umpire ruling on claims 
by interested parties free from political interference".^^ 
The new Act also repealed four industrial statutes introduced by the 
previous government - namely, the Essential Services Act, the Industrial 
(Commercial Practices) Act, the Electricity (Continuation of Supply) Act 
and the Electricity Authorities (Industrial Causes) Act - and replaced the 
Industtial Conciliation and Arbitration Act and its various amending Acts. 
The government also removed VEA provisions from the new legislation. 
Simultaneously with these changes the Government announced that it had 
reached agreement with the state's sixteen power industry unions which had 
given a commitment to uninterrupted electricity supply. The agreement 
was signed after the minister introduced further legislation restoring the 
superannuation rights of SEQEB workers sacked in 1985. The 
government's contribution which had been withheld along with accrued 
interest amounted to about $10.8 million.^ 
The new Industrial Relations Bill established a range of new functions 
and responsibilities for a retitled Industrial Relations Commission. Contra 
the recommendation of the Hanger committee, the commission was 
maintained as a principally lay tribunal. New procedures were also 
contained in the Act to restore the authority of the commission and to 
ensure automatic enforcement of orders issued by it. A further aspect of 
the new legislation, not recommended by the Hanger committee, provides 
for the government, as employer, to be bound by Commission rulings to 
a much greater degree than had previously been the case. Finally, new 
provisions of the Act included reciprocal arrangements to allow for joint 
sittings of the Queensland Commission with the federal and other state 
tribunals and for dual appointments to both bodies in order to provide 
greater scope for consistency in decisions. 
There are four areas in which the new legislation creates important new 
developments.^ First, the commission was given more flexible powers 
to arbitrate on matters such as hours of work and penalty rates which had 
been addressed in the Report into Industrial relations and Training in the 
Queensland Tourism and Hospitality Industry tabled in parliament in May. 
In some respects these arrangements allowed for agreements negotiated at 
enterprise level to be ratified by the Commission in the form of separate 
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or varied awards but subject to union input and argument and to the 
Commission's public interest test. 
The second departure in the new Act is to place greater emphasis on the 
avoidance of industrial conflict through the insertion of mandatory 
grievance procedures in awards which focus on negotiation and conflict 
resolution on the shop floor. Thirdly, the Commission is empowered to 
make orders as to the demarcation of specific work and therefore to 
prescribe permanent solutions to demarcation disputes. Fourthly, the new 
Act is designed to facilitate the process of union amalgamations generally 
through the process of a simple majority vote of eligible members. The 
objective is to promote mergers in line with the present policy of the 
federal government and the Australian Council of Trade Unions. 
Two further provisions enshrined within the new act may provide a 
basis for an alternative strategy for labour movement politics. The first is 
a requirement for the Commission to have a greater regard for the 
economic impact of its decisions than was previously provided for. It is 
required "to take into consideration the public interest, and to that end is 
to have regard to: the state of the economy; [and] the likely effects of the 
Commission's decision on the economy, industry generally and the 
particular industry concerned" (S.8.4[3]). The second stipulation concerned 
the establishment of a tripartite consultative committee including four 
representatives from trade unions and four from employer groups which is 
required "to investigate any matter pertinent to industrial relations ... 
appropriate to be brought to the Minister's attention" (S.19.9[a]). 
These two provisions, together with tripartite committees established 
under the Workplace Health and Safety Act to advise on health and safety 
policies, provide an institutional location for legitimate trade union 
intervention in some broader policy matters of direct consequence to the 
labour movement. In an era of significant structural change in the 
economy and subsequent restiucturing in industry sectors and in labour 
markets, industrial struggles within individual enterprises are less critical 
than those that can take place within political institutions and which affect 
broader legislative responses. This will require trade unions to develop 
appropriate policies and strategies not only with respect to industrial 
processes and the restructuring of awards but also to broader questions of 
macroeconomic management. Such a response is unlikely to come easily 
to a trade union movement accustomed to the divisive and confrontationist 
style that had become the norm in Queensland. 
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EDUCATION : INCREMENTALISM OR RADICAL 
REFORM? 
Bob Lingard and Colin Collins 
Writing about the 1957 defeat of Labor in Queensland and the appointment 
of Jack Pizzey, a graduate and teacher, as Minister for Education in the 
new Country/Liberal coalition, Spaull and SuUivan^ speak of "the 
sanguinity that pervaded schools" as a result. A similar sanguinity pervaded 
the schools and the broader education policy community when Labor's 
election victory in December 1989 ended thirty-two years of conservative 
mle in Queensland. By 1957 education had become an electoral liability for 
Labor^  while the same could be said of the Nationals in 1989. Lawry 
suggests that for the 1957 election. Labor, led by Jack Duggan after the 
"split", produced its most enlightened education policy platform since the 
Ryan government early in the century. Qther factors, most notably the 
"split", ensured Labor's resounding defeat at the polls. In 1989, the state 
Department of Education's Budgetary Initiatives, 1989-1990 document 
promised a substantial increase in educational funding by the National 
party government although, it must be noted, the promised increase was 
still well short of the funding demands contained in the Queensland 
Teachers' Union's budget submission for that year. The Nationals in the 
post-Bjelke-Petersen era were beginning to move slowly in a more 
progressive direction in education but the revelations of the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry ensured their electoral defeat. 
An historical assessment of education under successive conservative 
governments in Queensland 1957-1989 would suggest that the sanguinity 
manifest in 1957 had been grossly misplaced. The pity for Queensland 
schooling was that it did not have at any stage during the post-war 
economic boom period a government committed to education. 
Since the end of that boom in the mid-70s governments throughout 
Austialia have attempted to restmcture schooling, a process which fits 
within what Offe has called the "stmctural policy condition" whereby 
governments, under economic constraints, seek a restructuring of a policy 
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field so as to manage demand within a given expenditure ceiling. Within 
each of the state systems, there has been something of an administrative 
revolution with devolution moves which have been part of the broader 
reform of public sector management spawned by funding constiaints, and 
directed supposedly towards more efficiency and effectiveness. 
Queensland schooling has been affected by and has participated in these 
developments." However, there were specific idiosyncrasies in the 
Queensland schooling system during the long period of conservative 
political rule, most notably the very substantial under-funding of the 
system compared with that in the other states and the absence of equity as 
a central concern of policy-makers. Additionally, there had been an overt 
politicisation of curricula questions, beginning with the MACOS cause 
celebre of the late 1970s.^ It should be said that there was one 
progressive feature of Queensland schooling, namely the abolition of public 
examinations from the early 1970s. This was basically the way the state 
department sought to break university "control" of secondary schooling in 
the face of an expanding secondary school population. 
Given the above, this chapter attempts to do three things in relation to 
the education policy commitment and early practice of the Goss 
government. First, it briefly sketches Labor's education policy and 1989 
election commitments and compares these with the Nationals' policy and 
the Education Department's Budgetary Initiatives, 1989-1990 document, 
noting also the emergence of managerialism in the department under the 
Nationals. Secondly, it adumbrates the educational changes implemented 
since Labor took office. Thirdly, it provides some assessment of the 
prospects for change. 
Labor's schooling reforms were framed by the incoming government's 
strong commitment to public sector management reform, which while in 
some sense a response to the Fitzgerald Report, must also be seen as a 
specific Queensland manifestation of Labor's commitment at both federal 
and state levels for an efficient and effective public sector to be achieved 
through the practices of corporate managerialism, bearing in mind too that 
administration has always been an important focus of government at the 
state level in Australia. 
The 1989 Education Policies 
One useful way to categorise government policies is to utilise the 
distinction made by a number of theorists between symbolic and material 
policies, the distinction usually indicating whether policy changes contained 
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in a policy statement are actual or rhetorical. In one sense, the statements 
in the platforms of the political parties are simply rhetorical, and thus 
symbolic and an assessment of whether they are material requires analysis 
of policies put into practice when the particular party achieves power. The 
education policy platforms of the Labor and National parties offered in 
1989 are symbolic policies. The Nationals' platform was saturated with 
many of the central shibboleths of conservative ideology: the family, the 
monarchy, the flag, and the importance of non-government schools. There 
was an emphasis on education as a reproducer of the existing social order. 
The Labor education platform was much longer, more detailed and more 
encompassing of broader educational and social agendas, including an 
emphasis on equity. 
As one example, there was a clear difference between the two 
approaches to funding non-government schools. The Nationals undertook 
to continue to fund such schools on a per capita basis; but the Labor party 
would utilise the "Whitiam solution" of needs-based funding, while Labor's 
definition of disadvantaged students was much broader than that proffered 
by the Nationals. Almost as a hangover from the late 1960s and early 
1970s, Labor recommended the creation of a fully representative education 
commission, to monitor education policy, promote community awareness 
and debate and advise the minister on the needs and priorities for education 
in Queensland. 
With Labor's 1989 election material on education and with the State 
Department's Budgetary Initiatives, 1989-1990 (BI) document, we are 
moving towards material policies. Schooling was seen by Goss to be of 
paramount importance in Labor's election campaign and for the 
restmcturing of Queensland. This was very clear in Labor's Education 
Blueprint: Schools Policy produced in the election year, which listed 
rebuilding the school system and making education in Queensland the best 
in the country as top priority for a Goss government. As well as outiining 
what Labor would do in education, the document pointed to the parlous 
levels of state funding for education under the Nationals, the lowest per 
capita funding in Australia and the largest class sizes. 
The Goss solution was injection of an extra $250 million into the 
education system over the first three years of a Labor government. This 
would bring Queensland's expenditure into line with that of the other states. 
Here Education Blueprint followed the common pattern of policy 
documents in first defining the problem and then providing a solution to 
it. The document proposed that the increased expenditure be spent over a 
range of improvements, e.g. for improved skills such as literacy, better 
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buildings, more teachers, the teaching of Pacific Rim languages, more 
teacher in-service, more maths and science teachers, a new teacher career 
structure and an isolated areas incentive scheme for teachers. There was 
a recommendation to abolish the existing system of tertiary entrance (TE) 
scores at the end of Year 12 which reflected the fact that the TE score was 
an issue amongst swinging voters in all electorates across the state, being 
a crystallisation of concerns which had resulted from rapidly increasing 
retention rates to Year 12 without an expanded provision of tertiary places. 
The equity issue was not forgotten: an advisory committee would be 
established on gender equity in education, while specialist education for 
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders would be upgraded. 
Just three months before the election, the Education Department issued 
its "Information Statement, No. 132", entitled Budgetary Initiatives, 
igS9-90. Such a publication is produced each year and on this occasion 
the statement listed what the people of Queensland could expect if a 
National party government were returned. Interestingly, it read very much 
like the Goss schools paper released during 1989. There were differences; 
the BI paper was costed and written in much more detail, e.g. the 
"allocation of $1433 million (total education budget) represented an 
increase of more than 13% compared with 1988/89". 
Under its first heading, "Preparing Students", the BI paper included 
items as diverse as: commitment to P-10 curriculum; human relations 
syllabus (an innovation that can be attributed to Ahern's influence); creation 
of business education centres; new capital works; foreign language 
teaching; distance education and the continuation of the ministerial 
consultative council on curriculum. But it made limited recommendations 
regarding equity and it had only been the setting of equity agendas by the 
Commonwealth since the Whitiam period which had ensured any 
commitment to gender, migrant and working-class equity at all within the 
Queensland state system under the Nationals, despite the good intentions 
of individuals.' 
On the other hand, there was a lengthy section on "Expanding 
Entrepreneurial Activity in Queensland Education" in which various plans 
concerning the marketing of education (mainly to ASEAN countries) were 
discussed, as was the utilisation of EdMart to market departmental 
materials. 
The BI paper, like the Goss document, was a detailed list of expenditure 
commitments that highlighted some of the more progressive trends in 
Queensland education, for example the human relations syllabus and 
teacher award restructuring. With such a wealth of costed promises, one 
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can only wonder why the National party did not make use of it in the 
election campaign. The replacement of Ahern by Cooper as leader is one 
obvious explanation, for it was Ahern, who had, for example, made the 
ronning on award restructuring. Further, the BI document was clearly 
departmental, rather than National party in origin. Whatever the 
explanation, under the National party the public perception of schooling 
remained one of a poorly-funded, low-priority, conservative system, a 
system firmly controlled by its political masters and one with only a 
begrudging commitment to equity. 
The New Managerialism 
The BI paper also reflected the move, over a period of about a decade, of 
the Department of Education into a corporate managerialist mode. Kidston 
has documented the development of this "new managerialism" where he 
gives particular emphasis to the appointment of Lin Powell as Minister in 
1983 in its emergence* and for bringing Queensland in line with what has 
been called the "stmctural reform movement" in Australian education. 
Kidston goes on to show how the emergence of corporate managerialism 
was accelerated by the reform movement in the state public service, 
resulting from the recommendations of the 1988 Savage Report and 
reinforced by the large cut in federal allocations to the states in 1987. 
Queensland had a form of corporate managerialism without concerns for 
equity which distinguishes it from Labor versions of managerialism. Labor 
governments in Australia across the 1980s have responded to new right 
pressures by attempting to reform the public sector towards greater 
efficiency and effectiveness through corporate managerialism rather than 
pursuing an all-out privatisation policy. 
Devolution of a range of administrative and financial functions to the 
school level is the "service delivery" side of corporate managerialism and 
such devolution has gathered pace in education systems across the country 
in the 1980s, irrespective of the political party in power. The substantive 
move to devolution began in Queensland in 1989,' whereas responsibility 
for some expenditure items had been devolved to the school level from the 
mid-1970s. The development of the new managerialism was evident in the 
release in November 1989 of the Education Department's Interim Strategic 
Plan, which offered a clear statement of its goals, minus an equity concern. 
It was also evident in a number of other public documents released during 
1989, for instance the Meeting the Challenge papers numbers 1, 2 and 3 
and The Corporate Vision for Senior Schooling in Queensland. 
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Thus, as Labor gained power on 2 December 1989, the picture of the 
Department of Education was one of a centralised department that had 
begun the move to a corporate managerialist mode of operation, including 
some devolution. It had become more liberal than its previous National 
masters and their education platforms would suggest and this was 
particularly the case as the party grip on policy seemed to weaken and with 
the change from Powell, a highly interventionist minister, to Brian 
Littleproud, one who was less so. In fact, with some notable exceptions in 
respect of equity, and more substantial community involvement, 
departmental policies and practices were starting to resemble what the 
Labor platform would suggest though, of course, a conservative culture 
remained within the department.^" In moving from the symbolic to actual 
policies, we can now examine what the Goss government has accomplished 
in education since it won office. 
Education under Goss Labor 
With the Labor victory, there was an expectation of progressive change and 
nowhere was this more apparent than amongst the education policy 
watchers. Labor moved quickly on the Fitzgerald agenda and the 
renovation of the Queensland public service had been both a central 
election promise and a response to the Fitzgerald findings. Equity and 
merit were to be the slogans of the new public service with all senior 
appointments controlled by the Public Service Managerial Commission 
(PSMC), directly answerable to the premier. Those developments shaped 
education changes, particularly those relating to organisational and 
personnel matters. 
Before any internal restructuring of the Education Department got under 
way, the new minister for education, Paul Braddy - a Rockhampton 
solicitor with a background in Catholic social justice concerns - had to be 
seen carrying out the highly profiled Goss commitments on education. 
Even before ministerial personnel were appointed, a number ol 
undertakings were realised. In eariy December 909 new teachers were 
promised for 1990 (200 more than the number in the BI document) and 
1500 new tertiary places were created ($9 million had been promised in the 
BI document); in January a new insurance scheme for schools was also pul 
in place; in February $4.2 million was promised for pre-school education 
(money, however, which came from the Commonwealth government), bul 
in February the really big announcement was that the Tertiary Entrance 
Score (TES) would be abolished. Just before the election. Labor strategists 
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had discovered that parents and potential matriculants were worried about 
the increasing number of students unable to enter tertiary institutions. 
Professor Nancy Viviani, formedy of Griffith University but now of the 
Australian National University, was appointed as the sole reviewer of the 
TE score system. Backing her was a large reference committee of 
representatives from the various interest groups which was to report in July 
1990. The tight terms of reference reflected the minister's view that the 
government had a clear mandate to abolish the current TE score system, 
whilst the reference committee consisting of all members of the policy 
community reflected the more consultative approach taken by the minister. 
The Viviani report was released at the end of July and accepted by 
cabinet with minor changes shortiy afterwards. The basic recommendation 
of the report was the replacement of the simple three digit tertiary entrance 
score with a much more elaborate Student Education Profile with three 
components: an overall position (OP) which indicates a student's moderated 
school results in the five best subjects; a field position which measures the 
student's performance in clusters of related subjects; and a core skills test 
score, which lists the student's score on a standardised test based on 
Queensland syllabuses. It was an attempt to improve the process of tertiary 
selection through the provision of more information. The Teachers' Union 
supported this new system because it retained a strong school base. A 
testing education procedures authority (TEPA) will be set up to manage the 
new selection procedure. 
A review of the teaching of foreign languages in primary and secondary 
schools was established early in 1990. In August, the minister announced 
long range plans to implement second language teaching in all primary and 
secondary schools for all students by the turn of the century. The Premier's 
Department was involved in the selection of the languages to be 
emphasised in this policy package: Chinese, Japanese, Indonesian, French 
and German. While other languages will still be taught, the neglect of 
"community languages" is significant because the policy differs from the 
national language policy which seeks some balance between "foreign" and 
"community" languages. The Queensland development is indicative of an 
instmmentalist perception of schooling and a significant down-playing of 
multiculturalism. 
The minister supported the Teachers' Union submission for salary 
increases and a complex award restructuring which went before the 
Industrial Commission in the second half of 1990. Generally, there is a 
much better relationship with the unions; for example, union representatives 
have again taken their place on promotion committees, a practice ended 
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during Powell's time as minister. The prohibition of state school teachers 
appearing before the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
has been lifted. Sister Courtenay has been appointed as chair of the 
ministerial committee on non-state schools. 
It has also been announced that all non-state schools will have to be 
registered and that in future they will be funded on a needs, rather than on 
a per capita basis. The move to registration of all non-government schools 
was supported by the mainstream non-government schools, but incurred 
considerable opposition from the fundamentalist schools, the group at 
which the legislation will be directed." Leigh Tabrett was appointed to 
head the Office of Higher Education, a unit also promised by the previous 
government, and the two major female appointments appear part of a plan 
to expand opportunities for women in the department. 
There have been other changes in the Education Department. In the very 
early days of the Goss government, Braddy commissioned Consultancy 
Bureau Pty. Ltd. to review the organisational arrangements and 
management practices of the department. Two departmental persons were 
seconded to assist in the review. The report was not made public, a fact 
much criticised by some senior departmental administrators in the light of 
Goss' commitment to open government, but it is believed that the report, 
usually referred to as the Skerman report after its chief author, was very 
critical of a range of departmental administrative and policy matters which 
included: the gender-blind personnel policies of the Department; "the 
burying of equity concerns within the bowels of the Department"; the 
non-equitable distribution of resources; the top-heavy nature of the central 
office and the top-down nature of the introduction of policy changes; the 
need for firmer central coordination of devolution measures; the need for 
stronger leadership and clearer articulation of a departmental corporate 
vision (including goals and strategic planning); the need for a defence of 
public education; and the need for a commitment to a "service 
management" ideology with the schools as the focus of policy. It was 
rumoured that the Skerman report did not contain enough hard data to 
support the changes it had recommended, but perhaps the non-action on 
the report resulted from the fact that at the time the PSMC was not yet in 
place and its first function would be a review of all departments. 
In early March 1990 a policy unit was set up in the Department of 
Education comprised of six persons, none of whom came from the upper 
echelons of the department. The creation of the unit followed from the 
Skerman report; its function was to examine in more detail the operations 
of the department, tapping into a broader range of opinions and the 
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immediate aim was to produce a discussion paper on the organisation of 
the department. Shortly after its inauguration, the unit produced a video 
and document which were sent to all schools asking their opinions on a 
wide variety of matters concerned with the organisation of education in 
Queensland. Significantly, one of the questions was whether a leaner head 
office in Brisbane would be desirable (a feature of the corporate 
managerialist model). A broad consultation process was also set in train 
across the state, encompassing all relevant groups and this process can be 
contrasted with the eariier Skerman review. 
The formal aims of the Policy Unit are to implement government policy 
and to ensure the department has appropriate administrative structures with 
probably an additional function, to raise issues for the minister. The Policy 
Unit's document The Future Organisation of Educational Services for 
Students: A Discussion Paper was released in July and widely distributed, 
with a copy going to every teacher in the state and submissions in response 
sought by the end of August. The proposed reorganisation suggested in the 
document would see a leaner head office, the reduction of the number of 
regions, and the creation of school support centres between schools and 
regional offices. There was also a recommendation that a number of school 
administrative appointments be made at the school level by head office, 
regional office and parent representatives; the union has responded 
negatively to that suggestion. 
There is a real tension within the discussion paper between 
managerialist language and broader political agendas. For example, there 
are laudable statements that schools and teachers have to become central 
to education policy-making in the state and that the delivery of good 
education to all students needs to be the focus of policy; the appropriate 
balance between central and school roles in education policy-making is, of 
course, a central dilemma in contemporary Australian education politics. 
Teacher response to the document has been somewhat muted, although 
at the same time supportive of the more consultative approach. The view 
among teachers seems to have been that this was a document mainly about 
organisational structures, not about educational practices but Offe is surely 
correct when he asserts that "there is no such thing as an administrative 
reform which is nothing but an administrative reform".^ ^ 
The collection of opinions for the discussion paper is another 
manifestation of the minister's emphasis on consultation, a very progressive 
step in educational policy-making in the state. It might also be an 
indication that, apart from the reasonably easy quanthative changes and a 
social justice commitment, the minister does not have an established 
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agenda for reform. Green or discussion paper procedure has been heavily 
utilised by the Goss government in its period in office, strongly suggesting 
a commitment to more consultative government and a return to 
Westminster processes. 
A new director-general. Professor Roger Scott, then vice-chancellor of 
Canberra University and previously a professor at the University of 
Queensland, was appointed in mid-year with the involvement of the 
PSMC, further indication of change, not least because the appointee came 
from outside the system. 
The minister has created a ministerial consultative committee on gender 
equity and the department, under the direction of the minister, is in the 
process of preparing a social justice in education policy statement through 
a broad consultative process, the principles of which are to underpin 
departmental equity programs. There is also a move under way to create 
an equal employment opportunity plan within the department, whilst the 
Policy Unit's discussion paper has suggested that an EEQ section be 
located, in the first instance at least, under the direct jurisdiction of the 
director-general to ensure such principles are implemented. 
Labor has moved reasonably quickly to implement many of its election 
promises in education. These changes have been of an incrementalist kind, 
building upon processes which were underway within the department, 
particularly the emerging managerialism and teacher award restructuring. 
Substantial changes in the organisation and administration of education 
however have not as yet (August 1990) occurred. The Skerman review 
recommendations were not acted upon, but the Policy Unit appears to 
pursue the Skerman agenda through a more consultative process. 
Labor had promised an extra $250 million over its first three years in 
office but that amount will be very readily consumed by the costs of the 
teacher award restructuring and the impact of increases in enrolment 
leaving not much for other reforms. The Queensland Teachers' Union has 
argued that the costs of the award restructuring have to be additional to this 
proposed increase, for there is a very substantial capital expenditure 
backlog in education, particulariy in Labor electorates. There will be 
limited opportunities to redress this backlog, given the election promise that 
there would be no new taxes in the first term of office, so it can be 
anticipated that the emphasis will shift fairly quickly to questions of the 
utilisation of existing resources, rather than the provision of extia 
resources. Any prognosis of Queensland Labor's education reforms would 
need to take some account of the development of a more "national" 
approach to education policy-making under the Hawke federal government 
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and the operation of "corporate federalism", a concept developed to 
connote the relationship between Hawke Labor's "corporatist" approach to 
economic policy making (including, with John Dawkins as minister, the 
utilisation of education as a microeconomic reform tool) and the use of the 
Australian Education Council to create national policies for schooling." 
Notes 
1 Andrew Spaull and Martin Sullivan, A History of the Queensland Teachers' Union 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989), p,263. 
f. J. R. Lawry, "Education", in D.J, Murphy, R.B, Joyce and Colin A, Hughes eds,. Labor 
in Power: The Labor Party and Governments in Queensland, 1915-1957 (St, Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press, 1980), p,363, 
I, Claus Offe, Disorganised Capitalism (Oxford: Polity Press, 1985) 
4. Ross Harold, 'It Can't be Done': Devolution, Choice and Decision in Australian Schools 
(Brisbane, ACEA, 1989); Robert Kidston, "Implementing Corporate Management: The 
Queensland Education Department", in Glyn Davis, Patrick Weller and Colleen Lewis, 
eds. Corporate Management in Australian Government (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1989, 
pp,64-77); Kidston, Managing Change: A Case Study of the Department of Education, 
Queensland (Nathan: The Centre for Australian Public Sector Management, 1990); P.K, 
Casey and R.J, Macpherson, "Devolution in the Queensland Government School 
System", Unicorn 16 (1990):25-34. 
I, R, Smith and J, Knight, "MACOS in Queensland: The Politics of Educational 
Knowledge", The Australian Journal of Education 22 (1978): pp.225-48; John 
Freeland, "Class Struggle in Schooling: MACOS and SEMP in Queensland", 
Intervention (1979): 29-62. 
ft Bob Lingard, "Accountability and Control; a Sociological Account of Secondary School 
Assessment in Queensland", British Journal of Sociology of Education 11 (1990):171-
88 
fi Robert Lingard, "Multicultural Education in Queensland: The Assimilation of an Ideal", 
Discourse 4 (1983) 13-31; Bob Lingard, Miriam Henry and Sandra Taylor, "A Girl 
in a Militant Pose': A Chronology of Struggle in Girls' Education in Queensland", 
British Journal of Sociology of Education 8 (1987):135-52; Bob Lingard, "Teachers and 
Equity: Definitional and Policy Considerations", Unicorn 16(1990):156-62, 
I, Kidston, "Implementing Corporate Management"; Kidston, Managing Change. 
9: Harold, "~It Can't be Done'", 
10. Noel Preston, "The Fitzgerald Report and Education: A Case Study of Ideology, the 
State and Education Policy", Unicom (1990):8-14, 
II, Sunday Mail, 27 May 1990, 
12. Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State (London: Hutchinson, 1984): pp.105-
106. 
13. Robert Lingard, "Policy Making for Australian Schooling: the New Corporate 
Federalism", Journal of Education Policy, 16 (1991) forthcoming. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Barton, T.A. 1990. Industrial Relations Legislation in 1989. The Journal 
of Industrial Relations 32. 
Bennett, L. and M. Quinlan. 1989. Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
into the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1961-1987, 
Labour and Industry 2. 
Blackmur, D. 1986. The National Party Government and Industrial 
Relations in Queensland, 1983-1986. Paper presented to the 
Australasian Political Studies Association Annual Conference. 
Brisbane. 
Borbridge, Rob. Amalgamate or Perish? In The Future of Non -Labor 
Parties in Australia, by Brian Costar and Scott Prasser, eds. 
Toowoomba: University College of Southern Queensland. 
Forthcoming. 
Boreham, P., G. Dow, C. Littler and R. Stewart. 1988. Society and 
Economy in Queensland: The Strategic Role of the Public Sector. 
St Lucia: Labour and Industry Research Unit. 
Casey, P.K. and R.J. Macpherson. 1990. Devolution in the Queensland 
Government School System. Unicorn 16. 
Coaldrake, Peter. 1989. Working the System. St Lucia: University of 
Queensland Press. 
Coaldrake, Peter. 1990. Establishing a Senior Executive Service in 
Queensland. Paper presented to a National Conference on Improving 
Public Sector Management, Centre for Australian PubUc Sector 
Management, Griffith University. 
Codd, M. 1987. Recent Changes in Machinery of Government. Canberra 
Bulletin of Public Administration. 54. 
Cribb, Margaret Bridson and P.J. Boyce, eds. 1980. Politics in 
Queensland: 1977 and beyond. St Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press. 
Cribb, Margaret Bridson. 1985. Queensland. In Country to National, by 
Brian Costar and Dennis Woodward, eds. Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin. 
Davis, Glyn. 1990. Equity in the Queensland Public Sector. Paper 
presented to a National Conference on Improving Public Sector 
Management, Centre for Australian Public Sector Management, 
Griffith University. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Bibliography 271 
Davis, Glyn, Patrick Weller and Colleen Lewis, eds. 1989. Corporate 
Management in Australian Government. Melbourne: Macmillan. 
Dempsey, R. 1988. The State of the Union Movement at Australia's 
Bicentenary. Queensland Trade Unions' Directory, 1987-1988. 
Brisbane: Trades and Labour Council. 
Fitzgerald, G.E. 1989. Report of a Commission of Inquiry Pursuant to 
Orders in Council. Brisbane: Government Printer. 
Freeland, John. 1979. Class Struggle in Schooling: MACOS and SEMP 
in Queensland. Intervention. 
Gilbert, W.L. 1986. The Queensland Power Dispute. In Arbitration in 
Contempt. Melbourne: H.R.Nicholls Society. 
Goodwin, M. and G. Maconachie. 1990. Voluntary Employment 
Agreements: Labour Flexibility in Queensland. Labour and Industry 
% 
Goss, Wayne. 1990. Management of the Queensland Public Sector in the 
1990s. Research Paper No.5. Nathan: Centre for Australian Public 
Sector Management. 
Guille, H. 1989. A Tale of Two States: The Hanger and Niland Reports. 
Labour and Industry 2. 
Halligan, John. A Comparative Lesson: The Senior Executive Service in 
Australia. In Reform and Change in Public Bureaucracy: Tlte 
Impact of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, by Patricia W. 
Ingraham and David H. Rosenbloom, eds. Forthcoming. 
Hamill, David. 1980. The Sherwood By-election. In Politics in 
Queensland: 1977 and beyond, by Margaret Bridson Cribb and P.J. 
Boyce. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press. 
Hamill, David and Paul Reynolds. 1983. Three Cornered Contests in 
South East Queensland State Seats. St Lucia: Department of 
Government, University of Queensland. 
Hughes, Colin A. 1969. Images and Issues: the Queensland State 
Elections 1963 and 1966. Canberra: Australian National University 
Press. 
Hughes, Colin A. 1985. In the Constituencies: Competition with the 
Liberal Party. In Country to National, by Brian Costar and Dennis 
Woodward, eds. Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 
Hutton, D. 1987. What is Green Politics? In Green Politics in Australia, 
by D. Hutton. North Ryde: Angus and Robertson. 
James, P. 1974. In Place of Justice. Brisbane: Refulgence. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
272 Bibliography 
Kidston, Robert. 1989. Implementing Corporate Management: The 
Queensland Education Department. In Corporate Management in 
Australian Government by Glyn Davis, Patrick Weller and Colleen 
Lewis, eds. Melbourne: Macmillan. 
Kidston, R. 1990. Managing Change: A Case Study of the Department of 
Education, Queensland. Nathan: The Centre for Australian Public 
Sector Management. 
Lawry, J.R. 1980. Education. In Labor in Power: The Labor Party and 
Governments in Queensland, 1915-1957, by D.J. Murphy, R.B. 
Joyce and Colin A. Hughes, eds. St Lucia: University of 
Queensland Press. 
Lingard, Bob. 1983. Multicultural Education in Queensland: The 
Assimilation of an Ideal. Discourse 4. 
Lingard, Bob. 1990. Accountability and Control: a Sociological Account 
of Secondary School Assessment in Queensland. British Journal of 
Sociology of Education 11. 
Lingard, Bob. 1990. Teachers and Equity: Definitional and Policy 
Considerations. Unicorn 16. 
Lingard, Bob, Miriam Henry and Sandra Taylor. 1987. A Girl in a 
Militant Pose: A Chronology of Struggle in Girls' Education in 
Queensland. British Journal of Sociology of Education 8. 
Lingard, Robert. 1991. Policy Making for Australian Schooling: the New 
Corporate Federalism. Journal of Education Policy 16. 
McCarthy, P. 1985. Power Without Glory: the Queensland Electricity 
Dispute. Journal of Industrial Relations 27. 
McQueen, R., M. Gardner and M. Quinlan. 1985. Queensland Uber Alles. 
Legal Services Bulletin 10. 
Miller, Ian and Tony Koch. Joh's KO. Brisbane: Boolarong. 
Mitchell, R.J. 1985. Liberal and Labor Governments and Labour 
Legislation: is there a Trend to Direct Intervention? Proceedings of 
the Association of Industrial Relations Academics of Australia and 
New Zealand, Brisbane. 
Morris, P. 1989. "Looking Forward": A New Industtial Relations for 
Australia. Labour and Industry 2. 
Nutter, B.J. 1990. Queensland Public Sector Award Restmcturing. Paper 
presented to a National Conference on Improving Public Sector 
Management, Centre for Australian Public Sector Management, 
Griffith University. 
Offe, Claus. 1984. Contradictions of the Welfare State. London: 
Hutchinson. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Bibliography 273 
Offe, Claus. 1985. Disorganised Capitalism. Oxford: Pohty Press. 
Parkin, Andrew and John Warhurst, eds. 1983. Machine Politics in the 
Australian Labor Party. Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 
Pollitt, Christopher. 1984, Manipulating the Machine: Changing the 
Pattern of Ministerial Departments, 1960-83. London: .Allen and 
Unwin. 
Preston, Noel. 1990. The Fitzgerald Report and Education: .A. Case Study 
of Ideology, the State and Education Pohcy. Unicorn 16. 
Queensland Government. 1990. Supplementary Report of the Committee 
of Inquiry into the Industrial ConciUation and .Axbitration Act 1961-
1987 of Queensland. Brisbane: Government Printer. 
Quinlan M. and M. Rimmer. 1989. Work-place Industrial Relations 
Reform and Legislative Change: Hancock. Hanger, Nilan and the 
Business Council of Austraha. Labour and Industry 2. 
Reynolds, Paul. 1987. To tiie Polls in Queensland. 19S6, Labor Forun 
9. 
Reynolds, Paul. 1988. Three Cornered Contests in Brisbane a-d Sojih 
East Queensland Federal Electorates: 19"4-i9S~, Paper presented to 
30th Annual Australasian Pohtical Smdies .A_ssixnanon Conference. 
University of New England, Armidale. 
Reynolds, Paul. 1990. The 1989 Queensland State Elections: Tue End of 
an Era. Australian Journal of Politics and History 36. 
Reynolds, Paul. The Electoral Impact of Amalgamation of the Federal 
Non-Labor Parties. In The Future of Son-Labor Fames ir 
Australia, by Brian Costar and Scott Prasser, eds. Toowocr.ba: 
University College of Southem Queensland. Forthcoming. 
Shand, D.A. 1990. The Pubhc Sector Management Commission s Review 
Function. Paper presented to a National Conference on Improving 
Pubhc Sector Management, Centre for Australian Public Seaor 
Management, Griffith Umversit}. 
Shemian, Tom. 1990. E.ARC and AdmmisQ^tive Reform. Paper 
presented to Centte for Austrahan PubUc Sector Management 
National Conference, Griffith Universit)', 
Smith, R. and J. Knight. 1978. MACOS m Queensland: The PoUtics of 
Educational Knowledge. Australian Journal of Education 22. 
Spaull, Andrew and Martin Sullivan. 1989. A History of the Queensland 
Teachers' Union. Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
274 Bibliography 
Toohey, Brian. 1990. Fitzgerald: How the Process Came Unstuck. In 
Corruption and Reform: the Fitzgerald Vision, by Scott Prasser, Rae 
Wear and John Nethercote, eds. St Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press. 
Vaughan, Graeme. 1980. The 1977 Election: maintaining the 1974 
Realignment. In Politics in Queensland: 1977 and beyond, by 
Margaret Bridson Cribb and P.J. Boyce. St Lucia: University of 
Queensland Press. 
Warburton, N.J. 1990. Queensland's New Industrial Relations Bill. Paper 
presented to the Industrial Relations Society of Queensland. 
Brisbane. 
Whip, R.J., J.S. Western and F.M.B. Cass. 1980. Images and Issues 
Revisited. In Politics in Queensland: 1977 and beyond, by Margaret 
Bridson Cribb and P.J. Boyce. St Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press. 
Whitton, Evan. 1989. The Hillbilly Dictator: Australia's Police State. 
Crows Nest: ABC. 
Wiltshire, K. 1985. The Public Service. In The Bjelke-Petersen 
Premiership, 1968-1983 by A. Patience, ed. Melbourne: Longman 
Cheshire. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Persons 
INDEX 
Ahem, M.J„ 6, 52-53, 87-90, 93,106-
08, 111, 113, 115-22, 
125, 127, 133, 135, 139-
40, 154, 208, 210-12, 
217, 219, 263 
Alison, G., 132 
Atkinson, S,, 133-34 
Austin, B,D,, 115, 125-26, 134-35, 217 
Barbeler, J., 218 
Barnard, LH„ 197 
Beanland, D.E., 139, 141, 219 
Beard, P.F., 132 
Beattie, P.D„ 68, 99, 101-02, 104-05, 
219-21 
Bingham, E,M„ 212, 214-15, 218, 221 
Bishop, B,E,, 132 
Bjelke-Petersen, F,, 114 
Bjelke-Petersen, J,, 6,14-15, 28-35, 38-
49, 52-53, 60, 62-65, 70, 74, 78-80, 
85-87, 106, 113-17, 123, 128-29, 
133, 135, 175, 209 
Bolle, H,E., 176 
Bond, A,, 70 
Borbridge, R,E,, 140 
Braddy, P,J„ 264 
Bums, T,l,, 6, 33, 35, 38-51, 60, 63, 202 
Burton, T, 34 
Butler, J., 150 
Byrne Henderson, B,, 89 
Camm, R,E,, 35 
Campbell, W.B,, 115 
Carter, H,, 124, 149-50 
Casey, ED„ 6, 33, 35, 38-51, 63 
Chalk, G.W,W,, 129, 132 
Chapman, Y.A., 87, 122 
Clark, LA., I l l , 219 
Clauson, P,J,, 89 
Coaldrake, P,, 108 
Cooke, M., 252 
Cooper, T,R,, 6, 33, 35, 38-49, 52-53, 
55-56, 85, 89-90, 93, 108, 113, 119-
24, 133, 209, 211, 213-15, 217, 263 
Corcoran, J,D,, 176 
Court, C.W.M,, 177 
Courtenay, C, 266 
Crossman, R,, 205 
Davies, K,H„ 111 
Davis, G,, 203 
Dawkins, J.S,, 159, 269 
DeLacy, K,E„ 95, 198 
Delamothe, P,R., 132 
Dickie, P,, 221 
Drummond, D,, 93, 124-25, 217-18 
Duggan, J,E,, 259 
Edmond, W,M., 219 
Edwards, L,R„ 6, 28-29, 33, 35, 38-52, 
61, 130-32 
Fenlon, G.B„ 111 
Ferraro, S., 126 
Fisher, G,, 250 
FitzGerald, A.A,, 219 
Fitzgerald, G,E. See Fitzgerald 
Inquiry/Report 
Fitzgerald, S., 96 
Foley, M,, 111, 137, 219-20 
Forster, P,, 210, 214 
Fouras, J., 137 
Fraser, D., 154-55 
Fraser, J,M,, 15 
Garrett, P,, 56 
Gibbs, IJ., 125, 217 
Glasson, W,H,, 125 
Goleby, J,P., 67 
Goss, W.K., 6, 33-35, 38-49, 53, 55-56, 
78-80, 90-93, 95, 99, 103, 106-08, 
110-11, 118, 133, 135-36, 158-60, 
194, 197, 215, 220, 222 
Gunn, W.A.M., 53, 86, 90, 115-16, 213, 
219 
Gygar, TJ,, 137 
Hall, v., 218 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
276 Index 
Hampson, T,, 102, 105 
Hanger, R,I., 253 
Harper, N,, 219 
Harvey, L,T,, 125, 217 
Hawke, R,J.L., 15, 158, 177, 193 
Henderson, IT,, 150 
Herbert, J,D,, 61 
Hinze, R,J,, 35, 87, 89, 91, 107, 125, 129, 
135 
Holm, C,H,, 120 
Houghton, J.E,H,, 24, 62 
Hughes, C,A,, 218 
Hunter, B., 218 
Innes, J,A,M., 6, 33, 38-49, 78-79, 94-
95, 108, 126, 133, 136, 138-39, 159, 
215 
Irwin, J,, 218 
Iwasaki, Y., 87 
Jones, C, 134 
Joyner, R.M,, 145 
Kelly, J,, 218 
Kennedy, J., 214 
Keogh, L., 99, 101 
Kidston, R., 263 
King, R,G., 125-26 
Knox, W,E,, 6, 33-35, 38-50, 68, 70, 
130-31, 133, 137, 139 
Lane, D.F„ 87, 89, 91, 107, 124-25, 
134-35, 217 
Lee, N,E., 134 
Lester, V,P., 90, 122, 218 
Lewis, T.M,, 89, 209 
Lingard, K,R., 115 
Littleproud, B,G,, 264 
Low, A,G„ 126 
McComb, Y„ 34 
McKechnie, P,R,, 125 
McLean, I,, 102-03 
Menzies, R,G,, 130 
Mitchell, R.J,, 252 
Moir, A,, 63 
Muntz, G.H., 115, 125, 163, 217 
Murphy, D.J., 103, 137 
Newnham, N., 160, 214, 218 
NUe, F.J., 145 
Nutter, B.J., 249-50 
Offe, C , 259, 267 
Perrett, T.J., 146 
Pizzey, J.C.A., 259 
Pollitt, C, 191-92 
Powell, L.W., 87, 117, 163, 263-64 
Proctor, R.C., 70 
Pyke, P.M., 140 
Reagan, R., 
Redmond, R 
Robbins. 
Robson, 
Robson, 
, M. 
D., 
M.J 
Rushdoony, 
157 
:., 209 
, 96, 101 
212 
[., 219 
R., 150 
Santoro, S,, 89, 139, 219 
Sawyer, P,A., 141 
Schubert, S., 159 
Schuntner, L.T., 137 
Schwarten, R.E., 219 
Sciacca, C , 68-69 
Scott, R., 268 
Scott-Young, N.R., 132 
Sherman, T., 212, 215, 221 
Simpson, G.L., 115, 125 
Sparkes, R.L., 34, 86-87, 108, 114, 120-
21, 135, 210-11, 213 
Spaull, A., 259 
Spence, J,C,, 111 
Springbord, L.J,, 172 
Stone, J., 55-56, 140 
Stoneman, M,D., 219 
Sullivan, M., 259 
Swan, W,, 95, 102, 105, 154-55 
TabreU, L , 266 
Tenni, M.J,, 125 
Terry, P., 150 
Turner, N.J,, 126 
Unsworth, B,J,, 176 
Viviani, N,, 265 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Index 277 
Waiburton, N,G., 6, 33, 35, 38-49, 68, 
99,101, 133 
Watson, DJ.H., 141 
Watson Blake, M., 218 
Welford, R., 219 
Western, J.S., 218 
White, P.N.D., 132 
White, TA., 6,28-30, 33, 35, 38-49, 5 1 -
52, 62, 65-66, 133, 137 
Whitiam, E.G., 60, 177, 197 
Wiltshire, K.W., 248 
Woodgate, M.R., 219 
Wran, N.K., 176 
Wright, K,W„ 6, 33, 35, 38-49 
Subjects 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody Royal 
Commission, 266 
Aborigines, 237, 262 
Accountability, 60, 64, 66, 68-69, 74, 
118, 135, 207 
Administrative law, 215, 238 
Alliance faction. See Australian Labor 
Party 
Amalgamated Metal Workers Union, 100 
American Christian Reconstructionist 
Movement, 150 
Australian Alliance party, 144-45 
Australian Conservation Foundation, 56, 
148 
Australian Democrats, 140, 144-45, 151 
Australian Education Council, 269 
Australian Labor Party 
changes of leaders, 90-91, 99, 101, 
107, 133 
changes of officers, 102, 104-05 
electoral support, 7, 10, 118, 131, 
174-80 
factions, 96, 99-105, 135 
federal intervention, 100-04 
image, 11-21, 33 
split (1957), 5 
Australian Littoral Society, 148 
Australian Workers Union, 100 
Award restructuring. See Structural 
efficiency principle 
AWU faction. See Australian Labor party 
Bellevue hotel, demolition of, 129 
Bowman pre-selection, 99, 101 
Brisbane City Council elections 
1985, 133 
1988, 106 
British experience (of transitions), 191-93 
Bureau of Emergency Services, 198 
Bureau of Regional Development, 198 
By-elections 
Gympie (1979), 62 
Landsborough (1990), 139-41 
Merthyr (1989), 89, 135 
Redcliffe (1979), 6, 23-24, 62-64 
Redlands (1985), 6, 67-70 
Sherwood (1978), 6, 22-23, 61-62 
Sherwood (1990), 139-41 
South Coast (1988), 105, 135 
Cabinet, 194-96, 200-01 
Call to Australia party, 144-46 
Campaign (1989) 
ALP, 90-92, 98, 105-08, 153-55, 
158-59, 161 
Liberal, 92, 134-36, 153 
National, 93-94, 118-19, 122-24, 
153, 155 
Campaign fmance, 95, 109-10, 169-70 
Campaign slogans, 65-66, 70, 91, 93-95, 
107-08, 118, 121 
Candidates 
demographic characteristics, 163, 
171-73 
desirable attributes, 166-68 
group memberships, 168 
knowledge of, 36-37 
political backgrounds, 164-66 
pre-selection of, 103-04, 110-11, 
125-26, 136, 166-68 
survey of, 163-64 
women, 162-63 
Censorship, See Morals 
Centre faction. See Australian Labor 
party 
Centre Left faction. See Australian Labor 
party 
Chief Executive Service, 195, 199, 200-
01, 234-35, 237 
Citizens Electoral Councils, 144-46 
Civil liberties, 60-62, 66, 74, 129 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
278 Index 
Coalition 
electoral competition within. See 
Three-cornered contests 
possibility of renewed, 94-96, 111, 
126, 136 
relations within, 22-32, 128-30 
split (1983), 6, 19, 28-30, 65, 131 
Condom-vending machines. See Morals 
Consultancies, 203, 238 
Cooke Inquiry, 252 
Coombs Report, 196, 234 
Corbett Report, 234 
Corruption, 32, 55,57-60, 64, 69-80, 87-
88, 91, 93, 100, 107-08, 110-11, 
117, 122-23, 127, 135, 150-51, 153, 
167, 170, 208, 222, 248 
Council for a Free Australia, 150 
Criminal Justice Commission (CJC), 93, 
207-10, 214-18, 221-22 
Cronyism, See Corruption 
Daylight saving, 117, 119 
Democratic Labor party, 174-75 
Department of Education, 259-60, 262-
64, 266-67 
Department of Employment, Training and 
Industrial Relations, 250 
Department of Employment, Vocational 
Education, Training and Industrial 
Relations (DEVETIR), 227-28, 230, 
250 
Department of Industrial Affairs, 250 
Department of Justice, 195 
Department of Land Management, 198 
Departmental reviews, 232-34 
Dollar Sweets dispute, 246 
Drugs. See Morals 
Economic management, 56-57, 64-65, 
67-69, 71-72, 110, 119-20, 123 
Education, 55, 66-68, 70, 91, 107-08, 
110, 116, 171, 259-69 
Education Blueprint: Schools Policy. See 
Education 
Electoral and Administrative Review 
Commission (EARC), 93, 140, 142, 
204, 207-16, 218, 220-23 
Electoral reform, 66, 70, 74, 88-89, 147, 
210-12, 215, 220-21 
Electrical Authorities (Industrial Causes) 
Act, 246, 255 
Electricity (Continuation of Supply) Act, 
246, 255 
Electronic media, 91, 154, 157-58, 161 
Employment, 63, 66, 110. See also 
Unemployment 
Environment, 55-56, 108, 110, 116, 124-
25, 147-49, 151, 162, 171 
Equal opportunity, 203, 234-37, 266 
Essential Services Act, 246, 248, 255 
Family policy, 55, 65, 70, 108, 110 
Federal Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission, 226 
Federal elections 
1987, 85, 114, 185-86 
Federal experience (of transitions), 193, 
205 
Federal government, 12, 15-16, 60, 67, 
70, 193, 269 
Fitzgerald Implementation Unit, 210, 214 
Fitzgerald Inquiry/Report, 55, 57, 71, 75, 
80, 86-89, 91, 93-94, 96, 116-17, 
120, 122-23, 134, 139, 149, 156, 
195, 208-09, 213, 223, 225, 235, 
259-60, 264 
Foreign-owned land, 87 
Freedom of information, 147, 216, 238 
Gerrymander. See Zonal electoral system 
Gibbs Inquiry, 208 
Government, style of. See Accountability 
Government Research Unit (GRU), 
200-01 
Great Debate, 160-61 
Green Challenge, 144-49, 151 
Greypower party, 144-45 
Hanger Inquiry, 253-54 
Health, 66, 68-69, 110 
Homosexuality, See Morals 
Honesty in Government, See Corruption 
Hospitals. See Health 
Housing, 57, 66, See also Interest rates 
H,R. Nicholls Society, 246 
Industrial (Commercial Practices) Act, 
247, 252, 255 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Index 279 
Industtial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
Amendment Act, 246, 252 
Industtial relations, 204, 245-48, 252-56 
Industrial Relations Act, 254-56 
Inflation, 61 
Interest rates, 55-58, 171 
"Jobs for the Boys", See Corruption 
Joint Consultative Committees (JCC), 228, 
251 
Joint Structural Efficiency Committee, 251 
Kingston toxic waste, 148 
Labor Unity faction. See Australian 
Labor party 
Law enforcement. 5ee Police 
League of Rights, 150 
Liberal party 
changes of leaders, 130-33, 141 
electoral support, 7-10, 92, 131-32, 
137-38, 141-42, 179-80 
image, 11-21, 33 
Logos Foundation, 55, 124, 144, 146, 
149-51, 156-57 
Lucas Inquiry, 208 
Machinery of Government Committee 
(MOG), 196-203 
MACOS dispute, 260 
Maldng Government Work (MGW), See 
Public sector policy 
Media bias, 154-55, 158-60 
Ministerial expenses, 117, 124-25, 135, 
196, 198-99, 217-18 
Ministerial Staff Review Panel (MSRP), 
196, 202 
Ministers 
in coalition, 30 
knowledge of, 34-36 
opposing at election, 24-25 
Morals, 55, 59, 87, 108, 116-17, 123-24, 
136, 149-50, 156-57 
Mortgages, See Interest rates 
Mount Isa Trades and Labour Council, 
158 
Mudginberri dispute, 246 
National Party 
cabinet changes, 87, 115-16 
changes of leaders, 86-87, 89-90, 
111, 114-16, 119-21, 133, 212-13 
263 
electoral support, 9-10, 118, 179-80 
New managerialism (in education), 263-
64 
Non-government schools, 261 
Office of Higher Education, 266 
Old Guard faction. See Australian Labor 
party 
Parliamentary Committee for Electoral and 
Administrative Review (PCEAR), 219 
Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee 
(PCJC), 217 
Parliamentary term, 210-11 
Party images, 11-21, 33, 77-78 
Party leaders 
changes of, 49-53, 86-87, 89-91, 99, 
101, 111, 113-16, 119-22 
evaluation of, 38-53, 78-80, 121 
knowledge of, 33-37 
Party presidents, 34, 86 
Pensions, 63 
Performance indicators, 236 
Police, 68, 88, 91, 116, 129, 160, 208-10, 
214, 217 
Polls, 56-57, 135 
Premier's Independent Commission for 
Change and Reform (PICCAR), 214-
15 
Pre-selection, See Candidates. 
Print media, 154, 156, 161 
Professional Officers' Association, 250 
Program evaluation, 236 
Prostitution, See Morals 
Public Accounts Committee, 64, 93, 117 
Public Relations Media Office, 200 
Public Sector Management Commission 
(PSMC), 195, 203-04, 207, 221-23, 
225-26, 228-38, 250, 264, 266, 268 
Public sector policy, 194, 202-04, 225-
38, See also Machinery of 
Government Committee, Ministerial 
Staff Review Panel 
Public Service Board, 248-49 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
280 Index 
Public Service Management 
Employment Act, 249 
Public transport, 63, 68-69 
and 
Queensland Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission (QICAC), 
226-32, 250, 255 
Queensland Teachers' Union, 259, 265, 
268 
Queensland Trades and Labour Council, 
100, 227, 230, 251 
Rail freights, 119 
Rainforest Conservation Society, 148 
Redbank radioactive waste, 148 
Referendum, See Parliamentary term 
Regional development, 95, 110 
Reid Report, 234 
Restructuring process. See Structural 
efficiency principle 
Results, 137-38, 176-78, 187-88 
Return to Westminster. See Public sector 
policy 
Rural issues, 171 
Savage Report, 236 
Senior Executive Service, 195, 229, 234-
35, 237 
SEQEB dispute, 246, 255 
Sex education. See Morals 
Shop Distributive and Allied Employees 
Association, 100 
Skerman Report, 266, 268 
Small business, 66 
Social issues. See Family policy 
Socialist left faction. See Australian 
Labor party 
Special Branch, 218 
State elections 
1956, 187-88 
1957, 5, 175, 259 
1969, 174 
1972, 174-75 
1974, 174-75 
1977, 6, 60-61 
1980, 6, 64-65 
1983, 6, 65-67 
1986, 6, 70-72, 90, 100, 114, 133-34 
Status of Women Inquiry, 236 
Strikes, See Trade unions 
Structural efficiency principle, 226-32, 
236, 249-51 
Student Education Profile, 265 
Sturgess Inquiry, 208-09 
Survey data, 4-5, 6-11 
Target seats, 95, 97-98, 105 
Tasmanian experience (of transitions), 205 
Taxation, 61, 63-64, 124 
Tertiary Entrance scores, 262, 264-65 
Three-cornered contests, 21-25, 63, 92, 
129-30, 180-87 
Torres Strait Islanders, 262 
Tourism, 63 
Trade Practices Act, 247 
Trade unions, 15-17, 123-24, 228, 256 
Transition planning, 191-206 
Two-tier wages system, 249 
Unemployment, 60-67, 71 
United Peoples party, 144-45 
Uranium mining, 61 
Victorian experience (of administrative 
change), 234 
Viviani Report, 265 
Voluntary Employment Agreements 
(VEAs), 252-53 
Voters' Veto, 150 
Voting intention (of respondents), 6-11 
Whistleblowers' protection, 147 
Wilderness Society, 148 
Wildlife Preservation Society, 148 
Wilenski Reports, 196, 234 
Wolffdene Dam, 148 
Women's issues, 66 
Workplace Health and SafetyAct, 256 
Zonal electoral system, 94, 96, 174-75, 
187-88 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
POLITICAL CROSSROADS 
This book explores why thirty years of conservative rule in Queens-
land ended at the 2 December 1989 election. The new political cli-
mate which came with the Fitzgerald inquiry changed the dominant 
issues from strong leadership and economic development to reve-
lations of corruption and possibilities for reform. It was indeed a po-
litical crossroads for the people of Queensland. 
Eighteen experts from the fields of political science, media stud-
ies, public policy and sociology examine key etspects of this historic 
election — its leaders, parties, issues, campaigns and results. All 
are carefully analysed in the context of past elections. 
Significant issues include the importance of the media and the 
influence of the morals lobby and the green vote. A study of voting 
surveys from the 1970s to the present day Identifies just what made 
the Queensland electorate change, and the ALP campaign director 
reveals Labor's strategies for the election. Other commentators 
focus on Labor's transition to power; how Labor enacted 
Fitzgerald's recommendations; and the reform of the public service, 
industrial relations and education. 
D Q P PAPERBACKS 
Reference 
ISBN 0-7022-2362-X 
9 780702"223624 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
